Are we forgetting that Napoléon's Egyptian expedition and his original being sent to Italy (where he made a reputation for himself at Arcole) were both under the First French Republic? The Second Republic was as much of a joke. I wouldn't say that they won't embark on a hare-brained project.
WI: A Competent Napoleon III?
- Thread starter woll
- Start date
Are we forgetting that Napoléon's Egyptian expedition and his original being sent to Italy (where he made a reputation for himself at Arcole) were both under the First French Republic? The Second Republic was as much of a joke. I wouldn't say that they won't embark on a hare-brained project.
IIRC from the Aronson bios of Napoléon III (Queen Victoria and the Bonapartes, The Rise and Fall of the Third Napoléon; The Golden Bees - which covers all of the Bonapartes from Carlo Buonaparte all the way down to the pretender at the time of publication, as well as parts on the side-lines of Murats, Patterson-Bonapartes, Comte Walewski, de Morny and the de Beauharnaises), it's mentioned there. And ISTR reading it another bio of the period as well that Bismarck deliberately edited the telegram to sound like "a flourish of trumpets"
All true, but it is always difficult for a regime when it doesn't control the cities other than by repression
All Prussian non-commissioned officers were well educated in 1870, and a lot of them had been at the university. These Feldwebels knew that once their service in the army was over, they would not be forgotten, and get a position in the government bureaucracy . In terms of subalterns, I remember reading that there were French captains and even lieutenants well over 40 years old, the corresponding ranks in the Prussian army were at least 10 years younger (and lieutenants were in their 20s).
All this is true, but equally true is that in such a coalition government the conservatives will ask for their pound of flesh. There must be some concessions to the poorest classes, and I don't see an Ollivier government being able to muster a majority for that. I have also a question for you: after the fall of the empire, and the woes which followed such as the extra 6 months of war and the Commune of Paris, the economy of Republican France rebounded strongly in the 1870s (while the same economy was not strong at all in the second half of the 1860s): why was that?
Maybe you are right, and my anti-Bazaine prejudice is too strong. In any case I don't condone Bazaine's decision to try to take in his hands the future of France, and I believe it was a good thing that he failed.
You have certainly a point here, and I freely admit that I'm personally guilty to look back at military matters in the 19th century with 20/20 hindsight.
Most likely the point is not really important: the important thing is that the army of Chalons has not been ruinously defeated at Sedan, and that LN is still in power and in Paris. At this point, a cease fire and a peace treaty are in the cards, since Bismarck too has his own chickens to sort both at home (the war expenses are mounting very fast) and on the diplomatic side (no one in Europe is happy about this war, and fears that the outcome might be too upsetting: funnily enough, Italy and Austria were on the same page, for a change, and they were the most proactive in trying to call a conference of the Powers to mediate, although neither the British nor the Russians were showing too much interest)
It was the Thouret amendment, which was proposed in August 1848, and when LN spoke against it, his speech was less than impressive. However Cavaignac did not support it at the time (probably trying to show himself super partes), and the amendment failed. When the amendment came up again a couple of months later, Cavaignac changed his mind, but by that time it was too late.
You can check it here:
The French Republic under Cavaignac, 1848
General Louis Eugene Cavaignac has been a symbol of reactionary violence ever since he crushed the insurgent workers of Paris in the "bloody June Days" of 1848. Professor de Luna presents a fresh interpretation of the General, as well as a detailed examination of the turbulent year of European...
books.google.it
Last edited:
The banking system essentially.
One of the main features of the economic boom experienced in the 1850s was a financial revolution with a significant expansion of credit tools. French banking may not have been as powerful as that of the British, but it was quite powerful in its own right.
Even though shaked by the bankruptcy of the Pereire brother in 1867, the French financial sector remained healthy and in 1870, the credit score of France remained high, allowing Magne to borrow enough money to make up for war spending. That same way, Thiers was able to pay war indemnities to Germany in advance of schedule.
To put things further into perspective, that's the same banking sector that would eventually heavily invest in Russia as part of the alliance in the 1890s.
It makes sense.
At the time, Louis-Napoléon was considered by pretty much the entire establishment as a non entity. His past attempts at taking power in 1836 and 1840 had been miserable failures, and he wasn't helped by the strong german accent he got from his youth lived in Switzerland. Thouret reacted this way, but he was far from being the only one. Thiers and the remaining conservatives didn't think otherwise and supported Cavaignac candidacy. So everyone was surprised by Louis-Napoléon's election.
In terms of modern equivalent, to understand from our perspective, that was like US presidential election of 2016, with Louis-Napoléon playing Trump's playboy populist with the mantra "my name is my program". Noone took him seriously enough to see what was coming and didn't take measures that would bar him from power. Besides, Thouret's amendment didn't fit into the long term plans of the ultra conservative right and its efforts at restauring the monarchy.
To add some precision, public debt exploded from 55% to about 80% of GDP because of the war expanses and the war indemnities, the latter of which were funded through borrowing. That led to an important increases in taxes and duties through the 1870s that allowed to balance the budget and at times generate excedents. The 1880s were marked by an interventionnist policy marked by siginificant state spending on infrastructure, once again driving public debt to new highs, and it wouldn't be until the economic expansion of the 1890s that it would recede from 115% of GDP to a mere 60% on the eve of the Great War.
But I was referring to the banking sector as a reason of that economy rebounding because it's my understanding public debt at the time was mostly owned by domestic entities, from private citizens to banks. The point being that France had consistently the capacity to borrow to make up for its expenses.
But I was referring to the banking sector as a reason of that economy rebounding because it's my understanding public debt at the time was mostly owned by domestic entities, from private citizens to banks. The point being that France had consistently the capacity to borrow to make up for its expenses.
Last edited:
The solution might have been to keep the Presidential Election in the hands of the Assembly, without approving the Thouvet amendment. LN would never gain enough support in the House to be elected
It was planned so, albeit not in a particular way. If none of the candidates had reached over 50% of the votes, the election would have gone to the assembly which would have choice between the five candidates with highest number of votes.
That was the Lamartine compromise, wasn't it? He hoped to gain the presidency if no one got a majority.
However, earlier on in the year, the Assembly had to decide if the president would be elected through popular vote, or by the deputies in the Assembly. They went for the former, opening the door for a populist candidate; if they had kept the presidential election in the Assembly....