Why was Dreadnought so important?

Dreadnought also started a move to much heavier armor and centralized fire control. The introduction of the all big gun battery allowed for proper observation of shot fall (earlier observation efforts had been unable to separate the splashes from the main battery and the very similar secondary battery, which was usally only 2" smaller than the main guns).

I was hoping that someone would make that point.

Likewise, one other advantage of one main calibre: it simplified ammunition supplies and storage.
 
The US Navy arguably was right in the engines as these cheaper and more efficient that the Dreadnoughts and suited the USN's tactical view--the enemy will have to come to us.

That may be, but I don't think there's any strategy that can make reciprocating engines a fundamentally better choice than turbines.

At any rate, the US Navy was infected by Mahan's thought as anyone. And Mahan's dictum was to seek out a main fleet battle at sea. Whether that was off the Virginia capes, Bermuda, or Ireland, you still will need sustained speed and reliability, and turbines deliver that much better.

The South Carolinas were better ships than Dreadnought in key respects, no question. But engines was the one area where Dreadnought came out ahead.

And the US Navy clearly came to think so itself, since they ended up moving to turbines themselves on the second ship of the next class, the North Dakota - and all their succeeding dreadnoughts.

Jackie Fisher has to get credit for making the leap with these key innovations in one ship, and pushing through its construction quickly, giving the RN a headstart on all other rival powers (especially Germany). Without him, all-big gun turbine driven battleships *would* have happened within the decade - it just would have been piecemeal, and a little slower.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
Just thinking - how many enemy warships did the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet sink?

The battlecruisers are responsible for Scharnhorst, Gneiesenau, Blucher and the light cruisers at Heligoland Bight.

The Pommern was sunk by destroyers.

Probably all they can claim is a share in the Lutzow and the odd destroyer (+ one sub!)

In that time the British lose two dreadnought battleships: Audacious striking a mine, and Vanguard due to an internal explosion.

It does not seem much of a result does it?

Yet the presence of those battle squadrons guaranteed the blockade of Germany, a major factor in victory over the Central Powers. If they had never fired a shot the result would probably have been the same.

The RN was simply so large, that it could not really use many of its ships. The RN had more subs at the start of the war, but we hear 10 times more about the smaller German U-boat fleet. Why? Because the submarine role as port defense was made largely unneeded by the very large number of surface ships that kept the Germans in the southern North Sea and Baltic Sea. They submarines could have also been used as blockade ships following cruiser rules, but the RN had so many cruisers there was no need.

So the RN had more than enough ships to defend the English Coast from invasion, and not the right type of ships to attack the Germans in port except maybe on the first few days or weeks of the war.

And if they had not fired shots, the war would have been different because the High Seas Fleet would have regularly attack the Eastern Coast of London and might have even tried to cut the channel and Isolate the BEF. And there are some large ship yards on the East Coast, plus a direct attack on London is possible in the first days of the war. Using 13.5" guns to shut down the docks of London would be quite tempting, and without the dreadnoughts to fear, the Germans might have tried to force a major battle in the first days of the war. In the Baltic, the Germans did try to break through the minefields into Riga in 1915, so if the British did not have dreadnoughts, the war is different.

Or put another way, if the Germans knew all the Dreadnoughts were in Hong Kong, don't you think the decisions of the High Seas Fleet would have been a lot different? So yes the RN dreadnoughts had to fire shots and be in the area.
 
Ah, yes, Jackie 'Speed will be their armour' Fisher.

Might have been better if he wasn't around, really. A man who selected warship designs based on their attractive appearance rather than their capability for combat probably did more to harm the war effort than help it.
 
Fisher never intended Battlecruisers to fit into the battleline, he expected them to see use against targets no heavier - in most cases - than cruisers.
 
Fisher never intended Battlecruisers to fit into the battleline, he expected them to see use against targets no heavier - in most cases - than cruisers.
Fisher probably was capable of foreseeing that they would be used in a battle line. Further, he did understand that battlecruisers were inordinately expensive both to build and to operate.

Fisher, still can be defended. He was trying to solve a difficult problem. The UK Empire was losing ground to other countries--Germany, Russia, the United States, Japan, etc., in naval power. He was trying to figure out a way protect the sea lanes of an Empire. An understanding of the true fragility of the battlecruisers, as he envisioned the ships and the ships would be used, might have led to a difference approach.
 
Fisher probably was capable of foreseeing that they would be used in a battle line.
Well he intended them to work at the ends of the battle-line, but only as harrassers of the enemy, rather than real participants in the line itself. Ultimately, what fisher was aiming for was a super-cruiser, a ship that would fill the role of a cruiser, but do everything better.
 
Well he intended them to work at the ends of the battle-line, but only as harrassers of the enemy, rather than real participants in the line itself. Ultimately, what fisher was aiming for was a super-cruiser, a ship that would fill the role of a cruiser, but do everything better.

Not at all. The battlecruisers were to the 'fast response force' to reinforce distant fleets. Fisher had developed the idea of the 'flotilla system' which was to concentrate the Royal Navy into a few strategic areas of the world with the majority of the warships at each location being torpedo boats, destroyers and submarines. There would be a few battleships also there on station. When a crisis arose battlecruisers would be dispatched to the local theaters to support the warships there.

Fisher's 'flotilla system' was developed at the peak of Anglo-Franco rivalry and really didn't translate well to the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance era. As pointed out above he saw the battlecruiser as a cost savings measure to financially help the Royal Navy. The Dreadnought was actually conceived as a ship that was so expensive that battleship spending would be terminated in favor of battlecruiser - and we're not just talking about cost of building but also cost of manning and maintaining.

Also it should be recognized that the battlecruiser was simple the continuation of the armoured cruisers which were increasing in size and coming close to mounting large caliber guns. Many powers consider the armoured cruiser as a cheaper alternative to the battleship and Japanese did use them in their battleline at Tsushima. What Fisher was hoping for, and the Royal Navy did let him down on, was improved range finding and fire control and having that edge over any opponents.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Just like 'Hurricane' bows became the norm for carriers. Most of those concerns about turret placement were valid, but ultimately turned out to be less important than they first seemed.

In the second war, the German battlefleet did little damage, but the British spent an awful lot of resources taking them out. Sometime, the best use for a warship is to sit in port and tie up enemy resources guarding against it, or trying to destroy it.

I completely agree on the first point.

On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?

Japan's fleet had little choice but to fight to hold the defensive island barrier and prevent the US gaiing airbases that would dominate the home islands and the shipping routes back to Japan. In the end it would have made no difference if they had stayed in port.

Perhaps I'm just a frustrated Black Shoe admiral ;) All that money spent on lovely battleships and no-one ever plays with them :(
 

BlondieBC

Banned
On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?

The Germans won the the Baltic Sea. They cause the British to build roughly twice as many capital ships as the Germans. They cause more damage at Jutland. Basically, The Germans won the Baltic, tied the North Sea, kept the Germans coast safe. So I would call it a draw. The British were generally scared to keep big ships near the German coast, and vice versa.

Also, the Germans need to protect their coast even with the UK not in the war. The Germans had about 20 dreadnoughts, the combined French Fleet-Russia Baltic was 15 Ships. Italy was a unreliable ally, and people knew it on all sides.

It is true the fleet inflamed Anglo-German tensions, but it is lot more complicated than just the ships being built.

1918 was too late to seek decisive battle. 1914 or 1915 would have been the time to try it. But here is the key, even a clear German win does not lift the blockade. Assume a Battle of Jutland in August 1914 where the Germans crush the British and control the North Sea, the blockade will not be lifted directly. The British simply could afford to lose a battle 20-5, and still maintain the blockade. Now I do think the Germans should have been more aggressive, early on, because a naval victory would have huge diplomatic ripples, IMO. If you want to see how I think it would play out with a German win early, read my TL. The benefits of a German surface win early will be

1) Higher German Morale

2) Lower British Morale

3) British will have a mild panic and move forces around to "prevent an invasion" this will harm their war effort because the forces would largely be doing nothing compared to something like Gallipoli, fighting in Africa, Fighting in France.

4) It would make it less likely a country like Italy or Romania would enter the war. It also means neutral countries will be more pro-British.

5) It might make the UK consider a peace deal after major land defeats later in the war.

Most of these benefits don't happen in 1918.
 
On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?

The Germans accomplished the 'Fleet in Being', which is different than Riskflotte, by their own short comings. They expected and believed that the British would immediately attack them upon declaration of war and that the major battle would occur between Wilhelmshaven and Helgoland and they trained for that. They really never had an alternate plan nor even considered what to do if the British didn't come out.

It would appear that for all their vaunted military prowess the Germans comitted themselves to two major war plans without any backup, the Moltke Plan and the 'Tirpitz' Plan, and neither worked.
 
The British were generally scared to keep big ships near the German coast, and vice versa.

There is no good reason, tho a host of bad ones, that a close blockade of an enemy coast should be attempted in the early 20th century. Neither power was 'scared', but really smart.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
There is no good reason, tho a host of bad ones, that a close blockade of an enemy coast should be attempted in the early 20th century. Neither power was 'scared', but really smart.

I don't see your statement as a contradiction of my statement. When I visit a Zoo, I am scared to jump in the cage with the lions. It is also a smart decision.
 
On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?
No, I mean in WW2, with a relatively few ships, Germany managed to soak up dozens of bomber raids to little effect, aircraft and time that could otherwise have been spent more profitable elsewhere had those ships not existed.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
No, I mean in WW2, with a relatively few ships, Germany managed to soak up dozens of bomber raids to little effect, aircraft and time that could otherwise have been spent more profitable elsewhere had those ships not existed.

Yes, I agree, although if the resources spent on the "Ugly Sisters" as well as Bismarck & Tirpitz had been devoted to U-boats would the Germans have had a stronger hand in the Battle of the Atlantic, even if you just consider the manpower? The RN would still need battleships to face down the Italians, the Japanese (& the USN!?) Given the numerical imbalance the best Raeder could hope for was to act as a fleet in being with the odd hit-&-run mission.

I don't think there can be any hard & fast rule. The French, Italian & Austrian dreadnoughts hardly played an active role in the war. They were too precious to lose.

The High Seas Fleet was in a slightly different position. They had enough ships to threaten the Grand Fleet, certainly early in the war. Unknown to both parties they also had some genuine edges in quality. If they had been used more aggressively could they have made a difference. After all, Wilhelmine Germany lost the war with the sailors playing a crucial role in sparking the fires of revolution. Of course, a crushing British naval victory in 1915/16/17 could have set events in train earlier, although there would be a lot fewer mutinous matelots! I suspect Scheer & Hipper would do things differently a second time around, as it did not work in OTL.
 
Yes, I agree, although if the resources spent on the "Ugly Sisters" as well as Bismarck & Tirpitz had been devoted to U-boats would the Germans have had a stronger hand in the Battle of the Atlantic, even if you just consider the manpower? The RN would still need battleships to face down the Italians, the Japanese (& the USN!?) Given the numerical imbalance the best Raeder could hope for was to act as a fleet in being with the odd hit-&-run mission.
But without the Germans having a real fleet you have nothing stopping the British from assigning elements of the home-fleet to convoy escort, and in fact much less reason to spend money on the King George Vs, which only gives them a bigger anti-submarine budget.
 
One thing, maybe slightly off topic, is that C. F. Martin named their new style of guitar, made in 1916, Dreadnought. If the U.S. ships were so good why did an Amercian company not name it Carolina?

IN an early naval appropriation debate in the US Congress an opponent of the new US battleships and the naval race in general remarked that since the British named their new ship "Dreadnought", perhaps the US should use something more American...like "Skeered o' nothin" for the South Carolina. It would have also been a great guitar name.
 
Fisher never intended Battlecruisers to fit into the battleline, he expected them to see use against targets no heavier - in most cases - than cruisers.

Perhaps, but it was probably short sighted of him not to imagine that very few admirals would pass up the opportunity to put more 12" inch (and larger) guns in the battleline, even if they were on ships with cruiser-level protection.

Without Fisher, the "battlecruiser" probably would not have happened. Rather we might have seen the gradual upgunning of armored cruisers as true fast independent "cruisers" while keeping them always a step or two behind battleships in armament. Perhaps something like Blucher, or maybe ships with only 2 BB-caliber guns, with a large battery of middle-range guns (8-10 inch.)
 
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