Why didn't china industrialize first?

[Juumanistra]

Not sure if it was an incentive to start first, but being resource rich has been known to pull brakes on industrialization, like France in the XVIIIth century, or any of the oil countries

With regard to the latter, at least, it's not a matter of being rich in resources so much as being rich in one particular resource. Economies built upon the extraction of a particular commodity for export have, for at least as long as we've studied the subject, been warped and stunted for their efforts. Generally speaking, the less direct societal investment is required to harvest a high-value resource, the more distortive the "easy" wealth it brings from export is. Modern Gulf petro-states are a pronounced example of it due to the almost total lack of societal investment in oil extraction: Most of the production infrastructure was built by Western firms prior to independence/nationalization, and most of the capital required to maintain it is imported. The same problem can be witnessed, to lesser extents, in the antebellum American South, the cash-crop islands of the West Indies, and -- even earlier -- through the usage of the Silk Road by various post-Sassanid Persian/Iranian and Central Asian regimes as a revenue substitute for an actual tax-generating economy.

 

[123456789blaaa]

There is also the issue of the staple food being rice for most of southern China, but I haven't managed to fully digest this for the discussion, so I'll do a little rambling.

Rice has always been a double-edged crop. It is arguably the most nutritious in terms of calories among the staple crops for a given area of land, but at the same time this requires a large population. This means that any gains in labor from the extra birth is eaten up as labor to growing rice. This became a vicious cycle where there was no general gain of surplus.

Now, you may ask, why didn't they try to increase the productivity of each person? Well, this is likely where the social stratification and centralization I mentioned earlier come into play. While it is true that in terms of government size Europe tended to be bigger on a per capita level, there was a higher degree of vertical integration of the levels of government in China. This is likely due to a combination of the Confucian ethics and highly developed bureaucracy, but anyway the result was that the strength of the imperil government could penetrate deeper. What this meant that the regional governors and officials can have autonomy, but they can rely more on the imperial government to back them up if something happens. Thus, the regional governments could squeeze the peasants more effectively, ensuring that there is no real surplus to invest or utilize for development.

What about the merchants? This is one of the bigger differences between China and Europe. While they were disdained in both regions, on the social class system it can be argued that they held different positions. While one can argue that European merchants were above the peasants, in Confucian ethics the merchants were the lowest "free" class, just above the slaves. They could not express their rights as much as their European counterparts did, who managed to buy rights by either paying up or in payment for loans and such. Combined with the less vertically integrated political system of feudal Europe, and you have the situation where the merchants were in some position of power, managing to gain independent cities and the formation of the bourgeoisie. This didn't really happen in East Asia because the merchants were on a lower level below the farmers, and most of the trade was state-controlled, even if they used merchants for that trade.


So you have a situation where the staple crop mostly wipes out potential surpluses, a state system that could squeeze more out thus resulting in the virtual wiping out of the remaining surpluses, and a trade system where the merchants did not have the room or incentive to be investing in development or funding trading companies. All of this built up to the point there was no real reason to be industrializing. Labor is cheap, there is no real surplus to invest with, there were no real places to invest it outside of state enterprises.


Sorry for the rambling, as I said I haven't fully digested this. I do hope this provides food for thought.

And where do powerful South Chinese merchant-warlords like Koxinga fit into this?

 

[Petike]

snip

I am a Protestant. And I consider your claims ahistorical. Additionally, I'm not enamoured by the (mostly US-centric) view of there being some sort of mythical "Protestant work ethic". It's pure hype and ideologising, with dubious evidence. Historically, Protestants have been equally as industrious as they have been lazy gits, just like people of other faiths. I can say as much.

Unless you're actually willing to study the history of Christianity and how it developed and functioned within the secular contexts of various cultures, please don't post sweeping statements like the one you've posted. This sort of hyperbolic and biased generalising is the exact opposite of serious historical analysis.

China's issues with industrialisation had nothing to do with it not adopting Protestantism, or Christianity in general.

 

[Obergruppenführer Smith]

And where do powerful South Chinese merchant-warlords like Koxinga fit into this?

Leaving aside the fact he was not powerful (what, a de facto pirate?), he was working outside the system on a "barren" island where the majority were aboriginals with little rice farming. In other words, the area was not "China" until the Qing annexed it fully, and even then, the island was in a bubble until Japan got it.

So basically, the island of Taiwan was not part of the Sinosphere for a long time.

 

[123456789blaaa]

Leaving aside the fact he was not powerful (what, a de facto pirate?), he was working outside the system on a "barren" island where the majority were aboriginals with little rice farming. In other words, the area was not "China" until the Qing annexed it fully, and even then, the island was in a bubble until Japan got it.

So basically, the island of Taiwan was not part of the Sinosphere for a long time.

How on earth can you say that Koxinga wasn't powerful? Are you aware of what Koxinga was doing before he went to Taiwan? He managed to attack Nanjing and frightened the Qing enough to cause the Qing Emperor to want to personally lead an army to stop him. His organization brought in more money than the entire Dutch East India company. See this quote from Between Trade and Legitimacy, Maritime and Continent: The Zheng Organization in Seventeenth-Century East Asia By Xing Hang pages 108-109:

Although Company earnings from trade reached a high of 1,282,841 guldens (450,120 taels, 17 tons) in 1651, it also realized negative balances of 73,175 guldens (25,675 taels, 960 kg) in 1655 and 68,949 guldens (24,193 taels, 906 kg) in 1656.217 Hence, the VOC’s average annual commercial profits amounted to a little more than one-fourth of the Zheng organization’s sum of 1,365,000 taels, and about 60% of Chenggong’s direct income of 614,250 taels. Even at their height in 1651, these proportions only changed to one-third and 73.2%, respectively. In fact, the Company could not match the average performance of its competitor’s China-Japan trade alone. Zheng’s direct share of that profit, 330,750 taels (12.3 tons) out of 735,000 taels, compared favorably with his Dutch counterparts, and surpassed them for certain years. In spite of the VOC’s attempts to monopolize intra-Asian commerce through anti-competitive measures, such as restricting the spice and pepper trade to Batavia and seizing shipping, and through the promotion of substitutes to Chinese goods, the Zheng organization remained the dominant economic power of the Western Pacific. Besides the spectacular profits earned by him and his officials and commanders, private merchants sailing under his flag could acquire sizable fortunes. After deducting the interest rate of 100% on loans, they would realize a 100% rate of return on the Japan trade but break even in Southeast Asia on the whole. The lower profitability in the latter market resulted from the Dutch presence, which increased the risks and restrictions of doing business. Hence, the number of junks sailing there had declined precipitously from the late-Ming highs of 44 vessels per year.218 Moreover, merchants headed to Southeast Asia also tended to diversify their operations by stopping in Japan before returning.

He had an army of over 180,000 men in total and for the Nanjing expedition of 1658, took over 1000 junks as an expeditionary force. He was acknowledged the ruler of the overseas chinese-including the vital populations under Dutch and Spanish rule. His organization dominated trade in the southeastern coast and beat out the VOC in exporting products to Japan. It also maintained a covert presence throughout Manchu China through branches at Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Nanjing. He had the direct acknowledgement of the Yongli Emporer and incorporated Ming loyalism as a core tenet of his rule. How could anyone demean him as a mere pirate?

Why are you even bringing up Taiwan given that he died immediately after conquering it?

 

[Obergruppenführer Smith]

An issue with your narrative: The Zheng family was part of the government, not an independent enterprise. Now, obviously you have merchant-ruled states such as the Italian states, but the Zheng family was part of the Ming before the fall.

So yes, part of the same stratified system.

 

[Jiraiyathegallant]

China also wasn't quite as well placed for the colonialism of the sort you might be thinking. The Baltic, the English Channel, the Mediterranean.... Lots of places to bring use ships, meaning less distance on food or by barge to get goods to the coast for international trade. The Chinese (Of course this is dozens of governments over thousands of years, so their motives and rulers changed, but in general-) did not see others having things they wanted, outside of food and luxury goods. There is a reason the Europeans kept going to East Asia. They had a lot of nice stuff. The Europeans didn't have much they could bring over great distances besides precious metals and stones, which was why the Dutch made a lot of their money trading Asian goods between semi-isolated or hostile countries, then using some of the profits to send home spices, silks, porcelain, etc.

In some ways, they did. And then, Mongols.

In other ways, tue question isn't "Why didn't X industrialize?" But "Why did Britain?"

To add to this, the modern day UK has nearly the same length coastline as China. Europe is many times bigger overall in terms of coastline overall. This gave Britain (and Europe) and pretty big advantage.

 

[123456789blaaa]

An issue with your narrative: The Zheng family was part of the government, not an independent enterprise. Now, obviously you have merchant-ruled states such as the Italian states, but the Zheng family was part of the Ming before the fall.

So yes, part of the same stratified system.

...how was Zheng Zhilong part of the government? he was an illegal smuggler who ran away from home as a teenager and got baptized in Macau. The creation of an extensive hierarchical organization to plunder and smuggle more efficiently would seem to mark him as an enemy of the state if anything, From the source previously mentioned page 44:

"He also acquired the latest and most powerful guns and naval vessels available from the Dutch and other Europeans to effectively counter competition from rival outlaw groups and harassment from Ming government forces.54 With the help of these institutional innovations, he was able to mount sustained and successful raids on an unprecedented scale on the Mainland coast. From 1625 to 1628, he attacked and occupied several key Fujianese towns and plundered them for goods, killing one garrison commander and sinking hundreds of the best Ming ships in the process.55".

He received 0 help from the government in this endeavor of course. A big reason why he was so successful was because the Ming government was busy with the Manchu threat. How was his organization not an independent enterprise?

While Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) did make Ming loyalism a core part of his legitimacy, he never allowed it to interfere with his independence. Regent Lu "voluntarily" renounced his regency when he arrived in Xiamen and when an imperial edict reinstated the title in 1659 (the only time the Yongli Emperor ever issued a substantive command to Zheng) he retaliated by exiling the regent for one year to the Penghu Islands. For all intents and purposes Zheng Chenggong ruled an independent state not integrated at all with the distant Ming court in the southwest.

I don't know what you mean by the Zheng family being part of the "same stratified system". The half-Japanese son of a penniless teenager becoming a powerful warlord financed by an extensive merchant operation seems like the exact opposite of traditional stratified Confucian society?

EDIT: BTW this is all ignoring the greater context of the extreme commercialization of the Ming economy which everyone here seems to be glossing over.

 

[Obergruppenführer Smith]

...how was Zheng Zhilong part of the government?

You're forgetting how he became a governor and military commander? Sure, his past as a pirate was why he was able to reach such a position, but he was doing that outside the Sinospere in Japan and Taiwan. The existence of his organization does not affect the general narrative because it was an outsider who became part of the very system. He did not set out to out-compete others by innovation, he became a major landlord (contributing to the same stratified society) who added to his wealth with plunders.

All in all, he became part of the very system that stifled development.

EDIT: BTW this is all ignoring the greater context of the extreme commercialization of the Ming economy which everyone here seems to be glossing over.

Because commercialization by itself means nothing. When higher powers can easily take away what is earned without much repercussions, then where is the incentive to earn the surplus and push for higher profits?

 

[123456789blaaa]

You're forgetting how he became a governor and military commander? Sure, his past as a pirate was why he was able to reach such a position, but he was doing that outside the Sinospere in Japan and Taiwan. The existence of his organization does not affect the general narrative because it was an outsider who became part of the very system. He did not set out to out-compete others by innovation, he became a major landlord (contributing to the same stratified society) who added to his wealth with plunders.

All in all, he became part of the very system that stifled development.




Because commercialization by itself means nothing. When higher powers can easily take away what is earned without much repercussions, then where is the incentive to earn the surplus and push for higher profits?

But the very fact that a penniless merchant who gained his fortune through trade and plunder managed to integrate into the high ranks of the Chinese government seems to disprove the "stratification" hypothesis. Yes he gained profitable land but almost all major merchants and capitalists gained land. his main fortune was still in his trading organization. It certainly wasn't a supplement. Jakob Fugger was one of the richest European merchants in the world and he also gained plenty of profitable land. Can you give me an example of how him becoming a governor and military commander stifled development? It's not like he or his descendants stopped trading. He was still directly going against Confucian principles. If Koxinga had managed to gain control of China, do you think he would just give up his massive trade profits and outwards outlook towards the world?

If there was no incentive to earn a surplus and push for higher profits, then why did so many people under the Ming earn huge surplus' and push for higher profits? We can see constant complaining in written work about the conspicuous consumption going on and the wealth gained through trade. For a somewhat extreme example, see Zhang Tao paraphrased by Timothy Brooke in The Confusions of Pleasure page 4:

“[Zhang] completed his narrative of the seasons of the Ming with the world of his own adulthood in the 1570s. The face of Ming society was ravaged in the fall. ‘One man in a hundred is rich, while nine out of ten are impoverished. The poor cannot stand up to the rich who, though few in number, are able to control the majority. The lord of silver rules heaven and the god of copper cash reigns over the earth,’ he declared. ‘Avarice is without limit, flesh injures the bone, everything is for personal pleasure, and nothing can be let slip. In dealings with others, everything is recompensed down to the last hair.” His vision of descent into actuarial frenzy was apocalyptic. ‘The demons of treachery stalk,’ he warned. ‘Fights have turned to pitched battles; pounding waves wash over the hills; torrents flood the land.’ The sole remedy for this grim state of affairs was to ‘establish policies to close the gates and prevent the merchants from traveling about.’ But our author sensed that this remedy was impossible. All he could do was lapse into despair and offer the standard sigh of vexation in classical Chinese when everything is going wrong: ‘Juefu!’”2

The merchants of the south formed a powerful interest group in the government. The circulation of goods, people, and wealth increased dramatically. Merchants gained large amounts of upwards mobility to the anxiety of the tradtional scholarly class. Sumptuary laws were openly flouted. Scholar-officials started merging with the merchant class and engaging in commercial activities while being scholar-officials.

By the way...can you give me an example of the Ming government openly taking away a merchants hard-earned wealth?

EDIT: With the population growth, the development of industries and market towns, and monetization of the Ming era, I think attempts to generalize Chinese history in general are mistaken. How is this not something of a "consumer society"?

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

And where do powerful South Chinese merchant-warlords like Koxinga fit into this?

If I'm not mistaken he rose to power when the Ming's economy and government were in shambles. Couldn't he somewhat be seen as a southern counterpart to the Nurhaci, an opportunist who filled a void created by the decline of the Ming? (although unlike Nurhaci he also sought to legitimize his amassed power within Ming high society)

 

[123456789blaaa]

If I'm not mistaken he rose to power when the Ming's economy and government were in shambles. Couldn't he somewhat be seen as a southern counterpart to the Nurhaci, an opportunist who filled a void created by the decline of the Ming? (although unlike Nurhaci he also sought to legitimize his amassed power within Ming high society)

That's actually not a bad comparison. However, the key difference here is his nature as a Han Chinese person and intimate connections with Chinese society (which doesn't just mean the Ming government). This is the entire reason why he could integrate himself with the Ming government while Nurhaci never could. Koxinga was an embodiment of 17th c South Chinese trends and would have fit fine into a regime that embraced those trends instead of ignoring and suppressing them. I think that when a lot of people think of "china" in the abstract, they are thinking of common tropes and trends that don't really show the full picture of realities on the ground.