Dreadnought also started a move to much heavier armor and centralized fire control. The introduction of the all big gun battery allowed for proper observation of shot fall (earlier observation efforts had been unable to separate the splashes from the main battery and the very similar secondary battery, which was usally only 2" smaller than the main guns).
The US Navy arguably was right in the engines as these cheaper and more efficient that the Dreadnoughts and suited the USN's tactical view--the enemy will have to come to us.
Just thinking - how many enemy warships did the battle squadrons of the Grand Fleet sink?
The battlecruisers are responsible for Scharnhorst, Gneiesenau, Blucher and the light cruisers at Heligoland Bight.
The Pommern was sunk by destroyers.
Probably all they can claim is a share in the Lutzow and the odd destroyer (+ one sub!)
In that time the British lose two dreadnought battleships: Audacious striking a mine, and Vanguard due to an internal explosion.
It does not seem much of a result does it?
Yet the presence of those battle squadrons guaranteed the blockade of Germany, a major factor in victory over the Central Powers. If they had never fired a shot the result would probably have been the same.
Fisher probably was capable of foreseeing that they would be used in a battle line. Further, he did understand that battlecruisers were inordinately expensive both to build and to operate.Fisher never intended Battlecruisers to fit into the battleline, he expected them to see use against targets no heavier - in most cases - than cruisers.
Well he intended them to work at the ends of the battle-line, but only as harrassers of the enemy, rather than real participants in the line itself. Ultimately, what fisher was aiming for was a super-cruiser, a ship that would fill the role of a cruiser, but do everything better.Fisher probably was capable of foreseeing that they would be used in a battle line.
Well he intended them to work at the ends of the battle-line, but only as harrassers of the enemy, rather than real participants in the line itself. Ultimately, what fisher was aiming for was a super-cruiser, a ship that would fill the role of a cruiser, but do everything better.
Just like 'Hurricane' bows became the norm for carriers. Most of those concerns about turret placement were valid, but ultimately turned out to be less important than they first seemed.
In the second war, the German battlefleet did little damage, but the British spent an awful lot of resources taking them out. Sometime, the best use for a warship is to sit in port and tie up enemy resources guarding against it, or trying to destroy it.
On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?
On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?
The British were generally scared to keep big ships near the German coast, and vice versa.
There is no good reason, tho a host of bad ones, that a close blockade of an enemy coast should be attempted in the early 20th century. Neither power was 'scared', but really smart.
No, I mean in WW2, with a relatively few ships, Germany managed to soak up dozens of bomber raids to little effect, aircraft and time that could otherwise have been spent more profitable elsewhere had those ships not existed.On the second, in general I agree - the Riskflotte or "Fleet in Being" theory. Yet there are times when the situation demands an agressive defence as sitting in port will lose the war. In the end the High Seas Fleet main achievement was to tie up British resources that could have been spent elsewhere, but at the cost of inflaming Anglo-German relations and pushing the UK (willingly, perhaps) into the Entente camp. If they had sortied and destroyed a large potion of the Grand Fleet in late October '18, would it have had any affect on the armistice?
No, I mean in WW2, with a relatively few ships, Germany managed to soak up dozens of bomber raids to little effect, aircraft and time that could otherwise have been spent more profitable elsewhere had those ships not existed.
But without the Germans having a real fleet you have nothing stopping the British from assigning elements of the home-fleet to convoy escort, and in fact much less reason to spend money on the King George Vs, which only gives them a bigger anti-submarine budget.Yes, I agree, although if the resources spent on the "Ugly Sisters" as well as Bismarck & Tirpitz had been devoted to U-boats would the Germans have had a stronger hand in the Battle of the Atlantic, even if you just consider the manpower? The RN would still need battleships to face down the Italians, the Japanese (& the USN!?) Given the numerical imbalance the best Raeder could hope for was to act as a fleet in being with the odd hit-&-run mission.
One thing, maybe slightly off topic, is that C. F. Martin named their new style of guitar, made in 1916, Dreadnought. If the U.S. ships were so good why did an Amercian company not name it Carolina?
Fisher never intended Battlecruisers to fit into the battleline, he expected them to see use against targets no heavier - in most cases - than cruisers.