WI: 1983 nuclear disaster - with a twist?

I'm sure many of you know of Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet air defense officer who prevented nuclear war in 1983. He was commanding the Oko early warning station when it falsely "detected" a US missile being launched. Petrov correctly judged it was a false alarm.

Let's say, however, that the duty officer who called in sick and had Petrov take his place hadn't? Suppose Petrov hadn't been there for whatever other reason? Or suppose that he followed protocol and sent the warning?

The Politburo meets in Moscow. With only minutes to decide, they make the decision to retaliate. Nuclear launches are ordered against US and NATO targets.

Then, the report comes in - the system has malfunctioned and it was a false alarm. However, nuclear missiles have already been launched, and are streaking their way. Andropov picks up the hot line and calls Reagan, likely after Reagan has been notified that US early warning stations have picked up the Soviet launch, and explains that yes, Soviet nukes are inbound, but that it was based on a false alarm.

So what do you suppose Reagan's decision, as well as the advice of his cabinet and advisers, would have been? How would it have all ended?
 
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Once the Russian Missiles are in the air, Regan will authorize the launching of the US Missiles. Then He might take the phone call but by then it too late.
We still follow MAD. US missiles are launched on warning of incoming. The reason why the Russian missiles were launch in the first place is meaningless.
 
Once the Russian Missiles are in the air, Regan will authorize the launching of the US Missiles. Then He might take the phone call but by then it too late.
We still follow MAD. US missiles are launched on warning of incoming. The reason why the Russian missiles were launch in the first place is meaningless.

This unfortunately. The moment those Soviet missiles go green so do the USA's. All that happens is that Reagan gets a single phone call which essentially amounts to "Our bad."
 
Yeah, the thing is that a nuclear first strike is a nuclear first strike. In nuclear war everybody loses but the longer Reagan waits the more Americans are certain to die.
 
Some historians do dispute that Petrov prevented an exchange and he has certainly not claimed to have done so. It's unlikely that Soviet launch procedures depended on a single warning station any more than the US would launch based on a DPS based warning, or an indication from a single BMEWS station.

It is unlikely that it would even have gone to the Politburo as PVO H.Q would have checked other indications and concluded it was a false alarm.
 
Some historians do dispute that Petrov prevented an exchange and he has certainly not claimed to have done so. It's unlikely that Soviet launch procedures depended on a single warning station any more than the US would launch based on a DPS based warning, or an indication from a single BMEWS station.

It is unlikely that it would even have gone to the Politburo as PVO H.Q would have checked other indications and concluded it was a false alarm.

That is my thought also. However on this site he is worshipped
 
Some historians do dispute that Petrov prevented an exchange and he has certainly not claimed to have done so. It's unlikely that Soviet launch procedures depended on a single warning station any more than the US would launch based on a DPS based warning, or an indication from a single BMEWS station.

It is unlikely that it would even have gone to the Politburo as PVO H.Q would have checked other indications and concluded it was a false alarm.

Actually, he almost certainly did. Had he pressed the alarm, the information would have been immediately transferred to Moscow. The Politburo would have met in emergency, and would be told that they have only minutes to decide. It's very likely that they would have ordered an immediate launch.
 
The soviet union wouldn't launch a massive assault based on just three or five missiles though. The more likely thing is if they really thought it was legit they'd either wait to verify if more missiles were coming in or in till they had actually landed on soviet territory and since the missiles didn't exist welp
 
The MAD doctrine placed the recipient of an accidental attack in a "use them or lose them" position with respect to land based ballistic missiles and bombers. It would be almost certain that among the targets of a Soviet first or retaliatory strike would be SAC bomber bases and missile sites. Thus, two legs of the strategic triad, missiles and bombers, were shaky when it came to having time to make a decision.

Compounding the difficulty was that one had around 30 minutes from missile launch to impact. Subtract 10 minutes to confirm a genuine launch and you have about 20 minutes to decide whether to launch or not -- even less figuring some time lag between getting your bombers in the air before detonation. I'd say that in practice, a President had between 5 and 10 minutes to make a decision. There was a reason the nuclear football was always near the President.

Accordingly, I have no doubt at all that the US response would have been at least a massive retaliatory strategic missile attack. Perhaps, if communication was established that made clear the launch was based on a false warning -- and such communication were believed, which may be a rather dubious proposition -- there could have been a possibility of holding back bombers and sub-launched attacks, but all or a significant portion of the land-based missile arsenal would have been launched, which would have been catastrophic in and of itself.
 
???with what?

The ABM system protecting Moscow? ;)

If SAC believed that a possible attack was underweigh it would scramble its bombers and send them to their positive control points. Something CINCSAC could do without having to wait for further orders. If the President chose to use them they would be sent in, however if he did not, they could then be recalled and land at alternative bases (probably civil airports).
 
Some historians do dispute that Petrov prevented an exchange and he has certainly not claimed to have done so. It's unlikely that Soviet launch procedures depended on a single warning station any more than the US would launch based on a DPS based warning, or an indication from a single BMEWS station.

It is unlikely that it would even have gone to the Politburo as PVO H.Q would have checked other indications and concluded it was a false alarm.

Correct. The idea that a single radar station report leads to instant Armageddon is like a Soviet remake of Matthew Broderick's "Wargames". In the film, you heard constant overhead announcements like "BWEWS reports confidence is high!" Which would have been complete and total bullshit, since the BMEWS chains would have seen nothing.:rolleyes:

The MAD doctrine placed the recipient of an accidental attack in a "use them or lose them" position with respect to land based ballistic missiles and bombers. It would be almost certain that among the targets of a Soviet first or retaliatory strike would be SAC bomber bases and missile sites. Thus, two legs of the strategic triad, missiles and bombers, were shaky when it came to having time to make a decision.

Compounding the difficulty was that one had around 30 minutes from missile launch to impact. Subtract 10 minutes to confirm a genuine launch and you have about 20 minutes to decide whether to launch or not -- even less figuring some time lag between getting your bombers in the air before detonation. I'd say that in practice, a President had between 5 and 10 minutes to make a decision. There was a reason the nuclear football was always near the President.

Accordingly, I have no doubt at all that the US response would have been at least a massive retaliatory strategic missile attack. Perhaps, if communication was established that made clear the launch was based on a false warning -- and such communication were believed, which may be a rather dubious proposition -- there could have been a possibility of holding back bombers and sub-launched attacks, but all or a significant portion of the land-based missile arsenal would have been launched, which would have been catastrophic in and of itself.

This presupposes that the Soviets are launching most of their arsenal. Do they launch everything based on a single report? Was the Soviet command structure so incredibly vulnerable that no means existed to retaliate after the first few minutes?

The ABM system protecting Moscow? ;)

If SAC believed that a possible attack was underweigh it would scramble its bombers and send them to their positive control points. Something CINCSAC could do without having to wait for further orders. If the President chose to use them they would be sent in, however if he did not, they could then be recalled and land at alternative bases (probably civil airports).

Uh, that system is/was pointed at INCOMING missiles, not at outbound Soviet missiles scattered in bases all over the USSR.

This is getting silly.
 
Yeah, the thing is that a nuclear first strike is a nuclear first strike. In nuclear war everybody loses but the longer Reagan waits the more Americans are certain to die.
Besides, imagine it from Reagan's POV: The Russians' call is going to come in around the same time the US detects the launches in the first place, which means the Russians lose nothing by calling him. As such, he might decide that it's just an attempt to delay his response, by claiming it was all an accident. Considering that the Russians have just launched a first strike, they're not exactly the most trustworthy of sources.
 
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