So I recently learned about the Battle of Bald Hill during the Atlanta Campaign. General Hood had taken command of the Army of Tennessee by this point and this is one of the few battles he participated in that seems well thought out with a good chance of success.
Hood's plan for July 22 was to essentially replicate Stonewall Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville on May 2, 1863. Hood's hope was to rout the Army of the Tennessee and roll Sherman's armies - all 100,000 men - back to Peachtree Creek, defeating Sherman's entire campaign in the process. The opportunity was there but, as always, Hood was never able to execute it. A rather underwhelming performance by Hardee and Wheeler, Hood's rather laissez-faire command style, and magnificent fighting by the Army of the Tennessee led to the result. I think the main problem was in how hastily the plan was executed. Hood rather dramatically changed his mind on staying on the defensive on July 21 and decides to attempt the operation with less than 24 hours of preparation and it shows.
Bad luck on the Confederates part led to the Union winning the battle.
That statement irks me somewhat. A good deal of the contribution to Union victory was in how the Army of the Tennessee fought. That is, the culture of initiative and hard fighting that greatly resembles the Army of Northern Virginia.
For those who know a bit more about this battle, what consequences could have occurred had Hood been successful in this battle?
It depends on how successful the assault was. At the very least, the Army of the Tennessee could find itself badly mauled and its wagon train captured. The capture of McPherson's wagon train is probably the most decisive result of the battle. The loss of 1,600 wagons would have seriously damaged the Army of the Tennessee's mobility as an army, rendering them unable to serve as Sherman's flankers as they had done for the majority of the Atlanta Campaign. Sherman needs those wagons if he shall attempt the swinging of the majority of his troops southwards to destroy the Macon and Western Railroad. This was the operation that caused the fall of Atlanta and wagons played a critical role in allowing Sherman to move without railroads.
However, regardless of the losses inflicted on the Army of the Tennessee, I find Hood's hope to roll Sherman's entire district over-optimistic. Hardee's infantry would have been too worn out to continue the offensive, providing time for Sherman to react. IOTL, Sherman was able to construct a refused line with the Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Ohio. This line was well fortified by the standards of the American Civil War and it is unlikely that Hood would try to attack it.
Perhaps his reputation wouldn't be as bad as it is OTL.
To be honest, Hood's reputation somewhat bothers me. Before anyone says something, Hood failed in several ways as a commander but he was not incredibly wasteful with the lives of his men. Hood's plans in the Atlanta campaign were fairly well-thought out and many of them weren't frontal attacks. Contrary to popular belief, Hood did not waste 20,000 men in futile assaults. Rather, the Army of Tennessee had several formations (the cavalry corps, two infantry brigades, four reserve artillery battalions) stripped out in its invasion of Tennessee. The key weakness of Hood was that he never seemed to learn from any of his mistakes. Hood did his best to model his command style after Robert E. Lee's. That is, leave the details of major operations to subordinates. This, however, did not reflect the toxic and broken command culture of the Army of Tennessee, an army in which subordinates could ignore orders they did not like or amend the order to their liking. Hood was only physically present during the Atlanta Campaign at Bald Hill and only issued two direct orders. Hood never learned from his mistakes and ended up making the same one at Spring Hill.