WI: 1941 Two Front War for Soviet Union

Actually I don't see it that way. My impression is that it was a disparate and motley crew held together by the Political Komissars and Beria's Barrier Troops (zagraditelnye otriady). Given the tittering discontent, it is potentially not a stretch to see that intense suspicion might drive them apart.

That is nonsense. An army cannot be held together by fear alone. Had the Soviets been driven by nothing but fear then it would have disintegrated. In reality, it was a combination of coercion and genuine patriotism that motivated the Soviets to fight and with the Germans still undertaking a brutal and genocidal invasion, that same patriotism will still work hand-in-hand with the same coercion.

If done right, it migth come out as if the Baltic discontent and central asian one has nothing doing with Berlin.
We're talking the most rigorously policed state on the planet where Stalin holds a level of control Hitler can only dream about. The efficiency of the NKVD at this can be demonstrated by how pretty much all of the agent provocateurs the Germans tried to send OTL were swiftly caught.

Again, the whole point of my PODs is to keep Allies completely out of this one.
Which actually weakens Germany, without being able to loot Western Europe.

You raise some very valid points. I agree. However, please note, the point of conflict between belligerents is Vladivostok which they manage to hold. IJN is fully deployed.
Which is nice. But the IJN can't take Vladivostok. They can bombard it, they can blockade it, but taking it requires the IJA. And the IJA is going to be a bit busy getting smashed up in Manchuria.

Err no. Please see my response to Ian_W above.
Your response is based on an analysis of how a Soviet-Japanese war would develop that is completely at odds with the reality of the power of the relevant combatants.

German Economy is geared from 1935 onward with the bigger focus.
So no different then OTL.

What was looted in OTL is obtained via trade.
With what currency? The German rearmament program consumed any money that would be required for trade, with the result that Germany by 1940 was verging on fiscal collapse. Germany obtaining what it needs via trade and Germany building the army required to invade the USSR are mutually exclusive propositions.

Strength is more or less consistent with OTL, but critical experience is lacking.

I rather doubt that, actually. Just for one example: the Germans tapped out all most of their mobilizable manpower in 1941 preparing for Barbarossa and were only able to raise the numbers they did by replacing them with 1.5 million French PoWs.
 
I rather doubt that, actually. Just for one example: the Germans tapped out all most of their mobilizable manpower in 1941 preparing for Barbarossa and were only able to raise the numbers they did by replacing them with 1.5 million French PoWs.

So it's even worse than I suspected.
 
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So it's even worse than I suspected. Lol.

Yeah, they were able to get out even more manpower later on from the agricultural and industrial sectors by replacing them with Soviet PoWs and slave labor from the occupied territories along with cannibalizing a number of civilian industries... but if not for that the Germans would have found themselves flat out of combat-aged men to recruit in 1941.
 

Ian_W

Banned
But I am asking a "what if" such scenario does take place ?

For a start, you'd get some sort of diplomatic response from France. Something like an agreement with the Soviet Union that says ...

Article 1
In the event that France or the U.S.S.R. are subjected to the threat or the danger of aggression on the part of a European state, the U.S.S.R. and France engage themselves reciprocally to proceed to an immediate mutual consultation on measures to take in order to observe the provisions of Article 10 of the League of Nations Pact.
Article 2
In the event that, in the circumstances described in Article 15, paragraph 7, of the League of Nations Pact, France or the U.S.S.R. may be, in spite of the genuinely pacific intentions of the two countries, and subject of unprovoked aggression on the part of a European state, the U.S.S.R. and France will immediately lend each other reciprocal aid and assistance.
Article 3
Taking into consideration the fact that, according to Article 16 of the League of Nations Pact, every member of the League that resorts to war contrary to the engagements assumed in Articles 12, 13 or 15 of the Pact is ipso facto considered as having committed an act of war against all the other members of the League, France and the U.S.S.R. engage themselves reciprocally, [should either of them be the object of unprovoked aggression], to lend immediate aid and assistance in activating the application of Article 16 of the Pact.
The same obligation is assumed in the event that either France or the U.S.S.R. is the object of aggression on the part of a European state in the circumstances described in Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the League of Nations Pact.
Protocole de Signature

Article 1
It is understood that the effect of Article 3 is to oblige each Contracting Party to lend immediate assistance to the other in conforming immediately to the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as they are announced under Article 16 of the Pact. It equally understood that the two Contracting Parties will act in concert to elicit the recommendations of the Council with all the celerity that circumstances require and that, if nevertheless, the Council, for any reason whatever, does not make any recommendation or does not arrive at a unanimous decision, the obligation of assistance will nonetheless be implemented

Oh. Wait.

Thats the actual 1935 Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance.
 
In my opinion:

I don't think it would have gone very far. The Germans were unsuited for strategic bombing and manufacturing meaningful quantities (let alone effective deployment) of such aircraft was probably beyond their means. In any event strategic bombing had a rather secondary place in German doctrine: they expected to quickly overrun opposing countries with their land army, avoiding a prolonged campaign. The role of their air force was as a ground support weapon.
That was with Udet and Jeschonnek Driving the show. As I said in my POD, Udet is dead or sidelined for a variety of reasons. Health or whatever. His buddy Goering is busy elsewhere to listen to him. Wever is getting lot of clout and addresses the points you mentioned as well as change the doctrine. Also note, I didn't say Stuka's are completely eliminated. Just not as prominent. My point here is that, Soviets are subjected to 2000 Kilo Bomb load per aircraft rather than puny 250 kg. Of course JU-88 did have Dive Bomb capabilities, just not as good I suppose.
Lake Khasan was in 1938. If the Japanese had started a war in 1936 it would have gone very, very badly for them. Not only was the Red Army unaffected by Stalin's purges at the time, but even at this stage its best forces under its best officers were concentrated in the Far East. According to Coox the correlation of forces between the USSR and Japan at this time was as follows:
Fair Point. What I wanted to butterfly was that, Even if Lake Khasan happens in 38, the neutrality pact's percussion with the diplomatic route don't happen, thus closing the door on the future neutrality pact. As to Vladivostok, Without Khalakin gol, strategy is shifted possibly IJN influence that Naval force could be brought to bear. Not to mention relative proximity to home islands. with Oil in Daquing, the Port of Vladivostok would be handy.
We're talking the most rigorously policed state on the planet where Stalin holds a level of control Hitler can only dream about. The efficiency of the NKVD at this can be demonstrated by how pretty much all of the agent provocateurs the Germans tried to send OTL were swiftly caught.
Yet we still had Nationalistic movements. There was initial enthusiastic support to the Germans until Germans shot themselves in foot there with the Scorched Earth.
Which is nice. But the IJN can't take Vladivostok. They can bombard it, they can blockade it, but taking it requires the IJA. And the IJA is going to be a bit busy getting smashed up in Manchuria.
You didn't read. No Khalkin Gol.
For a start, you'd get some sort of diplomatic response from France. Something like an agreement with the Soviet Union that says ...
Oh. Wait.

Thats the actual 1935 Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance.
France in the 30's had a quantity of Fascist inclined population as well as politicians. They were very much aware of Little Entente pact but did lip service anyway. Their intention was to make pact with all neighbors of Germany. The Western parties to that pact clearly felt they were to be the whipping boy in Soviet Benefit in case of aggression. Given OTL Track Record of France's sticking to their pacts, this one has less of a chance as well.
 
That was with Udet and Jeschonnek Driving the show. As I said in my POD, Udet is dead or sidelined for a variety of reasons. Health or whatever. His buddy Goering is busy elsewhere to listen to him. Wever is getting lot of clout and addresses the points you mentioned as well as change the doctrine.

It doesn't matter who you put in charge of the Luftwaffe, it does not change the fact that Germany lacks the industrial capacity to build an adequate strategic bombing force without grossly harming it's tactical air and/or ground force to a point that the strategic bombing force never gets a chance to do it's work. The catch 22 is dead simple: strategic air power needs breathing space to work, and without a suitably adequate tactical air and/or ground force, Germany won't have enough breathing space. But to acquire the adequate tactical air and/or ground forces necessary to get the breathing space, Germany must sacrifice its strategic air force. It simply does not have the industry to do both.

The only countries in WW2 which were able to build strategic air forces of sufficient size to have a noticeable impact on the war were the British and Americans. The Americans were able to do it because they were the largest industrial power on the planet. The British were able to do it because from mid-1940 until mid-1944 they didn't have to worry about devoting the large amounts of resources needed to fight a major ground campaign and were being bankrolled by the Americans to boot. Neither of these apply to Germany. Even then, the full development of their strategic air forces took years and by the time their strategic bombing campaigns were able to drive the Germans and Japanese to the brink of industrial collapse, these two countries were already disintegrating due to their defeat in the ground (for Germany) and naval (for Japan) wars.

Fair Point. What I wanted to butterfly was that, Even if Lake Khasan happens in 38, the neutrality pact's percussion with the diplomatic route don't happen, thus closing the door on the future neutrality pact. As to Vladivostok, Without Khalakin gol, strategy is shifted possibly IJN influence that Naval force could be brought to bear. Not to mention relative proximity to home islands. with Oil in Daquing, the Port of Vladivostok would be handy.
The Japanese have no capacity to take the port of Vladivostok. A direct amphibious assault on the port would fail in the face of the strong garrison and heavy coastal fortifications. A naval landing nearby would be swiftly isolated and annihilated by a Soviet response force. An overland assault from Manchuria would require the IJA to defeat the Red Army... which it is manifestly incapable of doing. The IJN isn't a complete irrelevancy in a Soviet-Japanese war, as they would permit the Japanese to take Sakhalin and thwart any potential invasion of the Japanese mainland once Manchuria and Korea are overrun, but it is an irrelevancy where it matters: the clash between Soviet and IJA forces on the Manchurian/Soviet border.

The lack of neutrality pact is more then made up for by something vastly better: the defeat of the IJA and the eviction of Japanese forces from Manchuria and Korea. With that done, all the Soviets need to defend in the east are coastal defense forces around the possible landing sites and some mobile reserves to counterattack a developping beachhead and throw it back into the sea before it can be established. That requires rather fewer troops then what the Soviets needed to guard their eastern frontier IOTL.

Also: why are you bringing up the Daqing oil field again? You already accepted that particular facet is impossible in the timeframe discussed.

Yet we still had Nationalistic movements.
Only in the territories which had been recently occupied. Beyond that, any potential opposition had been crushed long ago and once the Germans moved across the 1939 frontier, they were met with apathy at best (and that quickly turned into hatred as the Germans went to work, see below).

There was initial enthusiastic support to the Germans until Germans shot themselves in foot there with the Scorched Earth.
German behavior in the Soviet Union was also an inevitability, given that they were necessary to make the invasion logistically possible and economically justifiable. Not to mention a full-scale invasion just flat out does not endear one to the population (as happened IOTL). So all the German actions which turned the general Soviet populace against them will still occur.

You didn't read. No Khalkin Gol.
Please try to read what I actually wrote. You stated that instead of Khalkin Ghol in 1939 we have a general Soviet-Japanese war in the 1936-38 period. My reply to this was to state the obvious: it results in the Japanese getting thrown off the before the 1940s roll around, butterflying away the purges and giving the Soviets an excellent learning experience in modern warfare that they can then apply against the Germans.

You make some pretensions in the OP about the Japanese taking Vladivostok, but this is completely contrary to the reality of how a war between the USSR and Japanese would actually develop. So I ignored it in favor of pointing out the impossibility of it.
 
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Ian_W

Banned
France in the 30's had a quantity of Fascist inclined population as well as politicians. They were very much aware of Little Entente pact but did lip service anyway. Their intention was to make pact with all neighbors of Germany. The Western parties to that pact clearly felt they were to be the whipping boy in Soviet Benefit in case of aggression. Given OTL Track Record of France's sticking to their pacts, this one has less of a chance as well.

Uhuh. They had fascist politicians. And they signed the actual 1935 Treaty of Mutual Assistance anyway.

You nailed the intention by the way. And with Poland a Nazi ally, the USSR becomes a neighbour of Germany.

The OTL record of France sticking to their pacts was shown on 3 September 1939.
 
a few quick observations....

to win a war against the Soviet Union the Germans have to use what worked for them in the Great War...

1. a large allied force (Austrians last time, if they play their cards better, the Eastern Europeans this time). The Poles fought a major war against the Soviets in 1919-1921 and won a defensive victory and achieved survival. That the Poles started the war to grab territory is important as well. Even if second rate in terms of equipment to the Germans, the Poles, Balts and other Eastern Europeans can absorb casualties and stretch out the front.

2. Prepare for the logistical demands of this campaign, which are indeed daunting and huge. Creveld goes into depth on how the Germans failed to do that in "Supplying War" The answer is not more trucks. The answer is spending resources on a better rail system with more slack in Germany, and devoting more men and resources to fixing the Soviet railways as they are overrun.

3. Know when to stop and dig in for the winter and or spring thaw

4. Fight to achieve a satisfactory victory. Conquering Russia isn't possible. Stripping away Soviet territory (trying for Brest Litovsk round 2 in other words) was in the Great War and might be here.

5. Unity of command ... someone running the front who is not the head of state with other demands on his time. Improves coordination all across the board. The 3 principal German army groups were bad at coordinating their actions unless directed to do so by the Fuhrer. So were the air fleets assigned to each one. Often the Germans robbed peter to pay paul during the campaign even when things were going well. Unit of command would reduce that kind of inefficiency.

To name just some things that went well for the Germans that do not require the Red Army to be the Imperial Russian Army

Regarding the Japanese... while a highly professional force and fairly large in 1936, the entire Japanese Army in 1937 only had 300,000 men and 17 divisions only part of which are in Manchuria. It lacks the manpower and formations to take on the Soviets in that era with hope of success. It needs at least 60 divisions, and least half for the operation for any hope of a successful Siberian adventure. As to equipment, while Japanese tanks aren't very good in 1936, neither are Soviet tanks. The BTs and T26s have some substantial issues, as of course do the Japanese tanks (type 97s). Point is however the Type 97 isn't available yet either. The Japanese have similar lack of depth in army aviation and while the IJN is a marvelous instrument in 1936 and would easily wipe out any Soviet ships that braved leaving port, it cannot do much more than that. Although I suspect a strong enough naval support assigned to an assault or siege of Vladivostok might give the Japanese that ... if it can be cut off from reinforcement (difficult)

Also important, the Japanese were prepared to fight a defensive war against the Soviets in the 1930s, but had no ambitions until they expanded their army in fighting an offensive one.

Meanwhile back in Germany....

the preparations, both military and diplomatic, you need require Hitler not being himself, or him being dead. Munich was the last chance for Hitler to achieve what he wanted peacefully. After that, he promptly seized the rest of Czechslovakia and permanently alienated the West. You need the West to fail to make Poland security guarantees and an alliance for the Poles to see alliance with Germany as a better answer than OTL. As the Poles have spent 20 years waging an internal propaganda war against both the Soviets and Germans, this is not easy. It isn't impossible, but again very hard. Hitler being around would to my mind make it impossible.

The points about German economic weakness are well put and well documented in a number of works. Getting the West to help Germany or at least not hinder it requires the West to see the Soviets as a bigger threat than Nazi Germany. This too is hard. The cash problem is indeed an issue.

Regarding a heavy bomber force. We know based on World War II experience that to really hit a target hard you need at least 300 heavy bombers to do it with. The Germans couldn't manage that in the 1930s and would be hard pressed to do so without a bigger industrial base than they had available. Even then it takes multiple raids and you still don't actually destroy the target, only cripple its productivity.

It took the Western Allies until 1944 to routinely get 300 American heavy bombers over a German target, and 1943 for the British to do it, as well as a painful learning curve. Now no one knows this in the 1930s, but still it would be a serious mistake for the Luftwaffe to forgo that chance to build one of the best tactical air forces ever fielded to build a heavy bomber force that would be more expensive and harder to maintain.

That said, having at least a hundred or so heavy bombers would be helpful for all kinds of missions from hitting Moscow at night to maritime patrol missions. It would require sacrifices though, or greater depth.

Regarding the Soviet Army... "Ivans War", a book that looks at the Red Army in some detail in the prewar and early war years, makes a good point about the lack of professionalism and substitution of party orthodoxy and zeal over effectiveness. It took some embarrassing fumbling in the Soviet invasion of Poland and worse fumbling in Finland along with the shock of the French collapse to really convince Stalin and the Party that military effectiveness requires professionalism and professional military officers who are competent even if they lack the true communist spirit.

Without those events, the Red Army will have to learn on the job. If it fights the Japanese in the 1930s it gets that chance. Without it it has to learn fighting the Germans. While the Germans aren't the experienced and tactically / operationally proficient force in 1939 that they were in 1940-41 (with Operation Merita... invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece probably their high point in that respect), they are still a lot better than the Soviets are in OTL in 1939. Defeating the Poles, who had a large army and who fought very bravely even while going down in defeat was something the Soviets weren't able to do in 1921.

My own suggestion, if you want a two front war with the Soviets, look at 1941, and assume the Japanese did get their ass handed to them and did something to remedy some of their worst problems.
 
a couple of other things regarding Germany in 1939

it has only a handful of Panzer divisions, some light divisions (weaker panzer divisions basically) and a handful of other motorized divisions. To put it another way, enough for one panzer army, not the 4 it had in 1941. It needs more time for production. Also the Panzer II is still the bulk of the German tank force, and they are even worse than the BT7 and T26 in weapon, armor and reliability.

And yes indeed, the Russians adapted very quickly. Figure the Germans have two years tops before their proficiency advantage melts away, just as it did in OTL, and once the fighting starts, it will be difficult to expand the armored force the Germans need to pull even a settlement that is close to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk.

also don't underestimate how much zeal there actually was in the Red Army. There was quit a lot actually, and many Russians truly believed that Communism was wonderful and the key to a better future for all. Throw in patriotism and the Red Army truly did consist of men and women who fought what they believed as a just war.
 
Figure the Germans have two years tops before their proficiency advantage melts away,

More like a little over a year and a half (one can trace a marked improvement in Soviet performance towards the end of summer 1942). And it only took the Soviets that long OTL because their forces kept getting demolished before they could really improve them and they had to focus on getting the next batch out the door. A weaker German assault which peters out further west would allow the Soviets to spend more attention and utilize more resources to fix their manifest problems.
 
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