WI: Afrikakorps reaches the Suez Canal

hipper

Banned
Taking Crete doesn't need actual invasion, starvation works too; the Luftwaffe pulled it's attention away in 1941 and in 1942, but in 1942 it just missed starving out Malta:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pedestal#Aftermath

The trouble with Malta surrendering in July 1942 after a failed pedistal is that it's too late whatever happens Torch will happen in November 1942 presenting the axis with a different set of problems which holding Malta won't solve.

In 1940 Malta had been stuffed full of supplies so it could not be starved in 1941.

To take Malta and have it help the Axis they have to choose Malta instead of Crete for invasion.

Crete is too close to Egypt to be cut off or starved out fighters can be flown directly to the island.

Cheers Hipper
 

Deleted member 1487

The trouble with Malta surrendering in July 1942 after a failed pedistal is that it's too late whatever happens Torch will happen in November 1942 presenting the axis with a different set of problems which holding Malta won't solve.

In 1940 Malta had been stuffed full of supplies so it could not be starved in 1941.

To take Malta and have it help the Axis they have to choose Malta instead of Crete for invasion.

Crete is too close to Egypt to be cut off or starved out fighters can be flown directly to the island.

Cheers Hipper
Sure, though it would certainly help in 1943 to maintain Tunisia shipping lanes. I was just using that as an example that it was possible to starve them out with sufficient application of air and naval power...which was not used IOTL and with Fliegerkorps X committed in January 1941, then split up in March to support Rommel and cover shipping lanes, then transferred to Greece in May-June, in 1941 no sustained effort was really made to starve it out. Invasion isn't necessary, sustained air-naval interdiction is though.
 
The trouble with Malta surrendering in July 1942 after a failed pedistal is that it's too late whatever happens Torch will happen in November 1942 presenting the axis with a different set of problems which holding Malta won't solve.

In 1940 Malta had been stuffed full of supplies so it could not be starved in 1941.

To take Malta and have it help the Axis they have to choose Malta instead of Crete for invasion.

Crete is too close to Egypt to be cut off or starved out fighters can be flown directly to the island.

Cheers Hipper

PEDESTAL was not until August. Frankly, I think you can make a case that Malta getting taken in June or July of 42 helps the Allies for two reasons. First the Axis will pay a huge price for taking the island. Second, PEDESTAL while successful was damned expensive. If Malta gets taken in June or July, no PEDESTAL and that means a lot of assets doing other things.
 
The trouble with Malta surrendering in July 1942 after a failed pedistal is that it's too late whatever happens Torch will happen in November 1942 presenting the axis with a different set of problems which holding Malta won't solve.

In 1940 Malta had been stuffed full of supplies so it could not be starved in 1941.

To take Malta and have it help the Axis they have to choose Malta instead of Crete for invasion.

Crete is too close to Egypt to be cut off or starved out fighters can be flown directly to the island.

Cheers Hipper

So what if, the Italians put priority to North Africa and Malta in 1940 and 1941 with help from the Germans? No messing around in Greece or anywhere else in the Balkans. What then?
 

hipper

Banned
Sure, though it would certainly help in 1943 to maintain Tunisia shipping lanes. I was just using that as an example that it was possible to starve them out with sufficient application of air and naval power...which was not used IOTL and with Fliegerkorps X committed in January 1941, then split up in March to support Rommel and cover shipping lanes, then transferred to Greece in May-June, in 1941 no sustained effort was really made to starve it out. Invasion isn't necessary, sustained air-naval interdiction is though.

In December 1941 malta's food supplies would last 8 months in July 1942 there was two months. To change this you'd need to stop the convoys in the latter half of 1941 which means increasing LW strength in Sicily at the expense of Barbarossa. But The RN proved able to push convoys through to Malta in the face of the heaviest air attack in 1942.
The easiest POD would be an Italian navy that pre war trained in night fighting.
 

hipper

Banned
So what if, the Italians put priority to North Africa and Malta in 1940 and 1941 with help from the Germans? No messing around in Greece or anywhere else in the Balkans. What then?

The trouble is Malta is a naval air campaign which masses of infantry divisions can't help, the real chance was for The German paratroopers to be directed at Malta rather than Crete, Maltas a tougher target though and the Paratroops will be dependent on Italian naval Reinforcement. But with some pre planning a combination of paratroops Siebel ferries and air landing troops could have captured Malta in 1941.
 

Deleted member 1487

In December 1941 malta's food supplies would last 8 months in July 1942 there was two months. To change this you'd need to stop the convoys in the latter half of 1941 which means increasing LW strength in Sicily at the expense of Barbarossa. But The RN proved able to push convoys through to Malta in the face of the heaviest air attack in 1942.
The easiest POD would be an Italian navy that pre war trained in night fighting.
I'm talking about January 1941 as the start of the aerial/naval blockade of the island, not December 1941. The POD is to keep X Fliegerkorps focused on blockading Malta and not moving it to Greece in June.
 

hipper

Banned
I'm talking about January 1941 as the start of the aerial/naval blockade of the island, not December 1941. The POD is to keep X Fliegerkorps focused on blockading Malta and not moving it to Greece in June.

In January 1941 Malta had about a years stocks, you'd need to keep X Fliegercorps there for that time and even then there is no guarantee that they will be able to maintain a complete blockade.
 
In January 1941 Malta had about a years stocks, you'd need to keep X. Fliegerkorps there for that time and even then there is no guarantee that they will be able to maintain a complete blockade.
What were the stocks of? And. Was all of that delivered in the second half of 1940?

AFAIK before the war the British thought Malta could easily be supplied from French North Africa so there was no need to maintain a large stockpile of supplies. However, when France surrendered the opinion changed and the new assessment was that Malta had become untenable. IIRC the first Malta wasn't a supply convoy or a reinforcement convoy, it was an evacuation convoy. In addition to taking out civilians to reduce the number of mouths to feed, it also took out supplies from the naval base, which IIRC included ammunition and all Malta's stock of submarine torpedoes.

Again IIRC it wasn't until about September 1940 with the Battle of Britain over and the lack of action by the Italians that the high command change its mind and began sending supplies and reinforcement to Malta.
 
This is from another thread, but I think it is relevant to this one...
Which would be nice if it was true, but it isn't. We have repeated instances throughout military history of armies crossing regions in the face of horrible weather, terrain, logistics, or all three. The common link between all of them is the absence of serious opposition. Weather doesn't stop armies. Terrain does not stop armies. Logistics doesn't stop armies. Resistance stops armies. Had the Soviets not mounted serious opposition in October, the Germans would have already been in Moscow by the time the mud set in. The idea that weather prevented the Germans from taking Moscow is merely a post-war misconception eagerly advanced by German generals in order to cover for their own failings in the planning and conduct of the war.
It's relevance here is that the Axis lost the El Alamein battles, not so much because they were weak due to lack of supplies, but because the enemy had become very strong. It's possible for the Axis to put a force just as strong as the force they had between June and October 1942 into Cyrenaica between June 1940 and December 1941, when the British Empire and Commonwealth forces in the region were weaker.
 

hipper

Banned
What were the stocks of? And. Was all of that delivered in the second half of 1940?

AFAIK before the war the British thought Malta could easily be supplied from French North Africa so there was no need to maintain a large stockpile of supplies. However, when France surrendered the opinion changed and the new assessment was that Malta had become untenable. IIRC the first Malta wasn't a supply convoy or a reinforcement convoy, it was an evacuation convoy. In addition to taking out civilians to reduce the number of mouths to feed, it also took out supplies from the naval base, which IIRC included ammunition and all Malta's stock of submarine torpedoes.

Again IIRC it wasn't until about September 1940 with the Battle of Britain over and the lack of action by the Italians that the high command change its mind and began sending supplies and reinforcement to Malta.


There is a very handy web site here about the siege of Malta,

It looks like they seet up an 8 month supply reserve in the second half of 1940 with significant reinforcement of men and equipment also.
By January 1941 they had about 16000 tonnes of flour stored and were issuing 2000-2500 tonnes a month.

https://maltagc70.wordpress.com/2015/09/16/16-september-1940-malta-facing-fuel-shortages/
 

Deleted member 1487

In January 1941 Malta had about a years stocks, you'd need to keep X Fliegercorps there for that time and even then there is no guarantee that they will be able to maintain a complete blockade.
Got a source on that? They went to some pretty hard rationing in April-May 1941 IOTL and needed several convoys reaching them once per month to keep going until then.
 
The trouble is Malta is a naval air campaign which masses of infantry divisions can't help, the real chance was for The German paratroopers to be directed at Malta rather than Crete, Maltas a tougher target though and the Paratroops will be dependent on Italian naval Reinforcement. But with some pre planning a combination of paratroops Siebel ferries and air landing troops could have captured Malta in 1941.

Exactly, the heavy casualties the Fallschirmjäger took during Crete soured Hitler on future operations, essentially killing OPERATION HERKULES. So have an Axis focus on the Central Mediterranean and Libya in late 1940 and early 1941 that includes an attempted seizure of Malta with airborne troops and Italian naval support. Don't mess around in Greece and the Balkans.
 
Exactly, the heavy casualties the Fallschirmjäger took during Crete soured Hitler on future operations, essentially killing OPERATION HERKULES. So have an Axis focus on the Central Mediterranean and Libya in late 1940 and early 1941 that includes an attempted seizure of Malta with airborne troops and Italian naval support. Don't mess around in Greece and the Balkans.
I read in Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War that Hitler was keeping the paratroops for an operation in the Caucasus offensive. IIRC to take the road that ran along the Black Sea coast. That might be another reason why the Operation Herkules didn't happen.
 

hipper

Banned
Got a source on that? They went to some pretty hard rationing in April-May 1941 IOTL and needed several convoys reaching them once per month to keep going until then.

Not quite, they started Rationing in March 1941 and in May they figured out they had enough supplies to last till January from the official history Petrol was the shortage.


Soon after the entry of Italy into the war it had been decided to build up an eight months' stock of essential commodities in Malta by April 1941. Seven months' stock had been provided before the arrival of the Luftwaffe prevented the programme being completed. In March rationing was introduced. This had not been done sooner because the Government of Malta had thought it best to let the people see for themselves how dependent they were upon the rare convoys for much of their necessities. The quantity of goods issued wholesale by the Government had however been controlled since the beginning of the war, and consequently less had been available in the shops. In this way there had already been cuts in the issues of sugar, fats, tinned meat, milk, coffee, and matches. So the added effect of rationing was small, except to ensure an equal distribution. At the end of May it was calculated that by rigid control the stocks in Malta could be made to

last until January 1942, with the exception of aviation spirit which at the present rate would last only until September. The ration of kerosene had also to be cut, and as kerosene supplied heat as well as light a reduction meant fewer hot meals for the population.
 

hipper

Banned
Exactly, the heavy casualties the Fallschirmjäger took during Crete soured Hitler on future operations, essentially killing OPERATION HERKULES. So have an Axis focus on the Central Mediterranean and Libya in late 1940 and early 1941 that includes an attempted seizure of Malta with airborne troops and Italian naval support. Don't mess around in Greece and the Balkans.

So the most realistic choice for an attack on Malta is instead of Crete.
 
I half remember people writing on other threads that the terrain on Malta meant that there were only a few suitable places for the paratroops to land. IIRC it was also said that there were plenty of stone walls fro gliders to crash into when attempting to land and that there weren't many places suitable for amphibious landings.

And by 1942 there were 11 British and 4 Maltese infantry battalions on the island supported by tanks, field artillery, coast artillery and AA artillery. Although that's a smaller force than the one that defended Crete, the forces on Malta had less ground to cover.

So had Operation Herkules been launched in 1942 there is no guarantee that it would have been a walkover.
 
I half remember people writing on other threads that the terrain on Malta meant that there were only a few suitable places for the paratroops to land. IIRC it was also said that there were plenty of stone walls fro gliders to crash into when attempting to land and that there weren't many places suitable for amphibious landings.

And by 1942 there were 11 British and 4 Maltese infantry battalions on the island supported by tanks, field artillery, coast artillery and AA artillery. Although that's a smaller force than the one that defended Crete, the forces on Malta had less ground to cover.

So had Operation Herkules been launched in 1942 there is no guarantee that it would have been a walkover.

Definitely not a walkover. But it does sound like that General Student, the man developing the plan, had more time to work on it as opposed to the hasty preparations made for the attack on Crete. It also sounds like the Axis had much better intelligence on the scope of the defenses on Malta. Student later claimed: "We even knew the caliber of the coastal guns, and how many degrees they could be turned inland." Probably a bit of an exaggeration, but maybe not too far off. If this is properly planned, resourced, and executed then it may not be the bloodbath that Crete was.
 
Definitely not a walkover. But it does sound like that General Student, the man developing the plan, had more time to work on it as opposed to the hasty preparations made for the attack on Crete. It also sounds like the Axis had much better intelligence on the scope of the defenses on Malta. Student later claimed: "We even knew the caliber of the coastal guns, and how many degrees they could be turned inland." Probably a bit of an exaggeration, but maybe not too far off. If this is properly planned, resourced, and executed then it may not be the bloodbath that Crete was.

Yes, not a walkover at all, it would be a filthy mess. Not at all a guaranteed win and if they do win it very well may meet the standard definition of a Pyrrhic Victory, Kurt Student's planning and preparations aside. That gets to my earlier point, I'm not sure losing Malta in the late spring or early summer of 1942 really hurts the Allies all that much. It won't enable Rommel's drive into Egypt, the 8th Army and the Western Desert Air Force were becoming too large and too well equipped and the Royal Navy would be relieved of a huge short term burden. Yes this may generate a requirement for greater carrier support for TORCH but then again HMS Eagle hasn't been sunk and HMS Indomitable isn't enjoying a six month stay in Uncle Sam's Carrier Repair Depot so they will have more carriers.

However, symbolically it would be a disaster, coming on the heels of so many other defeats. It would certainly send a panic through Allied capitals and maybe it means Patton's armored division gets sent to Egypt like they talked about.
 
Top