WI Admiral Kimmel and/or General Short had reacted more wisely?

Markus

Banned
It depends on when Kido Butai is spotted.

The worst case scenario for the Japanese would be to be spotted the evening before the attack.

The Pacific Fleet will slip out of PH no later than at dusk. Some have said the ships would be vulnerable to air raids but the Japanese have to find them first. At a speed of 20 knots they could be 160 nautical miles away from PH in any direction. The first wave was preceded by two of four scout planes. Assuming they are not shot down –a big IF- the first wave will be alerted no more than one hour before they reach PH. At that stage they would have to split up with the dive bombers proceeding towards PH and the torpedo planes searching for the US fleet. Nagumo will order the second wave to be re-armed and here the shit could hit the proverbial fan.

The USAAF had 140 fighters and app. 70 twin engine bombers on PH, Navy and Marines had 21 Wildcats, 8 Buffalos, and 34 dive bombers. That is more than enough to intercept the incoming airstrike, give the fleet a CAP and lauch airstrikes at Kido Butai. IOTL Enterprise was close to PH, with a few hours of warning she might be able to join.

If the warning comes just 75 minutes before the attack and is taken serious, it is more than enough time to get every land and ship borne AA-gun ready –the US had lots of both-, disperse the planes and get some in the air. IOTL the first US fighters took of 45 minutes after the attacks begun. With regard to the ships, they might be able to get moving after app. one hour earliest like USS Nevada, which means all would be still inside the port.


In any case airplane losses would be very high for the Japanese. They get either overwhelmed by US fighters that outnumber their escort by a factor of two to three or cut up by the triple-A when they make their slow and low attack runs. US battleship losses would be temporarily at worst.
 
The tragedy, of course, is that it will take something massive to provoke a response from Kimmel or Short.

OTL one group of Japanese planes arrived ahead of schedule and circled over Pearl Harbor, in broad daylight(!), for almost 20 minutes awaiting their colleagues and that didn't set off alarms.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The AAA is really what would make a difference in the losses. The Japanese lost signnifcant numbers in the 2nd wave from the still spotty AAA, this was another impact from the generally light construction of the Japanese aircraft (the B5N was especially vulnerable to AAA, as losses suffered at both Coral Sea and Midway to shipborn AAA demonstrated), one that gets a lot less attention than their vulnerability in air-to-air. Losses in the strike wings could easily reach 60% between the two waves.

This would literally gut the Mobile Fleet for six months, if not longer based on the way the IJN trained air wings. This sort of loss was why I mentioned that Nagumo might not be able to support the Wake operation out of concern of encountering American carriers. He would not have had enough striking power to engage a couple American carriers, and he had to assume that three U.S. decks were out for his hide.

In this scenario the escorting Zeros would be fully occupied with the American fighters so the damaging strafing against the ground targets, especially the airfields and the seaplane base are eliminated. This would also have allowed the Americans to have significant fighter strength available to address the second wave.

As I noted, this is close to the ideal scenario for the U.S. They still get the shock and unifying impact of the sneak attack among the American people, major shipping losses are still mostly, if not completely in this scenario, recoverable, and the JNAF is knocked out of the war for anywhere up to half a year. Best of all, there is a solid chance of either holding, or being able to recapture in very short order, Wake. With Wake in American hands, the entire Japanese central Pacific strategy unravels (as I pretty much show in my T/L).

It depends on when Kido Butai is spotted.

The worst case scenario for the Japanese would be to be spotted the evening before the attack.

The Pacific Fleet will slip out of PH no later than at dusk. Some have said the ships would be vulnerable to air raids but the Japanese have to find them first. At a speed of 20 knots they could be 160 nautical miles away from PH in any direction. The first wave was preceded by two of four scout planes. Assuming they are not shot down –a big IF- the first wave will be alerted no more than one hour before they reach PH. At that stage they would have to split up with the dive bombers proceeding towards PH and the torpedo planes searching for the US fleet. Nagumo will order the second wave to be re-armed and here the shit could hit the proverbial fan.

The USAAF had 140 fighters and app. 70 twin engine bombers on PH, Navy and Marines had 21 Wildcats, 8 Buffalos, and 34 dive bombers. That is more than enough to intercept the incoming airstrike, give the fleet a CAP and lauch airstrikes at Kido Butai. IOTL Enterprise was close to PH, with a few hours of warning she might be able to join.

If the warning comes just 75 minutes before the attack and is taken serious, it is more than enough time to get every land and ship borne AA-gun ready –the US had lots of both-, disperse the planes and get some in the air. IOTL the first US fighters took of 45 minutes after the attacks begun. With regard to the ships, they might be able to get moving after app. one hour earliest like USS Nevada, which means all would be still inside the port.


In any case airplane losses would be very high for the Japanese. They get either overwhelmed by US fighters that outnumber their escort by a factor of two to three or cut up by the triple-A when they make their slow and low attack runs. US battleship losses would be temporarily at worst.
 

Markus

Banned
What makes the high number of lost A/C in the 2nd wave so important is that this wave included only dive- and level bombers. For reasons of safety no planes were armed with torpedoes. In order to drop them in the shallow basin of PH the B5N had to fly much slower and lower than on the open seas. The Japanese planners recognized a torpedo attack could only be successful against unprepared triple-A.
 
The best possible hope for the U.S. at Pearl (short of the scenario laid out in my T/L) goes something like this:

1/3 of fighters moved to dispersal fields as far away as Maui.

1/3 of Fighters armed and fueled at each field, including dispersal fields, with orders already in place to go to a "Ready 15/Hot Pad" status if any sign of Enemy activity is detected.

12-18 Fighters up on a Dawn Patrol extending out 80 miles or so.

1/3 of AAA guns at fully armed and ready status with crews in barracks but with orders already in place to move to position if any sign of enemy activity is detected.

All ships have 1/3 ready watch set, with ready ammo at all AAA positions.

These are all potentially actions that the Commanders could have taken following the War Warning.

You now get into luck.

Radar operators reach Duty Officer who then decides to have one or more Dawn Patrol pairs investigate contact simply as practice in working with radar site.

OOD on several of the ships in Pearl react to the Ward contact report (especially the actual firing of weapons) and set a higher degree of alert, including securing watertight doors in engineering spaces.

Fighters intercept Float plane sent by IJN for final recon of harbor. Intercept reported and reacted to by Duty officer at Hickam.

Alarm issued at 07:15 local. Entire military in Hawaii wakes up and swears vengeance on asshole who called practice alert on #$^%& Sunday morning. everyone shuffles off to station while fighting hangover.

IJN 1st wave arrives to find 50-60 fighters up with rest warming up on ground, AAA batteries 60-70% manned and armed, ships with full water tight integrity set and at least 50 of AAA manned.

This would be the best possible scenario, JNAF losses would at least triple in this situation while American losses would go down by anywhere from 30-50%.The USN still loses three BB, at least until they can be salvaged, but the IJN loses close to two hundred aircraft (including write-offs due to battle damage) in the two waves. Wake may still be overwhelmed, but with the air wing losses Nagumo may not be ordered to put his force into harms way since the location of the American carriers will still be unknown.
Nagumo and Yamamoto both will not be happy campers after they read their loss reports.
 

Larrikin

Banned
War warning

A war warning was sent to all Pacific Commanders on Nov 25th 1941. What if Kimmel and Short had increased air recons as a result of this war warning? That this increase of air recon had found the Japanese fleet either as it was launching the attack or just after at arround 630am.
Would this have given the USAAC and Navy units time to respond. Would this have ment that part of the US fleet would be caught in the channel
and maybe sunk blocking access to Peal Harbor?

This fact often gets tossed around in regards to Kimmel and Short, what gets neglected is they got a stand down on threats from the north on Friday the 4th because the winter seas up there would be too rough.

So while they were being relaxed, it wasn't because they were stuffing up, but had specifically been told to cut the north western and northern patrol schedules.
 

Bearcat

Banned
This fact often gets tossed around in regards to Kimmel and Short, what gets neglected is they got a stand down on threats from the north on Friday the 4th because the winter seas up there would be too rough.

So while they were being relaxed, it wasn't because they were stuffing up, but had specifically been told to cut the north western and northern patrol schedules.

I've also read that they were conserving patrol aircraft, because they wanted them ready for operations commencing with the outbreak of war (Marshalls?). Constant patrolling wears out aircraft and patrolling versus training and maintenance was always a consideration.
 

Markus

Banned
I've also read that they were conserving patrol aircraft, because they wanted them ready for operations commencing with the outbreak of war (Marshalls?). Constant patrolling wears out aircraft and patrolling versus training and maintenance was always a consideration.

That was the Navy´s thinking. The USAAF could have covered the north-east with B-18 and -17 but the USN never told them that sector was not covered. IMO the Navy didn´t because of the general "we-won´t-be-attacked" attitude on PH.
 
I've also read that they were conserving patrol aircraft, because they wanted them ready for operations commencing with the outbreak of war (Marshalls?). Constant patrolling wears out aircraft and patrolling versus training and maintenance was always a consideration.

In addition to that, as I understand it, Kimmel and Short did not have that many patrol planes to begin with. There is a lot of ocean around Hawaii.

Does anyone have any figures on the amount of operational patrol planes (Army and Navy) plus qualified pilots?

Subtract from that routine maintenance that's going to take an airworthy plane out of the loop for a day or two and the normal number of pilots that are sick, on leave, or otherwise not available to fly on any given day.

Add to that, you can only fly in daylight hours for the most part. How much ground can you actually cover?
 
Last edited:

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
In addition to that, as I understand it, Kimmel and Short did not have that many patrol planes to begin with. There is a lot of ocean around Hawaii.

Does anyone have any figures on the amount of operational patrol planes (Army and Navy) plus qualified pilots?

Subtract from that routine maintenance that's going to take an airworthy plane out of the loop for a day or to and the normal number of pilots that are sick, on leave, or otherwise not available to fly on any given day.

Add to that, you can only fly in daylight hours for the most part. How much ground can you actually cover?

A-20 - 12
B-17 - 12
B-18 - 33

PBY - 71 (Two squadrons of these were not really available for serious patrolling. They were at Pearl for training prior to forward deployment and their crews were grass green. Actually available for patrol duties is around 17 aircraft, 2 PBY-1 and 15 PBY-3)

SBD -26 (including 23 Marine aircraft). Most of these were either training new crews or fleet reserve (i.e. down for repair)

Primary responsibility for patrol was the Army's job. It was up to the Army to protect the fleet while in port. This is one reason there are so few USN patrol aircraft in the inventory. There were sufficient aircraft to patrol out to around 300 miles in all directions.

The problem was nobody ever considered that the threat axis was the northern quadrant; any attack was expected to come from the southern half of the compass, toward the Mandates. The IJN approach was outside of normal shipping lanes and from an unexpected direction. Rather brilliant actually, much like most of the tactical planning for the strike.
 

Markus

Banned
Primary responsibility for patrol was the Army's job. It was up to the Army to protect the fleet while in port. This is one reason there are so few USN patrol aircraft in the inventory. There were sufficient aircraft to patrol out to around 300 miles in all directions.

I read it otherwise: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/7Dec41-1.html

The Hawaiian Air Force had 33 B-18 and 12 B-17D aircraft assigned, but the B-18s were old and their range was so short they would be of little value for patrol duty. As a result the Navy (which had over 60 long-range PBY Flying Boats) accepted the responsibility for long-range reconnaissance in the Hawaii area, with the Hawaiian Air Force providing short-range (20 miles out) coverage. ...

A proviso in the Martin-Bellinger report called for the Navy to go to the Air Force for assistance if the Navy was unable to provide the reconnaissance coverage necessary. The Navy never exercised this option, since it believed that an attack on Hawaii could not occur without some warning. Besides, with only 12 aircraft, Martin could lend only limited assistance.
The part about the short range of the B-18 is debatable but it shows the false sense of safety.
 
A-20 - 12
B-17 - 12
B-18 - 33

PBY - 71 (Two squadrons of these were not really available for serious patrolling. They were at Pearl for training prior to forward deployment and their crews were grass green. Actually available for patrol duties is around 17 aircraft, 2 PBY-1 and 15 PBY-3)

SBD -26 (including 23 Marine aircraft). Most of these were either training new crews or fleet reserve (i.e. down for repair)

Primary responsibility for patrol was the Army's job. It was up to the Army to protect the fleet while in port. This is one reason there are so few USN patrol aircraft in the inventory. There were sufficient aircraft to patrol out to around 300 miles in all directions.

The problem was nobody ever considered that the threat axis was the northern quadrant; any attack was expected to come from the southern half of the compass, toward the Mandates. The IJN approach was outside of normal shipping lanes and from an unexpected direction. Rather brilliant actually, much like most of the tactical planning for the strike.

Thanks. In other words, considering they had no operational 24/7/365 radar, Hawaii was seriously short on planes to run a continuous, dawn to dusk, 7 day a week, 360 degree patrol schedule.

That's going to limit when you can have a POD to get warning of the attack.

The most obvious POD is a quicker notification to Admiral Kimmel of the Ward's encounter with the midget sub. Even better is something happens to the sub, it gets caught up in the target that Antares was towing and captured by the Navy.

How would Short and Kimmel react to capturing an intact Imperial Japanese Navy midget sub, with two IJN sailors inside, at say, 6:45am on a sleepy Sunday morning?
 

Bearcat

Banned
Thanks. In other words, considering they had no operational 24/7/365 radar, Hawaii was seriously short on planes to run a continuous, dawn to dusk, 7 day a week, 360 degree patrol schedule.

Yeah, but a dawn / predawn patrol is more feasible, and will give at least some warning. Just an hour will make some difference. Two would make a lot more.

How would Short and Kimmel react to capturing an intact Imperial Japanese Navy midget sub, with two IJN sailors inside, at say, 6:45am on a sleepy Sunday morning?

I imagine, if confirmed to their satisfaction, all hell would break loose, and quickly.
 

Markus

Banned
Thanks. In other words, considering they had no operational 24/7/365 radar, Hawaii was seriously short on planes to run a continuous, dawn to dusk, 7 day a week, 360 degree patrol schedule.

That's going to limit when you can have a POD to get warning of the attack.

A 360 degree search is hardly needed. A fleet that sails past PH would put said major base between it and its bases. A 180 degree search to the west would suffice.

With regard to radar, my understanding is they could have kept it running 24/7 but choose not to.
 
That was one of the most damning points made, particularly against Kimmel, his idea that it was better to have no scouts out then to have what he felt might be insufficient.

Even worse, all his estimates assumed total 360 degree coverage was required, out of either a fetish for neatness or a fear of some hostile fleet sneaking up from San Diego.
 

Markus

Banned
Even worse, all his estimates assumed total 360 degree coverage was required, out of either a fetish for neatness or a fear of some hostile fleet sneaking up from San Diego.

The Coast Guard? Nope, they returned the Clemsons when the prohibition ended.

Saratoga gone rouge? Compared to that the plot of TV shows like 24 and Prison Break(2nd season) looks like a documentary.

The KM in disguise?
Even with GZ operational the KM would not amout to much...more than target practice.

Fetish for neatness it must have been. :D:D:D
 

burmafrd

Banned
The BIGGEST failures of both Kimmel and Short were that they did not prepare their commands for what from all accounts appeared to be an inevitable (or as close to it as means no difference) war.

THe Peacetime Mindset was the biggest reason that the attack worked. All too many had not accepted that war was coming sooner or later. IF they had gotten their commands into that mindset, and just as importantly that Pearl Harbor was indeed at risk of attack, then the attack would have failed.

When the Ward attacks the mini sub, this starts everyone waking up and preparing; the radar operator is believed; and so on. The Fleet would not have been so asleep to begin with; and would have reacted much faster. The airfields would have been ready to get aircraft up right away.

If this happens then the IJN still possibly causes a lot of damage to Battleship row, but they pay for it with much larger losses that have a huge impact down the road.
 
Top