WI: Afrikakorps reaches the Suez Canal

Hobart's mobile division had spent the last year training for an Italian invasion.
I don't dispute that. AFAIK all the British Empire and Commonwealth (BEC) troops were better trained than the Italians. The problem in June 1940 was that there weren't enough of them.

However, the quality of their equipment wasn't that superior to the Italians at this stage, because AFIAK the BEC forces in the Middle East in June 1940 were still using a lot of World War One era equipment, including their artillery.

The 7th Armoured Division was reputed to be the best trained of all the BEC formations in the Middle East in June 1940. However, it wasn't up to full strength in June 1940 and would not be until September when the first reinforcements arrived. It was the same for all the BEC divisions in the Middle East. This is the relevant paragraph from the British official history.
In Egypt General Wavell had some 36,000 men; they were not however organized in complete formations. Equipment was seriously short throughout, especially artillery of all natures, ammunition, fighting vehicles, and transport. The two armoured brigades of the 7th Armoured Division had each two regiments, instead of three, and these were only partly equipped.6 The 4th Indian Division also had but two brigades and part of its artillery. Of the New Zealand Division there was as yet one infantry brigade, a cavalry regiment less a squadron, a machine-gun battalion, and a field regiment of artillery. There were also fourteen battalions of British infantry and two artillery regiments. There was, in addition, the Egyptian Army, which was in some respects better equipped than many of the British units; but as Egypt had not declared war on Germany the amount of support to be counted on from the Egyptian Army was doubtful. In Palestine there were about 27,500 troops consisting of an in-complete horsed cavalry division, two cavalry regiments, two Australian brigades with two field regiments of artillery and some divisional troops, and a British infantry brigade and two other battalions. Of these troops the cavalry and the Australians were unlikely to be fully equipped and trained before the end of the year. From Palestine one brigade might have to be provided for service in Iraq, while certain other units were earmarked for internal security duties.
AFAIK all the British tanks in the Middle East in June 1940 were Light Tank Mk VI, which I admit was still better than the Italian L3. AFAIK the British didn't have any cruiser and infantry tanks in the theatre until September 1940.
 
The trouble is that they needed more motorised troops than they had available they also needed better training.
The preparation between September 1939 and June 1940 would have included moving as much of the Italian Army's Armoured Corps (2 armoured and 2 motorised divisions) and the Motor-Transport Corps (3 "lorried" divisions) over as the logistics would allow. If the logistics would not allow then they would send motorised divisions out instead of the infantry divisions sent out between September 1939 and June 1940 IOTL.

On the subject of logistics. Part of the planning includes increasing the capacity of the Libyan ports, improving the roads and building more airfields between September 1939 and June 1940.

I'd like to see them extend the railways in Libya too. The British were able to build a line from Mersa Maruth to Tobruk in the first half of 1942. I think the Italians could have done better than that in 9 months. For one thing all the planning had been done, because AFIAK a coastal railway had been planned in the early 1920s, but was cancelled in favour of building a road, so the route had probably already been selected and surveyed.
 
The 7th Armoured Division was reputed to be the best trained of all the BEC formations in the Middle East in June 1940. However, it wasn't up to full strength in June 1940 and would not be until September when the first reinforcements arrived. It was the same for all the BEC divisions in the Middle East. This is the relevant paragraph from the British official history.AFAIK all the British tanks in the Middle East in June 1940 were Light Tank Mk VI, which I admit was still better than the Italian L3. AFAIK the British didn't have any cruiser and infantry tanks in the theatre until September 1940.

So we need some Italian plan which doesn't seem unreasonable to have laying around, to push a force into Egypt in case of some general English collapse or political trouble (an Egyptian revolt or something), which could be applied in this case. This would be executed in July 1940 before the Cruisers and Matildas arrive. How large a force could the Italians reasonably supply and push forward to Matruh? Maybe two motorized regiments with some light tanks and artillery attached. If they took Matruh, its a small port but maybe could help keep that sized force supplied as it goes toward the Delta.

But, using the example of the block force at Beda Fomm which didn't have any cruisers (until later in the fight, and the Italians had M1340s), the British wherever they chose to fight, a small British force would be able to block the Italians, the Italians would stick to the coastal road, attack, fail, get wiped out in a counter attack, which might be a good thing for the Axis if this motivated the Italians to accept a small German armored force earlier, and/or focus on Libya instead of attacking Greece, and/or just keep the bulk of their forces on the Libyan border instead of advancing in September.

On the #2) OP scenario where the Germans take Tobruk in April 1941, then push an armored battle-group across the frontier and try to rush/bluff the British out of Egypt. The Germans were good at that sort of thing. I could see them getting all the way to Alexandria, where the British could and would defend the dock area and the attack would be stopped right there and the Germans would have to withdraw back. This might be a good thing for the Axis if a) This bluff the British out of defending Crete to defend the Delta. b) The Germans realize the futility of taking Egypt and focus on defending the Libyan frontier (original block force concept)
 
So we need some Italian plan which doesn't seem unreasonable to have laying around, to push a force into Egypt in case of some general English collapse or political trouble (an Egyptian revolt or something), which could be applied in this case. This would be executed in July 1940 before the Cruisers and Matildas arrive. How large a force could the Italians reasonably supply and push forward to Matruh? Maybe two motorized regiments with some light tanks and artillery attached. If they took Matruh, its a small port but maybe could help keep that sized force supplied as it goes toward the Delta.

But, using the example of the block force at Beda Fomm which didn't have any cruisers (until later in the fight, and the Italians had M1340s), the British wherever they chose to fight, a small British force would be able to block the Italians, the Italians would stick to the coastal road, attack, fail, get wiped out in a counter attack, which might be a good thing for the Axis if this motivated the Italians to accept a small German armored force earlier, and/or focus on Libya instead of attacking Greece, and/or just keep the bulk of their forces on the Libyan border instead of advancing in September.

On the #2) OP scenario where the Germans take Tobruk in April 1941, then push an armored battle-group across the frontier and try to rush/bluff the British out of Egypt. The Germans were good at that sort of thing. I could see them getting all the way to Alexandria, where the British could and would defend the dock area and the attack would be stopped right there and the Germans would have to withdraw back. This might be a good thing for the Axis if a) This bluff the British out of defending Crete to defend the Delta. b) The Germans realize the futility of taking Egypt and focus on defending the Libyan frontier (original block force concept)
This is the quote from the official history in Post 21 again. but broken up into its salient points.
In Egypt General Wavell had some 36,000 men; they were not however organized in complete formations:
  1. Equipment was seriously short throughout, especially artillery of all natures, ammunition, fighting vehicles, and transport.
  2. The two armoured brigades of the 7th Armoured Division had each two regiments, instead of three, and these were only partly equipped;
  3. The 4th Indian Division also had but two brigades and part of its artillery.
  4. Of the New Zealand Division there was as yet one infantry brigade, a cavalry regiment less a squadron, a machine-gun battalion, and a field regiment of artillery;
  5. There were also fourteen battalions of British infantry and two artillery regiments;
  6. There was, in addition, the Egyptian Army, which was in some respects better equipped than many of the British units; but as Egypt had not declared war on Germany the amount of support to be counted on from the Egyptian Army was doubtful.
  7. In Palestine there were about 27,500 troops consisting of an in-complete horsed cavalry division, two cavalry regiments, two Australian brigades with two field regiments of artillery and some divisional troops, and a British infantry brigade and two other battalions. Of these troops the cavalry and the Australians were unlikely to be fully equipped and trained before the end of the year. From Palestine one brigade might have to be provided for service in Iraq, while certain other units were earmarked for internal security duties.
So there were 4 divisions in Egypt (one armoured and 3 infantry) and 2 divisions in Palestine (one cavalry and one infantry) but they were all at about two-thirds of their full strength, which actually made them equal to an Italian infantry division which IIRC had about two thirds the infantry and two thirds the artillery of a full-strength British infantry division.

IIRC armies work on the rule-of-three, which means that the attackers have to attack in three times the strength of the defenders. On that basis 12 Italian divisions would be needed to overcome the 4 BEC divisions in Egypt. The Axis Army at the Battle of El Alamein in November 1942 had 4 German divisions and 10 Italian divisions. Admittedly they were all under strength and the troops they did have were short of supplies. However, I think it shows what could have been done in 1940 in spite of the poor infrastructure in Libya.
 
I agree that Mussolini should have had a plan before declaring war
I think the plan should have been to defend the border with France while invading Tunisia and Egypt from Libya and invading The Sudan, British Somaliland and possibly Aden from Italian East Africa.
 
From the British official history the strength of the French land forces in Tunisia and Syria in June 1940.
As regards the Allied forces, the French had in Tunisia six divisions, a fortress division, and a light cavalry division; a force which, as General Noguès had predicted, would be capable only of local operations with limited objectives. In Syria there was an expeditionary force of three divisions, inadequately armed and trained, in addition to some forty thousand troops organized for frontier duties and tribal control.
 
IIRC armies work on the rule-of-three, which means that the attackers have to attack in three times the strength of the defenders. On that basis 12 Italian divisions would be needed to overcome the 4 BEC divisions in Egypt. The Axis Army at the Battle of El Alamein in November 1942 had 4 German divisions and 10 Italian divisions. Admittedly they were all under strength and the troops they did have were short of supplies. However, I think it shows what could have been done in 1940 in spite of the poor infrastructure in Libya.

It took a serious amount of German trucks to keep that force level supplied, plus captured trucks and supplies, and even a captured railway (limited capacity) in the 1942 time frame, plus the Germans had their MFPs and Siebel ferries for coastal transport, even into Matruh and Ju52 supply when needed.

I agree that more could have been done with planning (12 Italian divisions marching into Egypt seems unrealistic though). Adding some port capacity and extending the local railway probably could have been done in the 30s without alarming the British too much (peacetime commercial benefits). Perhaps this all could be paid for with a lighter smaller Spanish civil war intervention. Perhaps even a May 20th 1940 "political emergency" contingency plan to bring back or hold the most valuable shipping and run some extra supplies to East Africa (in case the political situation might change). Forces could be moved the Libyan and Sudan frontiers under the justification that a political settlement might result in the adjustment of frontiers (a French/British deal to keep Italy neutral).
 

hipper

Banned
I don't dispute that. AFAIK all the British Empire and Commonwealth (BEC) troops were better trained than the Italians. The problem in June 1940 was that there weren't enough of them.

However, the quality of their equipment wasn't that superior to the Italians at this stage, because AFIAK the BEC forces in the Middle East in June 1940 were still using a lot of World War One era equipment, including their artillery.

The 7th Armoured Division was reputed to be the best trained of all the BEC formations in the Middle East in June 1940. However, it wasn't up to full strength in June 1940 and would not be until September when the first reinforcements arrived. It was the same for all the BEC divisions in the Middle East. This is the relevant paragraph from the British official history.AFAIK all the British tanks in the Middle East in June 1940 were Light Tank Mk VI, which I admit was still better than the Italian L3. AFAIK the British didn't have any cruiser and infantry tanks in the theatre until September 1940.

The 7th armoured division had cruiser tanks in June 1940 as can be seen by the presence of cruiser tanks in the early skirmishes.

From the official history below referring to an action on June 16th 1940.

"This discovery was reported to 4th Armoured Brigade, who sent forward a cruiser squadron of 7th Hussars and a troop of J Battery R.H.A. The squadron of the 11th Hussars had meanwhile taken action to hold the enemy. When the reinforcements arrived a concerted attack was made which routed the Italian force with the loss of more than 100 killed and captured, all their guns and light tanks and several lorries. There were no British casualties."

Reinforcements were sent out in September 1940 a very bold decision by Churchill.

The preparation between September 1939 and June 1940 would have included moving as much of the Italian Army's Armoured Corps (2 armoured and 2 motorised divisions) and the Motor-Transport Corps (3 "lorried" divisions) over as the logistics would allow. If the logistics would not allow then they would send motorised divisions out instead of the infantry divisions sent out between September 1939 and June 1940 IOTL.
.

The trouble with sending your best troops to Libya prior to Declairing war, is that it requires foreknowledge that France is going to collapse.
If France did not collapse your options are more limited with major forces in Libya.
 

hipper

Banned
I think the plan should have been to defend the border with France while invading Tunisia and Egypt from Libya and invading The Sudan, British Somaliland and possibly Aden from Italian East Africa.

Depends if you want a piece of France or not.
 

Deleted member 1487

It took a serious amount of German trucks to keep that force level supplied, plus captured trucks and supplies, and even a captured railway (limited capacity) in the 1942 time frame, plus the Germans had their MFPs and Siebel ferries for coastal transport, even into Matruh and Ju52 supply when needed.

I agree that more could have been done with planning (12 Italian divisions marching into Egypt seems unrealistic though). Adding some port capacity and extending the local railway probably could have been done in the 30s without alarming the British too much (peacetime commercial benefits). Perhaps this all could be paid for with a lighter smaller Spanish civil war intervention. Perhaps even a May 20th 1940 "political emergency" contingency plan to bring back or hold the most valuable shipping and run some extra supplies to East Africa (in case the political situation might change). Forces could be moved the Libyan and Sudan frontiers under the justification that a political settlement might result in the adjustment of frontiers (a French/British deal to keep Italy neutral).
Port Capacity wasn't an issue, getting sufficient supplies to Libya was (as was dedicating them to the theater). In April 1942 the Axis brought their all time max into Libya, over 150k tons with just Tripoli and a freshly liberated Benghazi. A bigger issue is getting it forward, which is the biggest issue given the lack of rail and increasing Allied air interdiction of ports and roads, including US Palestine based B17s hitting Benghazi and other Axis ports. The biggest thing that can really be done is to take Malta early and then avoid Greece and commit all Armored divisions/mobile divisions to Africa and limit the foot infantry to a minimum to free up transport capacity and supplies for the mobile divisions. Avoiding having to use air power, escorts, and supplies to route around Malta and attack it that can all be poured into fighting the Brits in Egypt....the problem though is they can do the same in reverse. Part of that then is not sending Italian troops at all to Russia either. So then the Italians have their pick of their own troops to send to Africa, have it be the focus on supplies/transport, and can send all their air power there and to say the Dodecansese for offensive air/naval operations.

And it wouldn't hurt to make fewer, but better AFVs for the Italians, especially assault guns with bigger guns to be able to shoot at and kill targets at a longer range, like with their 90mm gun.
 
The trouble with sending your best troops to Libya prior to declaring war, is that it requires foreknowledge that France is going to collapse. If France did not collapse your options are more limited with major forces in Libya.
The Italians don't have foreknowledge that France is going to collapse, but they do have the foreknowledge that the bulk of the French Army is going to be tied up in the north fighting the Germans.

Are mobile troops the best soldiers for fighting a war in the Alps? The Italian Army seems not to have thought so because Army Group West facing the French had 4 Alpine and 18 infantry divisions. Meanwhile most of the Italian mobile divisions were in the North East of Italy where they formed the 6th Army in Army Group East. The 6th Army consisted of the Armoured Corps with 2 armoured divisions and 2 motorised divisions, the M-T corps with 3 lorried divisions and the Fast Corps with 3 cavalry divisions. The Italians third armoured division was in Albania.
 
with what? Spaghetti bombs?
My preferred solution was for the Regina Aeronautica to drop thousands of leaflets on the British and French lines. Said leaflets would have "Two good reasons to surrender!" printed in French and English below a photograph of Manuela Arcuri's grandmother dressed as a POW camp guard.
 
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Handwaving the practical difficulties for a moment, capture of the Suez should ideally go hand in hand with the capture of Malta. Capturing both would turn the eastern Mediterranean Sea into an Axis lake. The British would have to go around the Cape of Good Hope to reach India, a major inconvenience. There are also political ramifications to be considered. With the eastern Mediterranean an Axis lake, Yugoslavia would think twice about turning against Germany and would likely join the Axis. Greece would then be overpowered by the Italians (and Germans), with British support being cut off, and this victory might renew Mussolini's credibility. With the proper application of pressure and the offering of some morcels of Greece in the Aegean Sea as well as the prospect of gaining Cyprus, Turkey could very well be convinced to join the Axis ITTL. With the entire Eastern Mediterranean under Axis control, we could see the DAK moved to Vichy French Syria and cause trouble in Iraq from there.

Ahem... there is this:

IIRC the British were already routing shipping around the Cape the moment Italy joined the war because the Med was no longer secure for shipping. Losing the Suez Canal will make things more difficult in the Middle East but it won't do terribly much beyond that in terms of the bigger picture.

This has been pointed out multiple times in these threads, and is clearly outlined in the history. Books, still some folks ignore all that & hold dearly onto the idea that the British were dependent on cargo ship traffic through the Med between June 1940 & May 1943. I guess those people are so anxious to find a Axis victory they will cling to any idea, however false.
 
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