WI: 1770 war over the Falklands

T What prevented the British victory was the ignorance of the situation and characteristics of the colonies and their inhabitants (they assumed would be less patriotic than their British counterparts). And this genre in their excessive ambition and objectives of the commanders on the ground.

I would probably add the successful resistance by the peoples of Argentina to this list.

this is something of a nuanced point, but it's a key one. You're treating the British victory as more likely than not. I'm pointing out that Britains' history fo expeditions in the Americas after 1770 or so is underwhelming, unless there's a local base of support.
 
Antecedents

Since one must first know the antecedents or causes ,from the Hispanic perspective,are:

The treaties of Utrecht (1713 and 1715) were very important to the
penetration of the English in the Plata, in particular its provisions
commercial, to the extent that they were given a title to navigate the
Atlantic and continue smuggling by Cologne in coalition with the
Portuguese, as well as for fishing and whaling and to try
seize the Falklands. Attempted to seize an isthmus of Panama
(key point of the Spanish trade) by the Admirals Anson and Vernon (1741), ended, however, a failure despite the British triumphalism (including commemorative coins were coined before knowing
win!).

During the administration of William Pitt the old (1756 - 1761), Count of
Chatham, who focused his foreign policy in the domain of the sea and the development of overseas colonies, England began planning the conquest of Spain's possessions in America. His son of the same name who also served as head of the British government, was the author in 1802 of a plan developed jointly with the Venezuelan adventurer Francisco de Miranda, who planned to take over the most important points of the Spanish Empire in America (Venezuela and the Plata), to extend its trade and promote their independence subject to England.
Indeed, the growing economic importance of silver, combined with
its strategic location made it suitable for the importation of British goods smuggling and export, also illegal, Potosí silver and gold in Chile.

Also acted in this regard, rootlessness and discontent of part of the upper classes and their desire to engage in direct trade with England. These factors are reflected in the frequency with which the region appeared in the British military projects and commercial expectations and explains the accession of the London merchants to the promoter of the invasion plan del Plata hosted by Pitt the Younger, Commodore Home Popham. While the insistence of the military leaders to impose English rule became the filibuster to Buenos Aires in a political and military disaster, the brief occupation of Montevideo had been a great economic success, as the crowd of traders sent by the English government had sold over a million pounds in just four months, and flooded the market rioplatense British manufactures, bankrupting many many traders and the emerging industry. It is, in the words of Peter Winn:

"... The River Plate showed no enthusiasm for Creoles change the government of a senile Bourbon [Charles IV] by a crazy Hannover [George III], but eagerly rushed to craft products entered Montevideo." (1)

The circumstances that led to the attack on the Rio de la Plata began with the rupture of the Peace of Amiens in 1802 Among Napoleonic France and England and Their allies resumed hostilities Between the two former rivals HAD suspended. Spain's refusal to enter the third coalition against Napoleon to England So irritated, Which led her to commit an act hostility to the infamous attack in October 1804, without a declaration of war.

1WINN, Peter. England and The Purple land. FHCE, Montevideo, 1997, pp.(https://openlibrary.org/books/OL21454530M/Tierra_purpurea. http://www.abebooks.com/tierra-purpurea-Purple-Land-England-Lost/9033171388/bd)

four Spanish frigates from the merchant and Callao
Montevideo sailing for Spain, off Cape St. Mary
Rocha. The reaction of Carlos IV was allied with France.

Despite its weight, Father José Manuel Pérez Castilian not
unless it could refer to this abominable act (according to his words) as follows:

"The British broke the peace that we enjoyed, albeit in a
precarious, and broke with the appalling fact that attacked Oct. 5
the frigates, Clara, Fame, Medea, and Mercedes, who left
Montevideo with flow on 9 August of that year. They took the three
first and made the fourth flight, killing most of its crew,
passengers and families who were in it with the insurance being in peace with the English had no reason to fear their insults. "4
In the blowing of the "Mercedes" met his death, among many, almost
entire family of Don Diego Alvear-the limits demarcator San
Ildefonso-; namely his wife, seven children, and a nephew and two
dependent-five slaves. 5
River Plate had begun to feel the English power and loathe Britain.

'... In the war that followed the casus belli made by the English government,
Spanish fleet was annihilated 'gloriously', along with France, compared
at Cape Trafalgar, October 21, 1805, by the far superior fleet
Admiral Horatio Nelson. This, in April 1801, had shelled the port
Copenhagen however-not the fact that Denmark was a country neutralpara
persuade him to leave the League of Neutrals, which integrated with
Prussia, Russia and Sweden, from the prior year and disintegrated as
result of that attack.
The defeat of Trafalgar left incommunicado Spain and its dominions
Americans. The British government, to finalizing the plan to take over the
Spanish Indies trade, saw this as the favorable situation and gave the last
preparatory step, taking over the Dutch colony of Cabo Buena Esperanza-from just three months earlier.

2 Taking Buenos Aires by the British
The April 14, 1806, when news Montevideo already had the
It takes the Cape of Good Hope by the British, set sail from this to the
Silver conquering expedition composed of 11 warships equipped with powerful artillery. On the island of St. Helena he made a scale, which strengthened its ground troops, commanded by Brigadier William Carr Beresford, amounting to 1,600 men. On June 8, the fleet arrived at Silver and blocked the entrance to the river. Aware of this, the viceroy, Marquis Rafael de Sobremonte, meant the ships, because of their size, they could not enter the port of Buenos Aires, so he hastened to send Montevideo few veteran forces that were in the capital and ordered the militia barracks ... 6
Sobremonte not knowledgeable landing had retired to
Córodoba with the flows of the Viceroyalty-more than a million pesos as
Ferns- and file of the capital, in compliance with the explicit details of the Board of War 1797 Montevideo rivalries and passions of the time made of the fact a leak, and the viceroy a coward. This version was picked up with a vengeance by an uncritical subsequent historiography, which until today's date unknown those rules and honorable service of Sobremonte as governor of Mendoza and defender of the border with Portugal (Brazil) in the Rio Yaguarón (Uruguay).

The truth is quite different. The invasion was not unexpected, but rather,
feared since the war for independence against England in the United
States, and it obeyed the measures taken by the Boards of War Montevideo 1796 and 1797, provisions that-due to the
limitations treasury Spaniard could not give them more effectively. Surely
Englishmen found a Viceroyalty unprepared. First,
because an extension of so much territory had only a few thousand
veteran soldiers, trusting their safety to neighboring militias bad
armed and worse disciplined, made as one hundred percent to their
adherence to the regimen. Is logical disadvantage to 1,500 veterans,
well armed, trained and iron discipline, motivated by robbery
made the previous year remittance Peruvian gold and silver had
represented a bounty of four million pesos. The authorities had
to improvise a defense by Blandengues, seasoned in the fight against Indian border and smugglers. But the tactic of fulminant
attacks and rapid withdrawals learned from the Indians, effective in the fight against them, failed to English: her fire was accurate and the outbreak of pomegranates (unknown) caused panic among the defenders. All this, plus the surprise factor explaining the surprisingly easy victory English, both the invaders as some historians attributed to the invader enjoyed a favorable reputation among locals.
No sooner taken possession of Buenos Aires, Beresford directed, 29
June, a proclamation to the people, promising to protect private property
and respect the Catholic religion and the laws of the country. The same would then
British bosses in Maldonado and Montevideo, and they violate their
word.
Most people are appalled, humiliated with defeat
and hostile to the invader, but not without the faction that wanted congraciase with
they. The English did not neglect the proselytizing work or stopped
interact with existing Masonic elements in the city, and even founded some new lodges, which acted Saturnino Rodríguez Peña and Miguel Aniceto Padilla (to their eternal infamy).
However, they did not attempt to engage with some disaffected groups with the Spanish government. Indeed, Beresford
sought to tempt the dominant sectors, keeping officials in office, confirming the duty of obedience of slaves to their masters-in
times when, for reasons of interest, England began to press
Europe to abolish slavery and getting him coolly
breakaway faction. However, highlighting the purpose
essentially mercantile conquest, on August 4, almost on the eve of their expulsion, the invading chief decreed free trade, with very low rates
customs in order to facilitate the empowerment of the colonial market .... "

4 CASTILIAN PEREZ, Jose Manuel. Report on the British invasions, In: Selected Writings. Chronicles
Historical 1787 - 1814 Montevideo, 1968 Uruguayans Classics Collection No. 130, p. 45.
5 Gandia, Enrique De. Buenos Aires Colonial. Clarity, Buenos Aires, 1957, pp. 71-72.

6 PALACIO, Ernesto. History of Argentina. Lillo Peña, Buenos Aires, 1957 Volume I. p. 154-155.
7 BAUZÁ Francisco. History of Spanish domination in Uruguay. Barreiro y Ramos, Montevideo, 1895, pp.
387-388. ARREGUINE Victor. History of Uruguay. Printing and Lithography Reason, Montevideo, 1892,
pp.118-119.

Oscar Abadie-Aicardi - In the 200 years of the English invasions of Rio de la Plata. 73
Humanities Year VI • No. 1 • December 2006 ISSN: 1510-5024

Jose Manuel Perez Castellanos 4. Report on the British invasions, In: Selected Writings. Chronicles
Historical 1787 - 1814 Montevideo, 1968 Uruguayans Classics Collection No. 130, p. 45.
5 Gandia, Enrique De. Buenos Aires Colonial. Clarity, Buenos Aires, 1957, pp. 71-72.











Antecedents and causes:

The treaties of Utrecht (1713 and 1715) were very important to the
penetration of the English in the Plata, in particular its provisions
commercial_ to the extent that they were given a title to navigate the
Atlantic and continue smuggling by Cologne in coalition with the
Portuguese, as well as for fishing and whaling and to try
seize the Falklands. Attempted to seize an isthmus of Panama
(key point of the Spanish trade) by the Admirals Anson and Vernon (1741), ended, however_ a failure despite the British triumphalism (including commemorative coins were coined before knowing
win!).

During the administration of William Pitt the old (1756 - 1761), Count of
Chatham, who focused his foreign policy in the domain of the sea and the development of overseas colonies, England began planning the conquest of Spain's possessions in America. His son of the same name who also served as head of the British government, was the author in 1802 of a plan developed jointly with the Venezuelan adventurer Francisco de Miranda, who planned to take over the most important points of the Spanish Empire in America (Venezuela and the Plata)_ to extend its trade and promote their independence subject to England.
Indeed, the growing economic importance of silver, combined with
its strategic location made it suitable for the importation of British goods smuggling and export, also illegal_ Potosí silver and gold in Chile.

Also acted in this regard, rootlessness and discontent of part of the upper classes and their desire to engage in direct trade with England. These factors are reflected in the frequency with which the region appeared in the British military projects and commercial expectations and explains the accession of the London merchants to the promoter of the invasion plan del Plata hosted by Pitt the Younger, Commodore Home Popham While the insistence of the military leaders to impose English rule became the filibuster to Buenos Aires in a political and military disaster_ the brief occupation of Montevideo had been a great economic success, as the crowd of traders sent by the English government had sold over a million pounds in just four months_ and flooded the market rioplatense British manufactures_ bankrupting many many traders and the emerging industry. It is, in the words of Peter Winn:

"... The River Plate showed no enthusiasm for Creoles change the government of a senile Bourbon [Charles IV] by a crazy Hannover [George III], but eagerly rushed to craft products entered Montevideo" (1)

The circumstances that led to the attack on the Rio de la Plata began with the rupture of the Peace of Amiens in 1802 Among Napoleonic France and England and Their allies resumed hostilities Between the two former rivals HAD suspended Spain's refusal to enter the third coalition against Napoleon to England So irritated_ Which led her to commit an act hostility to the infamous attack in October 1804, without a declaration of war

1WINN, Peter. England and Purpurea Earth. FHCE, Montevideo, 1997 pp.

four Spanish frigates from the merchant and Callao
Montevideo sailing for Spain_ off Cape St. Mary
Rocha The reaction of Carlos IV was allied with France.

Despite its weight, Father José Manuel Pérez Castilian not
unless it could refer to this abominable act (according to his words) as follows:

"The British broke the peace that we enjoyed_ albeit in a
precarious_ and broke with the appalling fact that attacked Oct. 5
the frigates_ Clara_ Fame, Medea_ and Mercedes_ who left
Montevideo with flow on 9 August of that year. They took the three
first and made the fourth flight, killing most of its crew,
passengers and families who were in it with the insurance being in peace with the English had no reason to fear their insults "4
In the blowing of the "Mercedes" met his death, among many_ almost
entire family of Don Diego Alvear-the limits demarcator San
Ildefonso-; namely his wife_ seven children, and a nephew and two
dependent-five slaves. 5
River Plate had begun to feel the English power and loathe Britain.

'... In the war that followed the casus belli made by the English government,
Spanish fleet was annihilated 'gloriously'_ along with France, compared
at Cape Trafalgar, October 21, 1805_ by the far superior fleet
Admiral Horatio Nelson. This_ in April 1801, had shelled the port
Copenhagen however-not the fact that Denmark was a country neutralpara
persuade him to leave the League of Neutrals_ which integrated with
Prussia, Russia and Sweden, from the prior year and disintegrated as
result of that attack.
The defeat of Trafalgar left incommunicado Spain and its dominions
Americans. The British government, to finalizing the plan to take over the
Spanish Indies trade_ saw this as the favorable situation and gave the last
preparatory step_ taking over the Dutch colony of Cabo Buena Esperanza-from just three months earlier.

2 Taking Buenos Aires by the British
The April 14, 1806, when news Montevideo already had the
It takes the Cape of Good Hope by the British, set sail from this to the
Silver conquering expedition composed of 11 warships equipped with powerful artillery. On the island of St. Helena he made a scale, which strengthened its ground troops, commanded by Brigadier William Carr Beresford, amounting to 1,600 men On June 8_ the fleet arrived at Silver and blocked the entrance to the river. Aware of this, the viceroy, Marquis Rafael de Sobremonte_ meant the ships_ because of their size, they could not enter the port of Buenos Aires, so he hastened to send Montevideo few veteran forces that were in the capital and ordered the militia barracks ... 6
Sobremonte not knowledgeable landing had retired to
Córodoba with the flows of the Viceroyalty-more than a million pesos as
Ferns- and file of the capital, in compliance with the explicit details of the Board of War 1797 Montevideo rivalries and passions of the time made of the fact a leak, and the viceroy a coward. This version was picked up with a vengeance by an uncritical subsequent historiography, which until today's date unknown those rules and honorable service of Sobremonte as governor of Mendoza and defender of the border with Portugal (Brazil) in the Rio Yaguarón (Uruguay)

The truth is quite different. The invasion was not unexpected_ but rather_
feared since the war for independence against England in the United
States, and it obeyed the measures taken by the Boards of War Montevideo 1796 and 1797_ provisions that-due to the
limitations treasury Spaniard could not give them more effectively. Surely
Englishmen found a Viceroyalty unprepared. First,
because an extension of so much territory had only a few thousand
veteran soldiers, trusting their safety to neighboring militias bad
armed and worse disciplined, made as one hundred percent to their
adherence to the regimen Is logical disadvantage to 1,500 veterans_
well armed, trained and iron discipline_ motivated by robbery
made the previous year remittance Peruvian gold and silver had
represented a bounty of four million pesos. The authorities had
to improvise a defense by Blandengues_ seasoned in the fight against Indian border and smugglers. But the tactic of fulminant
attacks and rapid withdrawals learned from the Indians, effective in the fight against them_ failed to English: her fire was accurate and the outbreak of pomegranates (unknown) caused panic among the defenders. All this, plus the surprise factor explaining the surprisingly easy victory English_ both the invaders as some historians attributed to the invader enjoyed a favorable reputation among locals.
No sooner taken possession of Buenos Aires, Beresford directed, 29
June, a proclamation to the people_ promising to protect private property
and respect the Catholic religion and the laws of the country. The same would then
British bosses in Maldonado and Montevideo, and they violate their
word
Most people are appalled, humiliated with defeat
and hostile to the invader, but not without the faction that wanted congraciase with
they The English did not neglect the proselytizing work or stopped
interact with existing Masonic elements in the city, and even founded some new lodges, which acted Saturnino Rodríguez Peña and Miguel Aniceto Padilla (to their eternal infamy)
However, they did not attempt to engage with some disaffected groups with the Spanish government. Indeed, Beresford
sought to tempt the dominant sectors, keeping officials in office, confirming the duty of obedience of slaves to their masters-in
times when, for reasons of interest, England began to press
Europe to abolish slavery and getting him coolly
breakaway faction However, highlighting the purpose
essentially mercantile conquest, on August 4_ almost on the eve of their expulsion, the invading chief decreed free trade, with very low rates
customs in order to facilitate the empowerment of the colonial market .... "

4 CASTILIAN PEREZ, Jose Manuel Report on invasions_ In: Selected Writings

Chronicles Historical 1787 - 1814 Montevideo, 1968 Uruguayans Classics Collection No. 130, p 45

5 Gandia_ Enrique De Buenos Aires Colonial. Clarity, Buenos Aires, 1957_ pp 71-72.

6 PALACIO, Ernesto. History of Argentina Lillo Peña, Buenos Aires, 1957 Volume I. p. 154-155

7 BAUZÁ Francisco History of Spanish domination in Uruguay Barreiro y Ramos, Montevideo, 1895, pp
387-388 ARREGUINE Victor History of Uruguay Printing and Lithography Reason, Montevideo, 1892 .pp.118-119.

Subpoenaed in: Oscar Abadie-Aicardi - In the 200 years of the English invasions of the Rio de la Plata. 73
Humanities Year VI • No. 1 • December 2006 ISSN: 1510-5024
 
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Argentina

I would probably add the successful resistance by the peoples of Argentina to this list.

this is something of a nuanced point, but it's a key one. You're treating the British victory as more likely than not. I'm pointing out that Britains' history fo expeditions in the Americas after 1770 or so is underwhelming, unless there's a local base of support.

To answer directly, is not that interested in British military history but in the Rio de la Plata estuary dominated the fleet, possessed the coast of the Eastern Band of the Uruguay with its major cities and even his worst attempt poorly planned and developed (full of logistical errors, command and communication between those responsible for carrying out the plan) of Regaining the viceregal capital; there was no threat to its rule or its eventual expansion.
Driven by ambition and triumphalism (government and military commanders), they forgot that the main objective was to Montevideo (the best port in the region, home of the Spanish naval station in the South Atlantic), gateway to the rich interior, but a city poor out of opportunities to enrich themselves by plunder. My point is that the British defeat in Buenos Aires was not inevitable, nor was also victory.
A victory that despite the rich booty more than likely, not guaranteed to remain in the city, much less control the Viceroyalty nor crazy plan to open a path of communication with Chile, who believed in British hands.
Naturally popular resistance and self-summoned militia, made the difference between the earlier capture of the capital and the final attempt that culminated in defeat, surprising the British planners
and that they had made them dependent on the fleet surrounded supplies an actively hostile population.
Finally the British commander could perfectly, pay the forces in their immediate comandso acebtar not withdraw all forces from Rio de la Plata. Evacuating the city of Montevideo (which could not have been recovered by the Argentines), whose possession would have been legitimate in the future peace
with the Spanish crown.
 
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You realise a lot of what you used is from past 1770 right?

Yes, I have noticed it. But since, the only historical attempt at conquest by England in the region, to argue against the impossibility of this attempt and do a reverse extrapolation to the time of the pod, is used
I thought appropriate to establish the causes of the events of 1806-07 and its results in Otl (from my point of view, Historic, of course).

Sorry, if I sidetracked too, pod theme.
 
But Britain was significantly weaker in OTL in the 1770s as well; compare its ability in naval battles during the period to how it perofrmed agianst the Franco-Spanish forces during the Napoleonic War.

And even if Buenos Aires falls, don't the locals in the surrounding territory just bleed the British? Much like the Americans in New York, actually...

The British were highly successful in the Seven Years' War in defeating both the French and then the Spanish navies. It's not inevitable that they'd maintain the upperhand in a Falklands War seven years later, but I think it's more likely than not. That would then allow them to invade again with a similar invasion force. Or, in fact, a bigger one, since in this war, the South Atlantic would be a major focus to the conflict rather than a sideshow: if they capture Montevideo it's game over for the Spanish.

Also, assuming British maintain naval dominance, the population of the surrounding territory is going to be (a) very small (b) cut off from Europe and (c) without any nearby cities supporting them. I think the Boers are the closer analogy than the Americans: a major problem, but not a terminal one.
 
The British were highly successful in the Seven Years' War in defeating both the French and then the Spanish navies. It's not inevitable that they'd maintain the upperhand in a Falklands War seven years later, but I think it's more likely than not.

That's true, but it's also something the Bourbons were aware of. Which is why they backed down... And as the War of Independence showed, the French navy was no pushover. (Or else Cornwallis wouldnt' have given up the ghost).

That would then allow them to invade again with a similar invasion force. Or, in fact, a bigger one, since in this war, the South Atlantic would be a major focus to the conflict rather than a sideshow: if they capture Montevideo it's game over for the Spanish.

Why do the Brits want Montevideo, as opposed to Cuba or Louisiana?

I think the Boers are the closer analogy than the Americans: a major problem, but not a terminal one.

The population of South Africa, according to Wikipedia, was about 27,000 whites in 1807. So I don't think a population 10X the size is the valid analogy, here.

This really seems to be asking "WI the Bourbons were idiots, so Britain can paint more of the world pink?"
 
That's true, but it's also something the Bourbons were aware of. Which is why they backed down... And as the War of Independence showed, the French navy was no pushover. (Or else Cornwallis wouldnt' have given up the ghost).

You can't have it both ways: that the French navy was both so weak they wouldn't have got into a war, and also strong enough that British victory is not certain.

Why do the Brits want Montevideo, as opposed to Cuba or Louisiana?

Havana would be more of a priority, but Montevideo is the base for the South Atlantic, so more strategic than New Orleans.

The population of South Africa, according to Wikipedia, was about 27,000 whites in 1807. So I don't think a population 10X the size is the valid analogy, here.

The Boers also didn't have a major British ally with a colony to the north that could be used to surround them.

This really seems to be asking "WI the Bourbons were idiots, so Britain can paint more of the world pink?"

What idiocy are the Bourbons having to do? I get that there's a resistance to the British expanding territory beyond what they had in our timeline, but the idea that it's impossible for them to hold a naval dependent colony when they have naval supremacy is a bit silly.
 
You can't have it both ways: that the French navy was both so weak they wouldn't have got into a war, and also strong enough that British victory is not certain.

I don't think the French would get into a war; they were pretty clearly calculating when their fleet would be large enough to attack Britain, and when it would be an ideal time to do so. That's why I think this is a nonstarter; the French plan was to watch the British collapse in isolation and alienation of 3 million Americans.

Havana would be more of a priority, but Montevideo is the base for the South Atlantic, so more strategic than New Orleans.

Not to the American colonists.

The Boers also didn't have a major British ally with a colony to the north that could be used to surround them.

No, just the Zulus, which I do not think are much better. (Though I would need to check the date for the Zulus). And how are the Argentines surrounded? Is Paraguay also taken?

What idiocy are the Bourbons having to do? I get that there's a resistance to the British expanding territory beyond what they had in our timeline, but the idea that it's impossible for them to hold a naval dependent colony when they have naval supremacy is a bit silly.

I don't have any resistance to it, as such. But I think we need an explanation as to why the French risk a war when they didn't OTL, and instead of answering that we started carving up Argentina, on the theory that the defeat of thousands of British troops in two different campaigns is a fluke.
 
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I don't think the French would get into a war; they were pretty clearly calculating when their fleet would be large enough to attack Britain, and when it would be an ideal time to do so. That's why I think this is a nonstarter; the French plan was to watch the British collapse in isolation and alienation of 3 million Americans.

The point is that we avoid the unrest in America, so that isn't something to wait on. In OTL the Spanish were keen on a fight, so it surely wouldn't take much for the French to have the same perspective. Perhaps we can say that Choiseul was dismissed after the Seven Year's War and someone else replaced him.

Not to the American colonists.

True. There was a plan in the 7YW for a colonial army to march across land for this. That doesn't have to compete with British troops.

No, just the Zulus, which I do not think are much better. (Though I would need to check the date for the Zulus). And how are the Argentines surrounded? Is Paraguay also taken?

Paraguay is not exactly easy to navigate through, and Brazil existed north of them also. By this point in history, Paraguay was also economically dependent in Buenos Aires, so it's not going to be a good source of supplies for the rebels. Certainly not in the way other American cities were for the Americans.

I don't have any resistance to it, as such. But I think we need an explanation as to why the French risk a war when they didn't OTL, and instead of answering that we started carving up Argentina, on the theory that the defeat of thousands of British troops in two different campaigns is a fluke.

Your first question is fair. I think we can say a more aggressive foreign minister who built up the navy sooner and bought into Spanish thinking over the Falklands. Perhaps this guy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/César_Gabriel_de_Choiseul

I don't think the defeat of thousands of British troops twice was a fluke. But I also don't think it was rout by the Argentinians. Here they are a quarter smaller, which would shift the balance towards the Brits. Especially if they had this as a primary part of their war focus rather than a badly mismanaged sideshow.
 
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