WI: Afrikakorps reaches the Suez Canal

Could the Afrikakorps have reached the Suez Canal before 1942?

I see two ways this could happen:

1. Mussolini allows the Germans to help him in his initial invasion of Egypt in 1940. The higher-quality German troops break the British lines and reach the Suez Canal in thE spring of 1940

2. Operation Sonnenblume succeeds in taking Tobruk. The Axis use the port to shorten their overland supply lines and continue the offensive 750 km to the Canal, reaching Port Said in the fall of 1941

How plausible is this, and what would the follow-on effects be? I could see the RN having to withdraw from the Med due to the danger of being trapped for starters. The Germans could also reinforce Vichy forces in Syria, and support pro-Axis forces in the Middle East, possibly getting some oil fields in the process
 
1. Italy was in no shape of declaring war that early. They had nothing ready. German forces would not be used for this purpose whilst France still needs to fall, German forces moving into Africa would alert the British and give them to opportunity to reinforce, and there is nothing the Italians can do to help against that so an attack right then would be suicide. Also Francei s till in control of Tunesia, which needs to be reinforced too, or the French simply march into Libya. Italy would have trouble fighting French forces on their homeland too, perhaps even risk loosing land. Bad for morale, bad for their military capabilities.

2. The British could disrupt Axis shipping and airforces pretty well, rushing towards Suez is a hell of a task. Logistics is a problem for them, El-Alamein is the bottleneck that they need to crack or no hpe of reaching further, port Alexandria needs to be captured unscathe and kept secure. I don't see them actually reaching Suez that quickly, not without reinforcements and better Naval security.

The Axis forces have no chance of reaching beyond the Suez channel, they can hadly hold on to Egypt if they would break the Royal Army. There is simply not enough equipment and its a logistical nightmare, plus the British army will reinforce right at the other side and the retreated army will join the reinforcements, tough nut to crack. The British might loose a lot of strategic and tactical ground and sea when losing Egypt, but they still outnumber the Axis forces on the opposite side of the Suez and in Sudan and the Axis forces are stretched over a big slap of desert.

However, locking out the Allies from the Suez canal, wrecking it even if they could, would help the Japanese at least, plus they lw down possibility of reinforcements in Africa from England, forcing them to reinforce from India.

I'm just throwing this up here, rushing it a bit before going to bed. I'm sure i've made a mistake or 2 with my assesments.
 
Handwaving the practical difficulties for a moment, capture of the Suez should ideally go hand in hand with the capture of Malta. Capturing both would turn the eastern Mediterranean Sea into an Axis lake. The British would have to go around the Cape of Good Hope to reach India, a major inconvenience. There are also political ramifications to be considered. With the eastern Mediterranean an Axis lake, Yugoslavia would think twice about turning against Germany and would likely join the Axis. Greece would then be overpowered by the Italians (and Germans), with British support being cut off, and this victory might renew Mussolini's credibility. With the proper application of pressure and the offering of some morcels of Greece in the Aegean Sea as well as the prospect of gaining Cyprus, Turkey could very well be convinced to join the Axis ITTL. With the entire Eastern Mediterranean under Axis control, we could see the DAK moved to Vichy French Syria and cause trouble in Iraq from there.
 
IIRC the British were already routing shipping around the Cape the moment Italy joined the war because the Med was no longer secure for shipping. Losing the Suez Canal will make things more difficult in the Middle East but it won't do terribly much beyond that in terms of the bigger picture.
 
It flat out wasn't going to happen. The Germans had clearly overrun their logistics by El Alamein. They weren't going to reach the Nile, much less the Suez because they were quite literally out of gas.

I also have never heard a plausible explanation for how Germany would get through the massive anti-tank obstacle that was the Nile River and Delta.
 

Towelie

Banned
It flat out wasn't going to happen. The Germans had clearly overrun their logistics by El Alamein. They weren't going to reach the Nile, much less the Suez because they were quite literally out of gas.

I also have never heard a plausible explanation for how Germany would get through the massive anti-tank obstacle that was the Nile River and Delta.
The Italians winning what by all rights should have been a ridiculously easy fight in September 1940 is the easiest way I can see. Once North Africa became THE front where Britain was fighting Germany, Churchill poured the resources of the Empire into defending it. Even if the Germans win at El Alamein, they have to deal with the Commonwealth Reserves closer to Alexandria.

Something to note: the Italians coastal infrastructure in Libya was awful, and the port capacity was even worse. If they pour resources into Libya's coastal infrastructure in the 1920s and make Benghazi and Tripoli better ports, they could very well have the logistics to support a campaign deep into Egypt. The issue was never about getting ships from Italy to Africa; the British took some out, but not nearly enough. The issue was the shitty Libyan ports and the lack of a road or railroad of quality get supplies and gas forward.

If they try this in the late 30s, however, the British will notice and correspondingly beef up Egypt.
 

I'm familiar with that.

The issue, however, is why and how? Italy during the Great Depression was not a wealthy place. They would need an unnatural level of foresight to foresee this and plan for it. Why does Mussolini pour massive amounts of cash into that instead of on the Italian mainland.

Discovering oil would work but it's probably not possible. We've had some discussions on this before and the major sticking point is that Libyan oil is much deeper than the technology of the time could identify and extract.
 
Really a more interesting question is what would happen if the Italians recognized that Libya was a really bad base for an offensive, because of the logistics, went over to the defensive there from the start, and stuck with it. The same horrible logistics situation would actually work quite well for them, and against the British, in defending Libya and they would have a good chance of holding on to Tripoli at least of some time.

That means no German reinforcements for Libya, or at the most the airpower since it could be used against British shipping in the Med.

If the Italians want to play a more active part in the war, they could send more troops to Russia. Well they could attack Malta, but I'm not sure if there is a point if you are not going to be attacking from Libya.

What I'm proposing would make alot of sense, which I realize was not a strong point with the fascists. I'm wondering what would be the effects. The POD could be Mussolini goes into a depression after the invasion of Greece, and delegates most of his decision making to someone who actually knows what he is doing.
 
The Italians winning what by all rights should have been a ridiculously easy fight in September 1940 is the easiest way I can see.
Not happening without significant outside help (which Hitler wouldn't offer and Benny wouldn't accept until way too late. I mean hells, OTL the Italians stalled at Sidi Barrani, ~95 km from the border, and 120 km short of the British positions at Mersa Matruh. And even if they got there, so what, the Italian armour is mostly tankettes which are going to be damn all use against even the cruiser tanks of the British, never mind the Infantry tanks. and don't think about outflanking them, there a huge minefield to the south which would be difficult or impossible to penetrate.

IMO the best way is for Rommel to capture Tobruk in early 1940, and then hold position until 1941 to allow the Axis to develop the infrastructure, and even then I don't see them realistically getting beyond El Alamein.

Really a more interesting question is what would happen if the Italians recognized that Libya was a really bad base for an offensive, because of the logistics, went over to the defensive there from the start, and stuck with it. The same horrible logistics situation would actually work quite well for them, and against the British, in defending Libya and they would have a good chance of holding on to Tripoli at least of some time.
Britain had laid extensive railways in Egypt, including one to Mersa Matruh. If Britain can hold the Italians at Halfaya Pass, they can extended that right up to El Salloum.
 
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Towelie

Banned
Really a more interesting question is what would happen if the Italians recognized that Libya was a really bad base for an offensive, because of the logistics, went over to the defensive there from the start, and stuck with it. The same horrible logistics situation would actually work quite well for them, and against the British, in defending Libya and they would have a good chance of holding on to Tripoli at least of some time.

That means no German reinforcements for Libya, or at the most the airpower since it could be used against British shipping in the Med.

If the Italians want to play a more active part in the war, they could send more troops to Russia. Well they could attack Malta, but I'm not sure if there is a point if you are not going to be attacking from Libya.

What I'm proposing would make alot of sense, which I realize was not a strong point with the fascists. I'm wondering what would be the effects. The POD could be Mussolini goes into a depression after the invasion of Greece, and delegates most of his decision making to someone who actually knows what he is doing.
I'm not sure why an amphibious attack on Malta was not planned right on the declaration of war. Malta had a weak garrison and its aerial and naval assets were considerably inferior to what Mussolini could levy against it. There were clearly enough troops for such an operation, in either Sicily or Libya. There is really no reason why the Italians could not overrun the island on June 10th-11th with an amphibious invasion.

The guns of the fleet at Taranto would have been sufficient likely to incinerate any defense. 6 battleships, 9 cruisers, and enough support craft to land 2 divisions on Malta, and this just would not be a fair fight.
 
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The problem is the difficulty of land transport within Africa, there are only so many trucks the Axis can have in Africa and even when Benghazi was operational many of these trucks were making the trip from Tripoli to the front because it was safer for ships.

If Italy had joined the narrow gauge rail lines they had in Tripoli and Benghazi their war effort would have been transformed because of so much of the administrative freight task would have been handled by a comparative handful of trains. The British had a rail line from the delta to Mersa Matruh before the war and extended it to the frontier and then into occupied Libya as the war progressed.
 
I'm not sure why an amphibious attack on Malta was not planned right on the declaration of war. Malta had a weak garrison and its aerial and naval assets were considerably inferior to what Mussolini could levy against it. There were clearly enough troops for such an operation, in either Sicily or Libya. There is really no reason why the Italians could not overrun the island on June 10th-11th with an amphibious invasion.

The guns of the fleet at Taranto would have been sufficient likely to incinerate any defense. 6 battleships, 9 cruisers, and enough support craft to land 2 divisions on Malta, and this just would not be a fair fight.
IIRC it was because Italy's entry into World War II was a last minute decision and the Italian armed forces hadn't made any preparations for an invasion of Malta. Ditto for invading southern France, Tunisia and Egypt. It was also why they didn't recall their merchant shipping.
 

hipper

Banned
I'm not sure why an amphibious attack on Malta was not planned right on the declaration of war. Malta had a weak garrison and its aerial and naval assets were considerably inferior to what Mussolini could levy against it. There were clearly enough troops for such an operation, in either Sicily or Libya. There is really no reason why the Italians could not overrun the island on June 10th-11th with an amphibious invasion.

The guns of the fleet at Taranto would have been sufficient likely to incinerate any defense. 6 battleships, 9 cruisers, and enough support craft to land 2 divisions on Malta, and this just would not be a fair fight.

When Italy declared war in 1940 she had only 2 reconstructed battleships in commission, she had two more almost ready and the New battleships again almost ready. The actual Italian Navy was outnumbered by the British and French Mediteranian fleets

Also Malta was a fortress with numerous costal batteries and the Monitor Terror with 2 15" guns integrated into the defenses.

That's why there was no Invasion.it would not have been a fair fight, just not in the way you imagine.
 

Towelie

Banned
When Italy declared war in 1940 she had only 2 reconstructed battleships in commission, she had two more almost ready and the New battleships again almost ready. The actual Italian Navy was outnumbered by the British and French Mediteranian fleets

Also Malta was a fortress with numerous costal batteries and the Monitor Terror with 2 15" guns integrated into the defenses.

That's why there was no Invasion.it would not have been a fair fight, just not in the way you imagine.

What good are coastal batteries without any sort of air force to defend them? The Pacific War proved this time and time again. Coastal batteries can repel ships without air cover, but not it the guns are being bombed from the sky, especially not if, as in the case of Malta, these guns were not integrated into some kind of subterranean cave structure, or as in 1940, defended by less than one squadron of truly obsolete aircraft. The fleet at Alexandria had no way to intercept an invasion, troops could get ashore pretty quickly, and they would be facing a small and weak garrison. Coastal batteries were fixed targets and easy to neutralize. A Monitor is no match for the naval forces it would be facing. The 15 in shells are nice. I'm not sure if the Terror would get a chance to fire them if things were prepared properly. The Repulse and Prince of Wales were also nice ships with impressive armament.

I know that Mussolini declared war on short notice, but they definitely should have had a plan ready to go by that point.
 
Really a more interesting question is what would happen if the Italians recognized that Libya was a really bad base for an offensive, because of the logistics, went over to the defensive there from the start, and stuck with it. The same horrible logistics situation would actually work quite well for them, and against the British, in defending Libya and they would have a good chance of holding on to Tripoli at least of some time.

That means no German reinforcements for Libya, or at the most the airpower since it could be used against British shipping in the Med.

If the Italians want to play a more active part in the war, they could send more troops to Russia. Well they could attack Malta, but I'm not sure if there is a point if you are not going to be attacking from Libya.

What I'm proposing would make alot of sense, which I realize was not a strong point with the fascists. I'm wondering what would be the effects. The POD could be Mussolini goes into a depression after the invasion of Greece, and delegates most of his decision making to someone who actually knows what he is doing.

The British gobbled up the Italian East African possessions through 1940/41. Left to there own devices these Indian, South African and Commonwealth troops minus garrisons would then be available for use in Libya or Greece. Doing nothing only prolongs the inevitable defeat for the Italians in Africa. Further if the Italians and British spend a year glaring at each other over the Libyan boarder before an real British offensive would the Germans be willing or even able to commit the OTL forces used in the Med and Africa after the start Barbarossa when their forces are fully committed in Russia? If not then the Italians get kicked out of Africa by 1942 with a fraction of the effort it took OTL.

Also the Italians are under no illusions about the ability of their forces to conduct modern warfare against a great power. However the British of late 1940 look to be on the ropes. With the fall of France and the threat of invasion of the home islands there will probably never be a better time to try to conquer Egypt and possibly even force Britain to the negotiating table. Certainly if given time to sort out their defences at home Britain is much more capable than Italy to increase the size and power of its forces in the Mediterranean theatre.

I can therefore see no other option than to attack and hope for the best.
 
In spite of the logistical difficulties and the differences in quality of the opposing forces I think the Italians could have done more between June and September 1940 had their entry into World War II planned since September 1939 rather than a last minute decision by Mussolini.

According to the British official history the British ground forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East were:
36,000 men in Egypt
27,500 men in The Sudan
9,000 men Sudan
8,500 men Kenya
1,500 men British Somaliland

82,500 Total​

The Italians were estimated to have 280,000 troops in Libya. They "only" had 250,000. The Italian Army in East Africa was estimated to have a total of 30,000 white and 100,000 native troops, with 400 guns, 200 light tanks, and 20,000 lorries. The actual totals on 1st June 1940 were: white 91,203; native 199,273; total 290,476. However, the Italian figures for East Africa included air force and navy personnel, while the British figures did not.

The Italians superiority in air power was equally impressive, even after allowing for its qualitative inferiority. This passages is from The Fight at Odds...
The outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East—an elastic term in its wartime usage, covering any territory, which was absorbed into the Middle East Command—found us with forces exiguous even by our own standards of military preparation. On 11th June Longmore received an official definition of his sphere of action. He was to command 'all Royal Air Force units stationed or operating in … Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, East Africa, Aden and Somaliland, Iraq and adjacent territories, Cyprus, Turkey, Balkans (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece), Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf'—an area of some four and a half million square miles. Unfortunately his resources were not on the same generous scale as his responsibilities. Twenty-nine squadrons, or some three hundred first-line aircraft, comprised the total. For the main types there was a hundred percent reserve available, but in the circumstances of June 1940, replacements and reinforcements from home would not be forthcoming very easily. Nor was there a local aircraft industry to help in the work of repair.

Almost half of these three hundred aircraft were based in Egypt, with the remainder in Palestine, the Sudan, Kenya, Aden and Gibraltar—a deployment corresponding with their primary role, which was defined as 'the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal and the maintenance of communication through the Red Sea'.1 The squadrons in Egypt, where the heaviest fighting was expected, were mainly those with the more up-to-date aircraft; the older types were relegated to the subordinate theatres. Few of the machines, however, were really modern. Nine of the fourteen bomber squadrons were armed with the reasonably efficient but very short-range Blenheim I, and two of the four naval cooperation squadrons had Sunderlands; but even the best equipped of the tactical reconnaissance squadrons flew the virtually defenceless Lysander. None of the five fighter squadrons had anything better than the obsolescent Gladiator biplane. Together, the Blenheims, Sunderlands, Lysanders and Gladiators made up eighteen of the twenty-nine squadrons. The remaining eleven were mounted on a remarkable assortment of miscellaneous and out-dated oddments, including Bombays, Valentias, Wellesleys, Vincents, Battles, Ju.86's (of the South African Air Force), Hardys, Audaxes, Harts, Hartebeestes and Londons. This did not prevent their rendering effective, and indeed noble, service.

Against these slender British resources the Italians could pit 282 aircraft in Libya, 150 in Italian East Africa, 47 in the Dodecanese, and as many more of their home strength of 1,200 machines as they were able, or cared, to concentrate in southern Italy and Sicily, or send over to Africa. Of the aircraft already in Africa in June 1940, the best fighter, the Cr.42, was about evenly matched with the Gladiator, while the main bomber, the S.79, though rather slower than the Blenheim I, had a longer endurance and carried a greater bomb-load. In terms of performance, the aircraft of the two sides were on the whole not unequal. It was in numbers, and in ease of reinforcement, that the Italian advantage lay.
Despite the logistical difficulties I think the Italians could have taken Egypt and the Sudan by the end of September 1940 with the armed forces they had in June 1940 provided they planned for it in the preceding 9 months.

Awaiting MattII's reply.
 

hipper

Banned
What good are coastal batteries without any sort of air force to defend them? The Pacific War proved this time and time again. Coastal batteries can repel ships without air cover, but not it the guns are being bombed from the sky, especially not if, as in the case of Malta, these guns were not integrated into some kind of subterranean cave structure, or as in 1940, defended by less than one squadron of truly obsolete aircraft. The fleet at Alexandria had no way to intercept an invasion, troops could get ashore pretty quickly, and they would be facing a small and weak garrison. Coastal batteries were fixed targets and easy to neutralize. A Monitor is no match for the naval forces it would be facing. The 15 in shells are nice. I'm not sure if the Terror would get a chance to fire them if things were prepared properly. The Repulse and Prince of Wales were also nice ships with impressive armament.

I know that Mussolini declared war on short notice, but they definitely should have had a plan ready to go by that point.

Hurricane fighters arrived in Malta the day after Italy declared war they operated from that island after a few weeks they with their more famous compatriots were able to prevent the Italian Air Force doing any serious damage in the first six months of the war. the main Italian fighter was a biplane and seriously outclassed by the hurricane. Malta was the most bombed place on the planet by 1942 and the costal batteries were not disabled, some of the costal batteries were indeed in cave systems

The fleet in Alexandria could certainly engage any landing operation within 24 hours and nothing in the history of Italian arms in ww2 suggests they were capable of an opposed amphibious assault and capturing the fortress within 24 hours.

The point about HMStereor is that she can lurk in the harbour where she is invisible to the italian fleet but she can engage that fleet using observation posts ashore.

I agree that Mussolini should have had a plan before declaring war
 

hipper

Banned
In spite of the logistical difficulties and the differences in quality of the opposing forces I think the Italians could have done more between June and September 1940 had their entry into World War II planned since September 1939 rather than a last minute decision by Mussolini.

According to the British official history the British ground forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East were:
36,000 men in Egypt
27,500 men in The Sudan
9,000 men Sudan
8,500 men Kenya
1,500 men British Somaliland

82,500 Total​

The Italians were estimated to have 280,000 troops in Libya. They "only" had 250,000. The Italian Army in East Africa was estimated to have a total of 30,000 white and 100,000 native troops, with 400 guns, 200 light tanks, and 20,000 lorries. The actual totals on 1st June 1940 were: white 91,203; native 199,273; total 290,476. However, the Italian figures for East Africa included air force and navy personnel, while the British figures did not.

The Italians superiority in air power was equally impressive, even after allowing for its qualitative inferiority. This passages is from The Fight at Odds...Despite the logistical difficulties I think the Italians could have taken Egypt and the Sudan by the end of September 1940 with the armed forces they had in June 1940 provided they planned for it in the preceding 9 months.

Awaiting MattII's reply.

The trouble is that they needed more motorised troops than they had available they also needed better training

hobarts mobile division had spent the last year training for an Italian invasion.
 
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