Why was Japan Successful in Modernizing and Korea and China not so?
- Thread starter Avalon
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Literacy also came hand-in-hand with a strong knowledge base, general educational infrastructure, and above all: money. That last was especially important, because industrialization is a lot easier when you have a wealthy investor class interested in making more money via industry, and Japan had one thanks to 200 years of peaceful internal trade and economic development, plus the general degradation of the economic power of the landowning samurai class. And despite the closed nature of Japan they imported a good deal of Western scientific knowledge even before Commodore Perry came knocking through Dutch traders in Nagasaki.
Their geographic position was also an aid. Japan was located clear on the other side of the world from Europe, and unlike China there were no ultra-valuable trade goods to entice European powers into coming in and knocking down the door anyway.
Their geographic position was also an aid. Japan was located clear on the other side of the world from Europe, and unlike China there were no ultra-valuable trade goods to entice European powers into coming in and knocking down the door anyway.
And
This may be the most critical of issues. The Japanese were isolationist, but not a hermit kingdom. They kept abreast to 'Western knowledge' through printed matter and would adopt said knowledge when it was 'useful'; such as modern medicine, telescopes, clockwork and so on. They also were familiar with 'non-traditional' products from afar, such as coffee.
By 1850, this meant that the Japanese language already had many 'modern' terms, key texts printed in Japanese, a well-educated strata and most importantly, a mindset which was open to the idea that the outside had much to offer. The 'battle' was already half-won; for the history of Czarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Qajar Persia and so on showing that often the 'dash for modernity' faltered because there was simply too little brain-power to make it so.
[emphasis mine]
This may be the most critical of issues. The Japanese were isolationist, but not a hermit kingdom. They kept abreast to 'Western knowledge' through printed matter and would adopt said knowledge when it was 'useful'; such as modern medicine, telescopes, clockwork and so on. They also were familiar with 'non-traditional' products from afar, such as coffee.
By 1850, this meant that the Japanese language already had many 'modern' terms, key texts printed in Japanese, a well-educated strata and most importantly, a mindset which was open to the idea that the outside had much to offer. The 'battle' was already half-won; for the history of Czarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Qajar Persia and so on showing that often the 'dash for modernity' faltered because there was simply too little brain-power to make it so.
How much did massive opium addiction among the Chinese male population in the 1800s hinder development?
Wow, talk about a complicated question...
IMHO, in China the greatest opposition to reform actually came from the traditionally-literate bureaucratic class, who recognized the threat that Western ideas posed to their worldview and social position. In Qing China, for example, reform leaders constantly had to defend themselves against qingyi (a sort of vox populi of Qing officials), whose cumulative influence the Manchu Court could not afford to ignore. As a result, modernizing reforms (i.e. those that took the Chinese state away from a traditionally Confucian orientation into a Western fiscal-military one) could only be conducted on a very ad-hoc and partial basis.
As an example, the depth + breadth of the Qing Self-Strengthening Reforms, especially in its non-military aspects, depended very much on the political influence of the Prince Gong faction in court, especially combined with Li Hongzhang (LHZ) in the bureaucracy. The Qing court did not have the political capital to issue a national directive for reform - LHZ didn't even hold formal national office, being Commissioner of the Northern Ports + Viceroy of the Capital Region. As a result, reforms moved faster when LHZ was politically ascendant (1860s), and slowed drastically when he was less so (1870s-90s). Their direction also depended on what LHZ liked (Navy, weapons, merchant shipping, foreign policy) versus what he chose to ignore (education, local govt, the "land economy").
The Qing court couldn't ignore qingyi not because they were Manchus ruling over Han, but because imperial policy post-Qianlong stressed consultation with the bureaucratic-gentry class rather than suppressing them. Qianlong in his late years engaged in repeated "struggle sessions" in order to dominate the bureaucracy; this alienated the monarchy + bureaucracy from society-at-large and resulted in rebellion during the 1810s. After the near-death experience from the various rebellions of the 1850-60s, the Qing had no desire to re-engage in such alienation, and in any case, the young Qing Emperors and Dowager Empresses that succeeded Daoguang had no capability of doing so.
The Qing had plenty of access to Western knowledge and Western-trained personnel; there was simply never the political ability to employ them for systematic reform. Even then, the Qing (on the surface) seemed on the brink of modernization in the 1870/80s, with modern armaments, experiments in industrial production/technology, regularized diplomacy, and even some forays into imperialism re: Korea and Tonkin. Ultimately, however, the partial nature of their reforms came to haunt them in the Sino-Japanese War of 94-5, exposing the poor training and logistics backup of the Qing compared with Japan and inaugurating a new era of semi-colonization for China.
All this is to say that ultimately, the Qing failed to 'modernize' because it failed to comprehensively reform, and that was because it could not override opposition from the traditionally-educated bureaucrats at court and the gentry that backed them in broader society. This is in contrast to Japan which, almost immediately after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, established comprehensive reform projects such as the Ministry of [Western] Education (1871), Home Ministry i.e police + local admin (1873), and legal reform (started 1872). Apart from the differing nature of the Tokugawa-era bureaucratic class, a key reason why the process went much more smoothly in Japan was that the Meiji oligarchs had squashed the opposition through military means, i.e. the Boshin War. Whatever opposition that wasn't co-opted into the new Japanese order had very little leverage by which to resist the tide of reform, as Saigo Takamori would find out in 1877.
Going from this, it's possible that the Qing could have modernized with a more despotic yet reform-minded leadership at its head. Sympathetic accounts of Empress Dowager Cixi see her as this, but she was unfortunately hamstrung by her not-very-legitimate political position, which meant more collaboration with the bureaucrats.
IMHO, in China the greatest opposition to reform actually came from the traditionally-literate bureaucratic class, who recognized the threat that Western ideas posed to their worldview and social position. In Qing China, for example, reform leaders constantly had to defend themselves against qingyi (a sort of vox populi of Qing officials), whose cumulative influence the Manchu Court could not afford to ignore. As a result, modernizing reforms (i.e. those that took the Chinese state away from a traditionally Confucian orientation into a Western fiscal-military one) could only be conducted on a very ad-hoc and partial basis.
As an example, the depth + breadth of the Qing Self-Strengthening Reforms, especially in its non-military aspects, depended very much on the political influence of the Prince Gong faction in court, especially combined with Li Hongzhang (LHZ) in the bureaucracy. The Qing court did not have the political capital to issue a national directive for reform - LHZ didn't even hold formal national office, being Commissioner of the Northern Ports + Viceroy of the Capital Region. As a result, reforms moved faster when LHZ was politically ascendant (1860s), and slowed drastically when he was less so (1870s-90s). Their direction also depended on what LHZ liked (Navy, weapons, merchant shipping, foreign policy) versus what he chose to ignore (education, local govt, the "land economy").
The Qing court couldn't ignore qingyi not because they were Manchus ruling over Han, but because imperial policy post-Qianlong stressed consultation with the bureaucratic-gentry class rather than suppressing them. Qianlong in his late years engaged in repeated "struggle sessions" in order to dominate the bureaucracy; this alienated the monarchy + bureaucracy from society-at-large and resulted in rebellion during the 1810s. After the near-death experience from the various rebellions of the 1850-60s, the Qing had no desire to re-engage in such alienation, and in any case, the young Qing Emperors and Dowager Empresses that succeeded Daoguang had no capability of doing so.
The Qing had plenty of access to Western knowledge and Western-trained personnel; there was simply never the political ability to employ them for systematic reform. Even then, the Qing (on the surface) seemed on the brink of modernization in the 1870/80s, with modern armaments, experiments in industrial production/technology, regularized diplomacy, and even some forays into imperialism re: Korea and Tonkin. Ultimately, however, the partial nature of their reforms came to haunt them in the Sino-Japanese War of 94-5, exposing the poor training and logistics backup of the Qing compared with Japan and inaugurating a new era of semi-colonization for China.
All this is to say that ultimately, the Qing failed to 'modernize' because it failed to comprehensively reform, and that was because it could not override opposition from the traditionally-educated bureaucrats at court and the gentry that backed them in broader society. This is in contrast to Japan which, almost immediately after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, established comprehensive reform projects such as the Ministry of [Western] Education (1871), Home Ministry i.e police + local admin (1873), and legal reform (started 1872). Apart from the differing nature of the Tokugawa-era bureaucratic class, a key reason why the process went much more smoothly in Japan was that the Meiji oligarchs had squashed the opposition through military means, i.e. the Boshin War. Whatever opposition that wasn't co-opted into the new Japanese order had very little leverage by which to resist the tide of reform, as Saigo Takamori would find out in 1877.
Going from this, it's possible that the Qing could have modernized with a more despotic yet reform-minded leadership at its head. Sympathetic accounts of Empress Dowager Cixi see her as this, but she was unfortunately hamstrung by her not-very-legitimate political position, which meant more collaboration with the bureaucrats.
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So would you say in many ways the reaction of those at the top in terms of social atavism and recollection of past events like said rebellion in the 10s was in many ways the blocking force in wide institution lead reform and then the lack of singular strong personages in the form of a legitimate leader like Meiji to rally around then also prevented narrow personally directed reform?
I would say so - Institution-wise, Emperor Jiaqing's reforms to the Grand Council (in the wake of rampant abuse of authority by Qianlong's favorite Heshen) in the 1800s-10s made it less likely that a reformist GC could override bureaucratic opposition to modernization (not that such momentum could be sustained if the Emperor opposed it). Even Prince Gong, who sort of led the GC from 60s-84 felt it necessary to repeatedly hand responsibility over to Li Hongzhang so the latter could be blamed if things went wrong, particularly when it came to diplomacy.
Queen Min did push for modernization, but the Japanese assassinated her. In both the case of Meiji and Queen Min, contact with the Americans was a catalyst for a modernization push, but geography makes it pretty hard to come up with a situation where American contact with Korea would precede American contact with Japan. As for the Qing, you might be able to get a modernized China, but not a modernized Qing, because they not only had a corrup bureaucracy but a monarch who refused to change with the times. Korea had an entrenched yangban (aristocratic bureaucrats) opposed to reform and modernization but they did have pro-modernization royalty. Seoul even became the first city in East Asia to get electricity, although it was only for street lights and the palace rather than what we think of as an electrified city today.
Another factor was that Japan's feudal system wasn't all that dissimilar to the one that had dominated Europe only a little while back, and therefore was suitable to a similar development as Europe. While China had a totally different system which had few similarities with the European one.
Something that cannot be forgotten in Japan's case was the policy of sankin kotai, where daimyo were expected to spend a year at court in Edo and a year in their fiefs. This was meant as a method of controlling the daimyo by the shogun but it also resulted in a quick exchange of ideas between the capital and the provinces.
Japan also had a great road system, which could only help. e.g the Gokaido.
Japan also had a great road system, which could only help. e.g the Gokaido.
The unique political situation of the Shogunate also helped. Typically those in power are resistant to change until its too late. Meanwhile those out of power, if they manage to grab it, then lack the political capital to both consolidate power and implement major change. Because Japan had the unusual Shogun-Emperor split, those out of power could co-opt the legitimacy of the Emperor to take power and immediately have the loyalty of the country, meaning they could focus on reform. It also created a powerful coalition of conservative types and reformer types.
Time. Japan was highly interested in the studies of Western Science, which they called Rangaku or Dutch Learning. In other words Japan mostly kept up with the West at least in theories if not in practice. This combined with their strong educational institutions and infrastructure is why other nations failed to emulate them in industrializing. They simply had the time.
I suspect the homogeneous nature of Japan may have assisted the modernisation. It allowed very rapid political development; from a 'traditional feudal' system to a modern 'nation-state' within ~50 years. It could take the new glue of patriotism and slather it on, which allowed the Japanese society to carry itself through the disconcerting developments - in effect, jumping from [to borrow Weber's terms for a moment] 'traditional domination' to a 'rational-legal' one.
Many 'traditional empires' failed at this, usually due to the kaleidoscope nature of their populations. They didn't have any handy 'glue' to keep everything together when they were at the iffy point between 'ending the OldWays' and the 'start of the NewWays'.
This also meant that there was less openings for good old 'divide and rule' when the Foreign Devils turned up...
Many 'traditional empires' failed at this, usually due to the kaleidoscope nature of their populations. They didn't have any handy 'glue' to keep everything together when they were at the iffy point between 'ending the OldWays' and the 'start of the NewWays'.
This also meant that there was less openings for good old 'divide and rule' when the Foreign Devils turned up...
Korea's at least as homogenous, so that doesn't feel like a complete explanation there.
Optical_Illusion
Banned
As well as literacy and structure of government, I'd look closely at:
- Strong culture of crafts production. There is the concept of the industrious revolution, which is about increase in labour hours before industrialisation (in Europe and East Asia), engaged in production of finished goods. While less clear about if this holds, there are some indications of development of strong and large artisan class in Japan at this time, and then this can absorb the learning and techniques for industrialisation. Industrialisation is not really possible if you do not have the base of people to maintain it.
(There is strong recent work that industrialisation in Britain basically predicted by having just very high density of crafts production and low density in agriculture, particularly in mechanics, relative to many European peers).
- Relatively large urban population; a less rural population is a strong resource. Tokyo is one of the largest cities in the world (while the overall urbanisation of country is not huge due to tendencies for urban population to cluster in the capital, it is still high relative to peers).
- Direct exchange and links, for instance The Choshu Five. I am not aware if there is anything too similar within sphere China and Korea, which seems indicative of early and intensive knowledge transfer attempts.
- Strong culture of crafts production. There is the concept of the industrious revolution, which is about increase in labour hours before industrialisation (in Europe and East Asia), engaged in production of finished goods. While less clear about if this holds, there are some indications of development of strong and large artisan class in Japan at this time, and then this can absorb the learning and techniques for industrialisation. Industrialisation is not really possible if you do not have the base of people to maintain it.
(There is strong recent work that industrialisation in Britain basically predicted by having just very high density of crafts production and low density in agriculture, particularly in mechanics, relative to many European peers).
- Relatively large urban population; a less rural population is a strong resource. Tokyo is one of the largest cities in the world (while the overall urbanisation of country is not huge due to tendencies for urban population to cluster in the capital, it is still high relative to peers).
- Direct exchange and links, for instance The Choshu Five. I am not aware if there is anything too similar within sphere China and Korea, which seems indicative of early and intensive knowledge transfer attempts.
It's probably half the explanation with the other half being Korea surrounded by other countries more powerful than it.
Once again asking what was the impact of China's opium addiction on its country's development. I believe I read at one point 25% of China's male population was addicted to opium in the 1800s