Why didn't the Axis take Malta?

After what happened in Crete Hitler was wary of using airborne troops for large scale air drops on defended positions.

There was also a feeling that the Italian Navy would abandon them and return to port if the Royal Navy mounted a serious challenge.

Then there was the island itself. It was smaller than Crete and the British garrison was more concentrated.

Also the Axis overkilled on how many troops to deploy. It was something like 25-30,000 airborne and Mountain troops plus 70,000 for the amphibious assault. This was too much for so little a target in the opinion of the Nazi hierarchy.

IMO they could have taken Malta if they really wanted to but it would have meant less troops and supplies for North Africa during the mid 1942 battles.

They may have captured Malta in July 1942 (Operation Herkules) but lost Gazala and maybe Libya before the Axis could reap the benefits of capturing the place.

Yes, by the summer of 1942 Rommel knew he was facing a two front war soon thanks to Hitler's December 1941 DoW on America and that Libya or Tunisia were no place for the Panzer Army Africa to wage such a war. Perhaps Rommel's biggest gamble in North Africa in killing Operation Herkules and going for Alexandria has long been critiqued and attacked. But, between two terrible options he had open to him at the time gambling for a quick assault in Eastern Egypt and the British 8th Army to panic and pull out to Palestine and wait for the Americans to arrive was IMO the better of the two terrible choices he had.

The Port of Alexandria in German and Italian hands and the large urban and anti-British population of Egypt joining the Panzer Army Africa were the two things that could have put the war in North Africa into overtime.
 

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Yes, by the summer of 1942 Rommel knew he was facing a two front war soon thanks to Hitler's December 1941 DoW on America and that Libya or Tunisia were no place for the Panzer Army Africa to wage such a war. Perhaps Rommel's biggest gamble in North Africa in killing Operation Herkules and going for Alexandria has long been critiqued and attacked. But, between two terrible options he had open to him at the time gambling for a quick assault in Eastern Egypt and the British 8th Army to panic and pull out to Palestine and wait for the Americans to arrive was IMO the better of the two terrible choices he had.

The Port of Alexandria in German and Italian hands and the large urban and anti-British population of Egypt joining the Panzer Army Africa were the two things that could have put the war in North Africa into overtime.

I agree with your assessment about why Rommel made his choice, BUT I think he did it knowing that logistically it was an impossible task and the plan relied on capturing allied stocks as per the previous offensives and presaging the German push in 1944 in the Ardennes. Rommel made a bad choice because the odds of winning were very small and relied on the British making the same mistakes as they did in 1941 without learning a thing AND also ignoring that the Afrika Korps had been much, much closer to its supply centers, while the British were far from theirs in 1941, but now the situation was reversed.

It was pretty obvious that there was no way the Axis could win and it would have been far better strategically to draw out the campaign as long as possible in Africa with an intact force, rather than gamble on the longest shot ever and have a shattered force when it fails. Rommel's calculation was very much in the tradition of big German gambles despite all the evidence demonstrating it was a stupid gamble and not gambling would be more in Germany's long term strategic interests.

Rommel did not have two terrible choices, he had one awful choice, attacking Egypt, or one strategically sound choice of drawing out the campaign in a defensive campaign in the Eastern Libyan desert as long as possible so as to keep the resource drain on the Axis to a minimum in 1942-43 to help the situation in Russia; that was the main front and he should have recognized that his efforts were simply to buy time for the main front.

Taking Malta and drawing out the African Campaign on the defensive was the best thing he could have done, because there was less than no chance of improving his position by attacking Egypt, something that was more than apparent at the time, not even just in hindsight.
 
Rommel did not have two terrible choices, he had one awful choice, attacking Egypt, or one strategically sound choice of drawing out the campaign in a defensive campaign in the Eastern Libyan desert as long as possible so as to keep the resource drain on the Axis to a minimum in 1942-43 to help the situation in Russia; that was the main front and he should have recognized that his efforts were simply to buy time for the main front.

In terms of grand strategy for the Germany war effort yes it ended up being a slight negative, but it had the potential if it was successful of being a huge positive for them. Rommel was getting from his spies in Egypt that the British were panicking and burning documents and making preparations to move to Palestine. Many a general has won an important strategic victory he shouldn't have because the enemy force panicked. The people panicking as it turns out were more civilians then the top brass of the 8th Army.

If Rommel did take Alexandria and the Suez it could have mighty effects on the war that some tend to underestimate. Churchill in 1941 to mid 42 had a lot of bad breaks and mistakes. A no confidence vote against Churchill is extremely likely and at that point it very well might have been successful. How positive it ends up being for the German strategic picture depends on who replaces him and how willing they are to negotiate some kind of peace with Germany and Italy or if they want to stay in the war, but not expend too much British lives and treasure so they half ass it and let the Soviets do the bulk of the fighting. In that case America might not get them to go along with a 1944 D-Day.

In terms of grand strategy the extra forces added to the Africa Korps in the end of 42 into 43 as emergency reinforcements did have a negative effect on the war effort in the East. But, they weren't going to save the 6th Army after the blunders there. It might improve things somewhat in the East at that time, but not by much.

You want to really change the war in the East in a positive way for the German position have Hitler actually listen to Guderian and Rommel telling him to go defensive instead of attacking the Kursk salient. The forces sent to Africa that could have been sent to the East would have made only a minor difference in late 42/early 43. Going defensive in mid to late 43 would have made a huge difference.
 
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