WI: Afrikakorps reaches the Suez Canal

And signaled their intent to go to war.
The British and French could only reinforce the Middle East and Mediterranean by weakening their forces fighting Germany. There is a crucial difference between knowing what the enemy is doing and being able to do something about it.
 
But the timing for that would be horrible. If the plan is incrase resources in Africa in September 1939 then that would mean they have to had placed divisions capable of a military campaign in Libya and East Africa, alerting the British and French of their intent. The Allies are no fools. A problem with that though, a project like that is going to take a long time and cost a lot of resources to perform, resources Italy was scarce of because the trains didn't run on time as truth had it. Only way, to take it from other positions like the French and Yugoslavian borders. bad idea. The French are going to build up at the Italian borders and secure Tunisia. The Italian need more and more resources every day.
But it is as I wrote to Wiking. It is one thing to know what the enemy is planning and quite another to be able to do something about it.

The British and French military resources between September 1939 and June 1940 weren't exactly plentiful either. Reinforcing the Middle East and Mediterranean at this time reduces the forces available to fight the Germans.

E.g. IOTL the British were lucky in a way because the losses the Kriegsmarine suffered in the invasion of Norway allowed them to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet and create Force H in the weeks before Italy declared war because of the losses the Kriegsmarine suffered in the Invasion of Norway.

Also the British were in the process of creating a base for 15 divisions supported by a large air force in the Middle East anyway. I admit that the knowledge that the Italians are strengthening their force in Libya would make them want to accelerate that programme, but the available resources won't make that possible.
 
He couldn't afford expecting a real war, I think that's the point we all need to focus on. Its not that he was too arrogant to think that there won't be any need of it, it was just that his country simply wasn't capable of fighting the British on equal terms. It was either a surprise attack and quick peace, or spaghetti bombs.
I think you meant he couldn't afford to fight a real war, which if you do I accept.
It's not that he was too arrogant to think that there won't be any need of it, it was just that his country simply wasn't capable of fighting the British on equal terms. It was either a surprise attack and quick peace, or spaghetti bombs.
I half agree with that. Only half because I think the surprise attack could have been better executed.
 
or spaghetti bombs.
They sounds like something from Michael Bentine's Potty Time.

According to that TV show the RAF used The Blotting Paper Bomb to immobilise U-boats, by dropping it into German docks to dry up all the water and prevent them from putting to sea.
 
The British and French could only reinforce the Middle East and Mediterranean by weakening their forces fighting Germany. There is a crucial difference between knowing what the enemy is doing and being able to do something about it.
I wonder if Italy had of hung out the war flags if Britain would have considered a Pearl Harbour style preemptive strike on the Italian Navy.

One big win and Italy will struggle to support their troops in North Africa.

The Italian merchant ships outside the med seized by the Allies had similar tonnage to all the merchant tonnage sank in ww2 to date as of when Italy entered the war.
 
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I wonder if Italy had of hung out the war flags if Britain would have considered a Pearl Harbour style preemptive strike on the Italian Navy.

One big win and Italy will struggle to support their troops in North Africa.
IIRC the British Mediterranean Fleet had been planning the Taranto raid since the Abyssinian Crisis. But where are they going to find the aircraft carriers to do it before June 1940? Furthermore the OTL Taranto raid knocked out half the Italian battleships, but it didn't stop them sending the Afrika Korps and additional Italian divisions to Libya.
 
These are some things that I think the Italians could have done with a POD of September 1939:
  1. In September 1939 form a torpedo bomber force of 150 S.M.79s in 5 wings of 30 aircraft. 3 of which would be based in Southern Italy, one in the Dodecanese and one in Italian East Africa. These would not be additional aircraft to the 600-odd S.M.79s Italy had in June 1940. They would be some of the existing S.M.79 units equipped and trained for torpedo bombing;
  2. Recall the Italian merchant ships outside the Mediterranean before the declaration of war;
  3. Don't make the arms deal with Sweden. IIRC they were also trying to sell aircraft to the Belgians in the Spring of 1940 and had sold several hundred Caprioni aircraft to the RAF, which weren't delivered due to the declaration of war, but it had got as far as the Air Ministry serial allocating their serial numbers;
  4. After war is declared with Great Britain, don't invade Greece. Send the Regia Aeronautica units to Libya. If that isn't possible for logistical reasons send the aircraft to Sicily to bomb Malta;
  5. Green and Fricker in The Air Forces of the World say that the force assigned to the Invasion of Greece included a group of 20 Junkers 87B dive-bombers. The Italians should have trained it for anti-shipping operations and sent it to Sicily;
  6. Don't send the Copo Aereo Italiano to attack England in October 1940. Instead send it to Sicily to bomb Malta by night.
Note that I haven't suggested sending the Italian ground troops used to attack Greece to Libya.

I think all the above are reasonable and might do another post listing the more controversial ideas.
 
These are some things that I think the Italians could have done with a POD of September 1939:
  1. In September 1939 form a torpedo bomber force of 150 S.M.79s in 5 wings of 30 aircraft. 3 of which would be based in Southern Italy, one in the Dodecanese and one in Italian East Africa. These would not be additional aircraft to the 600-odd S.M.79s Italy had in June 1940. They would be some of the existing S.M.79 units equipped and trained for torpedo bombing;
  2. Recall the Italian merchant ships outside the Mediterranean before the declaration of war;
  3. Don't make the arms deal with Sweden. IIRC they were also trying to sell aircraft to the Belgians in the Spring of 1940 and had sold several hundred Caprioni aircraft to the RAF, which weren't delivered due to the declaration of war, but it had got as far as the Air Ministry serial allocating their serial numbers;
  4. After war is declared with Great Britain, don't invade Greece. Send the Regia Aeronautica units to Libya. If that isn't possible for logistical reasons send the aircraft to Sicily to bomb Malta;
  5. Green and Fricker in The Air Forces of the World say that the force assigned to the Invasion of Greece included a group of 20 Junkers 87B dive-bombers. The Italians should have trained it for anti-shipping operations and sent it to Sicily;
  6. Don't send the Copo Aereo Italiano to attack England in October 1940. Instead send it to Sicily to bomb Malta by night.
Note that I haven't suggested sending the Italian ground troops used to attack Greece to Libya.

I think all the above are reasonable and might do another post listing the more controversial ideas.

Seems reasonable.
a) I think May 20th Italy could declare a state of emergency and recall merchant ships to the med. That is three weeks to get them back. I really don't see the British/French doing anything proactive at that point.
b) Without the invasion of Greece, extra shipping, and with some the extra air power flying escort for traffic to Libya, could the Italians be in a position to launch some sort of attack on Matruh before the British do Compass. This will go badly, but maybe not as badly as OTL operation Compass (British are happy to chop op offensive, pull 4th Indian to east Africa, Italians pull back to Libyan frontier).
c) The above means Italy is able to hold at least Tripoli before Germans show up (offsetting the extra British freed up)
 

CalBear

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God will have clearly pointed his finger at the Reich and the world is doomed.

It would have required divine intervention for Rommel to get to Suez.
 
Only way the Germans get to the Suez canal is the same way they got there in World War I, via Turkey.
good luck with that, whilst turkey had little offensive power of projection invading it would be another kettle of fish. And there is no way Turkey would have done anything voluntarily unless Britain had already lost.
 
If you're talking about the British, there's no such thing as "the Royal Army". There are a variety of Royal regiments and Corps, but the army as a whole answers to Parliament, not the Crown.
I think that's the Egyptian army
 
I think the plan should have been to defend the border with France while invading Tunisia and Egypt from Libya and invading The Sudan, British Somaliland and possibly Aden from Italian East Africa.
Tunisia is defended by the Mareth Line (tough to crack), and the logistics to dent the British in Egypt will be difficult to marshal. As for anything south of the Suez, I'm sorry, but no.
 
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God will have clearly pointed his finger at the Reich and the world is doomed.

It would have required divine intervention for Rommel to get to Suez.
Or in June 1941 the British War Cabinet decides to mount a holding campaign in Egypt and reinforce Malaya. That stops Operation Crusader, prevents the losses of Axis troops and equipment in that battle and moves the starting line for Rommel's 1942 offensive closer to the Suez Canal.

It also means that convoys from Alexandria to Malta in the first half of 1942 won't be possible. However, OTOH the Axis supplies would be going from Greece to ports in Cyrenaica rather than Italy to Tripoli, further away from Malta, but closer to Egypt.

That increases their chances of reaching the Suez Canal in the first half of 1942. However, I think the chances of success are only one-in-four and the depleted British Empire and Commonwealth (BEC) forces would hold the Alamein Line until reinforcements flood in during the second half of 1942. Then in October 1942 the 8th Army and Desert Air Force would begin the OTL offensive to recover the rest of Egypt, conquer Libya and push on into Tunisia.

In the meantime the BEC forces sent to the Far East in the second half of 1941 instead of the Middle East prevented the Japanese from taking Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Sumatra.
 
I think the most likely way for this to happen is for it to be tried as early as possible. Like shortly after the Battle of France, Hitler agrees to a truncated version of Raeder's Mediterranean Strategy that involves shipping a couple of divisions to Libya before a striking force at Malta is built up. I still think they will run out of gas somewhere in Egypt and will be held at Alamein but if this is going to happen, the earlier the better.
 
I think the most likely way for this to happen is for it to be tried as early as possible. Like shortly after the Battle of France, Hitler agrees to a truncated version of Raeder's Mediterranean Strategy that involves shipping a couple of divisions to Libya before a striking force at Malta is built up. I still think they will run out of gas somewhere in Egypt and will be held at Alamein but if this is going to happen, the earlier the better.
Could the Germans use their Ju52s to fly fuel from the Cyrenaican ports to the panzers? There were less British fighters in Egypt in the second half of 1940 than 1942 and because most of them were Gloster Gladiators their chances of intercepting them were not as good.

Instead of the OTL air assault on Crete would an air assault on the coastal railway in Egypt and Alamein Line launched from Italian bases in the Dodecanese Islands as part of Rommel's 1941 offensive be feasible? If the Axis can take the Suez Canal, the British won't be able to hold Crete and it won't matter as much if they can hold Malta.
 
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I think the most likely way for this to happen is for it to be tried as early as possible. Like shortly after the Battle of France, Hitler agrees to a truncated version of Raeder's Mediterranean Strategy that involves shipping a couple of divisions to Libya before a striking force at Malta is built up. I still think they will run out of gas somewhere in Egypt and will be held at Alamein but if this is going to happen, the earlier the better.

Could the Germans use their Ju52s to fly fuel from the Cyrenaican ports to the panzers? There were less British fighters in Egypt in the second half of 1940 than 1942 and because most of them were Gloster Gladiators their chances of intercepting them were not as good.

Instead of the OTL air assault on Crete would an air assault on the coastal railway in Egypt and Alamein Line launched from Italian bases in the Dodecanese Islands as part of Rommel's 1941 offensive be feasible? If the Axis can take the Suez Canal, the British won't be able to hold Crete and it won't matter as much if they can hold Malta.
Based on the above the POD could be that Hitler decides to take part in the Invasion of Greece whether the Mussolini wants his help or not. IOTL the Italians attempted to invade Greece from Albania on 28th October 1940 and the Germans invaded via Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on 27th March 1941 almost 5 moths to the day later.

I don't see the Greeks being able to put up a better fight against the Germans ITTL than they did IOTL, especially as they wouldn't have the support of W Force and 12 RAF squadrons.

The TTL Battle of Crete is likely to be much less bloody than the OTL version because there would be fewer BEC and Greek troops defending it.

This is likely to butterfly away the OTL Battle of Taranto (11/12th November 1941) and Battle of Cape Mapatan (27-29th March 1941).

The upside for the BEC is that they don't loose the equipment of 3 infantry divisions and half an armoured division plus tens of thousands of prisoners.
 
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hipper

Banned
There really needs to be a concerted effort to take Malta. I'm not sure why that wasn't a priority.

There were two opportunities to take Malta in may 1941 when they invaded Crete instead, and in spring 1942 when Rommel begged that the air support was given to the Africa corps For their gaza offensive. Crete was within bomber range of the Rumanian oilfields so it was probably the correct decision. By 1942 it was arguably too late to make much difference.
 

Deleted member 1487

There were two opportunities to take Malta in may 1941 when they invaded Crete instead, and in spring 1942 when Rommel begged that the air support was given to the Africa corps For their gaza offensive. Crete was within bomber range of the Rumanian oilfields so it was probably the correct decision. By 1942 it was arguably too late to make much difference.
Taking Crete doesn't need actual invasion, starvation works too; the Luftwaffe pulled it's attention away in 1941 and in 1942, but in 1942 it just missed starving out Malta:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pedestal#Aftermath
Operation Julius, a plan to supply Malta by simultaneous convoys from Gibraltar in Operation Harpoon and Alexandria by Operation Vigorous (12–15/16 June) were costly failures. Only two merchantmen from Harpoon reached the island, the Vigorous convoy was forced to turn back, several convoy escorts and many merchantmen, including the only tanker in Harpoon, were sunk.[8] By August, the fortnightly (two-weekly) ration on Malta for one person was 14 ounces (400 g) sugar, 7 ounces (200 g) fats, 10.5 ounces (300 g) bread and 14 ounces (400 g) of corned beef. An adult male worker had a daily intake of 1,690 calories and women and children received 1,500 calories. In August a mass slaughter of livestock began on the island to reduce the need for fodder imports and to convert grazing land for crop growing; the meat being supplied to the public through Victory Kitchens.[4] Malta would be forced to surrender if fuel, food and ammunition were not delivered before September and Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, the local air commander since July, warned that there remained only a few weeks' supply of aviation fuel. The Admiralty had the fast minelayer HMS Welshman converted to carry fuel and submarines were pressed into service to run supplies of aviation fuel, anti-aircraft ammunition and torpedoes through the blockade, to keep the remaining aircraft operational.[7] The First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander and Admiral of the Fleet Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord (professional head of the Royal Navy), concurred with Churchill that the loss of Malta would be

... a disaster of [the] first magnitude to the British Empire, and probably [would be] fatal in the long run to the defence of the Nile Valley.

— Churchill[10]
and prepared a new convoy operation from Gibraltar, with an unprecedented number of escorts, using ships taken from the Far East and from the Home Fleet, which had vessels to spare since the suspension of Arctic convoys, following the Convoy PQ 17 disaster.[11]

In 2000, Woodman called Operation Pedestal a strategic victory, raising the morale of the people and garrison of Malta, averting famine and an inevitable surrender.[96]

German reports on 17 August stated that all the tankers in the recent Mediterranean convoy had been sunk and none of the transports had reached their destination (assumed to be Egypt). The Allies had lost 13 vessels sunk, including nine merchantmen, one aircraft carrier (Eagle), two cruisers (Manchester and Cairo) and a destroyer (Foresight) but the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy had saved Malta. The arrival of about 32,000 short tons (29,000 t) of general cargo, together with petrol, oil fuel, kerosene and diesel fuel, was enough to give the island about ten more weeks supply beyond the few weeks that the existing stocks could maintain. Axis propaganda broadcasts made extravagant claims but a Kriegsmarine report noted the incomplete and contradictory evidence, allowing only a provisional conclusion. The arrival of four merchant ships and a tanker was unsatisfactory, because the revival of Malta as an offensive base would affect Axis supply routes in what might be the "decisive phase of the struggle for North Africa". Supermarina reached the same conclusion and Generale Giuseppe Santoro, deputy chief of staff of the Regia Aeronautica, wrote that the British had achieved a strategic success by bringing Malta back into action "in the final phase of the struggle in Egypt".[92]

In August, with Malta still besieged, 35 percent of Axis convoy shipping to North Africa was lost. Later that year, Weichold summed up the German navy's analysis,

.... To the continental observer, the British losses seemed to represent a big victory for the Axis, but in reality the facts were quite different, since it had not been possible to prevent a British force, among which were five merchant vessels, from reaching Valetta.... Thanks to these new supplies Malta was now capable of fighting for several weeks, or, at a pinch, for several months. The main issue, the danger of air attack on the supply route to North Africa, remained. To achieve this objective no price was too high, and from this point of view the British operation, in spite of all the losses, was not a defeat, but a strategical failure of the first order by the Axis, the repercussions of which will one day be felt...

— Weichold[93]
 
To paraphrase m0585, something rather more than was done needs be done about/to Malta. Seems like every time the Italians were ready to excise the cancer, the Germans were off on an escapade of their own, and vice versa. Would be a real assist to a scenario calling for the DAK reaching the Suez canal.
 
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