Why Were Eisenhower and Marshall So Worried About Spain in Nov. 1942?

Anaxagoras

Banned
When Operation Torch was launched in November of 1942, both Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall seemed inordinately worried that Spain was going to suddenly enter the war on the German side and attack Gibraltar, or perhaps attack the American landing force in Morocco out of Spanish territory on the African side of the strait. When he wrote out a list of ten things he was worried about as the operation unfolded, Eisenhower wrote "Spain is so ominously quiet" as his chief concern. Many troops were later kept back in Morocco and western Algeria to guard against a possible Spanish attack, even as the campaign in Tunisia unfolded.

Why this attitude towards the Spanish? Their concern seems extremely excessive. If the Spanish weren't going to enter the war in the summer of 1940, why would they do so in the fall of 1942?
 
There was worry that Germany would offer Morrocoan and Algerian territory to Spain. Retaining those territories were part of the carrot and stick used on the Vichy.
After Vichy was occupied, the carrot wasn't needed and could be offered more easily to Spain.
 
Remember, a lot of this may seem unlikely, even ASB in hindsight but through 1942 the Allies were afraid of a number of possible Axis operations like invasions of Hawaii, Ceylon, Madagascar, and Australia.
 
Plus at that time the Wallies were uncertain if the Soviets would hold.
That adds more worry that Spain would jump in like Italy did as France was falling.
 
... a lot of this may seem unlikely, even ASB in hindsight but through 1942 the Allies were afraid of a number of possible Axis operations ...

Bingo. The Axis had pulled off some stunning victories in the previous 3.5 years. As Churchill put it "Before Alamien we had hardly a victory, after Alamein we had hardly a defeat." When Op Gymnast = Torch were prepared the Allies were still suffering defeats. When Op Torch was executed the Victory at Alamein was still a work in progress, Op Uranus barely underway, the battles in the Solomons had no end in sight. Since the Germans had pulled off more than a few unanticipated victories & suprising coups the Allied leaders could not discount more suprises. Spain had four infantry and a motorized division with tanks attached in Spanish Morroco. The Allies knew the Axis had a airborne corps available to rush to Spain and 3,000+ aircraft in the Med region to draw on to reinforce Spain. In France there were two mechanized corps with three panzer & a motor rifle division which the Allies knew of. They did not know what else the Axis had at hand, or what the real capabilites were. In that context Op Torch was a fairly high risk operation. It is only after picking things apart for many decades the relative strengths and weaknesses have bee truly understood.
 

Japhy

Banned
The fact that the invasion plan included violating Spanish neutrality with a shit ton of overflights over Spanish Morocco and a sizable number over Continental Spain itself, certainly played a part. If Spain wanted that would count as plenty of grounds to do it.
 
I guess fear that even if Spain didn't directly invade that they'd allow the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to operate out of their territory. S boats and aircraft in the relatively close confines of the straits of Gibraltar could make it rather dicey for shipping even without taking Gibraltar.
 
I agree it does seem strange. The Spanish made no sign of Support for Germany in the West before, indeed it could be said that because of access to US imports it was in their interest to stay neutral.
The other perverse aspect is that Ike & FDR used their wariness about Spain to insist on a landing at Casablanca, and veto any extra landings further east than already planned. Perverse, in the sense, that previously Torch only went ahead because of British reluctance/refusal to have a Cross-Channel invasion in '42/43 - which would have been much riskier!
 
They did not know what else the Axis had at hand, or what the real capabilites were. In that context Op Torch was a fairly high risk operation. It is only after picking things apart for many decades the relative strengths and weaknesses have bee truly understood.

That is focussing on military capacity.

The British were far less worried that the US, probably because they had better intelligence on Spanish intent.

For the Spanish declaring war, or permitting the Germans to use their territory would risk:
  • the Canary islands being occupied
  • critical imports of grain and oil being suspended
  • SOE trying to restart the Spanish Civil War
  • threat of invasion via Portugal, or a seaborne invasion
  • occupation of Spanish colonies
Potential gains are limited, and depend on Germany beating the USSR, USA and the UK.
 
Remember, a lot of this may seem unlikely, even ASB in hindsight but through 1942 the Allies were afraid of a number of possible Axis operations like invasions of Hawaii, Ceylon, Madagascar, and Australia.

Oh yeah. After Pearl Harbor, the US Military Attaché in Romania came home and reported to the Army high command. He told them Germany had enough planes and paratroops for a successful invasion of Britain.

As for Spain during TORCH: Stanley Lovell was head of research and development for the OSS. He published an interesting, if unreliable memoir of his experiences: Of Spies and Stratagems. He devoted an entire chapter to "Operation CAPRICIOUS", undertaken in response to the perceived threat from Spain. Supposedly, there was intelligence that German troops were deploying in Spanish Morocco for an attack against the rail line from Casablanca to Algiers and Tunisia. The OSS was asked to come up with a way to stop this attack (other than pulling forces away from the critical battle in Tunisia). Their idea was bacteriological warfare: airdropping goat dung (thus the code name) loaded with various diseases all over Spanish Morocco. Some of his details are nonsense (the German troops were supposedly withdrawn and sent to fight at Stalingrad; but Axis forces at Stalingrad were cut off on 23 November 1942, and surrendered 2 February 1943). But other details are confirmed, i.e. the two bacteriologists who were supposedly employed were real scientists.

A lot of thinking at the time wasn't about what the other side actually could do, it was what this side thought the other side possibly could do.
 
Oh yeah. After Pearl Harbor, the US Military Attaché in Romania came home and reported to the Army high command. He told them Germany had enough planes and paratroops for a successful invasion of Britain.

As for Spain during TORCH: Stanley Lovell was head of research and development for the OSS. He published an interesting, if unreliable memoir of his experiences: Of Spies and Stratagems. He devoted an entire chapter to "Operation CAPRICIOUS", undertaken in response to the perceived threat from Spain. Supposedly, there was intelligence that German troops were deploying in Spanish Morocco for an attack against the rail line from Casablanca to Algiers and Tunisia. The OSS was asked to come up with a way to stop this attack (other than pulling forces away from the critical battle in Tunisia). Their idea was bacteriological warfare: airdropping goat dung (thus the code name) loaded with various diseases all over Spanish Morocco. Some of his details are nonsense (the German troops were supposedly withdrawn and sent to fight at Stalingrad; but Axis forces at Stalingrad were cut off on 23 November 1942, and surrendered 2 February 1943). But other details are confirmed, i.e. the two bacteriologists who were supposedly employed were real scientists.

A lot of thinking at the time wasn't about what the other side actually could do, it was what this side thought the other side possibly could do.

And given a long string of Axis victories that continued through the first half of 1942, there were serious concerns about a whole host of "possible" operations through the end of 1942 and into 1943...
 
...
As for Spain during TORCH: Stanley Lovell was head of research and development for the OSS. He published an interesting, if unreliable memoir of his experiences: Of Spies and Stratagems. He devoted an entire chapter to "Operation CAPRICIOUS", undertaken in response to the perceived threat from Spain. Supposedly, there was intelligence that German troops were deploying in Spanish Morocco for an attack against the rail line from Casablanca to Algiers and Tunisia. ...

The railway from Casablanca to Tunisia was of such low capacity & little used by the Allies it would have been a good diversion of German forces. Still, as Anarch wrote its all about perception. A illustration of this is 'Plan Rubber'. This was pushed by Admiral King in early 1942. He became convinced the Axis intended to use French airfields in Morroco & Dakkar to stage a airborne force that would occupy airfields of Brazils north east coast. It was known the Brazilian Army leadership had a lot of German sympathizers & feared they would influence the government into accepting German airbases there. In hindsight the concept is absurd, but in January 1942 it seemed real enough to King & his staff.

Perhaps King was influenced with knowledge of a German inquiry about using Morrocan airfields. A German military representative to Petains government made a inquiry about using the airfields to stage or base maritime reconissance flights over the Central Atlantic. The French said in effect they's think about it& the idea was not pursued. Possiblly because the Germans had to few VLR aircraft to make this work.
 
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