I just do not get the impression that Hitler had the same visceral "racial" hatred of the French he had toward the Jews and Slavs. Yes, there's some pretty strong anti-French stuff in Mein Kampf (the French are a menace to the white race because they use African troops in the Rhineland, etc.) but remember that this was a product of the Ruhr-occupation era, when such sentiments were pretty common in Germany. During the 1930's Nazi diplomats tried to reassure the French that with France gone from the Rhineland, Hitler's anti-French attitudes were a thing of the past. Well, they would say that, wouldn't they? All the same, Hitler's remarks about France in the Table Talks (assuming their authenticity) while to some extent contemptuous of the French and suspicious of their intentions do not really seem to contemplate the extinction of the French--rather he seems to be saying he can make no deal with the French until he can be sure there is no longer any power to the east of Germany with which they could ever align themselves; that even then the French will be fundamentally hostile but that won't be so bad because Germany will control Europe as far as the Urals and have a strong ally in Italy and can utilize the divisions among the French themselves:
"It's a fact that, from a global point of view, the French are behaving very badly, but all the same they're closely related to us..."
"France remains hostile to us. She contains, in addition to her Nordic blood, a blood that will always be foreign to us. In addition to Paris, which is more spontaneous in its reactions, she has the clerical and masonic South. In imitation of Talleyrand in 1815, the French try to profit by our moments of weakness to get the greatest possible advantage from the situation. But with me they won't succeed in their plans. There's no possibility of our making any pact with the French before we've definitely ensured our power. Our policy, at this moment, must consist in cleverly playing off one lot against the other. There must be two Frances. Thus, the French who have compromised themselves with us will find it to their own interests that we should remain in Paris as long as possible. But our best protection against France will be for us to maintain a strong friendship, lasting for centuries, with Italy. Unlike France, Italy is inspired by political notions that are close to ours...
"If I'm told that some countries want to remain democrats — very well, they must remain democrats at all costs ! The French, for example, ought to retain their parties. The more social-revolutionary parties they have in their midst, the better it will be for us. The way we're behaving just now is exactly right. Many Frenchmen won't want us to leave Paris, since their relations with us have made them suspect in the eyes of the Vichy French. Similarly, Vichy perhaps does not take too dim a view of our being installed in Paris, since, if we weren't there, they would have to beware of revolutionary movements.
"France, with its two-children families, is doomed to stagnation and its situation can only get worse. The products of French industry do not lack quality. But the danger, for France, is that the spirit of routine may triumph over the
generative impulses of progress...
"We must take care to prevent a military power from ever again establishing itself on this side of the Urals, for our neighbours to the West would always be allied with our neighbours to the East. That's how the French once made common cause with the Turks, and now the English are behaving in the same fashion with the Soviets..."
https://archive.org/stream/HitlerTableTalk/Hitler TableTalk_djvu.txt
And it is noteworthy that when Hitler speaks of Lebensraum for the Germans in Europe it is always the East he talks about, never the West. Yes, there had been plans to remove the French from the "closed zone" west of Alsace-Lorraine and open it to German colonization but "Following the commencement of
Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, any lingering German ambitions to expand the Reich westward beyond annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and
Luxembourg were, for all intents and purposes, abandoned. The war with the
Soviet Union brought the prospect of vast conquests in the East that would have taken decades (if not generations) to colonize. Hitler, who had always believed Germany's destiny lay in the east, basically lost whatever interest he had in diverting German settlers and resources from the East in an effort to colonize what he saw to be Germany's relatively "civilized" western neighbors. During the night of 17–18 December 1941, the German troops guarding the line were simply withdrawn, as the military commander of France
Otto von Stülpnagel decided that diverting increasingly limited German manpower to guard a line that he deemed as being merely illusionary (since virtually the whole population had returned) could no longer be justified.
[4] Nevertheless, in theory the line continued to exist for the rest of the German occupation.
[4]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zone_interdite