Japan never really had a coherent plan for the post-war. Nazi Germany was extremely centralized, meaning there could be official policies that the German government could then elaborate on. Japan, on the other hand, was a mess of feuding officers, each with their own vision of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere; Tojo never had the authority over his subordinates that Hitler did (case in point: Tojo was eventually forced to resign in 1944, whereas Hitler was still in control until after the Soviets were actually in Berlin).
So what you had were a bunch of somewhat vague plans, none of which had any official imprimatur, and thus never got developed beyond the hand-waving stage.
As the war started to go bad, there was some more thought put into what acceptable peace terms would look like (although even there they were fairly delusional, with many holding out for essentially a white peace in 1945), but event then there were some fairly sharp divisions within the government.
The entire Japanese WWII experience was basically a long lesson in why you should never allow short-term tactics to dominate over long-term strategy, and the dangers of the sunk-cost fallacy. The entire Second Sino-Japanese War is basically a series of ever-increasing Japanese escalations, each one justified by the need to protect previous gains (each of which had been originally justified to protect the gains before that), until "let's start a war with multiple superpowers, either one of whom could defeat us alone" was seen as the logical alternative to "you know, maybe we should just pull out of China; it's a giant bloody quagmire that we've been trying to end for over 4 years." It didn't help that anyone who did suggest option #2 had an excellent chance of getting assassinated.