WI: a SR Russia and Long America - The Century of the Common Man

[galileo-034]

Though the point has already been evoked, I'd like to explore it further. I'm actually looking for some idea of US TL in the 20th century, something in the vein of MaskedPickle Perot TL, and I found this period in the immediate aftermath of WWI to be fertile in opportunities.

The POD here is Wilson dying from his strokes in september/october 1919, leaving for at least 17 months the presidency into Thomas Marshall hands.

​

The two points discussed as I read it in a few threads are the League of Nations' ratification and the impact on the election of 1920.

On the former, it was mentionned that a stronger leadership of a healthy Marshall instead of the incapacited Wilson IOTL could have improved the chances of a compromise getting through the Senate, though I don't know enough of the topic to argue on.
The latter is indeed the most interesting point.

Though a defeat to Republicans is practically assured, I a curious to see how the short presidency of Marshall could impact the process, and overall the political history of the following decade, for we have almost 13 months between the death of Wilson and the election, and another four (inauguration is still in March) for Marshall to lead the country.
The first thing that comes to my mind is that we would have Robert Lansing not pushed out of the cabinet by Wilson clique and staying as Secretary of State. Now, could he have some influence in getting a compromise on the LoN to get it passed?
There is also the replacement of Glass as Secretary of the Treasury, assuming Glass still goes to the US Senate. Would Marshall still pick Houston to fill the seat or someone else? Is there an opportunity for a more efficient, or less controversial, replacement to Glass?
And we have the Irish issue. It happened that the defection of Irish electors to Republicans over Wilson's reneging his word to stay out of the war, and support the British, hit hard the prospects of Democrats in the cities of North. With Wilson dead and Lansing still in, could there be a reconciliation, even a partial one? I mean some earlier and stronger move towards a mediation by Marshall in the then escalating conflict in Ireland that could mitigate the distrust towards Democrats, albeit not to the point of improving their actual chances at winning in 1920.
Coming to the election process, I don't doubt that as a sitting president, Marshall would be assured of being nominated, but I wonder about FDR chances at still getting onto the ticket and the consequences of this not happening for his future carreer.
Coming the result, I mind about Marshall potentially carrying, beyond Cox's OTL score, Tennessee and Oklahoma, and perhaps even his home state of Indiana.

What do you think?

 

[David T]

One interesting difference Marshall could make:

"Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall was reported in the New York Times of April 21, 1919, to the effect that he 'would send a sufficiently large force to Russia to thoroughly exterminate the Bolsheviki.'" Evans Clark, *Facts and Fabrications about Soviet Russia* http://books.google.com/books?id=po0bAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA14 (Clark's book is a pro-Bolshevik polemic, but the same quote is found in Charles Marion Thomas, *Thomas Riley Marshall, Hoosier Statesman,* p. 252.)

Does he try to carry out that policy in this ATL? He would have to become president by the summer of 1919 IMO to have any chance to make a difference, and even then I doubt the US forces are logistically able to save Denikin...

 

[galileo-034]

That's not like if had then the power to enforce that 'declaration of principle' should I say. I doubt it would have even been politically feasible.

Still, I think of that President Marshall scenario potentially in continuation of an idea I explored in another thread about Trotsky capture/death at Kazan in auguste/september 1918 and the subsequent collapse of the Bolshevik regime, leaving SRs and the Constituent Assembly fighting, trying to put down warlords in Caucasus (Denikin), Siberia (Semyonov) and Ukraine (Peltiura, Makhno), or remnants of Soviet power in Tashkent, not speaking of Basmachi insurgents in Turkestan. In that perspective, we potentially end with a much less threatening Russia instead of Soviets, though with a socialist inspired regime.
I doubt that this would significantly affect the course of the Red Scare, but the absence of a repressive regime such as Soviet Russia may play a role in 1924 in making easier for Progressives to ally with Farmer-Labor and other socialist trends without distrust about communist influence (assuming that La Folette runs as a third party candidate).

 

[galileo-034]

Continuing into the President Marshall scenario, I've worked on the possible alternate 1924 election.

The primary difference here is that Harding lives (I would have traded a President's life for another, idea inspired by Emperor Julian), so the atmosphere of corruption lasts longer (as an example of butterflies, Attorney General Harry Daugherty would stay longer in the cabinet).

On the democratic nomination process, that impacts McAdoo candidacy as his ties to the oil tycoon Doheny are more a liability than IOTL due to Harding and the scandal lasting and eventually allows Smith to win the nomination. Other consequence of the weaker McAdoo candidacy is that Alabama US Senator Oscar Underwood is able to include in the platform an anti KKK resolution (which IOTL failed by a close margin). Ultimately, for a balanced ticket, I would consider Underwood as Smith's running mate.

Smith/Underwood 1924 Democratic ticket​

On the Republican side, I think of Coolidge still the natural candidate (Harding declining to run), though I hesitate at his running mate.
I explored the Campbell Slemp option (with a divergence he is still representative by 1924) on ground of his OTL connection, with as an aim, an earlier Southern Strategy, but he was too much unknown and the situation that could boost his chances, the outcome of Democratic convention with KKK and anti catholic outburst against Smith/Underwood ticket, don't abide by the calendar (the Democratic Convention happened later and lasted longer so this outcome wouldn't be known until long after the Republican ticket is formed). I could take the OTL running mate, but I wanted to explore the possibility of the Hoover option. Hoover was in a good position for the VP spot (due to the importance of California outlined in the 1916 election and the need of a westerner to compete with the appeal that a dissident run by La Follette would have), but Republicans preferred Dawes, fearing Hoover could alienate Republicans significant share of farmers' vote. To justify this option, I could say the atmosphere of corruption of the Harding administration would help the Lorimer scandal breaking out earlier (I've not found details other than those provided on the wiki page of 1924 election) and dooming Dawes' prospect.

Concerning La Follette independent run, I wouldn't change it. Though Smith appears as much more moderate as Davis was IOTL, I understand La Follette wanted by his run (not unlike Teddy Roosevelt in 1912) use this bid to retake control of GOP from the conservatives, so I keep this dissident run against the 'conservative' Coolidge candidacy happening. As well, I don't see reasons to change his running mate.

There is my projection of the 1924 election with these tickets:

Overall, Smith result is not much different from Davis IOTL in 1924 (136 EVs for Davis, here 137 for Smith), but that's still better than Smith's score in 1928 IOTL (87 EVs). The main difference is in the geographical repartition. Due to the anti Catholic reaction (as 1928 IOTL) plus a strong opposition from KKK (courtesy of Underwood stance), you have Smith performing worse than in OTL 1928 in the South; he even loses Alabama (won in OTL 28 only by a thin margin) due to harsh KKK opposition. Otherwise, there is a better performance in the North due to Smith's appeal among Easterners and Catholics, though all his wins, New York, Maryland, Illinois and even Nevada, are only due to the presence of La Follette that take votes away from Republicans and gives a plurality to Smith (though a short one). I've wondered about Massachussets and Rhode Island some time, but I ultimately awarded them to Coolidge on merit of his 'favorite son' status (and some reported presence/influence of KKK in Rhode Island during these years).

La Follette also performs better due to Hoover effectively pushing away some farmers' vote to him, and because Coolidge has weaker position to start with : Harding impopularity is still hurting Republicans, and since Coolidge has not become president prior to the election, he is a more obscure candidate, though he still effectively plays the "Silent Cal" image to keep distance with Harding's administration. There is also less difficulties for an alliance of Progressives with Farmer-Labor and Socialists on account of the Communists relative absence (since Russia is ruled more "democratically" by SRs who won the civil war over Bolsheviks and Whites).
Thus, outside his home state, La Follette takes Minnesota, the Dakotas and Montana, plus wins Idaho with a very thin margin and loses Iowa and perhaps Washington with similarly thin margins.

How interesting do you find these developments?

 

[galileo-034]

Ideas on developments?

 

[David T]

That's not like if had then the power to enforce that 'declaration of principle' should I say. I doubt it would have even been politically feasible.

I am not so certain that it would have been politically unfeasible for President Marshall to do more for the Whites in 1919 than was done in OTL. You have to remember the strongly anti-Bolshevik mood of the time which I described at https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...enin-bullitt-agreeement-of-march-1919.356184/:

***

"Finally, there was the problem of the anti-Bolshevik mood of public opinion, both in western Europe and the United States. Bullitt later tesriified to the Senate that "Mr. Lloyd George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with British public opinion. He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand, and he said, 'As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?' The Daily Mail was roaring and screaming about the whole Russian situation..." http://books.google.com/books?pg=PA66&id=8eURAAAAYAAJ Likewise, in the US, "Russia caused a flare-up in the press at home when anti-administration newspapers published garbled stories about Bullitt's mission to Moscow, with allegations that Wilson was planning to recognize the Bolsheviks." (Cooper, p. 487) "The fear of a spread of revolution was intensified by strikes that paralyzed public life in Great Britain, by Bela Kun's Bolshevik coup d'etat in Hungary on 23 March, 1919, and by Lenin's proclamation of a Communist International. These events met with sharp criticism in Europe, and made it virtually impossible for democratically elected politicians to enter into negotiations with the Soviets." Georg Schild, *Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution,* p. 107.
http://books.google.com/books?id=EzKmEuOU_ywC&pg=PA107"

 

[galileo-034]

I've not yet all read your references, but that's not much a matter of a particularly anti Bolshevik mood but about sending again soldiers away in an useless war.
We have to rememer that by the time Marshall becomes president, that's about october 1919, Kolchak's cause is already done and so is the Volunteers' Army in South Russia after its failed offensive on Moscow.

He can very well say "we will quarantine Bolshevik Russia with help and support of our allies, and fight the enemy within our borders with all means available", but he won't invade Russia and restore Whites, which is too much too ask by this point. That could have been considered if the British and the French would have pressed on their intervention, but if even they decide it wasn't sustainable to do more than occupying a few coastal areas (especially after what happened to the French at Odessa), I don't see Marshall pushing for further intervention, especially after Kolchak demise.

 

[David T]

I've not yet all read your references, but that's not much a matter of a particularly anti Bolshevik mood but about sending again soldiers away in an useless war.
We have to rememer that by the time Marshall becomes president, that's about october 1919, Kolchak's cause is already done and so is the Volunteers' Army in South Russia after its failed offensive on Moscow.

He can very well say "we will quarantine Bolshevik Russia with help and support of our allies, and fight the enemy within our borders with all means available", but he won't invade Russia and restore Whites, which is too much too ask by this point. That could have been considered if the British and the French would have pressed on their intervention, but if even they decide it wasn't sustainable to do more than occupying a few coastal areas (especially after what happened to the French at Odessa), I don't see Marshall pushing for further intervention, especially after Kolchak demise.

I specifically wrote above that Marshall would have to become president "by the summer of 1919" to have any chance of saving the Whites, and doubted that he could do it even then. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...omas-marshall-1919-1921.412096/#post-14416820 I realize that your POD was having Wilson's stroke be at the time it was in OTL (only make it fatal) but it is perfectly plausible for it to be a few months earlier...

 

[galileo-034]

My fault, I did miss the point. But the thing is that Marshall can't really go further than what the French and the British do.

Anyway, my goal is more about the impact of a Marshall presidency on US politics. In the event I go for a Bolshevik defeat, I would use an earlier POD at the battle of Kazan in 1918 as explained above with the victory of SRs instead, since the battle involved a push by Czechoslovaks supported by an insurgent People's Army of Komuch under Kappel that claimed its legitimacy from the SR Constituent Assembly represented by a committee of SRs:

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Army_of_Komuch
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_of_Members_of_the_Constituent_Assembly .

I assumed that SRs would carry the momentum after a victory at Kazan (Siberia hasn't yet been taken over by Whites though two government rival, one SR in Vladivostok and another in Omsk, White it seems) with support of the Czechoslovak legion, a victory that would have involved Trotsky capture and Red Army subsequent collapse.

 

[galileo-034]

I just looked more at the peripheral conflicts of the Russian Civil War, and my attention came back to Armenia.
I wonder what would have been the position and actions of a President Thomas Marshall to help Armenia against Turks. Any idea?

 

[galileo-034]

Going through a brief recap of British elections of 1922, 1923 and 1924, I came to wonder about the chances of MacDonald's first government lasting longer with a non Bolshevik Russia.

Instead of Bolsheviks in power, we have the SRs ruling what's looking like a democratic regime, with a multi party system authorized but dominated by SRs, and more keen to respect Russian previous engagements with its foreign partners and not put forward an international revolution policy. Baltic countries would also become independent as IOTL, and so would too Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan (in either cases, I don't see SR Russia invading at the risk of alienating the Allies, even though there is less motives for Allies to support these republics without Bolsheviks in power), but Turkestan is still reintegrated (there is to terminate the Tashkent Soviet, though I don't exclude there may be autonomy for regional entities such as Khiva, Bhukara or Turkmens). Also, Baron von Ungern-Sternberg is still chased out of Baikal region and expel Chineses from Mongolia to restore Bogd Khan.

Given that the problem of relations with Russia isn't much one ITTL, would the Liberals still keep from supporting a censure motion against MacDonald? Or would there even be a Campbell Case for this motion to be introduced? Also, without a Zinoviev letter and without such an anti communist atmosphere, would the Liberals fare better in a future general election and avoid fading into darkness ?

 

[galileo-034]

To return on British politics, I mind about a longer MacDonald First Ministry pushing Labor in position to better take advantage of the 1929 crisis due to a better schedule, assuming it still happens due to economic factors remaining roughly the same. I mean that by surviving the Campbell Case, the fall of MacDonald cabinet may be pushed by a couple years. Assuming Conservatives under Baldwin still win the next general election, they would be in power during the crisis and a good time after the crash so they can be blamed for mismanagement, and put the Labor in a position to win big in the early 30s. How that would affect the UK, not to mention we have potentially the Labor in charge when come the Abdication Crisis ?

Continuing on butterflies, there may be some speculation over Clemenceau, and I still hesitate between having him mortally wounded during the assassination attempt and having him successfully elected President of the Republic. Since kung zog already begun an excellent TL on the premise of killing Clemenceau, and that I already killed Wilson, I would favor the latter option, but I shall wait until I finish reading Clemenceau biography to settle the choice. The perspective of having Clemenceau as President of the Republic from 1920 to 1927 is an interesting perspective, regarding his influence on the government.

Still, the other main topic interesting on French politics in such a TL would be to see what effect would have the absence of Communists in power in Russia.
The direct consequence is over Socialist party (SFIO)'s Congress of Tours that happened in 1920. IOTL, it was to discuss the proposed rallying of the Communist 3rd International, but though the majority of the base went to form the Communist party, a minority including most of the elected officials of the SFIO. Obviously here, we wouldn't have such a split. However, the main effect is that unlike IOTL, the most radical wing of the Socialists stays in SFIO, making it probably less moderate than it would become after the OTL split, and potentially less palatable for the electors.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tours_Congress

Another mention at the butterflies of a SR Russia is the situation in Iran (still called Persia at the time).
The Soviet intervention in Gilan IOTL and the subsequent creation of a Soviet Republic of Gilan had done much to prepare the ground for Reza Shah coup in 1921. Here, it's doubtful this republic would ever happen though a longer lasting Jangali rebellion could be in orders. However, since in these years, situation was pretty much chaotic and anarchic, I imagine a coup is still unavoidable, and Reza Shah would still be the natural candidate (unless there is a high ranking officer of equivalent standing I didn't hear of).
An interesting thing I read on Reza Shah is that he initially intended to replace the monarchy with a republic on the Turkish model but relented due to clerical opposition. I wonder if it's possible in this context a delayed takeover by Reza Shah ends into Iran becoming a secular republic. Any thought?

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Socialist_Soviet_Republic
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reza_Shah

Also, there is China, and Mongolia in a lesser extent.
First are the consequences on the KMT and the Communists.
We know the Soviets were instrumental in the birth of the Communist Party of China. But here, since there is no internationalist Soviet Russia, I wonder about the possibilities for the CPC to ever be created. I'm balancing between these proto-Communists joining the ranks of the KMT to bolster the Wang Jinwei left wing, or having them instead forming a Socialist Revolutionary Party of China, instead of Communist (I guess SR ideology could be as well if not more suited in an agrarian oriented China).
There is also the influence of Soviet advisers in the training of KMT military branch and the overhaul of the KMT party structure in a more centralist, Communist-esque structure.
Taking on the party structure, could a less centralized party apparatus mean less power for Chiang Kai-shek and more chances for Wang Jingwei to compete with him, or even take over KMT instead of him. On the military side, I imagine SR Russia would still be happy to help fellow revolutionaries in need if asked.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Kuomintang#Early_years
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China

Then, there is Mongolia.
IOTL, von Ungern-Sternberg didn't intervene here until 1920/1921, when he was eventually forced out of Baikal region after Japanese withdrawal, but here, as we imagine a SR victory in autumn 1918 (victory at Kazan followed by a march on Moscow), and reunification under Allies mediation, that leaves both Ungern-Sternberg and Semyonov little room. During the civil war, them and their cossacks were widely seen as bandits, and it's likely SR government would eventually come to settle the issue, so they would left with the choices of submission or exile. The timing is important as we are at the eve of a Chinese invasion which itself had some serious consequences in Chinese warlord politics.
Duan Qirui, one of the most influential warlords in China, had then to justify the War Participation Army, a personal army he had raised on Japanese loans on the pretext of participating to the Great War. He chose Mongolia, expecting an easy conquest, and after the death of Mongolian Prime Minister Mamnansüren, there was indeed not much resistance offered. Eventually, Chinese occupying forces pissed off the Mongolian, paving the way for von Ungern-Sternberg conquest. However, back in China, this conquest had for effect to upset Zhang Zuolin, a warlord controlling Manchuria, who didn't like to see a strong army close to his border and eventually joined a coalition against Duan Qirui, resulting in the Zhili-Anhui War during which Beiyang Army was decisively defeated and Duan Qirui forced to flee.
Now, the question is how plays the new schedule. Looking at the bio of Mongolian Premier Namnansüren, his death is said to have possibly due to poisoning, though there is no evidence (but that leaves some room for an alternate history). Also, he is mentionned to have tried to get some assistance in Russia to defend against China but failed to get anything significant. However, in the perspective of von Ungern-Sternberg and Semyonov having to face assertion of SR government authority, they may want to seize the opportunity and offer their services to Mongolia, eventually butterflying the suspicious death of Premier Namnansüren.
I mention Semyonov who IOTL didn't go to Mongolia with Ungern, but did have similar projects it seems. The difference however between the two is that Semyonov seems more likely to meddle in Mongolian internal affairs where Ungern left Bogd Khan and his government relatively undisturbed.
Also, there is know if with SRs victorious, Duan will still go ahead with the invasion of Mongolia since Russia and China had signed an agreement in 1915 that forbade Chinese troops in Outer Mongolia (though aknowledged Chinese suzerainty under an autonomy regime). Assuming he still goes ahead, with Namnansüren still alive and Ungern at the head of Mongolian army, perspectives of success look less likely than IOTL. If the Chinese still win, I assume that this wouln't change much to the following Zhili-Anhui War, but if the fierce war leader that Ungern is succeed in driving them back, and I've no doubts he would be capable of such an exploit given what he did IOTL, that could change the situation back in China. Giving Chinese invasion a defeat in 1919, I could imagine that Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian clique would not feel as threatened as IOTL and wouldn't be driven to support the Zhili clique against the Anhui clique headed by Duan. If the conflict between Anhui and Zhilli cliques still breaks out in these conditions, we can think that Anhui clique has better chances in holding, extending Duan Qirui stay in power. But what would be the consequences for southern China ?

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tögs-Ochiryn_Namnansüren
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhili–Anhui_War
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupation_of_Mongolia

 

[galileo-034]

The more I read on early Chinese Communists, the more I think in this TL, they shall still form their own party, albeit under a Socialist Revolutionary Party of China (SRPC) label.

May Fourth Movement demonstration

As it appears the defining moment of CPC formation was the May Fourth Movement in 1919, to protest the concessions of Versailles to Japan in China, one that was violently suppressed by the Beiyang Government, since there is no more Communist Russia by this time, but a SR government in power, it looks all likely that Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu take on the SR interpretation of Marxism than the Leninist one.
And if we assume that with Russian SRs in power, Chinese 'SRs' could be potentially less agressive in their cooperation with KMT within the First United Front, and butterfly such incident as the Zhongshan Incident which saw Chiang Kai-shek cement his hold over the KMT military apparatus and put him in position to challenge Wang Jingwei.
More than the continuation of the First United Front, the SRPC could remain longer in the hands of Chen Duxiu who was more inclined towards a libertarian interpretation of socialism by opposition to Mao Zedong's Leninist interpretation (though the term itself would be less relevant in this TL, maybe to replace with Blanquist).

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_Fourth_Movement
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Dazhao
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Duxiu
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canton_Coup

Chen Duxiu

Also looking back at the Zhili-Anhui war, the conflict appears unavoidable, but without Fengtian support, Zhili chances seem less assured as I said. However, I looked more into the figure of Wu Peifu, a general of the Zhili clique and subordinate to Cao Kun. He appears as one of the greatest military genius of this time in China, winning against Anhui and Fengtian cliques seemingly hopeless battles against odds, only beaten because of the betrayal of Feng Yuxiang. Oddly enough for such a high profile general, he never sought political office and remained steadfastly loyal to Cao Kun even though the latter was weakened by the scandal of his 'purchase' of the presidency. Is there anyone with some experience of warlord China to say whether or not Wu Peifu would be still able to defeat the Anhui clique without Fengtian support ITTL ?

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Peifu

General Wu Peifu​

 

[galileo-034]

Historically, the treaty of Sèvres signed in 1920 effectively dismantled the Ottoman Empire, and some even said it was worse than what Germany faced. The refusal of Turkish Nationalists to agree to it led to a continuation of the resistance, mainly in the form of a war with Greece which raged until Greek final defeat in 1922. The Turkish victory led to a complete abandonment of the Sèvres treaty replaced with a much more kind Treaty of Lausanne.
In Greece, the backlash against the monarchy led to the establishment of a Second Hellenic Republic. This republic would barely last a decade, but unable to cope with the Great Depression, the monarchy was eventually restored.
In Turkey, a prominent feature of the war was the material support of Bolshevik Russia to Turkish nationalists, though barely enough in the first stages, was certainly a factor in the survival of Turkish Nationalists, and their fortunes against Greece.

Now, with Bolsheviks out, Turkey finds itself deprived of its Russian ally, could find it more difficult.
I first thought of this subject about the Turkish-Armenian war in late 1920 which allowed Turkey to recapture major areas from Armenia. In this context, I thought it possible for Armenia and Georgia to keep the province of Kars which the Turks retook IOTL.

Speaking of the Greek offensives, though it can't be denied the meddling of King Constantine reflected into poor military leadership during the campaign, the Greeks came close in late 1921 to break the final lines of defense of Nationalists on Sakarya River, a few dozens of kilometers from Ankara, which marked the greatest extent of their progression. I could consider earlier opportunities to have the lack of Soviet supply and financial help tipping the war course, but seeing how much energy and determination the Turks put in resisting Greeks through 1920 and 1921, I find it more plausible to bring the breaking point of their resistance later, especially at such a crucial moment as the Battle of the Sakarya River.

To speak of a peace treaty, it seems impossible to return to the treaty of Sèvres, given that even France and others put it in doubt and begun renegotiating it before even Greeks were defeated. In the event of a Turkish defeat on the Sakarya River and a following armistice, we could have reasonably Greece keeping the Smirna area, albeit extended to add strategic depth as per one of the Greek war aims, and also keeping Eastern Thrace. The straits would be neutral, Constantinople could be made a Free (or International) City as Tangier or Danzig, with the straits demilitarized. In the east, I would think of the Wilsonian borders of Armenia as not much possible for the political goodwill of Western Allies, though I think we could consider Kurdish autonomy in the worse case scenario (worse for the Turks).

I don't know yet what political fallout to expect in Turkey from such a peace, but in Greece, the victory instead of a defeat would save the monarchy for the time being. But, that puts monarchists and Republicans in a reverse position when come the Great Depression. We could have the Second Hellenic Republic, born in a very different context, having better chances to stand, unless we end in a Spanish like situation with a civil war breaking out in the 1930s, and potentially Turkey coming back for a revenge.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish–Armenian_War
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Turkish_War_(1919–1922)
  
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sakarya
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Hellenic_Republic

 

[galileo-034]

To return on the Zhili-Anhui war, I now think that the Zhili clique can still win without Fengtian involvement, albeit with more difficulties.


So, with the failure/setbacks in the invasion of Outer Mongolia, Zhang Zuolin doesn't feel threatened and compelled to join the anti Anhui coalition. But in the state of Chinese politics in late 1910s, it looks more or less unavoidable that war between Zhili and Anhui cliques is looming, and that there would be still a coalition to be built against Duan Qirui and the Anhui Clique.

Then, the absence of Fengtian involvement would free some troops, though some troops could be in fact stuck in Mongolia, fighting the Russo-Mongolian army of von Ungern-Sternberg, not counting that there would be a minimum screen to cover Beijing to avoid a surprise from Fengtian army. All in all, I'm saying that will the talented Wu Peifu, it's still possible for the Zhili to win the conflict.

However, the main problem I have with imagining the ulterior developments.
IOTL, the power sharing between Zhili and Fengtian Cliques that followed the Zhili-Anhui War led to the First Zhili-Fengtian War which ended into a serious defeat for the Fengtian Army. Eventually, Zhang Zuolin would expand and further modernize his army along the economic and industrial apparatus of Manchuria to support it with some Japanese help, and try a second time, succeeding through convincing Feng Yuxiang to switch sides.
The obstacle in my reasoning is that by removing the power sharing between Zhili and Fengtian Cliques (and the due to no Fengtian involvement in the anti Anhui war, I remove the immediate cause for the Zhili-Fengtian wars. Then, I am wavering between considering that it's only a matter of time before Zhang Zuolin decides to contest Zhili hegemony (though the KMT government holds sway over some southern provinces), and for this point is the ambitions shown by Zhang Zuolin IOTL, and considering that he will continue to stay neutral like Yan Xishan in Shanxi.
In both cases, that leaves the Fengtian Clique out of a war for a longer time, and leaves more time for Zhang Zuolin to build up Manchuria as an economic and industrial power instead of bringing it to collapse through the repeated burden of sustaining military campaigns, and that's even more true in the event of the neutrality/independence option.

Zhang Zuolin, leader of the Fengtian Clique and ruler of Manchuria​

Regarding the prospects of the Northern Expedition, that situation potentially jeopardizes its chances of a KMT reunification.
If Zhang Zuolin stays neutral, then the Zhili Clique is free to focus its forces against the KMT, and with Wu Peifu, to fend off any attempted invasion of central China, perhaps even to conquer Guangdong if instructed.
If the Fengtian Clique eventually invades, then in the worst timing possible for KMT, it finds itself battling fresh and modern Fengtian army instead of what they fought IOTL (considering that then, Manchurian economy had been in deep troubles due to previous military campaigns), and in this context, Zhang Zuolin should be able to keep KMT at bay, pushing back the moment of unification by either side for a few years or even a decade (assuming Manchurian economy could barely cope with the cost of holding onto the new conquests to have Zhang Zuolin considering going south of the Yangtze River before consolidating, leaving time for KMT to prepare for another round). The best timetable for KMT would be Fengtian invasion happening well before the Northern Expedition happens for the OTL result to still happen.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Zuolin
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Zhili–Fengtian_War
  
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Zhili–Fengtian_War
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Expedition

(You can find good maps, such as the one above, for warlord China during these wars in the French versions.)​

 

[galileo-034]

It's a bit hard to evaluate what potential developments could be for the absence of a Polish-Soviet war as we know it.

Reading through articles online, the primary factor for it occuring was the Bolsheviks' intent to export their revolution and link up with revolutionaries in Germany and Hungary. Here, though there would probably still be revolutionary agitation in Germany and Hungary as we knew it, there will be no Soviet help forthcoming.
Still, that doesn't butterfly completely some of the causes of the conflict.

The borders of the new Polish state are yet the main problem.
In Russia, we have SRs who likely took Moscow and Petrograd, keeping on the momentum they didn't lose at Kazan. Still, you have the more right wing Volunteers Army in South Russia, North Caucasus and Ukraine mainly, which represents troubles if both sides don't find a way to go along instead of continuing the civil war.
That is to say we can consider that for a few months into 1919, Poland may be left alone with her neighbors.

Without Soviets in, Poles would still be up for a fight over Polish populated areas, which is here the regions of Wilno (Vilnius) and Lwow (Lviv).

IOTL, they occupied Vilnius for a short time after the withdrawal of German forces, only to be chased by Soviet forces and their local allies, and waged war upon the republic of Western Ukraine (Galicia) to keep Lwow. They eventually retook Vilnius and crushed the republic of Western Ukraine.
Given that Allies would be pressuring for more compromise between a still allied Russia and Poland, I guess we could still have the border roughly following the Curzon line of 1919 (the one including Lwow/Lviv), plus the region of Vilnius which according to the German census of 1916 had a Polish majority.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish–Ukrainian_War
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Central_Lithuania
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curzon_Line
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish–Soviet_War

 

[galileo-034]

I only searched superficially the occupation of the Ruhr, but it strikes me that Raymond Poincaré, as French prime minister, was one of those responsible for the occupation.

As I understand Poincaré, the man was rather agressive and a hardliner on Germany. But, more important, he and Georges Clemenceau were famous political enemies (which set an odd relationship when Poincaré was compelled to call on Clemenceau in 1917, lacking alternatives). So, if I was to make Clemenceau elected President of the Republic in 1920, it's not likely that Poincaré be recalled to power.

(Poincaré and Clemenceau side by side)

I don't know yet the figures that would replace Poincaré at the time of the Ruhr Crisis given that the French legislative elections of 1919 delivered a strong right majority (the Blue Wave), but I tend to think they may be less prone to take such a unilateral move as occupying Rhineland. I think perhaps to another Briand government or close to it.

Now, I can neither evaluate the potential consequences though I can give some ideas.
Without the economic strain caused by the occupation of the Ruhr and the 'passive resistance' of its population, we can think that Germany could solve earlier the hyperinflation crisis, though I guess the potential agitation by France over delays would cost Cuno his post, though later than IOTL.
1923 is also the year Hitler attempted a putsch in Munich, but he would have in this context less ground without French occupation. There is to think of the impact that the occupation of Rhineland and the subsequent 'passive resistance' had on the Nazi narrative and that their absence would have.

(No! You won't submit us!)
Perhaps the absence of such an occupation, an earlier end of the hyperinflation crisis and the less brutal settlement of the reparations would deprive Nazis of some decisive electors, keeping in mind that their victory in 32 and 33 weren't a foregone conclusion (when we think of Bruning and Schleicher plans). In that case, we could end up with a military dictatorship instead of Nazis when it comes to the Great Depression.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperinflation_in_the_Weimar_Republic
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupation_of_the_Ruhr
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beer_Hall_Putsch
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristide_Briand

 

[galileo-034]

Searching through the political reforms defended by Socialist Revolutionaries in matter of constitutional organization, I found this web page that alledgedly quotes the SR program of 1905: https://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/srprog.html .
That link also appears to be cited in the english page of the Socialist Revolutionary Party of Russia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Revolutionary_Party#External_links
And the text sourced from "Source: V.V. Vodovozov (ed.), Sbornik programm partii v Rossii, 1st edition . St Petersburg, 1905 pp. 20-1." .

The excerpt that interests us if that on political and legislative reforms :

• In the Realm of Politics and Legislation The establishment of a democratic republic with broad autonomy for oblasts and communes, both urban and rural; increased acceptance of federal principles in relations between various nationalities; granting them unconditional right to self-determination; direct, secret, equal, and universal right to vote for every citizen above twenty years of age regardless of sex, religion, or national origin; proportional representation; direct popular legislation (referenda and initiatives); election, removability at all times, and accountability of all officials; complete freedom of conscience, speech, press, meetings, strikes, and unions; complete and general civil equality; inviolability of the individual and home; complete separation of the church from the state and declaration that religion is a private affair for every individual; introduction of a compulsory, general public education at government expense; equality of languages; free justice; abolition of permanent armies and their replacement by a people's militia.

That fits more or less in the idea of a federal structure. So instead of USSR, I woud rather call it Federative Democratic Republic of Russia or FDRR.

The point on removability makes me thinking to the concept of recall elections, such as in the United States or else.

But that doesn't settle the uncertainty over exact form of government. For instance, the legislative organ: monocameral or bicameral?
On the American model, if there SRs were to adopt a federal system, the Senate would be the instrument to represent krais, oblasts, especially when some are dominated by non Russians. Otherwise, we would have a lone Assembly.
And to speak of the executive power, would there be a president and a prime minister, or would the functions be merged? Would he or they be responsible to the Parliament (then it's a parliamentarian system, not unlike France at the time) or an independent executive cabinet like in the USA with a president directly elected?
Given the previous nature of Russia, I would think SRs would favor a parliamentarian approach like that of France where "democracy doesn't trust in the men (or women) of providence", with a Premier answerable to the Duma (which fits more in the principle of being removable at all time) and eventually a President of the Republic, relatively powerless like in France, who appoints the Premier and is elected by the Parliament, Senate or not.

 

[galileo-034]

Like with China, I wondered about Communists in Germany, but the more I looked, the more I find that the KPD and its spartakist predecessor had a much more local anchorage to have a split occuring from the USPD. So I guess that instead of calling itself communist the Spartacus League would create a SRPD ( Sozialrevolutionärer Partei Deutschlands , in an approximate German). Through I imagine a spontaneous uprising in the wake of Eichhorn's dismissal, but the reluctance of Rosa Luxemburg and failure of the Bolshevik Revolution to water down Liebknecht's revolutionary enthusiasm would possibly avert the drama that happened IOTL, instead allowing a negotiated end to the uprising, especially avoiding the entrance of Freikorps into Berlin and the consequences it had.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Revolution_of_1918–19
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spartacist_uprising

Meanwhile, in Hungary, I expect the failure of the Bolshevik revolution to temper the zeal of local revolutionary and avert the apparition of the Hungarian Soviet Republic by allowing the government of Count Karolyi, President of the Hungarian People's Republic, to survive the Vix Note (exigeance by Allies Hungarians withdraw from even more territories) instead of having the rumor of a Karolyi's note handing power to the proletariat (which Karolyi denied ever writing, so I guess that's may be a forgery that wouldn't have a reason to exist ITTL) causing the revolutionaries, including Bela Kun, taking power.
That might in turn avoid that Admiral Horthy takes power and ends the Republican regime.
Also, I wonder if avoiding the conflicts caused by Hungarian Soviets with Czechoslovakia and Romania, and eventually the Romanian invasion, would help Hungary to get a better deal in the treaty of Trianon, especially when considering there is no such urging need as preventing any link up of Hungary with Russia ITTL due to Bolsheviks long gone.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Hungarian_Republic
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_Soviet_Republic
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Trianon

A consequence of no Hungarian Soviet Republic may be no Bavarian Soviet Republic, as I read the former's success inspired the latter's creation. So, instead of having revolutionaries proclaiming a Soviet Republic in the aftermath of Eisner's assassination, we have anarchy lasting longer before the government of Weimar eventually steps in to restore order, this time too without the direct intervention of Freikorps needed.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bavarian_Soviet_Republic

So, coming back to the German national scene, we get the SRPD (alternate KPD) more powerful. However, though the role of the Freikorps was less important, I don't think this butterflies away the Kapp-Luttwitz coup in 1920. However, how the coup fails is another matter. IOTL, the opposition of bureaucracy and the general strike were key factors in the failure of the coup, but here we have the old Spartakists surviving the January 1919 uprising and in position to extract political gain from the general strike, especially by Liebknecht who seemed keen to take the least opportunity at hand for a revolution. I mean they are in a good position to take over the workers' mobilization against the coup while also presented with the opportunity to replace the discredited Weimar government, possibly through another putsch of their own, and that's considering that IOTL, there was another leftist uprising in the Ruhr, as a consequence of the Kapp Putsch, but where workers resisted the Weimar government afterwards.
That would potentially put the Weimar government in a harder place than IOTL, but depending on the timetable of events, it might still have a chance.
If the SRPD stays in line to support Ebert against the Putsch up to the time the Putsch collapses, Ebert may still turn back to conservatives and freikorps he just defeated to suppress the Spartakists, but maybe at the cost of a small civil war, kind of the Ruhr Uprising scenario at greater scale.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kapp_Putsch
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruhr_uprising

 

[galileo-034]

As in OTL, the 1928 election would look a foregone conclusion due to the prosperity achieved under the Coolidge administration.

We still have Coolidge not running for a second term, due to the loss of his son Calvin Jr in similar circumstances to OTL (Calvin Jr caught a blister while playing on White House grounds and it infected, leading to death by blood poisoning), though delayed from 1924 to 1925 (here Coolidge moves to the White House only in 1925).
The only sensible difference is that Hoover begins his run as the sitting vice president. I don't think there is much reasons to change in the Republican ticket, being Hoover/Curtis like IOTL.

On the Democratic side, this could look a bit like IOTL, if not for what happened in 1924.
Let's recap 1924.
Due to longer Harding presidency, the atmosphere of corruption scandal damages McAdoo's candidacy due to his links to oil tycoon Doheny. This allows Alabama Senator to include an anti KKK resolution in the Democratic platform and that Governor Smith catches the nomination and picks Underwood as running mate. In the general election, due to anti Catholic backlash and KKK increased anti Smith and anti Underwood agitation, Democrats suffer heavily. Smith loses much ground in the South, including Alabama, but due to the stronger La Follette Progressive run (Hoover being selected as VP instead of Dawes scares some farmer votes away from GOP and the absence of an anti communist scare make easier an alliance of Progressives, Farmer-Labor and Socialists), and their spoiler effect, Democrats carries several northern states.
Come 1928, as IOTL, the Democratic nomination doesn't attract many politicians who feel this is going to be a Republican year due to popularity of Coolidge policies, so as IOTL, that leaves the way open to Smith.

Now, let's see what happens to Franklin D Roosevelt as he would have a certain impact I guess.
I wondered if I had to keep him on the Democratic ticket in 1920 as running mate to President Marshall, but I think I should settle for retired Major General Lawrence Tyson of Tennessee, who seems rather palatable to balance the ticket with a southern appeal (though I make this choice out of convenience as an alternative to FDR and justify Marshall better result in the region).
When FDR returns into active politics in 1924 after being afflicted by paralytic illness, once Smith wins nomination, I guess Smith would do as in 1928 IOTL and supports him as his successor as Governor of New York, a race which would pit him against his cousin Theodore Roosevelt Jr: Roosevelt vs Roosevelt ...
IOTL, Smith won against Roosevelt Jr by a bare 110,000 votes, but surely benefited from incumbent status, while all other offices were carried by Republicans. ITTL, FDR has not even the prestige of a previous vice presidential run and the uncertainty over his physical fitness would be even more a trouble, eventually causing Theodore Roosevelt Jr to win.
No need to say, I just butterflied the chances of a FDR presidency.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_state_election,_1924

Let's return to Smith.
IOTL, he hadn't the occasion to run a second time after his 1928 loss, but here he has it. The field is open as no serious contenders is running against him. With James Farley still his campaign manager (he begun as campaign manager for Smith before going over to FDR in 1928), Smith could learn on his failings in 1924 and improve his tactics and strategy for 1928. Note Farley's presence in 1924, though I didn't consider it previously, can be considered here to partially justify Smith good performances in the North and urban areas while doing damage control.
Smith's comeback would begin by the reconquest of the governorship of New York in 1926. Though I hesitated to have Smith running for US Senator instead, given 1926 was a Democratic year in New York (in a reverse situation, Democrats' ticket carried almost all offices this year) and that Smith has too name recognition as previous governor and presidential candidate.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Farley
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_state_election,_1926

Going into the general election, I don't think there is possible alternatives to Senator Robinson from Arkansas as running mate, due to the need of a southerner to anchor his numbers in the Solid South, Underwood being more or less a spent force after the loss of Alabama (though I guess Underwood would try to avenge this loss and stay in Alabama politics, either by running for reelection as US senator or running for governor, but in both case with anti KKK crackdown in mind).
With improved campaigning, toning down the anti Catholic sentiment, blaming KKK for losses in 1924, etc, we could get Solid South back to Smith plus good results in New England and New York, overall confirming the inroads he made in urban areas IOTL in 1928 as ITTL in both 1924 and 1928 and the subsequent start of another political realignment.

For the map after, I am just speculating on the base of OTL 1928 numbers as I can't effectively and properly evaluate the impacts of the 1924 election on this one, so that would be a rather minimal scenario for Smith.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_1928

Note this election doesn't take in consideration a possible third party run as I couldn't find plausible justification for the Progressive party to run another presidential ticket after La Follette's death.
You might also wonder if I'm heading to a Smith presidency as a result of the Great Depression and the crisis of 1929, but honnestly, though that is to me an interesting perspective, I don't know. It could take this way if I take the 1932 OTL Democratic convention as a base, but ITTL, the political landscape within the Democratic has been deeply affected by the elections of 1924 and 1928, and it remains to see whether or not there would be someone to stand against Smith instead of FDR, a possibility I don't exclude though I have no names in mind for the moment. Feel free to advance your ideas.