WI a Different peace on the eastern front in WW I

Peace negotiations began on December 22, 1917, a week after the conclusion of an armistice between Russia and the Central Powers, at Brest-Litovsk (modern Brest, Belarus, near the Polish border). The Germans were represented officially by Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann, but the most important figure in shaping the peace on the German side was General Max Hoffmann, Chief of Staff of the German armies on the Eastern Front (Oberkommando-Ostfront). Austria-Hungary was represented by Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin, and from the Ottoman Empire came Talat Pasha. The Germans demanded the "independence" of Poland and Lithuania, which they already occupied, while the Bolsheviks demanded "peace without annexations or indemnities" — in other words, a settlement under which the revolutionary government that succeeded the Russian Empire would give neither territory nor money.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Armisticebrestlitovsk.jpg

OTL Treaty of B-L.

We all know how that bold part worked out for the Russians as Germany enforced its views by marching into the Ukraine, the Baltic states and Belarus which they annexed in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, an enormous concession for Lenin and his merry band. The Germans of course lost this empire in the Treaty of Versailles and this chunk of territory was too big anyway since it took the Germans 1 million men to occupy it. Suppose the Soviets accept the original peace in their crappy military situation and peace is made around December 1917 or January 1918.

Poland and Lithuania become independent German puppet states and the 1 million they needed IOTL to occupy their gains can mostly be sent west. What effect does this and more prep time have on the spring offensives of 1918 if they occur? Is there an opportunity for a late CP 'victory'?

Thoughts or suggestions?
 

Deleted member 1487

Most of the men left were 3rd and 4th line troops. They would be useless in the West, much like the Austro-Hungarians were OTL in 1918. However the major benefit to both would be relieved of the need to logistically support their far-flung occupation troops with their woefully inadequate resources. This won't change things much in the terms of a CP victory or draw, as the deal was sealed with US entry, but there are some major effects on the course that 1918 takes which can change the post-war situation.

First, the AH will freak out that they can't try to exploit Ukraine for food, but OTL it didn't supply anything for the home front anyway. Instead, it fed the troops on the ground, but at very high political cost, as the so-called 'bread peace' resulted in the AH turning parts of Galicia over to the Ukrainian nationalists for food, alienating the loyal Poles, which in turn helped to destabilize the empire as this once key group now joins the call for independence. Without occupying Ukraine, AH won't turn this land over and piss off the Poles, and may even get grain in the peace deal.

More importantly, without the promise of Ukrainian grain the AH are forced to start farming again, hopefully meaning they start to demobilize soldiers for farm labor and return some nitrates to agriculture. Hopefully this will enable troops returning from Russian PoW camps from turning to brigandage when they were denied this option OTL. Also, the weakest point of the AH war effort was their logistics meaning they were least able to send troops beyond their borders and supply them. Without the need to do that, trains can return to stabilizing the home front, preventing situation like in 1918 where 5000 train cars full of wheat rotted in Trieste because there wasn't enough locomotives to pull it, as there were too many trains being used in the East. So things are less unstable at home in 1918 (hopefully).

Same goes for the Germans-they won't have to supply troops in the Caucasus so those trains and coal can be used to transport food from the country side to the cities, helping morale. Now if they could only get rid of the incompetent Hindenburg plan....

1918 sees the CP home front and, by extension, the remaining fronts more stabile due to better supply. It also frees up crucial manpower for duties at home, which were not decisive but helpful nonetheless. The war is still lost, but with a more stabile home situation perhaps the CPs can then hold on longer, which would prevent a Versailles type situation, as the CPs can then reject it without worrying about revolution at home (well as bad as OTL) and push for moderation of terms.

Honestly the best thing the Habsburgs could do would have been to pull out of Northern Italy and the precarious supply situation there to they're own borders and defensible terrain with intact armies, enabling them to negotiate or force the Italians to fight their way into Austria, giving them leverage in a peace deal. It also helps change the way the Empire dissolves, perhaps changing the post war situation immensely, creating greater stability in the post war states.

Austria is the one state that stands to benefit, as with a stabile army and more stabile home front, they could defend their new state with their defensible borders. This also means that more German minorities near the border could be included in the nation by militarily means, which also helps support the Germans in their bid for a negotiated peace. It defends their southern border and could very well force the Allied forces moving through the Balkans to pause while pushing on, as the prospect of fighting through Austria is not exactly appealing. Austria can then be joined to Germany after the Habsburgs are removed from power by internal pressure and the Empire collapses. This sets precedent for these nations to be joined. Hungary is still screwed. The Czechs might now be able to get exactly what they want in the peace deal either, if it means Westerners having to die for their aggrandizement. The Galician Poles are a bit of a wild card, as they will probably revolt and join Poland, but will they be judged for staying with the Austrians for longer ITTL? Also, without the bad blood over the Ukraine deal, will the Galician Poles be up for invading Germany with the rest of the Poles? They are the breadbasket of the new state and have disproportionate power then in the new state.
 
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Most of the men left were 3rd and 4th line troops. They would be useless in the West, much like the Austro-Hungarians were OTL in 1918.

Could they not have been sent to quiet sectors of the front, and so released other troops to take part in the offensive?
 

Deleted member 1487

Could they not have been sent to quiet sectors of the front, and so released other troops to take part in the offensive?

No, because those 'quiet' sectors were also staffed by 3rd line troops also. In 1918 there were several classifications of German divisions, attack being 1st line, static or trench being second, with the 3rd and 4th line being made up of the least fit and old men (including most in their 50's and 60's). Literally all they were good for was occupation duties, no front line service. Honestly, all the remaining fighting fit troops were already committed, there was no last reservoir of young men of fighting quality. There was a reason that the 1 million men were left in the East: they had no use elsewhere. They were deprived of horses for the most part and only sucked up useful resources (i.e. trains) that were more profitably spent at home, as the supposedly resource rich areas turned out to be resource sinkholes.
 

Typo

Banned
I actually tried to make a TL based on this.

If Germany still loses, then what's interesting is how far the USSR get in the early 20s if they hold the Ukraine and two of the three Baltic states to start with.

The Bolsheviks might actually successed in getting all of the old Tsarist empire minus Finland back.
 
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