YOU know NOTHING about Chinese history.With the GDP Song has,if it was as martial as the Tang Dynasty,it would totally destroy the Jurchens,Tanguts and the Mongols.
A favourite quotation I've read about the Song Dynasty was basically this:It has the GDP(comparative) level of the United States,the military spending of Nazi Germany and the military prowess of Fascist Italy.
While Song was undoubtedly a very wealthy economy, the method of calculation could be disputed. We can take all days discussing why it's unreliable to deduce the GDP numbers based on fiscal income, food price, or workers' wages, it doesn't matter because wealth doesn't necessarily translate into military power.
Often, an over sophisticated economy makes it hard to manage for a state with an inadequate legal and management system, or extract resources from it. An over monetized economy is often more fragile than a simpler agrarian economy. In short, possessing a sophisticated economy often works against military performance.
You know, while you can compare across dynasties, or across countries, you can never say one is "more martial" and another is less. Martial prowess isn't a linear feature. Different dynasties has to fight different enemies in different forms of wars and shape their armies accordingly, and their domestic conditions, which are often their predecessor's making, varied as well. (Let alone comparing it to countries in XX Century.)
Tang's campaigns against the Eastern and Western Turks were splendid successes, but even they were bogged down in fighting the Tibetans (Remember Du Fu's Bing Che Xing?) and the Khitans (Yes, the same Khitans as the Liao.) and often suffered defeats.
Liao and Jin, while keeping their nomadic characters, had their own agriculture, industry and writing system were much, much stronger and well established than purely nomadic people like the Xiongnu, the Turks, the Northern Yuan or the Dzungars.)
darthfanta said:
The odds were not stacked against the Song Dynasty.
I've just explained why they were.
darthfanta said:
The problem with the Song Dynasty was that it prioritised civilian control over the military so much that they would generally place complete amateurs(bureaucrats) over the control of the army,who would sometimes try to command the army in battle miles away from the front as if they have invented radios.Successful generals,no matter how loyal they were,were executed or removed from power from baseless charges due the the bureaucrats' jealousy of military success.They generally see successful generals as competitors for power.Another problem the Song army had was that it's soldiers were so badly treated that morale and discipline was inevitably poor.This also meant that the brightest would serve as civil servants rather than join the military.A final problem is the so-called 'lack of cavalry'.Unlike what plenty of people have said,the Song Dynasty,while it has less horses than the Tang Dynasty,could have still formed reasonably large cavalry forces(smaller than the Tang of course),the problem however was that instead of making an independent cavalry force,they tend to intersperse their cavalry all over the army,mixing them with infantry(a bit like what the French did with their tanks during WWII). Organizationally,the entire Song army was a complete mess.
I'd like to see some of your sources on Song cavalry tactics. But please bear in mind that horses are needed for message relay, scouting, transportation, as well as civilian purposes.
For military uses, quality of horses vary wildly depending on where they were raised, and how they were raised. There are plenty of discussions on this topic, and both
ancient sources and
modern discussions agreed that Song horses were vastly inferior in both quality and quantity, and they were utterly dependent on foreign sources, which in turn means that Liao and Xia could cut Song off during wartime, preventing the Song from replenishing its losses. This could explain why the Song could not sustain in long wars against the Liao.
Now compare it to Liao's lavish cavalry forces :
For every formal soldier, there are three horses, one forager, one tent guard. 每正軍一名,馬三匹,打草穀、守營鋪家丁各一人 (遼史: 卷三十四志第四兵衛志上)
Horses reproduce, reaching as much as a million,牧馬蕃息,多至百萬 (遼史/卷24)
The Taizong selected elite troops from all across the country, sending his personal guards into the Army of Pishi. A cavalry of five hundred thousand was assembled, and might of the state was boosted. 太宗益選天下精甲,置諸爪牙為皮室軍。合騎五十萬, 國威壯矣。”(遼史‧兵衛志中)
Granted, these records might be exaggerated, but it's still a far cry from Song documents full of desperate cries of horse shortages.
Things were worse for Southern Song. They were reliant almost sorely on Tibet for battle-worthy horses.
Song only fell decades after he died.By the time Song actually fell,it was decades after the Mongols attempted their conquest.Take note that all of this was against a poorly organized,motivated and trained army that has very little cavalry and competent leadership.
Doesn't all these proves that the Song military wasn't as bad as previously assumed? They held against military pressure from Liao, and Jin, and Yuan, who were all organised states, other than nomadic raiding bands.
darthfanta said:
Most of the time,the civilian leadership in the capital basically said screw the army and had the army poorly supplied and paid.To prevent coups and mutinies,the best and brightest were discouraged from joining the military,and in the event that a genius level general like Yufei did arise,they would generally have them killed or dismissed from service due to jealousy.
Yue Fei was a special case. The court, feeling insecure after a great disturbance, killed the person with more troop on his hand than all others.
Comparing how Song generals were treated to what was it like in other Chinese dynasties, I'd say Song treated their officers comparatively well.
Also take note that if the Song Dynasty was actually competent,it would have conquered Western Xia (which would have given them better cavalry) and reclaimed the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun(which would have provided a natural barrier against aggression from nomad invasions from the north).
Invading a country with strong cavalry, using infantry forces, to solve the problem of horse shortage? It sounds like a recipe for military disaster, which was exactly what happened.
Sorry,but what I've read is largely in Chinese.
Still do share it please. Many of our members do read Chinese.
If the Song Dynasty had a competent army,the Mongols wouldn't be owning half of China to begin with.They lost over half of China to the Jurchens and the Tanguts due to their incompetence.They were so pathetic that they couldn't even conquer land from the Khitans who were at the same time getting badly mowed by the Jurchens.If the Song Dynasty was at least competent,they'd be able to reconquer the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun from the Khitans,and from there get a natural boundary to easily defend against northern nomads.There's also the fact that if they didn't lose half of China to the Jurchens and the Tanguts the Mongols wouldn't be able to get any of their engineers.We are not talking about the Song suddenly becoming militarized when the Mongols invaded,but when they first began the dynasty.
Even if we are talking about what would happen when they militarized when the Mongols started invading,chances are that with reforms they could have weathered the Mongol storm.Southern China isn't really particularly favorable to horses.There's also the fact that the Song did resist for decades successfully in the south,and that's with a leadership and army that's widely known as incompetent.Just think about the possibilities of what would happen if the leadership was in fact competent.
To sum up, while it's okay to blame "culture", "lack of martial spirit", or "to value letters and belittle arms", doing so often lead us to ignore many real problems Song Dynasty faced, some of them inherited from late Tang and the Five Dynasties.
Song had a disadvantageous head start in the first place. No other major dynasty started with its major defensive terrains and horse pastures already lost, or with a well established agro-pastoral state next door, in possession with the pre-mentioned defensive terrain and horse pasture. Qin, Han, Sui and Tang started in the Northwest, and they often fought with the help of nomadic tribes. Ming started against a semi-decayed Yuan, which was too weak to defeat the Southern warlords, but strong enough to keep other nomadic groups suppressed.