Operation Julius, a plan to supply Malta by simultaneous convoys from
Gibraltar in
Operation Harpoon and
Alexandria by
Operation Vigorous (12–15/16 June) were costly failures. Only two merchantmen from Harpoon reached the island, the Vigorous convoy was forced to turn back, several convoy escorts and many merchantmen, including the only tanker in Harpoon, were sunk.
[8] By August, the
fortnightly (two-weekly) ration on Malta for one person was 14 ounces (400 g) sugar, 7 ounces (200 g) fats, 10.5 ounces (300 g) bread and 14 ounces (400 g) of corned beef. An adult male worker had a daily intake of 1,690 calories and women and children received 1,500 calories. In August a mass slaughter of livestock began on the island to reduce the need for fodder imports and to convert grazing land for crop growing; the meat being supplied to the public through Victory Kitchens.
[4] Malta would be forced to surrender if fuel, food and ammunition were not delivered before September and
Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, the local air commander since July, warned that there remained only a few weeks' supply of aviation fuel. The Admiralty had the fast minelayer
HMS Welshman converted to carry fuel and submarines were pressed into service to run supplies of aviation fuel, anti-aircraft ammunition and torpedoes through the blockade, to keep the remaining aircraft operational.
[7] The
First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander and
Admiral of the Fleet Dudley Pound, the
First Sea Lord (professional head of the Royal Navy), concurred with Churchill that the loss of Malta would be
... a disaster of [the] first magnitude to the British Empire, and probably [would be] fatal in the long run to the defence of the Nile Valley.
— Churchill
[10]
and prepared a new convoy operation from Gibraltar, with an unprecedented number of escorts, using ships taken from the Far East and from the
Home Fleet, which had vessels to spare since the suspension of Arctic convoys, following the
Convoy PQ 17 disaster.
[11]
In 2000, Woodman called Operation Pedestal a strategic victory, raising the morale of the people and garrison of Malta, averting famine and an inevitable surrender.
[96]
German reports on 17 August stated that all the tankers in the recent Mediterranean convoy had been sunk and none of the transports had reached their destination (assumed to be
Egypt). The Allies had lost 13 vessels sunk, including nine merchantmen, one aircraft carrier (
Eagle), two cruisers (
Manchester and
Cairo) and a destroyer (
Foresight) but the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy had saved Malta. The arrival of about 32,000 short tons (29,000 t) of general cargo, together with petrol, oil fuel, kerosene and diesel fuel, was enough to give the island about ten more weeks supply beyond the few weeks that the existing stocks could maintain. Axis propaganda broadcasts made extravagant claims but a
Kriegsmarine report noted the incomplete and contradictory evidence, allowing only a provisional conclusion. The arrival of four merchant ships and a tanker was
unsatisfactory, because the revival of Malta as an offensive base would affect Axis supply routes in what might be the "decisive phase of the struggle for North Africa".
Supermarina reached the same conclusion and
Generale Giuseppe Santoro, deputy chief of staff of the
Regia Aeronautica, wrote that the British had achieved a strategic success by bringing Malta back into action "in the final phase of the struggle in Egypt".
[92]
In August, with Malta still besieged, 35 percent of Axis convoy shipping to North Africa was lost. Later that year, Weichold summed up the German navy's analysis,
.... To the continental observer, the British losses seemed to represent a big victory for the Axis, but in reality the facts were quite different, since it had not been possible to prevent a British force, among which were five merchant vessels, from reaching Valetta.... Thanks to these new supplies Malta was now capable of fighting for several weeks, or, at a pinch, for several months. The main issue, the danger of air attack on the supply route to North Africa, remained. To achieve this objective no price was too high, and from this point of view the British operation, in spite of all the losses, was not a defeat, but a strategical failure of the first order by the Axis, the repercussions of which will one day be felt...
— Weichold
[93]