WI: ACW Battle of Bald Hill

So I recently learned about the Battle of Bald Hill during the Atlanta Campaign. General Hood had taken command of the Army of Tennessee by this point and this is one of the few battles he participated in that seems well thought out with a good chance of success. Bad luck on the Confederates part led to the Union winning the battle. For those who know a bit more about this battle, what consequences could have occurred had Hood been successful in this battle? Perhaps his reputation wouldn't be as bad as it is OTL.
 
So I recently learned about the Battle of Bald Hill during the Atlanta Campaign. General Hood had taken command of the Army of Tennessee by this point and this is one of the few battles he participated in that seems well thought out with a good chance of success.
Hood's plan for July 22 was to essentially replicate Stonewall Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville on May 2, 1863. Hood's hope was to rout the Army of the Tennessee and roll Sherman's armies - all 100,000 men - back to Peachtree Creek, defeating Sherman's entire campaign in the process. The opportunity was there but, as always, Hood was never able to execute it. A rather underwhelming performance by Hardee and Wheeler, Hood's rather laissez-faire command style, and magnificent fighting by the Army of the Tennessee led to the result. I think the main problem was in how hastily the plan was executed. Hood rather dramatically changed his mind on staying on the defensive on July 21 and decides to attempt the operation with less than 24 hours of preparation and it shows.
Bad luck on the Confederates part led to the Union winning the battle.
That statement irks me somewhat. A good deal of the contribution to Union victory was in how the Army of the Tennessee fought. That is, the culture of initiative and hard fighting that greatly resembles the Army of Northern Virginia.
For those who know a bit more about this battle, what consequences could have occurred had Hood been successful in this battle?
It depends on how successful the assault was. At the very least, the Army of the Tennessee could find itself badly mauled and its wagon train captured. The capture of McPherson's wagon train is probably the most decisive result of the battle. The loss of 1,600 wagons would have seriously damaged the Army of the Tennessee's mobility as an army, rendering them unable to serve as Sherman's flankers as they had done for the majority of the Atlanta Campaign. Sherman needs those wagons if he shall attempt the swinging of the majority of his troops southwards to destroy the Macon and Western Railroad. This was the operation that caused the fall of Atlanta and wagons played a critical role in allowing Sherman to move without railroads.

However, regardless of the losses inflicted on the Army of the Tennessee, I find Hood's hope to roll Sherman's entire district over-optimistic. Hardee's infantry would have been too worn out to continue the offensive, providing time for Sherman to react. IOTL, Sherman was able to construct a refused line with the Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Ohio. This line was well fortified by the standards of the American Civil War and it is unlikely that Hood would try to attack it.
Perhaps his reputation wouldn't be as bad as it is OTL.
To be honest, Hood's reputation somewhat bothers me. Before anyone says something, Hood failed in several ways as a commander but he was not incredibly wasteful with the lives of his men. Hood's plans in the Atlanta campaign were fairly well-thought out and many of them weren't frontal attacks. Contrary to popular belief, Hood did not waste 20,000 men in futile assaults. Rather, the Army of Tennessee had several formations (the cavalry corps, two infantry brigades, four reserve artillery battalions) stripped out in its invasion of Tennessee. The key weakness of Hood was that he never seemed to learn from any of his mistakes. Hood did his best to model his command style after Robert E. Lee's. That is, leave the details of major operations to subordinates. This, however, did not reflect the toxic and broken command culture of the Army of Tennessee, an army in which subordinates could ignore orders they did not like or amend the order to their liking. Hood was only physically present during the Atlanta Campaign at Bald Hill and only issued two direct orders. Hood never learned from his mistakes and ended up making the same one at Spring Hill.
 
That statement irks me somewhat. A good deal of the contribution to Union victory was in how the Army of the Tennessee fought. That is, the culture of initiative and hard fighting that greatly resembles the Army of Northern Virginia.
I did not mean to discount the fighting of the Union army. I meant that the Confederates had many opportunities throughout the battle that they either didn't take advantage of, or just failed to work. Thanks for your insight.
 
I did not mean to discount the fighting of the Union army. I meant that the Confederates had many opportunities throughout the battle that they either didn't take advantage of, or just failed to work. Thanks for your insight.
This is something I noticed that's a recurring pattern in the Western Theater during the ACW. I recently read a great book on the Fort Henry/Donelson campaign by a retired US Army officer. He noted that the Confederates had a number of opportunities to crush Grant's army but to quote the author:
The Fort Henry–Fort Donelson campaign provides a unique and interesting insight into a breakdown in command. In the course of the war, there was no other parallel of such incompetence and incapacity. The campaign was lost not by the defeat of a Confederate army, but through its mismanagement and surrender by blundering leaders while it still had the will and the means to fight.

Gott, Kendall D.. Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, February 1862 (p. 271). Stackpole Books. Kindle Edition.
This also happened during the Vicksburg campaign: in terms of manpower the Confederates and Union forces had relative parity. However, a fragmented and divided CS command meant that Grant could concentrate his forces to achieve superiority and win victories.
 
I meant that the Confederates had many opportunities throughout the battle that they either didn't take advantage of, or just failed to work.
I think this is fair. The Army of Tennessee’s attacks were totally uncoordinated and its leadership, division commander and above, was mixed, especially so in Hardee’s Corps.
  • The attack led by William B. Bate is the most pathetic attack I have read before. Bate decided to attack four infantry regiments and two artillery batteries with two very under strength brigades (the strongest brigade somehow missed action) and suffered 500 casualties (40% of his strength) for just 41 Federals.
  • William H. T. Walker’s failure was more understandable. Terrain killed any chance of coordinating with Bate and caused his division to be separated upon contact with the XVI Corps. Although one of his brigades got ambushed and routed, Walker’s attack was in position to roll up Dodge’s flank if he broke through on the left. Walker tried to fill the void of leadership after the leading brigade commander went down from a bullet wound and was killed for his troubles. His replacement was a decrepit old man who was later assigned to lighter duties. With that change, the division was knocked out in just an hour.
  • George Maney was the new commander of Cheatham’s excellent Tennessee Division and did not excel in his new role. This could be partially due to Hardee’s decision to shift Maney’s division which caused Cleburne’s reserve brigade to be separated from the rest of the division. Regardless, Maney’s assault was uncoordinated, allowing Giles A. Smith’s decimated division to fight off the attack and protect the flank of Mortimer Leggett’s division.
  • Cleburne performed very well. The only mistake he committed was his allowing of the Texas Brigade to be isolated and vulnerable.
  • Carter L. Stevenson of Cheatham’s Corps is an excellent example of how not to be a division commander. Despite orders to attack vigorously, his four brigade strong division was barely unegaged. While his right flank encountered fierce opposition, his left flank attacked three regiments holding a line the length of two brigades and retired after suffering 40 casualties. Carter Stevenson’s failed assault was the big opportunity lost for Hood.
  • The biggest failure was Hood’s lack of orders on the field. Aside from setting Hardee into motion, Hood did little to influence the flow of battle to the Confederacy’s advantage. His orders to Cheatham only instructed a diversion, which was amended by Cheatham to be a full blown assault. The assault proved successful at first, with high casualties inflicted on both sides. But Hood doesn’t seem to be interested in coordinating the movements and attacks between Hardee and Cheatham. By the time Hardee launches his last assault, Cheatham’s charge is already beaten back with heavy losses.
 
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