WI : Abu-Kariba of the Himyarite Kingdom lives longer and establishes religious tolerance.

So one of the more interesting points in Yemeni history is the Jewish Himyar kingdom - which converted under Abu-Kariba. However, with Jews being persecuted in Aksum, Himyar persecuted Christians in Himyar.

What if instead of dying before his sons were fully grown, he lived long enough to secure a smooth succession, and ruled for tolerance - the basis being that at Yathrib, the Jews fought alongside Pagans. So Christian, Pagan, and Jew can all fight as men of Himyar - even if Jews get preferential treatment.

Could it butterfly an invasion from Aksum? Lead to a strong Jewish Arabia?
 

Maoistic

Banned
This portion of Arabic history is not as well-known as it should be despite its importance for the origins of Islam. It could well be that Himyar expands with the help of Christian and Zoroastrian troops and mercenaries thanks to religious tolerance, creating a large Jewish empire, and perhaps one that could rival the Rashidun and Ummayyad caliphates in size. Let's remember that there was a lot of unrest in Arabia which is what caused the expansion of the Arabs in the first place and Himyar had a lot to do with this unrest due to not being either Christian nor Zoroastrian. This new empire would break off though, but it would spread Judaism nevertheless and create similar independent states in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean that are neither Roman nor Persian.
 
This portion of Arabic history is not as well-known as it should be despite its importance for the origins of Islam. It could well be that Himyar expands with the help of Christian and Zoroastrian troops and mercenaries thanks to religious tolerance, creating a large Jewish empire, and perhaps one that could rival the Rashidun and Ummayyad caliphates in size. Let's remember that there was a lot of unrest in Arabia which is what caused the expansion of the Arabs in the first place and Himyar had a lot to do with this unrest due to not being either Christian nor Zoroastrian. This new empire would break off though, but it would spread Judaism nevertheless and create similar independent states in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean that are neither Roman nor Persian.

Interesting. I'm curious as to why you expect it to follow more-or-less the same trajectory as the Caliphate - that was certainly an extreme circumstance, and this PoD is 200 years earlier.

I would expect a strong Jewish Arab state to form, but probably one that is more being competed over for influence by the Romans and Persians, as a large, slower to form, Arabia is a strategic threat to both of them in reality.

Unintuitively, I can see this being an interesting situation for Aksum - they'd be dwarfed by a Himyarite Arabia, but are also a great ally for the Romans if Himyar is hostile. As a result, Aksum could be supported in expanding south of the Romans so as to provide a strong ally there, rather than risk encirclement.

It is an interesting question for me however, what engineering skill could the Romans provide to Aksum so as to help them resolve any environmental issues? Aqueducts? Copies of the Marib Dam? Road Building? I'm unfamiliar with the technical skills of both Aksum and Arabia at this point.
 

Maoistic

Banned
Interesting. I'm curious as to why you expect it to follow more-or-less the same trajectory as the Caliphate - that was certainly an extreme circumstance, and this PoD is 200 years earlier.

I would expect a strong Jewish Arab state to form, but probably one that is more being competed over for influence by the Romans and Persians, as a large, slower to form, Arabia is a strategic threat to both of them in reality.

Unintuitively, I can see this being an interesting situation for Aksum - they'd be dwarfed by a Himyarite Arabia, but are also a great ally for the Romans if Himyar is hostile. As a result, Aksum could be supported in expanding south of the Romans so as to provide a strong ally there, rather than risk encirclement.

It is an interesting question for me however, what engineering skill could the Romans provide to Aksum so as to help them resolve any environmental issues? Aqueducts? Copies of the Marib Dam? Road Building? I'm unfamiliar with the technical skills of both Aksum and Arabia at this point.

I believe Himyar would expand because they were under similar conditions, or would fall into similar conditions at the very least, under Roman and Sassanid expansionism, and 200 years earlier would be a good start to stabilise the kingdom and make it powerful enough that it would eventually become similar to Palmyra, which used expansionism in order to curb Roman dominion and assert independence completely, not to mention that the Himyars would be the best vehicle for Arab unification against Roman and Sassanid tyranny. Muhammad succeeded because there either wasn't any stable government in the Arabia of his time (which was basically a tributary merchant state of Aksum) that could realise a rebellion, thus leaving him without competition to unify the Arabs, or the states that were stable and relatively powerful were vassal tributary states complacent with the Romans and Sassanids, like the Lakhmid kingdom for example.

As for Aksum, I think the Himyarites, like Muhammad, would realise that going against Aksum would be a mistake and ignore it. This is the reason why Aksum did not intervene at the time the armies of the first Caliphs were kicking everyone and everything in the face. A Himyar that searches for religious tolerance would naturally not be hostile to Aksum and even become, not allies, but still neutral states to each other.
 
I believe Himyar would expand because they were under similar conditions, or would fall into similar conditions at the very least, under Roman and Sassanid expansionism, and 200 years earlier would be a good start to stabilise the kingdom and make it powerful enough that it would eventually become similar to Palmyra, which used expansionism in order to curb Roman dominion and assert independence completely, not to mention that the Himyars would be the best vehicle for Arab unification against Roman and Sassanid tyranny. Muhammad succeeded because there either wasn't any stable government in the Arabia of his time (which was basically a tributary merchant state of Aksum) that could realise a rebellion, thus leaving him without competition to unify the Arabs, or the states that were stable and relatively powerful were vassal tributary states complacent with the Romans and Sassanids, like the Lakhmid kingdom for example.

As for Aksum, I think the Himyarites, like Muhammad, would realise that going against Aksum would be a mistake and ignore it. This is the reason why Aksum did not intervene at the time the armies of the first Caliphs were kicking everyone and everything in the face. A Himyar that searches for religious tolerance would naturally not be hostile to Aksum and even become, not allies, but still neutral states to each other.

While I see your reasoning for the opinion that the Arab expansion into other regions, is likely or at least possible in a scenario without Muhammad, and is an idea that I have expressed in the past, the particulars that you enumerate, are in my opinion, somewhat flawed.

1. "Similar conditions," The Himyari and other Yemeni states were most certainly not in the same positon as the early dar al-Islam in terms of geopolitical arrangements. Himyar was based upon trade of the Red Sea whereas the early dar al-Islam and Khilafah, was based entirely in the central and it arose from a culture and ethos that was that, that of the Hijaz and Nejd regions. These regions of the Hijaz and Nejd, differed from Yemen critically in terms of its culture and the positioning that it will likely take in geopolitical scheming. The geopolitical situations of the Hijaz lent themselves toward the conquest first, of the interior of Arabia and then into Yemen and finally northward into the Levant and Iraq. Yemen however, has no real need for the conquest of the Arabs to the north if in a strong position and would be unable to conquer the Hijaz or Nejd if weakened. The Nejd especially, would give constant headaches for a nation based in the extreme southward of the land of Arabia. Yemen itself, is with a fairly large population, mountains and deserts on all sides, naturally leans toward the monopoly of trade entering the Red sea from the East and south. Based upon the realities with which Yemen is centered, it would be possible that Himyar as a powerful Yemeni state, expands west and south into Africa to further monopolize its grip on trade and as part of the greater slave trade so greatly mentioned and lucrative in the epics of the Arab peoples.

Further, it is quite an oddity to compare the religious fervor with which the Arab armies of the dar al-Islam engaged the foes they faced to a 'tolerant Himyari Jewish-Yemeni state.' I also do not see how simply tolerating other groups leads to any benefit for the Himyar. A monarchy or clan that focuses itself upon trade benefits from diversity, as the coming and going merchants exchange goods freely and the tolerance of diversity, allows this to flourish more astutely. However, diversity is not a benefit to the expanding nation, especially the expanding nation that relies upon continuous victories, as the Muslim did and how Himyar would if they were to ever possibly face the Sassanids (I cannot imagine the Himyar actually resisting the Byzantines unless the Byzantines decide to actively support Aksum, which would in my opinion not lead to Byzantine-Himyar conflicts, but Byzantine support of East African magnates versus the Himyari armies). Further, such diverse armies would be inclined to infighting and bribes by the enemy. The Muslim armies of Umar ibn al-Khattab purged most dissent from their armies and in terms of religion and background, the entire forces were essentially copies of one another. Your, 'tolerant Himyar,' would not be, making it a diverse force unlike that of the Mulsim forces of the Khilafah.

2. "best vehicle for Arab unification," The idea of the Arabs as a single and unbroken unit of people has yet to arise and possibly only arose with Islam in the IX century. Yes, the Arabs were certainly a distinct group and one in which they made distinct from other groups, especially those of Africa, however, the idea that Yemeni would have any goals for the unification of Arabs is an anachronism. Further, the ideal Arab that we think of and are attempting to apply to Abu Kariba or Himyari Jews and what have you, cannot be applied. Traditionally, the ideal Arab so spoken of in the medieval texts is that of the Arab from the land of Nejd or the Hijaz and to an extent northern Yemen; not the land of Himyar to the far south, which like the land of Magan, was tied to the trade from the ocean as opposed to the origins of the Bedouin and the hard necessities of the desert and of a life of raiding and warfare.

This necessity of war and raiding, lent itself to the ideals and Islamic concepts of jihad and ghazw (struggle and raiding). These to my view, contributed to the success of the Arab armies initially in their conflicts with the Sassanid and Byzantines.

3. The question of Aksum you raise, I disagree with. I doubt for one, that the early Islamic state avoided the kingdom of Aksum out of fear. There is nothing in the Islamic record to suggest this. The only suggestions that we have is that the Early Muslim considered the Aksumite ruler, Najashi to be Muslim or at least a Christian with certain truths and or proofs (scholars disagree on which it was within the fiqh of Islam). Further, it is suggested by the ulema that Najashi implemented the laws enumerated in the Torat and Injil, in their pristine sense. Thus, the ulema reason, for why jihad was not placed upon Najashi, was that he was not causing fitnah (mischief) in the earth by the practice of laws that were revealed by Allah in the past. As in the more correct sense of jihad in the physical sense, war is to be made against all who do not practice the sharia with which Allah has enjoined upon all humanity. Additionally, some argue that Najashi had a pact of submission and protection pact with the Muslim, which I personally do not agree with. It is my opinion that the previous view, that it was believed by the early Muslim, that Najashi practiced a form of law form previous scripture that the Muslim reasoned was permissible and war with them was not permissible.

4. The idea that the Sassanids or Byzantines were tyrants in the modern sense that you use the word, would be incorrect. Though, I am not understanding what you mean by this. Could you elaborate on this tyranny of the Sassanid and Byzantine. Either I am unaware of Byzantine-Sassanid interference in Arabia of the time or you are referencing the term taghoot or taghwaheet (those who transgress the limits or a tyrant) in Islamic jurisprudence. Which is it?
 
I believe Himyar would expand because they were under similar conditions, or would fall into similar conditions at the very least, under Roman and Sassanid expansionism, and 200 years earlier would be a good start to stabilise the kingdom and make it powerful enough that it would eventually become similar to Palmyra, which used expansionism in order to curb Roman dominion and assert independence completely, not to mention that the Himyars would be the best vehicle for Arab unification against Roman and Sassanid tyranny. Muhammad succeeded because there either wasn't any stable government in the Arabia of his time (which was basically a tributary merchant state of Aksum) that could realise a rebellion, thus leaving him without competition to unify the Arabs, or the states that were stable and relatively powerful were vassal tributary states complacent with the Romans and Sassanids, like the Lakhmid kingdom for example.

This I don't disagree with (in terms of the broad strokes) but I fail to understand why you expect a successful Himyar to conquer say North Africa, or Syria. Those were rather impressive edge cases that exposed significant weaknesses in both Empires that may not be allowed to develop through the caution of a significant third party involvement.

As for Aksum, I think the Himyarites, like Muhammad, would realise that going against Aksum would be a mistake and ignore it. This is the reason why Aksum did not intervene at the time the armies of the first Caliphs were kicking everyone and everything in the face. A Himyar that searches for religious tolerance would naturally not be hostile to Aksum and even become, not allies, but still neutral states to each other.

As far as I understand, Aksum has good press in Islamic thought because they housed the earliest Muslims when they were chased from (Medina?). Himyar and Aksum however are still trade competitors, but that isn't a typically valid cause for war - whereas defending persecuted peoples even then was a justification that would be tolerated by the people going to war.

While I see your reasoning for the opinion that the Arab expansion into other regions, is likely or at least possible in a scenario without Muhammad, and is an idea that I have expressed in the past, the particulars that you enumerate, are in my opinion, somewhat flawed.

1. "Similar conditions," The Himyari and other Yemeni states were most certainly not in the same positon as the early dar al-Islam in terms of geopolitical arrangements. Himyar was based upon trade of the Red Sea whereas the early dar al-Islam and Khilafah, was based entirely in the central and it arose from a culture and ethos that was that, that of the Hijaz and Nejd regions. These regions of the Hijaz and Nejd, differed from Yemen critically in terms of its culture and the positioning that it will likely take in geopolitical scheming. The geopolitical situations of the Hijaz lent themselves toward the conquest first, of the interior of Arabia and then into Yemen and finally northward into the Levant and Iraq. Yemen however, has no real need for the conquest of the Arabs to the north if in a strong position and would be unable to conquer the Hijaz or Nejd if weakened. The Nejd especially, would give constant headaches for a nation based in the extreme southward of the land of Arabia. Yemen itself, is with a fairly large population, mountains and deserts on all sides, naturally leans toward the monopoly of trade entering the Red sea from the East and south. Based upon the realities with which Yemen is centered, it would be possible that Himyar as a powerful Yemeni state, expands west and south into Africa to further monopolize its grip on trade and as part of the greater slave trade so greatly mentioned and lucrative in the epics of the Arab peoples.

Whilst I don't dispute much of this analysis, I do have some points of disagreement - one being that there are some reasons to take over Northern Arabia. One is to ensure secure ports along the Incense Road (the same reason more or less as they'd go west and south) - but also because it provides security through defense in depth, but also access to other resources, and a larger army. I'm not sure Northern, Central, or Southern Arabia independently could be as secure as a united Arabia.

Further, it is quite an oddity to compare the religious fervor with which the Arab armies of the dar al-Islam engaged the foes they faced to a 'tolerant Himyari Jewish-Yemeni state.' I also do not see how simply tolerating other groups leads to any benefit for the Himyar. A monarchy or clan that focuses itself upon trade benefits from diversity, as the coming and going merchants exchange goods freely and the tolerance of diversity, allows this to flourish more astutely. However, diversity is not a benefit to the expanding nation, especially the expanding nation that relies upon continuous victories, as the Muslim did and how Himyar would if they were to ever possibly face the Sassanids (I cannot imagine the Himyar actually resisting the Byzantines unless the Byzantines decide to actively support Aksum, which would in my opinion not lead to Byzantine-Himyar conflicts, but Byzantine support of East African magnates versus the Himyari armies). Further, such diverse armies would be inclined to infighting and bribes by the enemy. The Muslim armies of Umar ibn al-Khattab purged most dissent from their armies and in terms of religion and background, the entire forces were essentially copies of one another. Your, 'tolerant Himyar,' would not be, making it a diverse force unlike that of the Mulsim forces of the Khilafah.

You can have armies that have a common approach involved even when diverse, it just requires semi-professionalism or just standards for troops.

However, yes - pious furvour has its own edge - tolerance works more to make the expansion of institutions smoother. But it is a scale - loyalty to a King may not be the same as loyalty to a religious figure (excluding Ancient Egypt), but I would think that you'd still have very pious Jews - and that would be taken advantage of, with other groups being more auxiliary, or lesser parts of any army (say 3 columns are Jewish, 1 Pagan, 1 Christian, 1 Zorastrian) - if disarming the non-Jews in that scenario leads to only 1 in 3 converting, you've cut your potential army to 66% of it's size - so your recruitment pool shrinks.

It is a sliding scale.

2. "best vehicle for Arab unification," The idea of the Arabs as a single and unbroken unit of people has yet to arise and possibly only arose with Islam in the IX century. Yes, the Arabs were certainly a distinct group and one in which they made distinct from other groups, especially those of Africa, however, the idea that Yemeni would have any goals for the unification of Arabs is an anachronism. Further, the ideal Arab that we think of and are attempting to apply to Abu Kariba or Himyari Jews and what have you, cannot be applied. Traditionally, the ideal Arab so spoken of in the medieval texts is that of the Arab from the land of Nejd or the Hijaz and to an extent northern Yemen; not the land of Himyar to the far south, which like the land of Magan, was tied to the trade from the ocean as opposed to the origins of the Bedouin and the hard necessities of the desert and of a life of raiding and warfare.

This necessity of war and raiding, lent itself to the ideals and Islamic concepts of jihad and ghazw (struggle and raiding). These to my view, contributed to the success of the Arab armies initially in their conflicts with the Sassanid and Byzantines.

+1. We're looking at very different Arabias. Although there are geopolitical advantages to unity - Himyar likely doing it to halt the raiding of trade routes and increase trade revenues (whilst also increasing their military clout as an added bonus). Not simply to unify Arabia
 

Maoistic

Banned
The question of Aksum you raise, I disagree with. I doubt for one, that the early Islamic state avoided the kingdom of Aksum out of fear.

Try to trim down your arguments. I can barely make out what is in it. I didn't use the term fear anywhere. I only said that going after Aksum was a mistake, which is not the same as fearing it.

4. The idea that the Sassanids or Byzantines were tyrants in the modern sense that you use the word, would be incorrect. Though, I am not understanding what you mean by this. Could you elaborate on this tyranny of the Sassanid and Byzantine. Either I am unaware of Byzantine-Sassanid interference in Arabia of the time or you are referencing the term taghoot or taghwaheet (those who transgress the limits or a tyrant) in Islamic jurisprudence. Which is it?
Please, you know what I refer by tyranny (that is, oppressive rule). While the Romans and Sassanids didn't dominate most of Arabia directly (though the Levant and Mesopotamia were heavily populated by Arabs), they used it as a battleground, they controlled trade routes, the made alliances with oppressive rulers. Unless you ascribe to the school of thought that this doesn't count as oppression because it was in the past.
 
Try to trim down your arguments. I can barely make out what is in it. I didn't use the term fear anywhere. I only said that going after Aksum was a mistake, which is not the same as fearing it.


Please, you know what I refer by tyranny (that is, oppressive rule). While the Romans and Sassanids didn't dominate most of Arabia directly (though the Levant and Mesopotamia were heavily populated by Arabs), they used it as a battleground, they controlled trade routes, the made alliances with oppressive rulers. Unless you ascribe to the school of thought that this doesn't count as oppression because it was in the past.

A recent member to the site, making suggestions that insult my posting style. I see how this is.

The Byzantines and Sassanids did not turn the better part of Arabia into a battle ground. To make this claim, you need evidence. Further, the only areas in which this was the case was the Lakhmids and Ghassanids and other northern Arabian conglomerates. It is argued and often agreed by scholars that both empires lacked knowledge of the city of Makkah and thus the Quraysh to any satisfying degree and to say that the Sassanids and Byzantines were ‘tyrants’ to people whom they had likely never heard of, seems quite odd.

Well my point was not centered on fear, simply the idea that I promoted a counter argument to the theory that the Muslim state and people avoided Aksum for strategic reasons. Fear is more linked to ‘not making a mistake’ in that Muhammad feared making a mistake, or whatever opinion that you promote.
 
@RogueTraderEnthusiast

1. It would benefit Himyar to make connections in the Hijaz and Nejd with both pagan and Jews. This comes with the benefit of allowing locals to defend trade routes and removes the risk of rebellion that will occur so frequently in this region, as to be useless for Himyar. Nejd and Hijaz were constant areas of revolt and strife for the Umayyad and Abbasid, despite having the all encompassing religion of Islam to assist in their authority. Himyar has no Khilafah or wider concepts of rule they support and thus the ruling of an area becomes even harder.

Have Himyar conquer the Hijaz and Nejd and soon you will write how Aksum conquered Himyar.

2. The size of the army is secondary to their zeal and discipline. Continually and increasingly diverse armies in the past required a certain amount of liberal handling that weakens their effectiveness. Early Muslim armies by their virtue of being zealous and homogeneous were adverse to the practices of partying and drinking before battle, which plagued earlier Arab armies. In fact, other Arab armies were diverse or much more than the early Muslim, in that they brought Arabs from all across their lands and mercenary from both great empires. However, in their camp, there was infighting, drinking and partying near constantly before battle and it is mentioned their drop in effectiveness due to the fact that their leaders could not enforce discipline.

The principles carry to Himyar, simply having a larger army means nothing when entire armies flee to the simple posturing of the enemy. Also, look to the failure of the Umayyad to capture Constantinople, due principally to their use of Egyptian-Christian sailors who revolted once reaching the Bosporus. A 33.3% decrease in army size is better than possibility of revolt or lack of discipline.


3. Empires and states collapse once they prioritize prestige above conservative and sustainable growth. Himyar can do this, but I do not estimate it being a successful long term adventure.
 

Deleted member 97083

Could the Himyarites and Nabataeans have formed an alliance to co-dominate the western coast of Arabia?

Or would conflicts over the Indian Ocean trade be too great? Might the Nabateans/Romans end up sabotaging the Himyarites in this case?
 
@RogueTraderEnthusiast

1. It would benefit Himyar to make connections in the Hijaz and Nejd with both pagan and Jews. This comes with the benefit of allowing locals to defend trade routes and removes the risk of rebellion that will occur so frequently in this region, as to be useless for Himyar. Nejd and Hijaz were constant areas of revolt and strife for the Umayyad and Abbasid, despite having the all encompassing religion of Islam to assist in their authority. Himyar has no Khilafah or wider concepts of rule they support and thus the ruling of an area becomes even harder.

Have Himyar conquer the Hijaz and Nejd and soon you will write how Aksum conquered Himyar.

Fairly said. I think that working with locals to ensure security would be a boon - which later evolves into direct rule (or integration) - but I would expect these local groups to have some reliance on Himyar in that process - so they'd probably have to fortify certain areas. Again, not immediate conquest - but eventually trying to 'break' local groups that were hostile, in favour of those who weren't. I mean, Himyar would probably be paying, but Yathrib would be directing local affairs (like most provinces/vassals).

2. The size of the army is secondary to their zeal and discipline. Continually and increasingly diverse armies in the past required a certain amount of liberal handling that weakens their effectiveness. Early Muslim armies by their virtue of being zealous and homogeneous were adverse to the practices of partying and drinking before battle, which plagued earlier Arab armies. In fact, other Arab armies were diverse or much more than the early Muslim, in that they brought Arabs from all across their lands and mercenary from both great empires. However, in their camp, there was infighting, drinking and partying near constantly before battle and it is mentioned their drop in effectiveness due to the fact that their leaders could not enforce discipline.

The principles carry to Himyar, simply having a larger army means nothing when entire armies flee to the simple posturing of the enemy. Also, look to the failure of the Umayyad to capture Constantinople, due principally to their use of Egyptian-Christian sailors who revolted once reaching the Bosporus. A 33.3% decrease in army size is better than possibility of revolt or lack of discipline.

Discipline isn't dependent on faith. You can still have codes of conduct for armies. Heck, look at the Romans.

But as I said, spectrum. Discipline is good, and even preferable. But being able to hold more fortresses, or have more flanking forces has its benefits as well. Compare the Soviets to the Germans for example, Quantity vs Quality is a military doctrinal argument that goes to this day.

3. Empires and states collapse once they prioritize prestige above conservative and sustainable growth. Himyar can do this, but I do not estimate it being a successful long term adventure.

I would never suggest a successful Himyar just "Goes off and conquers", but does so when it suits its needs. First to secure Incense, then to secure Yathrib (if desired), then to secure Persian Trade, then to secure internal trade routes (if any). Unity by accident, not purpose (or at least not till it is a foregone conclusion).
 
@RogueTraderEnthusiast

2. I did not say it is dependent upon faith. My references to faith are to deal with the Muslim armies of Arabia, not discussing others. It is unlikely that Himyar develops Roman like secular discipline or for that matter, Assyrian. It is difficult to do and most Islamic nations had very undisciplined armies up until the Ottomans.

Comparing the USSR v. Germany is quite odd for this scenario. The status of war was far different in the Middle Ages where pitched battles held far more importance to sustained logistical struggles. Within these pitched battles, massive armies can be routed with a minuscule number of troops. Look at the Battle of Mount Vesuvius, where Sparatacus and his force of 60 gladiators put over 3000 Roman militia to flight or how only a few hundred Zanj warriors put an entire Abbasid army to rout simply with a night attack. Further, strategic positions in the Middle Ages can be held with extremely small numbers of men. In the Abbasid-Zanj conflict, Zanj defenders could defend against throngs of Abbasid soldiers by forming a defensive position at key positions in a local mosque in al-Mukhtara, or it is also possible to hold a fortress with only a hundred or less men. The numbers do not assist in this and the more diverse and varied, the greater chance of bribery and defection.

Mind you, that mosque defense that I reference; the Zanj by holding that key mosque position in the city with no more than say 30 men, neutralized around 300-500 Abbasid troops and extended the lifespan of the Zanj besieged by at least a week. Examples like this is why it is not necessary to have these large monstrosities for armies.
 
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Deleted member 97083

Comparing the USSR v. Germany is quite odd for this scenario. The status of war was far different in the Middle Ages where pitched battles held far more importance to sustained logistical struggles. Within these pitched battles, massive armies can be routed with a minuscule number of troops. Look at the Battle of Mount Vesuvius, where Sparatacus and his force of 60 gladiators put over 3000 Roman militia to flight or how only a few hundred Zanj warriors put an entire Abbasid army to rout simply with a night attack. Further, strategic positions in the Middle Ages can be held with extremely small numbers of men. In the Abbasid-Zanj conflict, Zanj defenders could defend against throngs of Abbasid soldiers by forming a defensive position at key positions in a local mosque in al-Mukhtara, or it is also possible to hold a fortress with only a hundred or less men. The numbers do not assist in this and the more diverse and varied, the greater chance of bribery and defection.
Valid points. That being said, sustained logistical struggles did determine many ancient and medieval wars. Rome's failure to expand into Germania, Teutonic Order's failure to expand into Lithuania, second Mongol attempt to conquer Hungary, etc. To some extent, even the initial wars where Arabs invaded Byzantine Syria after the 602-628 Byzantine Sassanid War and Byzantine limits were utterly exhausted by previous war. There may not have been a front line, but logistics overcame pitched battles in these instances. Even when there were very significant pitched battles, they had been set up by logistical conflicts in the countryside, series of raids and attempts to supply sieges in enemy territory, etc.
 
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Valid points. That being said, sustained logistical struggles did determine many ancient and medieval wars. Rome's failure to expand into Germania, Teutonic Order's failure to expand into Lithuania, second Mongol attempt to conquer Hungary, etc. To some extent, even the initial wars where Arabs invaded Byzantine Syria after the 602-628 Byzantine Sassanid War and Byzantine limits were utterly exhausted by previous war. There may not have been a front line, but logistics overcame pitched battles in these instances. Even when there were very significant pitched battles, they had been set up by logistical conflicts in the countryside, series of raids and attempts to supply sieges in enemy territory, etc.

My argument is not that logistics do not have bearing, but that vast numbers are not necessary in sustaining wars of logistics in the Middle Ages. This was the fundamental of @RogueTraderEnthusiast Soviet-German reference. This was also my reasoning for referencing the Zanj defense of the mosque during the siege of al-Mukhtara, where a tiny number were able to neutralize an entire contingent of Abbasid warriors.
 
@RogueTraderEnthusiast

2. I did not say it is dependent upon faith. My references to faith are to deal with the Muslim armies of Arabia, not discussing others. It is unlikely that Himyar develops Roman like secular discipline or for that matter, Assyrian. It is difficult to do and most Islamic nations had very undisciplined armies up until the Ottomans.

Fair play, poor reading on my part. I'm not sure I agree, but it is certainly a possibility either way.

Comparing the USSR v. Germany is quite odd for this scenario. The status of war was far different in the Middle Ages where pitched battles held far more importance to sustained logistical struggles. Within these pitched battles, massive armies can be routed with a minuscule number of troops. Look at the Battle of Mount Vesuvius, where Sparatacus and his force of 60 gladiators put over 3000 Roman militia to flight or how only a few hundred Zanj warriors put an entire Abbasid army to rout simply with a night attack. Further, strategic positions in the Middle Ages can be held with extremely small numbers of men. In the Abbasid-Zanj conflict, Zanj defenders could defend against throngs of Abbasid soldiers by forming a defensive position at key positions in a local mosque in al-Mukhtara, or it is also possible to hold a fortress with only a hundred or less men. The numbers do not assist in this and the more diverse and varied, the greater chance of bribery and defection.

Mind you, that mosque defense that I reference; the Zanj by holding that key mosque position in the city with no more than say 30 men, neutralized around 300-500 Abbasid troops and extended the lifespan of the Zanj besieged by at least a week. Examples like this is why it is not necessary to have these large monstrosities for armies.

I used those two because they still stick in my mind as the quintessential Quantity vs Quality armies. Where both sides had victories due to their relative strengths.

As to other examples - Thermopylae is an example of Discipline and quality winning out over quantity, until quantity found a way around to flank.

I have absolutely no disagreement with you here - discipline is good, but heterogeneity and size has its own advantages. Ideally you'd have them in lock-step - but you could have them all be very effective in different circumstances (i.e. Pagans do the cavalry, Jews do the Main Infantry) - or have Garrison A be Jewish, but Garrison B nearby is all Pagan - simply because of allocation choices.

However, between Quality and Quantity - Quantity has Lanchesters Laws on their side.

I will take issue with some of your examples though. They took advantage of strategic and tactics as much as quality. Spartacus had a slave army of indeterminate size, and 200 gladiators (of which 60-70 were used to rappel down a bloody cliff!). Zanj was a night attack - good strategy, capable of simply shocking a disorganised enemy, and the other Zanj was basically holding a fortified position.

Like, they are examples where large armies can be neutralised, but not that discipline was the key factor, but good strategy.

But as I said before both doctrines have their pro's and cons. But if through simple tolerance you can levy 50% more troops than your enemy, with a moderate range of quality - you can use your worst troops as a meat shield, or as flanking forces based on the strategy of the day. I think we risk talking in circles if we keep having a QvQ debate. :p

So yeah, very different armies potentially between Tolerant Himyar and Muslim Arabia.
 
@RogueTraderEnthusiast

My reasoning for referencing those examples of the Sparatacus serville wars or the Zanj, was to illustrate the nullification of large armies of the day. Such so, that a large military could not be so routed in times of the Soviet Union or WW2 as they were in the Middle Ages.

I am not disputing that size and a degree of diversity has benefits. The fundamental however, is how would the fact of tolerance and having a larger army lead the Himyari to great success outside Yemen? Remember, that this discussion began with a refutation or questioning of the poster Maoistic, who asserted this toleration would lead to the Himyari unifying Arabia and invading the Sassanid and Byzantine empires.

Sure the Himyari can have this grand and large army of mercenary and levied peoples of different religion. However, the fundamental is whether they can with this army, make gains similar to the Muslim conquests of Umar Ibn al-Affan, which as I’ve stated, was the opinion enumerated by the poster, “Maoistic.”

Honestly, a Himyari army filled with all types of mercenary and diverse types of troops, would be no match for the Sassanids. Imagine the amount of defections the moment the Himyari force falters and the Sassanid offers pardons for defection.
 
I'm not saying it'd go as far as Maoistic. I think a unified Arabia (perhaps even going so far as to pressure any client states of Rome or Persia is possible, if not required.) is possible outside the Roman and Persian Empires.

That isn't to say that Tolerance is the same as Secular - I've stated I'd still expect some privileges for Jews, and as such it'd become the vast majority. (and the Synagogues would certainly be trying to convert people.) So I'm saying this from the Himyar having a strong economic position, with a history of attacking Yathrib (indicating their ability to act in Central Arabia effectively), are in a better position that most if they aren't attacked by Aksum when its leadership isn't as effective.

So yeah - not defending fighting the Sassanids (unless it was defensive, in which case the Romans would get involved, and vice versa, IMO), which I said to Mao.
 
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