Why do People think the Weimar Republic's Foreign Policy Failed?

[Faeelin]

Not really a particular WI, but I've noticed a trend around here for, any time a German militarist, or Hitler, etc. takes over Germany before 1931, he is able to be far more effective at overturning Versailles than the OTL Weimar Republic was. Usually this is handwaved away by saying "Communists," as if their invocation was a magical spell to stop Germans neighbors from acting as they did in OTL in the 1920s.

But it seems to me, frex, that if Germany gleefully absconded with part of Poland during the Russo-Polish War, or if the Kapp PUtsch had taken power in 1920 and announced they would no longer enforce Versailles, the response wouldn't be to go "oh, well." It would be for France to view Germany as actively trying to overturn Versailles before the ink was dry.

Implicit in all of this is the idea that man, those generals and militarists knew how to get things done. Give them ten years to rule Germany and you won't recognize the place!

 

[Tyr Anazasi]

Not really a particular WI, but I've noticed a trend around here for, any time a German militarist, or Hitler, etc. takes over Germany before 1931, he is able to be far more effective at overturning Versailles than the OTL Weimar Republic was. Usually this is handwaved away by saying "Communists," as if their invocation was a magical spell to stop Germans neighbors from acting as they did in OTL in the 1920s.

But it seems to me, frex, that if Germany gleefully absconded with part of Poland during the Russo-Polish War, or if the Kapp PUtsch had taken power in 1920 and announced they would no longer enforce Versailles, the response wouldn't be to go "oh, well." It would be for France to view Germany as actively trying to overturn Versailles before the ink was dry.

Implicit in all of this is the idea that man, those generals and militarists knew how to get things done. Give them ten years to rule Germany and you won't recognize the place!

Weimar's foreign policy was not unsuccessful, as it was the base for a certain Austrian's successes. Weimar had many problems but dealt with it effectively. They made treaties with the Soviets, when it became clear Germany needed help, and as no other power was able or willing to help Germany. Long before the term appeasement policy was used, the Germans did this to reach more from the Entente powers, especially France. That failed in the end. And indeed this failing led to the successes another one harvested. As it became more and more clear in 1931/32 that France was not willing to move, the Germans got the possibility to ignore France, as she was now isolated and unwilling/unable to make another war. Few know, that the rearmament was accepted generally already in 1932. It was too late to save the Weimar Republic though.

 

[yourworstnightmare]

I don't think Weimar's foreign policy was a failure. It was the best possible policies in a quite hopeless situation. They tried to achieve peaceful unfication with Austria, which only failed because the old Entente powers didn't wanted it. The occupation of Ruhr had very little to do with foreign policy, rather with a hopeless economic situation, and the French taking advantage of it (something Germany could not have stopped in any way). And the ties to Soviet Russia made sense, since Germany really had no other way to turn.

 

[Realpolitik]

If the Weimar Republic actually survived a decade longer or two, it is quite possible they would have gotten Austria and remilitarized the Rhineland, and just generally built Germany into a great power again. Germany was just too big and too nationalistic to keep down forever save a WWIIish event.

Unfortunately, for the time they existed, Weimar's politicians had a very limited scope of motion, given problems with right and left wing nutjobs that make the USA today look quaint(nasty as the Tea Party can be, they haven't launched coups or started street brawls, and they don't have an organized paramilitary), a military and deep state that operated largely outside of the control of the democracy(and that wasn't a secret to Ebert, Stresseman, and Company. Whoever takes over Germany, especially in the 30s as the outside restrictions grow more and more irrelevant, will have to either castrate the military like Hitler did or appease them-they hold the true power in Germany), and economic issues that make 2010 USA look like the Garden of Eden.

 

[Faeelin]

I'm trying to imagine a situation in which the far right seizes power in 1920, announces it will dissolve Versailles, muahaha, shoots up a bunch of socialists, and doesn't end in President Adenauer of the West German Republic.

 

[TRH]

I think something to that effect is going on over here.

 

[Faeelin]

I think something to that effect is going on over here.

Well, no offense to that poster, who is working on a fun read, but it's kind of my point. All Germany needed to do was say "Nein!" and shoot the reds, and then i could do whatever it wanted because hey, Hitler was able to do that too sort of 15 years later.

 

[Tyr Anazasi]

The problem of Germany was Versailles. I wonder, if it would have been better to call the French at Versailles by saying: Nein. No power would have been able and/or willing to occupy Germany.

Anyway, the German interior problems were mostly basing on foreign causes. Nearly all points have Versailles as the main cause. From the inclusion of the right into the Republic to the economy.

 

[Faeelin]

The problem of Germany was Versailles. I wonder, if it would have been better to call the French at Versailles by saying: Nein. No power would have been able and/or willing to occupy Germany.

Anyway, the German interior problems were mostly basing on foreign causes. Nearly all points have Versailles as the main cause. From the inclusion of the right into the Republic to the economy.

Isn't the answer to Nein to go "Okay, we'll just occupy the Rhineland and set up a puppet government, you militarist jerks."

Prior to the resolution of the Ruhr Crisis, Germany was collapsing. If Britain supports France, and Poland supports France, because Germany cannot be trusted?

 

[Realpolitik]

Isn't the answer to Nein to go "Okay, we'll just occupy the Rhineland and set up a puppet government, you militarist jerks."

Prior to the resolution of the Ruhr Crisis, Germany was collapsing. If Britain supports France, and Poland supports France, because Germany cannot be trusted?

Because Britain doesn't want any one country to get too powerful, including France, as shown by OTL in 1923 when the Labor government opposed the occupation. That goes against the jolly old policy.

Besides, I'm a little skeptical that a separate Rhineland would work in the long term. This isn't Alsace Lorraine-it's a densely populated province that is German and wants to remain German. Unless Germany is completely stomped like 1945, they will be back eventually, and Rhenish separatism will not prevail among the population unless the French can offer something very attractive along with force. Otherwise, the French supporting the idea just would make it worse in PR terms. It'll only work as long as France stays there-and how long will they stay there, especially if the Germans are winning the propaganda battle like OTL? The Ruhr occupation raised sympathy for Germany, and the French economy has its own problems. The country was also rather war-weary, as seen by the 30s reaction to the German buildup.

 

[Faeelin]

Because Britain doesn't want any one country to get too powerful, including France, as shown by OTL in 1923 when the Labor government opposed the occupation. That goes against the jolly old policy.

But this was against a Germany that was falling behind on reparations, not a Germany that unilaterally renounced Versailles and was led by warmongers.

These two things are a bit different. "Hohum, I guess all those boys in Flanders died for nothing" does not seem like an apporpriate response.

This isn't Alsace Lorraine-it's a densely populated province that is German and wants to remain German. Unless Germany is completely stomped like 1945, they will be back eventually, and Rhenish separatism will not prevail among the population unless the French can offer something very attractive along with force. Otherwise, the French supporting the idea just would make it worse in PR terms. It'll only work as long as France stays there-and how long will they stay there?

Much as the population of Austria was German and wanted to stay German?

 

[Realpolitik]

But this was against a Germany that was falling behind on reparations, not a Germany that unilaterally renounced Versailles and was led by warmongers.

These two things are a bit different. "Hohum, I guess all those boys in Flanders died for nothing" does not seem like an apporpriate response.



Much as the population of Austria was German and wanted to stay German?

I did not read that the Germans rejected the Versailles treaty according to who you were responding to. I apologize sincerely, I'm a little distracted.

I don't know if the militarists could have taken power in Germany in 1919-the Revolution was based on an end of the war, and restarting the war was unthinkable. The population was sick of it, and the militarists need to put down the Spartacists in 1919-they can't take on the WAllies. And damn the later "stab in the back" myths, the commanders knew they were beaten and knew that further fighting would be on German soil(and thus, they conveniently shifted blame to the civilians).

Well, Austria was part of a different empire beforehand-Austria-Hungary. The Rhineland was actually part of Germany itself-it's pretty difficult to make it into an Austria in 1919. The Rhenish separatists had no mainstream support. It would have no long term chance at survival. And most Austrians did want to be part of Germany when it began to rise-all of the pre-Nazi politicians ran on hopes of a "unification", Austrians generally viewed themselves as German and it might be that the Nazis delayed the process rather than sped it up-Dolfuss spread the idea that Austrians were "better Germans". That only changed with defeat in WWII and with the Austrians happily becoming "the first victim". If the Nazis didn't totally discredit the idea, it would probably be part of Germany today.

 

[ChazMo]

Giggedy.

Well, no offense to that poster, who is working on a fun read, but it's kind of my point. All Germany needed to do was say "Nein!" and shoot the reds, and then i could do whatever it wanted because hey, Hitler was able to do that too sort of 15 years later.

The idea isn't that Germany can do whatever it wants. Around 1920, it's a state crippled by political turmoil, with a ramshackle, stripped-down military. A French move against the Ruhr would be quite sufficient to bankrupt it outright and a chaotic sense of national identity. Keep in mind that even the Weimar government, with its coterie of liberals and socialists at the top, was deemed merely tolerable by the Allies - it flouted Versailles, and very little of the leadership was ready to publicly acknowledge even basic treaty commitments.

 

[Realpolitik]

I think the main difference between the militarists and the Nazis were that the former were somewhat more rational/sane, and that's the faulty reasoning behind most of the threads you mentioned. A "sane" right wing junta in charge of Germany... But Germany CANNOT do anything like that in 1920 save cooperating with the Soviet Union's invasion of Poland, and everybody with a serious chance of getting power will know it.

In the 1930s, they can do way more. And democratic or militarist, Austria and the Rhineland were on the table. It probably wouldn't be different in regards to that.

 

[Realpolitik]

Giggedy.

The idea isn't that Germany can do whatever it wants. Around 1920, it's a state crippled by political turmoil, with a ramshackle, stripped-down military. A French move against the Ruhr would be quite sufficient to bankrupt it outright and a chaotic sense of national identity. Keep in mind that even the Weimar government, with its coterie of liberals and socialists at the top, was deemed merely tolerable by the Allies - it flouted Versailles, and very little of the leadership was ready to publicly acknowledge even basic treaty commitments.

And on top of all of that, I will repeat this: the mostly intact "deep state" fundamentally only tolerates Weimar and the civilians in charge because they have to around 1920. The politicians have to be very careful, especially as things get more "normal" in Germany, and memories of the hunger and desperation of 1918 get more distant in the din of the rising right wing.

Besides, the civilians were nationalistic not just because they had to be, but because Ebert and Company honestly were. They weren't going to acknowledge Versailles more than they had to. Even the German Communists were not immune from it(helped by the fact that the Soviets loathe Poland too-the land of the white barons!). Germany was very nationalist in the 20s(taking off from the strong nationalism that already existed before the war), as is often the case with countries that have suffered defeats like that.

 

[Magnificate]

Because Britain doesn't want any one country to get too powerful, including France,

The interesting question is whether France had the potential to become too powerful.

 

[ChazMo]

The interesting question is whether France had the potential to become too powerful.

Britain's concern here is reinaugarating Germany's status as a reliable trade partner. French actions did everything to hinder this, hence why the two found themselves diametrically opposed on enforcing Versailles provisions.

 

[Realpolitik]

The interesting question is whether France had the potential to become too powerful.

France is still an overseas empire who was thought to have had the most powerful army in the world up until 1940. The British would believe it.

 

[Faeelin]

The Rhenish separatists had no mainstream support. It would have no long term chance at survival.

I agree with you: In OTL. In ATL when the socialists are getting shot in Berlin, and politicians are fleeing into exile, and France is offering sweet financial aid while the rest of Germany goes hungry?

Hrm.

Keep in mind that even the Weimar government, with its coterie of liberals and socialists at the top, was deemed merely tolerable by the Allies - it flouted Versailles, and very little of the leadership was ready to publicly acknowledge even basic treaty commitments.

I don't think that's quite right; Locarno was a pretty public affirmation of Versailles's agreement on Alsace-Lorraine, and the Weimar states agreed to pay reparations, and not until the early 1930s did Germany begin to rearm.

I think the main difference between the militarists and the Nazis were that the former were somewhat more rational/sane, and that's the faulty reasoning behind most of the threads you mentioned.

I actually don't think there's a big difference between the two.

And on top of all of that, I will repeat this: the mostly intact "deep state" fundamentally only tolerates Weimar and the civilians in charge because they have to around 1920. The politicians have to be very careful, especially as things get more "normal" in Germany, and memories of the hunger and desperation of 1918 get more distant in the din of the rising right wing.

We know what turnout was like in the last election before 1928, right? You see the Weimar Parties with a commanding lead. Only when you get the Depression, adn teh Hunger Chancellor, do things get worse and the Far Right gains power.

I don't think Shiny Hapy Weimar was inevitable, but neither do I think that the Weimar Republic was necessarily a fluke and barely tolerated.

Britain's concern here is reinaugarating Germany's status as a reliable trade partner. French actions did everything to hinder this, hence why the two found themselves diametrically opposed on enforcing Versailles provisions.

Britain had more than one concern. Who was it who said Germany should pay until the pips squeaked?

 

[TRH]

I actually don't think there's a big difference between the two.

Not an expert on these intricacies, but as I understand it, the militarists would have preferred to address Danzig and the Corridor before any other foreign policy concerns. Hitler by contrast waited 4-5 years to do the same, and only after several other moves.