WI: 2nd Schleswig War = Great European War?

So, I've been doing some more research for future updates on my timeline, and I came across this in David Duff's Eugenie and Napoleon III;
This was a moment when Napoleon might have opposed Prussia and, if he had, he would have had the backing of Eugenie. But Napoleon was ill and his troops were scattered in Rome, Algiers and Mexico. He tried to retrain his position as the arbiter of Europe though statesmanship not war, and he concentrated on driving a wedge between Prussia and Austria. To an extent he succeeded, but delay of the day of reckoning was his only prize. It was to Britain that he should have looked for the answer to the threat rising like a mist about him. But there Queen Victoria, who should have been talking face to face with the Emperor whom she liked and understood so well, was sitting in the gloom listening to the sepulchral voice of Albert repeating on the well worn record that everything that Prussia did was right.

If the Queen and her Ministers had talked with the Emperor at this time, perhaps the German Empire might never have been born. Thirty years later Lord Rendel was chatting with Mr Gladestone:
Mr G. told me as a fact not enough know... that the Third Napoleon had in 1864 missed an opportunity which, turned to account by France, would probably have altered the whole course of subsequent history. Lord Palmerston, without the consent of the cabinet or, indeed, any consultation with it, made, towards the end of the Session, in and through him, a statement that if Denmark choose to stand firm in the Augustenberg affair and resist the dictation of Germany, Denmark would not find itself alone. Denmark naturally interpreted this declaration as a pledge of British aid, and on finding it a broken reed greatly resented this betrayal. When it came to the point, it was clear England would not undertake to protect Denmark single-handed against Prussia, Austria, and the Bund, and so it was necessary at the least to throw over Palmerstone and Denmark.

But meanwhile the government made proposals to France for a joint assistance of Denmark, and undertook, if France would go in with England, to aid Denmark with all its force by sea and land. Napoleon was foolish enough to decline the proposition, on the ground that the interests involved for France were much inferior to those of England, which might look after its own affairs. So Denmark went to the wall, and the first aggressive steps in the series of movements by Prussia towards the creation of the German Empire and the reduction of French pretension was secured at a a time when Louis Napoleon might have easily nipped the Bismarck program in the bug.

[...]

It was not only the Austrians who were vanquished at Sadowa, but the French also. Napoleon had lost his power in Europe. His offers to mediate were brushed aside. Even King Victor Emmanuel ignored him now. He knew full well that, with his forces deployed and the feeling of the people against war, he could not face a show-down with Bismarck. He did not realize that, if he had quickly dispatched a force to the scarcely guarded banks of the Rhine, the Southern States might well have joined him and the Prussians forces obliged to retreat towards Berlin. Yet that fear hung heavily over Bismarck's head-quarters.

So, plenty to work with here. I think of several PODs off the top of my head in the immediate time-period that would lead to France agreeing to the British position; it had only been a decade earlier that the two had been allies in the Crimean War. So what are the repercussions, short-term and long-term (50+ years) if France, Britain, and Denmark declare war on Prussia (and potentially Austria) over the Schleswig-Holstein Question?
 
Well it wouldn't be a war with just Prussia and Austria, but with the whole German Confederation although Prussia and Austria were the most powerful members.
It was the time of the German nationalism and unification, so perhaps this larger foreign threat could result in a larger German Empire including Austria, since it certainly provoke a national reaction especially when French forces (from their POV every time since Richelieu) will attack the German Confederation. A German loss could postpone the unification, but it won't prevent them in the long run.

Furthermore at the time, at least in Britain, they didn't oppose the German unification; the French position as an European great power on the continent was more opposing.
 
Hmm, that seems to actually be the opposite of what I've been reading :confused:

I've read that there was sympathy for the German cause, that is the right of the Germans to unify, although at the same time they did feel sorry for poor Denmark, regarding the Schleswig wars.
 
I've read that there was sympathy for the German cause, that is the right of the Germans to unify, although at the same time they did feel sorry for poor Denmark, regarding the Schleswig wars.

Hmmm. So Perhaps the Brits enter the war rather halfheartedly?

Also, sources? If you don't mind me asking. I'm going off the aforementioned work by Duff as well as Elizabeth Longford's Victoria R.I. , and about a dozen or so online resources, I'd have to pull up my bookmarks to check exact titles/urls for you. Duff and Longford in particular paint a picture of a Victoria that was still in mourning over Prince Albert's rather abrupt death, and thus clinging to his past advice regarding Prussia, while she was also quite put-out with Louis Napoleon over his infidelity, as Victoria and Empress Eugenie had become close friends.

As Palmerston obviously was eager to counter the German threat, perhaps either with a later death for Albert (possible POD; he doesn't go to see the Prince of Wales [future Edward VII] over his affair with Nellie Clifden, either because he doesn't believe the rumors or the affair never happens), or a closer working relationship between Napoleon and Victoria (possible POD; No affair with Madame Walewska, which broke the bonds between the two, as well between Napoleon and Eugenie), leads to a British government more fully committed to the Danish cause? IOTL Napoleon was a bit over a flip-flopper on the issue, only countermanding the orders to send his troops to the Rhine the night before, so I feel that with a stronger commitment from Britain he would go-ahead and make that push.
 
This is a fantastic idea for a timeline. Do you propose that Sweden/Norway would intervene in this war? I understand the Students Scandinavian movement was operating at this time. If this does erupt into a general war I think we would see a lot of swedish volunteers, if not outright Swedish intervention.
 
This is a fantastic idea for a timeline. Do you propose that Sweden/Norway would intervene in this war? I understand the Students Scandinavian movement was operating at this time. If this does erupt into a general war I think we would see a lot of swedish volunteers, if not outright Swedish intervention.

I'm not sure, I hadn't thought of the Swedes, however if we see Swedish involvement we might see the Russians becoming involved as well. The Ruskies had, after all just lost a major war to the Franco-British entente cordiale only a decade earlier; on the other hand Russia had previously supported Denmark during the first First Schleswig War, and had basically forced Prussia to bow out of the war under threat of invasion. Add into all that that the Russians and Swedes had a long history of conflict and I could see the Tsar objecting if there are too many 'volunteers' arriving to support Denmark from countries not directly involved in the war.

Also, I agree its an excellent idea for a timeline, however I'm rather busy with my own. I was throwing this out here just to see what other people thought of it as a WI; if someone takes the ball and runs with well that'd just make my day :)
 
This is actually a really interesting period for a war. The French and Austrians will be using extremely similar shock tactics, which the Austrians adopted after 1859 and the French abandoned after the Austrian defeat in 1866. Despite their small numbers the British are really going to cause the Prussians difficulty- they have accurate breech-loading cannon which the French lacked in 1870, and can shoot accurately at distance unlike the Austrians in 1866.

It's important not to make the mistake of over-rating the Prussian military at this point. Though the Dreyse is imperfect its strengths cover a multitude of flaws, but the army as a whole is still shaking down after the Roon reforms. The excellent Wars of German Unification by Dennis Showalter explains:

"The crucial question was whether, and how well, the restructured army could fight. Here the verdict was more mixed. In particular, foreign observers noted that the Prussian dispersed formations tended to get out of hand. The short-service conscripts were willing enough, but lacked the initiative of men with more time in uniform. Deployed in open order, too many young soldiers got lost or went to ground and stayed there. Only men in the third year of service, argued most company officers, could really be trusted on a skirmish line. The rest, as a rule, wasted ammunition to no purpose. At the storming of Dueppel and, later, Alsen Island, even company columns fell into confusion, failed to press forward attacks or stalled because the captain was uncertain of how to proceed. Colonel Emil Rothpletz, a Swiss officer, noted that his Prussian counterparts preferred to use battalions rather than companies whenever the terrain permitted, while the Austrial official history stressed that vulnerability of Prussia's small company columns to either counter-attacks or fire action."

The Prussian artillery is far from being the effective machine it was in the Franco-Prussian war- in 1866 it was fairly solidly humiliated against the Austrians due to poor tactics and obsolete equipment. Furthermore, rather than the slick effective mobilisation of 1870 the rest of the German Confederation will mobilise slowly (see the time taken by the West German Federal army in 1866) and any action they take will suffer from the fact that all ten corps were under a single army commander nominated by the Austrians.
 
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