Why was France so successful in the revolutionary wars?

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Yes there is the obvious zeal of nationalism, the revolutionary use of levee en masse and the personal genius of Napoleon.

But was that all there was? France have just lost a war against Britain barely 25 years before 1789, how was France able to achieve European hegemony during the pre-1812 to such a degree so quickly when the ancien regime failed at it for centuries (closet they got was LouisXIV)?
 
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They really did reform the economic system which had been hobbled by centuries of nobility/clergy loopholes. Besides just look at the stats for France, their population and GDP relative to the rest of Europe at the time. Besides, things were desperate at the beginning--anything can happen then.
 
Yes there is the obvious zeal of nationalism, the revolutionary use of levee en masse and the personal genius of Napoleon.

But was that all there was? France have just lost a war against Britain barely 25 years before 1789, how was France able to achieve European hegemony during the pre-1812 to such a degree so quickly when the ancien regime failed at it for centuries (closet they got was LouisXIV)?


They got rid of the incompetent aristocrats that had been running the army for so long and started promoting on the basis of merit and competence.
 
1) France was the greatest continental military power before the revolution
2) enthusism (both nationalistic and revolutionary) drastically cut down the rate of desertion in french armies.
Thus french armies could march at night, send foraging parties and live on the land, hide in forests.
All other european armies could not (press-ganged recruits would desert)
3) in the first 2 years of the revolution, 300 generals were executed.
The survivors were good
4) during the revolution the concept of war changed, passing from limited to total war.
The french were the first to grasp it.
 
- France was really big. Much of the diplomatic history of the last century before the revolution had been "France fights everyone and draws". France had by far the biggest population of any European state, and was at the same time the 2nd or 3rd most advanced in its social organisation (more guns, more moneys).

- Revolutionary zeal. In the 18th century, warfare was conducted by proportionately tiny armies led by a collection of heroes, cads, and scoundrels who went around selling their famous services like modern football managers, and soldiered by the sweepings of the street. An actual citizen army determined to defend the country was unprecedented, and the effect it had on recruitment and morale was tremendous.

- Innovative tactics. Simply because they had such vast reserves of poorly-trained manpower to exploit, the French developed the effective use of columns and skirmishers to a much higher level than anyone had in the 18th century. Combined with aggressive leadership, high morale, and the excellent artillery, it took the other armies some time to realise what had hit them.

- Innovative supply system. The French realsied that, when the majority of your troops could be relied upon not to desert, it was perfectly possible to move through the relatively rich lands of western Europe by begging and borrowing. This gave them a tremendous freedom of movement.

- The corps system. Splitting the army up into combined-arms units led by trusted subordinates made it vastly more flexible. Napoleon's ability to send away large parts of his army and know it would achieve wwhat he told it to was crucial in the campaign leading up to Austerlitz.

- Good leadership. Yes, the French favoured promotion by merit; but the other thing to consider is that large parts of the old army had gone over to the revolution (the Emigres were a rather nutty fringe) and brought their considerable expertise with them. The French Royal Army wasn't shoddy. They had even more recently won a war with Britain, known to posterity as the American Revolutionary War.

- Other goodies inherited from the Royal Army. In particular, a splendid artillery. The cannon wasn't a support weapon for the French, but the vital battle-winner.

- The first large army (with no disrespect intended to Suvorov or the Duke of Wellington, but their circumstances were rather differant) to be the battalion-to-battalion equals of the French were the Austrians in 1809. Note that by this time, French tactics have had plenty of time to be adopted and adapted all over Europe; the Austrians have modernised their military system and brought in conscription to make up their numbers; German nationalism is stirring; and in general the Austrians have gained most of the French advantages except numbers. That's what the Wagram campaign came down to: numbers.
 
A very succint overview by IBC. I think that Revolutionary France shares a lot in common with Nazi Germany (militarily at least). They used innovative new tactics that enabled them to continously defeat all comers, with the exception of the Spanish Ulcer. However, as is always the case the other powers adapt and eventually are able to fight back on more or less equal terms.

The interesting point here is, that within 23 years of 1789 France was master of Europe, but 2 years later she was a defeated and humbled nation under foreign occupation.
 
France have just lost a war against Britain barely 25 years before 1789

Well, one has to bear in mind, they lost the Napoleonic wars against Britain as well. :eek:
The American Revolutionary War is a notable exception, the more worth to study, though!

In the 18th century, warfare was conducted by proportionately tiny armies led by a collection of heroes, cads, and scoundrels who went around selling their famous services like modern football managers, and soldiered by the sweepings of the street. An actual citizen army determined to defend the country was unprecedented, and the effect it had on recruitment and morale was tremendous.

Overall an excellent analysis which sums it up pretty much. I would like to comment on this paragraph, though. By the 18th century, the professionalism of the not-so-tiny standing armies had taken some strides forward already. The picture you paint here still shows into the right direction when compared to the levée en masse, but even more fits the 17th century.

I also would like to add that pioneering in creating at least partially a "citizen" (or rather subject-) army was Brandenburg-Prussia all through the 18th century. Friedrich II's father already had to rely on a system which had elements of a draft in it, otherwise his poor country wouldn't have been able to afford the overproportionally large army. Friedrich II profited from these structures during his wars.
However, I admit that Prussia didn't work with these experiences during the latter half of the century and failed to cope with the French challenge just as the others did.
 
The interesting point here is, that within 23 years of 1789 France was master of Europe, but 2 years later she was a defeated and humbled nation under foreign occupation.


Not so uncommon. Assyria was seemingly at the height of its power just a few years before its destruction. So was the Third Reich. In AD 630 the Byzantine Empire seemed to have seen off its enemies and to be more secure than ever, but four years later it was fighting for its life against the Arabs.

There are probably other cases I have overlooked. Nations at the seeming peak of their power are often less secure than they appear. It would have been a similar story for Britain had she succumbed to the U-Boats in 1917.
 
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Let's not forget better hygiene (less dysentery) and sanitary conditions for the medical corps. And it was the French Army that made the revolutionary discovery that the best wrapping for an amputation was the cleaned-out skin remains of the soldier's appendage!
 
IBC already mentioned it, but only in a bysentence: France did not have to fear mass-desertion as the other armies of the Great powers. French armies could march through the night, hide in forests, march without cavalry along the sides to avoid desertion. They were much more maneuverable in battle and on the battlefield. Tactics of other armies were limited due to the fact that they always had to avoid situations which allowed for desertion.
 
Overall an excellent analysis which sums it up pretty much. I would like to comment on this paragraph, though. By the 18th century, the professionalism of the not-so-tiny standing armies had taken some strides forward already. The picture you paint here still shows into the right direction when compared to the levée en masse, but even more fits the 17th century.

I'm sure you're right: I was being a bit naughty using that analogy, since I lifted it from a book about Peter the Great, but I liked it too much. ;)
 
IBC already mentioned it, but only in a bysentence: France did not have to fear mass-desertion as the other armies of the Great powers. French armies could march through the night, hide in forests, march without cavalry along the sides to avoid desertion. They were much more maneuverable in battle and on the battlefield. Tactics of other armies were limited due to the fact that they always had to avoid situations which allowed for desertion.


Though Wellington was happy enough to park hiself in front of the Forest of Soignies at Waterloo.
 
France have just lost a war against Britain barely 25 years before 1789, how was France able to achieve European hegemony during the pre-1812 to such a degree so quickly when the ancien regime failed at it for centuries (closet they got was LouisXIV)?

You're forgetting the crucial thing here. France lost a war against Britain 25 years prior because they fought Britain away from home, in the colonies, where the UK had a fantastical advantage over them, insurmountable. This was not different to 1789. The UK still tore apart the French navy when it faced it. The difference is that France simply did not fight overseas in the Revolutionary Wars, entirely eliminating Britain's strength against them. It's a bit like asking why, say, the USA who are the best country in the world at NFL, baseball etc could not beat England at football last week. It's a totally different sport.
 
You're forgetting the crucial thing here. France lost a war against Britain 25 years prior because they fought Britain away from home, in the colonies, where the UK had a fantastical advantage over them, insurmountable. This was not different to 1789. The UK still tore apart the French navy when it faced it. The difference is that France simply did not fight overseas in the Revolutionary Wars, entirely eliminating Britain's strength against them. It's a bit like asking why, say, the USA who are the best country in the world at NFL, baseball etc could not beat England at football last week. It's a totally different sport.

Elephant and whale analogy. Both animals are biggest in their environments but unable to tackle other one in other's home. Same with UK and Germany in 1940.
 
A corollary to the less-desertions is that French morale was very high, compared to their competitors, and with good reason.

The French army didn't simply punish you for everything and anything (the Russians made you run the gauntlet though rarely executed anyone, while the British merely lashed you, but they were also great fans of hanging, for almost any imaginable offense). They didn't have to punish you as much becasue they recruited rather than conscripted and then entrusted the recruits to professional officers who didn't spend the money meant for boots on personal liquor cabinets quite as often.

Higher morale translated to better campaign and battlefield performance.

I will agree with IBC that although Suvorov vs. anyone Napoleon could muster against him would probably end in Suvorov's victory (numbers being comparable), that wasn't the case throughout the Russian army. The Russians had widely varied quality of troops and officers, and although there wasn't anything as awful as the Shuvalov Corps of the 7YW during the Coalition wars, some came pretty close.
 
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