WI: Afrikakorps reaches the Suez Canal

However, symbolically it would be a disaster, coming on the heels of so many other defeats. It would certainly send a panic through Allied capitals and maybe it means Patton's armored division gets sent to Egypt like they talked about.

Could this have an effect on Vichy politically enough that would stiffen French resistance in Northwest Africa? (plus combined with the political effect of the Germans holding in Egypt due to the extra supply getting across.)
 

hipper

Banned
By the end of 1942 the German Logistic supply was massively smaller than the supplies going to the allies in Egypt marginal increases in supplies crossing the med will not change much, however diversion of support from Rommel to an invasion of Malta could have reduced his effectiveness in the summer offensive. He might never have made it to el alemain after all.

Cheers Hipper
 
By the end of 1942 the German Logistic supply was massively smaller than the supplies going to the allies in Egypt marginal increases in supplies crossing the med will not change much, however diversion of support from Rommel to an invasion of Malta could have reduced his effectiveness in the summer offensive. He might never have made it to el alemain after all.

Cheers Hipper

Concur, taking Malta in 42 will be a slog and a lot stuff bound for Rommel will go to Student instead and get fed into the fire...
 
If the Germans make it to the Suez Canal, do they also make it across and take Palestine? Will the Germans attack the Jewish population there?
 
Could this have an effect on Vichy politically enough that would stiffen French resistance in Northwest Africa? (plus combined with the political effect of the Germans holding in Egypt due to the extra supply getting across.)

Highly unlikely, as soon as the Allies launch TORCH, Hitler will still reply with ANTON, effectively ending the Vichy regime...
 
Or in June 1941 the British War Cabinet decides to mount a holding campaign in Egypt and reinforce Malaya. That stops Operation Crusader, prevents the losses of Axis troops and equipment in that battle and moves the starting line for Rommel's 1942 offensive closer to the Suez Canal.
It also means abandoning Empire troops trapped in Tobruk, which the Australian government would likely get rather shirty about, so, no.

That increases their chances of reaching the Suez Canal in the first half of 1942.
Only if they put a ton of money and resources into infrastructure, otherwise they'd be only fractionally better off than in 1942 when they took Tobruk anyway.

Exactly, the heavy casualties the Fallschirmjäger took during Crete soured Hitler on future operations, essentially killing OPERATION HERKULES. So have an Axis focus on the Central Mediterranean and Libya in late 1940 and early 1941 that includes an attempted seizure of Malta with airborne troops and Italian naval support. Don't mess around in Greece and the Balkans.
The problem with that is that the Fallschirmjäger drop with only a pistol and knife, their heavier weapons (including rifles) are dropped separately. That worked well enough for Crete where the population density today is only 75/km^2, mostly clustered in a few cities, but in Malta the population density was ~857/km^2, so it will be much more likely that the weapons intended for the Fallschirmjäger will actually end up in the hands of the locals and the garrison to be used against their intended recipients.
 
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It also means abandoning Empire troops trapped in Tobruk, which the Australian government would likely get rather shirty about, so, no.
That makes the passage about the British deciding not to defend the Malay Peninsular in Paul Keating's cultural cringe speech rather ironic.

IIRC the Australians were evacuated by sea and replaced with a British division. So it might be British troops that were left in the lurch at Tobruk.
Only if they put a ton of money and resources into infrastructure, otherwise they'd be only fractionally better off than in 1942 when they took Tobruk anyway.
It's the resources required to defeat an enemy force of a given size. If the British 8th Army and Desert Air Force were weaker a smaller force would be required to defeat them and a smaller force requires less "stuff". But, I admit that the infrastructure might not be up to even that.

However, my suggestion about the British Government deciding to give priority to the Far East over the Middle East was not a serious one in the first place.
 
It also means abandoning Empire troops trapped in Tobruk, which the Australian government would likely get rather shirty about, so, no.

Only if they put a ton of money and resources into infrastructure, otherwise they'd be only fractionally better off than in 1942 when they took Tobruk anyway.

The problem with that is that the Fallschirmjäger drop with only a pistol and knife, their heavier weapons (including rifles) are dropped separately. That worked well enough for Crete where the population density today is only 75/km^2, mostly clustered in a few cities, but in Malta the population density was ~857/km^2, so it will be much more likely that the weapons intended for the Fallschirmjäger will actually end up in the hands of the locals and the garrison to be used against their intended recipients.

This is why I like sites like this one, and rue the fact that such get rarer daily. I had forgotten this tasty little morsel about German airborne doctrine/tactics. No smart ass 20YO today could even conceive such a thing, much less make use of that fact in an analytic fashion...is difficult to wrap your head around.
 
It also means abandoning Empire troops trapped in Tobruk, which the Australian government would likely get rather shirty about, so, no.

Only if they put a ton of money and resources into infrastructure, otherwise they'd be only fractionally better off than in 1942 when they took Tobruk anyway.

The problem with that is that the Fallschirmjäger drop with only a pistol and knife, their heavier weapons (including rifles) are dropped separately. That worked well enough for Crete where the population density today is only 75/km^2, mostly clustered in a few cities, but in Malta the population density was ~857/km^2, so it will be much more likely that the weapons intended for the Fallschirmjäger will actually end up in the hands of the locals and the garrison to be used against their intended recipients.

Like I said, it is by no means a guaranteed victory and even if they win, it will be an bloody awful mess and they may well conclude it wasn't worth the price, especially when they still get stopped cold at El Alamein...
 
Even if the Afrikakorps gets to the Suez, then what? You're talking about an opposed river crossing to get onto the Sinai Peninsula. Even if the German do that, then they have to cross about 100 miles (167 km) of desert to get into Israel (then Palestine). All the time, the British would be getting reinforced while the Germans would be pushing their logistics past the breaking point. The Germans reaching the Suez would be the very best they could do, and a most likely a Pyrrhic victory.
 
Like I said, it is by no means a guaranteed victory and even if they win, it will be an bloody awful mess and they may well conclude it wasn't worth the price, especially when they still get stopped cold at El Alamein...
I'm just pointing out one of the several major issues with such a landing. If Malta is taken, I wouldn't expect such light casualties as they got at Crete, more like 50% of the paratrooper force dead or wounded.
 
I'm just pointing out one of the several major issues with such a landing. If Malta is taken, I wouldn't expect such light casualties as they got at Crete, more like 50% of the paratrooper force dead or wounded.

I am thinking higher...
 
At the end of the day, what good does it do them?

Egypt was worthless from a material standpoint, Indian Ocean commerce had to be re-routed around Africa the moment Italy entered the war anyway, and the British could still easily supply forces in Upper Egypt (which, confusingly enough, is in the south) via Port Sudan or even Kenya and the railway that linked to it.

Taking Lower Egypt and the Suez Canal does not help Axis industry or the Axis war effort one bit.


However long you look at the map, the British will almost always be able to reinforce and supply any given theater in the area better than the Axis.

Even total and complete success is still a bad outcome (assuming some way is found to make the whole thing work), since it inevitably came at the expense of the crucial confrontation against the USSR.
 
(assuming some way is found to make the whole thing work),

As for how it could be done, maybe some sort of combination of this and this - Italian surprise naval/air attack on Alexandria, an adoption of a Mediterranean strategy after the Fall of France and lower Fallschirmjager losses allowing a surprise capture of Cyprus, and thus opening a last-minute route to supplying axis-friendly Syria & Iraq before the British take them out.
 
I compiled this from a website called British Army Medical Services and the Malta Garrison 1799-1979. If there are any errors it was because the website was difficult to follow.

The Built Up of the Royal Artillery and Royal Malta Artillery in Malta 1939-43
September 1939


At the outbreak of war the artillery defences of Malta consisted of:
  • one anti-tank regiment (26 RA), with 4 batteries
  • one heavy anti-aircraft regiment (7 RA), with 3 batteries (2 British and one Maltese)
  • 2 coast artillery regiments (4 RA and 1 RMA) with 6 batteries between them (3 British and 3 Maltese)
That is a total of 13 batteries (9 British and 4 Maltese) under 4 regimental headquarters.

According to the source I am using the roles of the Coast Artillery were: Counter Bombardment; Close Defence; and the Examination Anchorage Service. The counter bombardment role was performed by 4 Heavy Regiment, RA (later renamed 4 Coast Regiment) with seven 9.2-inch guns. The other roles were performed by 1 Heavy Regiment, RMA (later renamed 1 Coast Regiment) with ten 6-inch and nine twin 18-pdrs

26 Anti-Tank Regiment, RA had arrived in Malta in April 1939. It supported the Malta Infantry Brigade. According to the source I am using its batteries included: one manning 18-pdr Beach Guns; one battery of 12-pdr guns; one mobile battery of 6-inch howitzers and one battery of 3.7-inch howitzers.

A HAA battery had 8 guns either 3-inch or 3.7 inch so that presumably there were 24 anti-aircraft guns on Malta. Earlier in the year the anti-aircraft requirements of Malta had been set at 112 heavy and 60 light AA guns plus 24 searchlights.

June 1940

Between then and Italy's entry into the war it had grown to one anti-tank, 2 coast artillery and 3 HAA regiments with the formation of 2 RMA and 11 RMA. 8 new batteries had actually been formed, but one HAA Battery was sent to Egypt leaving 3 HAA, 3 LAA and one searchlight unit in Malta. This mean that there was now a grand total of 20 artillery batteries (9 British and 11 Maltese) on Malta consisting of 6 coast (3 British and 3 Maltese), 4 anti-tank (all British) and 10 air defence batteries. The air defence batteries consisted of:
  • 6 HAA batteries (2 British and 4 Maltese). At 8 guns per battery the total strength should have been 48 HAA guns, but the British official history says that there were only 34 HAA guns on Malta;
  • 3 LAA batteries (all Maltese). At 12 Bofors 40mm guns per battery there should have been 36 LAA guns, but the British official history says that there were only 12 LAA guns on Malta;
  • One searchlight battery (8 Battery, RMA). The establishment of a S/L battery was 24 "lights" and this unit was the only air defence unit that was up to full strength because the official history says that there were 24 searchlights on Malta.
End 1940

In September 1940 the 26th Anti-Tank Regiment, RA became the 13th Mobile Coast Defence Regiment. Its 4 anti-tank batteries (15, 40, 48 and 71) were reorganised into 2 defence batteries (15/40 and 48/71).

Although this reduced the number of RA batteries on Malta to 7 it was more than compensated for by the arrival of 8 batteries (4 HAA, one LAA, one searchlight and 2 field) in October and November, which produced a net increase to 15 batteries made up of 6 HAA, one LAA, one searchlight, 3 coast, 2 defence and 2 field units. The number of regimental headquarters increased to 6 (2 HAA, one searchlight, one coast, one mobile coast defence and one searchlight) in November 1940 when 4th Searchlight, 10th HAA and 12th Field Regiments arrived.

Meanwhile 4 new RMA batteries (2 HAA, one LAA and one coast) were formed in the fourth quarter of 1940, bringing the total to 15 (4 coast artillery, 7 HAA, 4 LAA and one searchlight) plus 5 HAA Battery in Egypt. There were still 3 regimental headquarters (1 Coast, 2 HAA and 11 HAA).

Thus the total strength of the artillery on Malta at the end of 1940 was 30 batteries (15 British and 15 Maltese) under 9 regimental headquarters (6 British and 3 Maltese) consisting of:
  • 12 heavy anti-aircraft batteries (6 British and 6 Maltese) under 4 HAA regimental headquarters (7 RA, 10 RA, 2 RMA and 11 RMA). If at full strength the 12 batteries would have had a combined strength of 96 guns;
  • 5 light anti-aircraft batteries (one British and 4 Maltese) either independent or under one of the HAA regiments. If at full strength the 5 batteries would have had a combined strength of 60 guns;
  • 2 searchlight batteries (one British and one Maltese) in one regiment (4 Searchlight, RA/RMA). If at full strength the 2 batteries would have had a combined strength of 48 searchlights;
  • 7 coast batteries (3 British and 4 Maltese) in 2 regiments (4 Coast, RA and 1 Coast, RMA);
  • 2 mobile coast defence batteries (all British) in one regiment (13th MCD, RA);
  • 2 field batteries (all British) in one regiment (12th Field, RA). After the reorganisation of 1938 field batteries would normally had twelve 25pdr gun-howitzers, so there could have been 24 field artillery pieces on the Island.
1941

The expansion of the artillery in Malta led to the formation of HQ 7 AA Brigade in January 1941 and 10 AA Brigade in May 1941. These formations were not disbanded until the second quarter of 1944.

According to the source I am using there seems to have been a HQ Royal Artillery in 1941, with a HQ Fixed Defences under it to control the non-anti-aircraft units and the 2 AA brigades controlling the AA units.
  • 12th Field Regiment, RA was reorganised in November 1941, when it was brought up from 2 to 3 batteries.
  • 13th MCD Regiment, RA was renamed 26th Defence Regiment on 29th June 1941. The regiment was increased from 2 to 3 batteries when 13th Defence Battery, RMA was formed in August 1941.
  • 74th LAA Regiment, RA was formed on Malta in February 1941. Under it was the existing British LAA battery. It was gradually brought up to a strength of 4 batteries during the course of 1941 with batteries that arrived in March, July and August;
  • 3rd LAA Regiment, RMA was formed in March 1941 to control the 4 existing Maltese LAA batteries, which had previously been independent or under the HAA regiments;
  • 4th HAA Regiment, RA and 32nd LAA Regiment, RA arrived in Malta on 24th July 1941. Each regiment had 3 batteries;
At the end of the year there were 40 batteries on Malta (24 British and 16 Maltese) under 13 regimental headquarters (9 British and 4 Maltese). There were now 14 HAA batteries (8 British and 6 Maltese) with an establishment of 112 guns; and 11 LAA batteries (7 British and 4 Maltese) with an establishment of 132 guns. The searchlight establishment was still 48 "lights".

1942

The Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) controlled all the artillery units in Malta. At the beginning of the year he had 40 batteries under 13 regimental headquarters, which would increase to 46 under 15 regimental headquarters by the middle of the year. This strength would be maintained until the spring of 1943.

The fixed defences were increased from 4 to 5 regiments in June 1942 when 5 Coast Regiment, RMA was formed. There were now 3 coast regiments (4 RA, 1 RMA and 5 RMA), one defence regiment (13 RA) and one field regiment (12 RA). However, the number of batteries was only increased from 13 to 15 consisting of 10 coast (an increase of 3), 2 defence (a decrease of one) and 3 field batteries.

By 1942 there were 5 HAA regiments (4 RA, 7 RA, 10 RA, 2 RMA and 11 RMA) under 10th HAA Brigade. No new regiments were formed, but the number of HAA batteries was increased from 14 to 15 (8 British and 7 Maltese) by the formation of 14 Battery, RMA in January. This was assigned to 4 HAA Regt, RA so that it now had the normal 3 batteries instead of 2. At an establishment of 8 guns per HAA battery there should now have been 120 heavy AA guns on Malta.

By 1942 there were 3 LAA regiments (32 RA, 74th RA and 3 RMA) under 7th LAA Brigade. They were reinforced 3 batteries in January 1941 with the arrival of 32 LAA Regt RA with 2 batteries in January and the formation of 15 Battery, RMA. There were now 14 LAA batteries (9 British and 5 Maltese) on the Island with a total establishment of 168 Bofors 40mm guns.

Finally there was 4th Searchlight Regiment, RA/RMA with 2 batteries (484 Battery, RA and 8 Battery, RMA). There was no change to the searchlight organisation in 1942.
 
If the Germans make it to the Suez Canal, do they also make it across and take Palestine? Will the Germans attack the Jewish population there?

If they conquer the Middle East somehow... well the world is in for a lot of hurt as the DAK just lept over logistics and a whole host of other practical and physical constraints.

The DAK planned on bypassing the bulk of Palestine and going straight for to the port of Basra if they got out of Egypt on their maps. If Germany holds the Middle East the Grand Mufi will likely return in time with trained Bosnian Waffen SS and there will be violent conflict in Palestine.

Then again to make that happen requires some huge changes like Italy asking for help early, the USSR joining the war on the side of the Axis, no Pearl Harbor, etc. which means the British position in the Middle East is already under major assault.
 
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hipper

Banned
I compiled this from a website called British Army Medical Services and the Malta Garrison 1799-1979. If there are any errors it was because the website was difficult to follow.

The Built Up of the Royal Artillery and Royal Malta Artillery in Malta 1939-43
September 1939


At the outbreak of war the artillery defences of Malta consisted of:
  • one anti-tank regiment (26 RA), with 4 batteries
  • one heavy anti-aircraft regiment (7 RA), with 3 batteries (2 British and one Maltese)
  • 2 coast artillery regiments (4 RA and 1 RMA) with 6 batteries between them (3 British and 3 Maltese)
That is a total of 13 batteries (9 British and 4 Maltese) under 4 regimental headquarters.

According to the source I am using the roles of the Coast Artillery were: Counter Bombardment; Close Defence; and the Examination Anchorage Service. The counter bombardment role was performed by 4 Heavy Regiment, RA (later renamed 4 Coast Regiment) with seven 9.2-inch guns. The other roles were performed by 1 Heavy Regiment, RMA (later renamed 1 Coast Regiment) with ten 6-inch and nine twin 18-pdrs

26 Anti-Tank Regiment, RA had arrived in Malta in April 1939. It supported the Malta Infantry Brigade. According to the source I am using its batteries included: one manning 18-pdr Beach Guns; one battery of 12-pdr guns; one mobile battery of 6-inch howitzers and one battery of 3.7-inch howitzers.

A HAA battery had 8 guns either 3-inch or 3.7 inch so that presumably there were 24 anti-aircraft guns on Malta. Earlier in the year the anti-aircraft requirements of Malta had been set at 112 heavy and 60 light AA guns plus 24 searchlights.

June 1940

Between then and Italy's entry into the war it had grown to one anti-tank, 2 coast artillery and 3 HAA regiments with the formation of 2 RMA and 11 RMA. 8 new batteries had actually been formed, but one HAA Battery was sent to Egypt leaving 3 HAA, 3 LAA and one searchlight unit in Malta. This mean that there was now a grand total of 20 artillery batteries (9 British and 11 Maltese) on Malta consisting of 6 coast (3 British and 3 Maltese), 4 anti-tank (all British) and 10 air defence batteries. The air defence batteries consisted of:
  • 6 HAA batteries (2 British and 4 Maltese). At 8 guns per battery the total strength should have been 48 HAA guns, but the British official history says that there were only 34 HAA guns on Malta;
  • 3 LAA batteries (all Maltese). At 12 Bofors 40mm guns per battery there should have been 36 LAA guns, but the British official history says that there were only 12 LAA guns on Malta;
  • One searchlight battery (8 Battery, RMA). The establishment of a S/L battery was 24 "lights" and this unit was the only air defence unit that was up to full strength because the official history says that there were 24 searchlights on Malta.
End 1940

In September 1940 the 26th Anti-Tank Regiment, RA became the 13th Mobile Coast Defence Regiment. Its 4 anti-tank batteries (15, 40, 48 and 71) were reorganised into 2 defence batteries (15/40 and 48/71).

Although this reduced the number of RA batteries on Malta to 7 it was more than compensated for by the arrival of 8 batteries (4 HAA, one LAA, one searchlight and 2 field) in October and November, which produced a net increase to 15 batteries made up of 6 HAA, one LAA, one searchlight, 3 coast, 2 defence and 2 field units. The number of regimental headquarters increased to 6 (2 HAA, one searchlight, one coast, one mobile coast defence and one searchlight) in November 1940 when 4th Searchlight, 10th HAA and 12th Field Regiments arrived.

Meanwhile 4 new RMA batteries (2 HAA, one LAA and one coast) were formed in the fourth quarter of 1940, bringing the total to 15 (4 coast artillery, 7 HAA, 4 LAA and one searchlight) plus 5 HAA Battery in Egypt. There were still 3 regimental headquarters (1 Coast, 2 HAA and 11 HAA).

Thus the total strength of the artillery on Malta at the end of 1940 was 30 batteries (15 British and 15 Maltese) under 9 regimental headquarters (6 British and 3 Maltese) consisting of:
  • 12 heavy anti-aircraft batteries (6 British and 6 Maltese) under 4 HAA regimental headquarters (7 RA, 10 RA, 2 RMA and 11 RMA). If at full strength the 12 batteries would have had a combined strength of 96 guns;
  • 5 light anti-aircraft batteries (one British and 4 Maltese) either independent or under one of the HAA regiments. If at full strength the 5 batteries would have had a combined strength of 60 guns;
  • 2 searchlight batteries (one British and one Maltese) in one regiment (4 Searchlight, RA/RMA). If at full strength the 2 batteries would have had a combined strength of 48 searchlights;
  • 7 coast batteries (3 British and 4 Maltese) in 2 regiments (4 Coast, RA and 1 Coast, RMA);
  • 2 mobile coast defence batteries (all British) in one regiment (13th MCD, RA);
  • 2 field batteries (all British) in one regiment (12th Field, RA). After the reorganisation of 1938 field batteries would normally had twelve 25pdr gun-howitzers, so there could have been 24 field artillery pieces on the Island.
1941

The expansion of the artillery in Malta led to the formation of HQ 7 AA Brigade in January 1941 and 10 AA Brigade in May 1941. These formations were not disbanded until the second quarter of 1944.

According to the source I am using there seems to have been a HQ Royal Artillery in 1941, with a HQ Fixed Defences under it to control the non-anti-aircraft units and the 2 AA brigades controlling the AA units.
  • 12th Field Regiment, RA was reorganised in November 1941, when it was brought up from 2 to 3 batteries.
  • 13th MCD Regiment, RA was renamed 26th Defence Regiment on 29th June 1941. The regiment was increased from 2 to 3 batteries when 13th Defence Battery, RMA was formed in August 1941.
  • 74th LAA Regiment, RA was formed on Malta in February 1941. Under it was the existing British LAA battery. It was gradually brought up to a strength of 4 batteries during the course of 1941 with batteries that arrived in March, July and August;
  • 3rd LAA Regiment, RMA was formed in March 1941 to control the 4 existing Maltese LAA batteries, which had previously been independent or under the HAA regiments;
  • 4th HAA Regiment, RA and 32nd LAA Regiment, RA arrived in Malta on 24th July 1941. Each regiment had 3 batteries;
At the end of the year there were 40 batteries on Malta (24 British and 16 Maltese) under 13 regimental headquarters (9 British and 4 Maltese). There were now 14 HAA batteries (8 British and 6 Maltese) with an establishment of 112 guns; and 11 LAA batteries (7 British and 4 Maltese) with an establishment of 132 guns. The searchlight establishment was still 48 "lights".

1942

The Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) controlled all the artillery units in Malta. At the beginning of the year he had 40 batteries under 13 regimental headquarters, which would increase to 46 under 15 regimental headquarters by the middle of the year. This strength would be maintained until the spring of 1943.

The fixed defences were increased from 4 to 5 regiments in June 1942 when 5 Coast Regiment, RMA was formed. There were now 3 coast regiments (4 RA, 1 RMA and 5 RMA), one defence regiment (13 RA) and one field regiment (12 RA). However, the number of batteries was only increased from 13 to 15 consisting of 10 coast (an increase of 3), 2 defence (a decrease of one) and 3 field batteries.

By 1942 there were 5 HAA regiments (4 RA, 7 RA, 10 RA, 2 RMA and 11 RMA) under 10th HAA Brigade. No new regiments were formed, but the number of HAA batteries was increased from 14 to 15 (8 British and 7 Maltese) by the formation of 14 Battery, RMA in January. This was assigned to 4 HAA Regt, RA so that it now had the normal 3 batteries instead of 2. At an establishment of 8 guns per HAA battery there should now have been 120 heavy AA guns on Malta.

By 1942 there were 3 LAA regiments (32 RA, 74th RA and 3 RMA) under 7th LAA Brigade. They were reinforced 3 batteries in January 1941 with the arrival of 32 LAA Regt RA with 2 batteries in January and the formation of 15 Battery, RMA. There were now 14 LAA batteries (9 British and 5 Maltese) on the Island with a total establishment of 168 Bofors 40mm guns.

Finally there was 4th Searchlight Regiment, RA/RMA with 2 batteries (484 Battery, RA and 8 Battery, RMA). There was no change to the searchlight organisation in 1942.


remember at the start on the war HMS Terror was in Malta harbour and according to Cunningham integrated into the Defenses
 
remember at the start on the war HMS Terror was in Malta harbour and according to Cunningham integrated into the Defenses
Thanks. Unfortunately, I couldn't remember, because I didn't know in the first place.

However, I don't know if you are agreeing or disagreeing with me. What I was trying to show was that Malta's ground defences were relatively strong against an amphibious or airborne invasion in June 1940, but that it was below its prescribed strength in AA guns.
 

hipper

Banned
Thanks. Unfortunately, I couldn't remember, because I didn't know in the first place.

However, I don't know if you are agreeing or disagreeing with me. What I was trying to show was that Malta's ground defences were relatively strong against an amphibious or airborne invasion in June 1940, but that it was below its prescribed strength in AA guns.

You are in fact correct that Aa defenses were the weakest part of maltas defenses in comparison with the Costal artillery. HMS Terror was a monitor with two 15inch guns
 
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