Why would France aid the CSA against the USA?

Not to be churlish, but because it was the ONLY time the British "won" against a peer competitor in the Nineteenth Century after the Industrial Revolution, perhaps?

The Russian war required the combined might of the Ottoman, French, and British empires and the Kingdom of Sardinia to prevail against the Russians (and the threat of the Austrian Empire, of course).

If coalition warfare doesn't count why even debate the Civil War? It's not like the British are going into the war without the CSA after all. So going by the track record of Britain in coalition warfare I'd call the Union doomed then. ;)

Though your use of quotation marks around won is highly amusing. Apparently annexing the enemies territory doesn't count ;)

And the British lost every battle in 1880-81 against the Boers.

I imagine the fact they were outnumbered in every fight might have had something to do with it. Well that and the rather remarkable lack of critical thinking Colley displayed.

Though again the relevance of a three month war against an unreinforced colonial garrison is highly questionable.

So if it takes 250,000 British empire troops 11 months to "overrun" the entirety of Boer territory (and another 20 to actually get a surrender, but oh well, that doesn't count, apparently, because the British who died in the last 20 months of the war didn't count, I guess),

The British won the conventional war in 11 months. That is not up for debate.

The length of time it took them to win the guerrilla war is irrelevant when discussing any hypothetical war with the Union. Unless you're suggesting the Union armies will just disband let the British walk in and occupy the entire United States then fight a guerrilla war against them I don't see what point you're hoping to prove other than you seem to be unable to distinguish between a conventional and guerrilla war.

Evidently you're of the opinion that Operation Iraqi Freedom and the war in Afghanistan are 100% comparable to each other.

I wonder how many troops and how much time it will take to "overrun" the US in 1861-65.

Well since absolutely no one but you has suggested this I hope you enjoy arguing with yourself.

Or how many French troops it will take to do the same to Mexico?

36,000 seemed fairly capable of doing it. I recall Juarez was pretty strapped for options until the Civil War ended. I can only imagine how he would have gone on without the Union's help.

Or Spanish in the Dominican Republic, Chile or Peru?

Because of course Spain is comparable to France and Britain. I mean they're a European power so obviously they can be copy pasted for how each nations performance would look ;)

Look, this may astound you, but the argument is NOT that the Mexicans could defeat the French in France in the 1860s (because AZTEC EAGLES HOOAH;)), or the Dominicans, Chileans, and Peruvians combined could defeat the Spanish in Spain in the same decade.

Logistics matter. Time and distance matters. There's a reason history turns out the way it does, and it usually has something to deal with physics in a rational universe.

The only astounding thing is that you always keep appealing to historical determinism in these arguments. Sure you trot out distance and logistics, but this becomes much harder to take seriously when we have rather numerous examples of large expeditionary forces being sustained and supplied at even greater distances than across the Atlantic before the very decade we are discussing.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Says who?

However the French are quite happy with the US simply not conquering CSA..

Says who?

The French, after all, even at their most reckless, chose not to recognize the rebels in diplomatic terms, much less provide active military support, much less go to war with the United States.

Seems that NIII was sharp enough to figure out war with the U.S. in the 1860s was not a winning move, considering his foreign policy during the Civil War and eventually the French withdrawal from Mexico.

So apparently the man on the scene was better able to do the cost/benefit analysis back in the day then some of those observing 15 decades later.;)

War, after all, is not a board game. Even in the Nineteenth Century.

Best,
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
Evidence, not determinism

The only astounding thing is that you always keep appealing to historical determinism in these arguments. Sure you trot out distance and logistics, but this becomes much harder to take seriously when we have rather numerous examples of large expeditionary forces being sustained and supplied at even greater distances than across the Atlantic before the very decade we are discussing.

Evidence, not determinism.

When the historical evidence is such that the best analogue anyone can come up with in terms of a European intervention using military force against an opposing force in the Western Hemisphere in the period that ends in a "victory" for the interveners is Spain against the Cuban rebels, one has to wonder.

When the track record of the various European powers in terms of deploying and sustaining military power in the era against a Western enemy at the distances in question trends against "success" in such endeavors, one has to wonder.

When the track record of steam navies having a decisive impact on the course of major land wars between peer competitors at the distances - or even less than - in question trends negatively, one also has to wonder.

But other than that, sure. Makes perfect sense, right up there with UNTHINKABLE, ZEELOWE, and a host of other brilliant operational concepts.

Again, not to inject historical economic reality into any of this, but the US and France had a strong trade relationship in the 1850s and 1860s; US exports to France included cotton and a wide variety of other goods (manufactured and otherwise), while French exports to the US included a variety of manufactured and (especially) luxury goods; the amount of silks exported to the US from France in 1859 (for example) was worth roughly 138 million francs, of some 460 million francs in such exports in total in the same year. Wine was another major export from France to the US, with values in the tens of millions. Along with luxury goods, of course, in 1861 the US purchased large quantities of French munitions, both for the forces mobilized in 1861 and to deny them to the rebels.

There are multiple sources for the above, but among them are the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations reports, filed by the US consuls in the appropriate national capitals, ports, or both. These vary widely in quantity and quality, and in online accessibility today, but as an example, in the second and third quarters of 1863 alone, France exported to the US more than 52.3 million francs of material from the Paris consular district; monetary totals from the Marseilles consular district shows more than $2.2 million worth of exports in the 1862-63 FY, and (for contrast) $4.1 million worth of imports to Marseilles. There were 9.3 million francs of goods exported to the US through Lyons in the same period.

Again, these are simply consular reports; a summary of all (US-France) exports and imports through Paris, Le Havre, Marseilles, Cette, Lyons, etc for this purpose would take far more effort than anyone rational would care to embark upon, but it should suggest the economic costs for France for an attack on the US at the very moment the French were wading ever-deeper into the Mexican quagmire. Presumably "one war at a time" is a rational strategy, even for l'empereur...:rolleyes:

Source:
https://books.google.com/books?id=xi...page&q&f=false

Best,
 
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The French might not mind having some leverage over the Confederacy, and historically there were plenty of people in France who took out almost ruinous risks to supply the Confederacy with even aid (Armand and Enlarger come to mind) and didn't get their money back.

The North might move to a Sherman like stratagem sooner, but that doesn't necessarily equal victory if a better supplied South can dig in its heels first.

In total its probably not enough to win Southern independence, but it makes for a much harder fought war.

That there were a number of Frenchmen idiotic enough to make loans to the CSA doesn't mean that you would find the huge amounts of money needed. Finding enough idiots to fall for the "Nigerian Bank scheme" to support yourself doesn't mean a nation state could do so.

Difficult to do as the French will want their money and it will become more and more obvious they won't be able to pay it back.

Harder? Yes. Much harder? I doubt it. The CSA was pretty much "maxed out" regarding debt as is.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
That there were a number of Frenchmen idiotic enough to make loans to the CSA doesn't mean that you would find the huge amounts of money needed. Finding enough idiots to fall for the "Nigerian Bank scheme" to support yourself doesn't mean a nation state could do so.

Difficult to do as the French will want their money and it will become more and more obvious they won't be able to pay it back.

Harder? Yes. Much harder? I doubt it. The CSA was pretty much "maxed out" regarding debt as is.
When was it? No-one's suggesting intervention in 1864, but in 1862 the financial situation wasn't too bad.


Confederate_prices.JPG
 
When was it? No-one's suggesting intervention in 1864, but in 1862 the financial situation wasn't too bad.


Confederate_prices.JPG

Inflation certainly is one indication but it isn't the only one and unless it turns around the war very fast, it is going to be a big problem. By mid 1863 prices went up over ten times looking at that chart. The CSA's debt load makes Modern Greece look like Germany.
 
Wikipedia is entirely unreliable.

However, the sources that are linked to are worth reading; for example, Sir John Miller Adye's Review of the Crimean War, page 142:


https://books.google.com.au/books?id=HNggFdfSqqEC&pg=PA197&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Army of the East's OOB at the time of Inkerman, for example:

(British) infantry originally landed in Crimea ... 25,000
Losses in action ... 3000
Left sick ... 5000
Absent (various duties, including 3rd Division) ... 9000
Actual troops present ... 8,000
Divisional OOBs at Inkerman:
Guards - 1300
2nd - 2500
Light - 2000
4th - 2200

Casualties at Inkerman (defensive battle against a Russian offensive) were 2600, which means the effectives left to the Army of the East were all of 14,400.

The 93,000 figure in total over the course of the war in the Black Sea, and the 50,000 effective "high point" in theater (which includes those in the Balkans and Dardanelles, for example) is from Kinglake. If you dig around, you can find it - I think it's Volume I of the nine.

The South African figures are from the Royal Commission, by way of Pakenham, as stated above.

Best,

Its odd but I'm sitting here looking at my copy of "The Colonial Wars Sourcebook" by Philip.J.Haythornwaite which uses Pakenham's The Boer War (and about 50 other reputable sources including Conan Doyle, Winston Churchill, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the War Office Official History and the autobiography of Christian De Wet).

And it puts the total Boer numbers at 67,000 to 87,000.
With an initial field force of 50,000 and about 60,000 (of which about 25% were in the field at any one time) during the Guerrilla phase.

During the initial stage of the conventional phase of the war the Boers even had superior numbers, before the reinforcement column that was the catalyst for the conflict arrived, and prior to the deployment of the British 1st Corps under Redvers Buller.
For example at Mafeking Baden Powell, with 1200 men, was besieged by 5,000. Kimberley with a 2600 strong Garrison, was besieged by 7,000 Boers.
Against the Natal Garrison of 14-15,000, Commandant-General Piet Joubert had 21,000 men, which, even after the arrival of 1st Corps, goes a long way in explaining "Black Week".

In the Conventional phase of the war the British Field Army under Frederick Roberts, is numbered at some 100,000 men. And during the longer Guerrilla Campaign the figure given is 250,000.

The 450,000 figure was for everyone who served in any capacity, and certainly not continuously, incidentally including Arthur Conan Doyle, as a Doctor (And the real reason for his Knighthood), and Winston Spencer Churchill (He was a POW, read his book about his escape).

For example the Naval Brigades (They provided the heavy artillery at Colenso) were all withdrawn back to their ships after the first 11 months.
And the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteer units all served much shorter campaigns than the Regulars.

And it gets even more interesting when you consider that some Boers fought for both sides, De Wet's own brother joined the "National Scouts".
So were probably counted twice (Much like Galvanized Yankees).
Or possibly Baden-Powell who started out as a Regular Army Officer, then organised the South African Police, which also included veterans of both sides, and tends to get included in the totals as a paramilitary force.

And perhaps the Boer figures should be adjusted to include their own logistical support, at almost every Commando Muster the men would bring along a Black Field Hand to act as Servant, water bearer, ammunition carrier, horse holder etc. And they would accompany their Master on campaign. And would often be captured at the same time, but were generally not counted as part of the Boer Army's strength or officially listed as POW's.
Why do you think that Blacks were rounded up and interred in the Concentration Camps (Not the Empire's finest hour!).
 
The 450,000 figure was for everyone who served in any capacity, and certainly not continuously

Would the specific numbers help to put this to bed? Unfortunately it skips the period of the major battles, because the reinforcements arrived in stages, but it covers the guerrilla war pretty well.

1900 [Cd.421] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1900
Theoretical strength at 11 October 1899: 12,007 NCOs and men (note: some Indian reinforcements incorporated in this total did not arrive until after the outbreak of hostilities).

Strength as at 1 December 1900 (NCOs and men only):
Regulars- 142,893
Colonials- c.33,000 [does not allow for disbandment of Colonials, etc., of which precise details have not been received]
Imperial Yeomanry- 8,000
Volunteers- 7,500
Militia- 18,900
Total- 210,293

1901 [Cd. 462] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1901
Strength as at 1 February 1901 (all ranks):
Regulars- 141,490
Colonials- c.28,339 [inclusive of recently raised Colonials whose numbers have not yet been reported]
Imperial Yeomanry- 7,995
Volunteers- 7,700
Militia- 19,425
Total- 204,949

1901 [Cd. 578] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1901
Strength as at 1 May 1901 (all ranks):
Regulars- 138,002
Colonials- 58,821
Imperial Yeomanry- 23,104
Volunteers- 9,385
Militia- 20,104
Total- 249,416

1902 [Cd. 892] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1902
Strength as at 1 January 1902 (all ranks):
Regulars- 141,700
Colonials- 57,300 [these numbers are uncertain]
Imperial Yeomanry- 13,650
Volunteers- 5,400
Militia- 19,750
Total- 237,800

While I'm in the Parliamentary Papers, here's the Crimea return (1857 Session 1 (42) Army in the East. Return concerning the late army of the East) for "Men [i.e., NCOs, drummers, and rank and file] remaining in the Crimea on 9th September 1855." "N.B.- the men at Scutari, etc., cannot be included as in the Crimea"
Cavalry- 5,086
Royal Artillery- 6,688
Royal Sappers and Miners- 598
Infantry- 37,898
General total of all arms: 50,270

I guess that to get to peak strength you should technically add the casualties taken at the Redan on 8 September 1855 back, or possibly include the 491 men of the 92nd who landed in the Crimea on the 15th and, as a result, were left off the return. Also worth bearing in mind when people want to cite the Crimean example, taken from Colonel G.G. Walker, 'Our Militia, and How to Improve It', Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, vol. 24 no. 106 (1880), pp.449-50:

"we entered upon that great struggle, supported by the English Militia alone, numbering in fact less than 60,000 of all ranks, of whom some had no training at all, some had had twenty-eight days, and not one more than fifty-six. And even these were only embodied, not all at once on the outbreak of war, but by slow degrees, as the gravity of the struggle forced itself on our unwilling minds... I ask whether... so far from the performance of the Militia during the Crimean War being accepted as the standard of its value in the future, it is not more just to say that the want at that time of a strong Militia was not the least important cause of our barren successes, and of our sore disasters, and that the history of those campaigns might have had to be re-written, if at the outbreak of hostilities, our Army had at its back, not the weak, raw force I have endeavoured to describe, but a solid, well-trained Militia, 100,000 strong, able at once to contribute 30,000 bayonets to our first line, and to take over, not after a delay of months, but at a week's notice, the whole garrison duty, both of Great Britain and the Mediterranean."

Militia strength at training, 1861: 114,003
Enrolled volunteer strength, 1863: 162,935
 
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Would the specific numbers help to put this to bed? Unfortunately it skips the period of the major battles, because the reinforcements arrived in stages, but it covers the guerrilla war pretty well.

1900 [Cd.421] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1900
Theoretical strength at 11 October 1899: 12,007 NCOs and men (note: some Indian reinforcements incorporated in this total did not arrive until after the outbreak of hostilities).

Strength as at 1 December 1900 (NCOs and men only):
Regulars- 142,893
Colonials- c.33,000 [does not allow for disbandment of Colonials, etc., of which precise details have not been received]
Imperial Yeomanry- 8,000
Volunteers- 7,500
Militia- 18,900
Total- 210,293

1901 [Cd. 462] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1901
Strength as at 1 February 1901 (all ranks):
Regulars- 141,490
Colonials- c.28,339 [inclusive of recently raised Colonials whose numbers have not yet been reported]
Imperial Yeomanry- 7,995
Volunteers- 7,700
Militia- 19,425
Total- 204,949

1901 [Cd. 578] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1901
Strength as at 1 May 1901 (all ranks):
Regulars- 138,002
Colonials- 58,821
Imperial Yeomanry- 23,104
Volunteers- 9,385
Militia- 20,104
Total- 249,416

1902 [Cd. 892] Army. Return of military forces in South Africa, 1899-1902
Strength as at 1 January 1902 (all ranks):
Regulars- 141,700
Colonials- 57,300 [these numbers are uncertain]
Imperial Yeomanry- 13,650
Volunteers- 5,400
Militia- 19,750
Total- 237,800

While I'm in the Parliamentary Papers, here's the Crimea return (1857 Session 1 (42) Army in the East. Return concerning the late army of the East) for "Men remaining in the Crimea on 9th September 1855." "N.B.- the men at Scutari, etc., cannot be included as in the Crimea"
Cavalry- 5,086
Royal Artillery- 6,688
Royal Sappers and Miners- 598
Infantry- 37,898
General total of all arms: 50,270

I guess that to get to peak strength you should technically add the casualties taken at the Redan on 8 September 1855 back, or possibly include the 491 men of the 92nd who landed in the Crimea on the 15th and, as a result, were left off the return. Also worth bearing in mind when people want to cite the Crimean example, taken from Colonel G.G. Walker, 'Our Militia, and How to Improve It', Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, vol. 24 no. 106 (1880), pp.449-50:

"we entered upon that great struggle, supported by the English Militia alone, numbering in fact less than 60,000 of all ranks, of whom some had no training at all, some had had twenty-eight days, and not one more than fifty-six. And even these were only embodied, not all at once on the outbreak of war, but by slow degrees, as the gravity of the struggle forced itself on our unwilling minds... I ask whether... so far from the performance of the Militia during the Crimean War being accepted as the standard of its value in the future, it is not more just to say that the want at that time of a strong Militia was not the least important cause of our barren successes, and of our sore disasters, and that the history of those campaigns might have had to be re-written, if at the outbreak of hostilities, our Army had at its back, not the weak, raw force I have endeavoured to describe, but a solid, well-trained Militia, 100,000 strong, able at once to contribute 30,000 bayonets to our first line, and to take over, not after a delay of months, but at a week's notice, the whole garrison duty, both of Great Britain and the Mediterranean."

Militia strength at training, 1861: 114,003
Enrolled volunteer strength, 1863: 162,935

Thank you its very comprehensive, although some are still likely to dispute it.

In all fairness I think the figures I have for the Natal (Only) Garrison in 1899 include Officers and Other Ranks, Local forces and even the Police.
And possibly include some of the 10,000 reinforcements whose dispatch to South Africa resulted in the Boer Ultimatum that led to war...

... yes the Boers started it!
 
He's been making these arguments for years:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=298353

To answer the original post, from the above locked thread:

Anaxagoras -
Although the policy of Napoleon III was not to intervene unless the British did so as well, there was one potential POD for French intervention without British involvement. When Ben Butler was commanding the occupation forces in New Orleans, he harassed the European diplomatic community there and threatened at one point to open fire on a French warship that was moored on the river. While an adroit politician, Butler was not very subtle when it came to diplomatic matters (which is why Lincoln recalled him from New Orleans). In such a volatile atmosphere, it's not impossible that some sort of incident would have taken place that could have become a French version of the Trent Affair.

In such a case, the main effort of the French would be to use their naval power to reopen the Mississippi River.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
So you agree there were less than 90,000 Boer combatants

Its odd but I'm sitting here looking at my copy of "The Colonial Wars Sourcebook" by Philip.J.Haythornwaite which uses Pakenham's The Boer War (and about 50 other reputable sources including Conan Doyle, Winston Churchill, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the War Office Official History and the autobiography of Christian De Wet). And it puts the total Boer numbers at 67,000 to 87,000.
-snip -
The 450,000 figure was for everyone who served in any capacity, and certainly not continuously, incidentally including Arthur Conan Doyle, as a Doctor (And the real reason for his Knighthood), and Winston Spencer Churchill (He was a POW, read his book about his escape).

So you agree there were less than 90,000 Boer combatants and 450,000 British (including imperial and colonial) troops?

Great, we agree.

In my universe, 450,000 divided by 90,000 is five.

Best,
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
Great, so 50,000 in the theater...

While I'm in the Parliamentary Papers, here's the Crimea return (1857 Session 1 (42) Army in the East. Return concerning the late army of the East) for "Men [i.e., NCOs, drummers, and rank and file] remaining in the Crimea on 9th September 1855." "N.B.- the men at Scutari, etc., cannot be included as in the Crimea"
Cavalry- 5,086
Royal Artillery- 6,688
Royal Sappers and Miners- 598
Infantry- 37,898
General total of all arms: 50,270

Great, so 50,000 in the theater at the high point (two years into the war)... of some 93,000 sent to the theater over 24 months.

Which is, of course, is what I've posted all along. Thanks for confirming. Very collegial of you.

Best,
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
Great, so 50,000 in the theater at the high point (two years into the war)... of some 93,000 sent to the theater over 24 months.

Which is, of course, is what I've posted all along. Thanks for confirming. Very collegial of you.

Best,

If 50,000 was the high point, then wouldn't it make sense for it to include officers?
If 50,000 was the high point, then wouldn't it make sense for it to include either 6,000 casualties suffered at the Redan or the reinforcements on the way to arrive next week?
If 50,000 was the high point, then wouldn't it make sense for it to include the Dardanelles and Balkans units? Unlike what you say, this explicitly does NOT include those at Scutari etc.

The fact that you explicitly stated that 50,000 included the numbers in the Balkans and Dardanelles

"the 50,000 effective "high point" in theater (which includes those in the Balkans and Dardanelles, for example)"

And then rob showed you a value of 50,000 for NOT all the troops, AFTER a major battle, in the CRIMEA only, and you treated it as a confirmation of ALL troops at PEAK in the BLACK SEA, is within a shade of outright lying.



By the same logic I could calculate the size of the Other Ranks of the Army of the Potomac the day after Petersburg (or Gettysburg) and then call it the peak army size of the Eastern Theatre.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
By the way, it does look like the British can't bloody well win this argument, can they?

If they deploy a lot of troops, well, that proves that they need the numbers to win against their opponents.
If they deploy few troops, well, they're just unable to support more!

Talk about rigged.
 
By the way, it does look like the British can't bloody well win this argument, can they?

If they deploy a lot of troops, well, that proves that they need the numbers to win against their opponents.
If they deploy few troops, well, they're just unable to support more!

Talk about rigged.

Not just that but the Brits are not even in this scenario so basically if TFSmith was ISOTed back to command the American arms when the French screwed up his blockade and started feeding more supplies to the Confederates his solution would be to declare war on the British!

Yeah not going to end well that one :D
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Should we also consider the French steam ships of the line?

I mean, they're not as well armoured as the ironclads, but

Napoleon x 9 (90 guns each)
Prince Jerome (100 guns)
Eylau (100 guns)

Mean that the average ship is going to be able to chuck about 40 rounds per broadside.

(The RN blows them out of the water with the spectacular 68-lber, which could penetrate Warrior, but the eleven steam ships of the line should not be completely discounted.)
 
Absolutely Not!!!

So you agree there were less than 90,000 Boer combatants and 450,000 British (including imperial and colonial) troops?

Great, we agree.

In my universe, 450,000 divided by 90,000 is five.

Best,

No what the figures that both Myself and robcraufurd show are that at the outbreak of hostilities the Boers were the ones with numerical superiority 50,000 v 12,007 (About 4 to 1).
That during the Conventional phase of the war the odds were 100,000 v 50,000 (No more than 2 to 1).
And that during the Guerrilla campaign it was at most 250,000 v 60,000 (About 4 to 1).

At no point were the actual odds 5 to 1.

Using total numbers served tends to be a complete "Armchair General" Fallacy.

The obvious example being the ACW. Since according to the enlistment figures (And there is great variation for the Southern numbers) the Union should have consistently outnumbered the Confederacy by 2.5-3.0 to 1 on every battlefield, obviously not true!

And its about as dangerous as counting every US Serviceman who ever did a tour in Vietnam (2,594,000 to 2,709,918 opposed to peak in country 549,500) for an accurate comparison of the relative strength of the combatants.
 
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