Why did the United Kingdom scrap Conscription in 1960?.

You are comparing mandarins and oranges.
And in addition not all your facts are quite correct either, but I guess that really would depend on the year.
Tell me what's wrong. The BAOR's contribution to NATO ground forces was minimal compared to the Royal Navy's role in the North Atlantic.
 
Britain, like the United States, historically did not have conscription for the army. British liberty required that the army be small, and since it was the Royal Navy and not the army that really prevented foreign invasion this was acceptable on security purposes. It was only the large conflicts of WWI and WWII where the British resorted to conscription because of the scale of the war. So getting rid of conscription was simply going back to normal British policy. The US was the same way - the Cold War policy of peacetime conscription was an aberration, and it was jettisoned as a result of the unpopular Vietnam War and the need to reform the new US Army in the wake of demoralization.

In contrast, the continental European powers had long relied on conscription because they needed large armies for self defense. It was more politically acceptable for them to conscript citizens, so it didn't end until the Soviet threat receded.
 
National Service also produced far more troops than the Army needed, most never left the UK. The obvious answer to that is to not call up everyone liable to serve, much as happened in the US. This however would have been unacceptable to the British public. As it was they were prepared to put up with it because everyone had to do it. You might be able to put it off to finish your apprenticeships or attend university but in the end you did your time like everyone else. If however only some served then there would have been endless accusations of bias in the system, people cheating the system or using influence to dodge their duty or nust plain corruption.
 
National Service also produced far more troops than the Army needed, most never left the UK. The obvious answer to that is to not call up everyone liable to serve, much as happened in the US. This however would have been unacceptable to the British public. As it was they were prepared to put up with it because everyone had to do it. You might be able to put it off to finish your apprenticeships or attend university but in the end you did your time like everyone else. If however only some served then there would have been endless accusations of bias in the system, people cheating the system or using influence to dodge their duty or nust plain corruption.

Australia had a selective service scheme during the Vietnam War years. Men had to register and names were drawn by lottery based on date of birth. About 5000 men were called up each year, making up about half of the manpower if our 4 infantry battalions on active service. A loophole existed where a man could undertake his service in the CMF (reserves ) and if someone joined the CMF of their own accord they were not liable for the ballot. Thus a lot of young men never got called up and thousands of others went to the CMF which became seen as a haven for shirkers. Meanwhile the ones who did get called up went to Vietnam or Malaysia for active war service .
 
RN contribution was nothing if the RAF/USAF could not keep the UK as a spring board for American conventional power into NATO, but all that was ALL MOOT if the forward Korps could not contain the SOVIET thrusts [BOAR & BUNDESWEHR/US V & VII KORPS] .

In time I realised that the RED ARMY was not the 10 foot tall supermen- propaganda wanted us to believe. After the 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR this kid started to study how they could be defeated. Then I dived into WW-II to find out why it took the massive RED ARMY/RED AIRFORCE-4 years to halt the Wehrmacht and drive it back to Berlin - with hefty support of the Anglo American bombing campaign.

More and more I realised that the number of weapons was not the determing step - but the quality of the troops and determination to bring these weapons to bear , that counted. This meant much much more than any 'bean counting' of the 'talking heads'.


BTW always LOVED YES MINISTER & YES PRIME MINISTER .
 

Oddball

Monthly Donor
Tell me what's wrong. The BAOR's contribution to NATO ground forces was minimal compared to the Royal Navy's role in the North Atlantic.

Your main problem is that it seems to me that you think a Duch "Division" is the same as a British " Division" is the same as a US "Division" is the same as a German "Division" and so on.

The other "problem" is your OOB: example is that your Duch I Corps in 1989 actually contained a German Panzer division, and thus did not contain four Duch Divisions. In addition a corps sized unit is MUCH more than just "combat divisions."

Anyhow, the main issue here is that to me you seem to wastley downgrade the BAOR's role in the defence of Europe during the Cold War, wich to me is just ludicrous.
 
Your main problem is that it seems to me that you think a Duch "Division" is the same as a British " Division" is the same as a US "Division" is the same as a German "Division" and so on.

The other "problem" is your OOB: example is that your Duch I Corps in 1989 actually contained a German Panzer division, and thus did not contain four Duch Divisions. In addition a corps sized unit is MUCH more than just "combat divisions."

Anyhow, the main issue here is that to me you seem to wastley downgrade the BAOR's role in the defence of Europe during the Cold War, wich to me is just ludicrous.

Then what was so special about the BAOR's role in NORTHAG compared to the German, Dutch, or Belgian corps that were also there? BAOR had three mechanized divisions (1st Armoured with 5 tank battalions and 5 mech battalions, 3rd Armoured with 5 tank battalions, 5 mech battalions, and 2 light role battalions, and 4th Armoured with 2 tank battalions and 3 mech battalions plus a UK-based infantry brigade with 3 battalions in Saxons) to three Dutch mechanized divisions with a total of twelve tank and twelve mech battalions. BAOR's 2nd Infantry was large, but only had two battalions of armoured scout vehicles to go with about 14 light role infantry battalions and minimal towed artillery support. This force composition gives the BAOR an advantage in overall numbers but only rough parity with the Dutch armoured and mechanized forces.

Looking at corps support units, BAOR had 3 battalions of 175mm and 203mm self-propelled guns (each with 12 guns), a missile regiment, and two battalions of Rapiers, plus four engineer battalions. I Dutch Corps had a significantly larger artillery group, with five battalions of 203mm guns (16 guns each) and three battalions of 155mm towed guns (24 guns each) plus a total of seven engineer battalions directly assigned.
 

Oddball

Monthly Donor
Then what was so special about the BAOR's role in NORTHAG compared to the German, Dutch, or Belgian corps that were also there? .

Regarding the Germans: nothing, except that the Germans perhaps were even more valuable then the British

Regarding the others: everything.
Insofar that everything Iv read, heard and experienced myself indicates that BAOR contributed significantly to the planned defende of Europe.

No, Im not going to give you any References except that I did service in the Norwegian Army and had atleast some contact With several of the discussed nationalities.
 
Regarding the others: everything.
Insofar that everything Iv read, heard and experienced myself indicates that BAOR contributed significantly to the planned defende of Europe.

The question is not whether the BAOR's contribution was significant (insofar as one of eight frontline corps could be considered significant). The question is whether BAOR's contribution in Germany was comparable in scale with the Royal Navy's role in the maintenance of the SLOCs in the North Atlantic, which leads back to the original thread topic regarding the fact that Britain abandoned conscription 50 years before Germany.
 
The short answer is the 1957 Defence Review, called by others on this site "The Sandystorm."

The longer answer is that the British armed forces relied on voluntary enlistment until 1916. It was abolished at the end of World War One and re-introduced in the spring of 1939 to provide the personnel needed for the doubled Territorial Army field force and the massive expansion of Anti-Aircraft Command. Conscription for all the armed forces was introduced when World War II broke out and this time was continued into peace. Initially the conscripts had to serve 2 years, then as part of the austerity cuts down to 18 months and when the Korean War broke out it was put back up to 2 years.
I'd strongly recommend downloading the 1957 White Paper from the National Archives (free) and reading it - Sandys gets a bad reputation for what he did to the RAF and some of his more questionable judgements about missiles, but the fundamentals of the review strike me as very sound indeed and the only problem with ending conscription was that it wasn't done earlier.
Bluntly, you can't effectively fight imperial (i.e. brushfire-type) wars with conscripts, and conscripts need regulars to train them. If your likely threat is from small wars, then you need a professional army and said army will only be hindered by the need to train large numbers of conscripts. The effect on the peacetime economy was also very significant indeed - not just the loss of trained manpower but the large fraction of the industrial base of the UK going to support a large set of conventional forces.
 

Oddball

Monthly Donor
The question is not whether the BAOR's contribution was significant (insofar as one of eight frontline corps could be considered significant). The question is whether BAOR's contribution in Germany was comparable in scale with the Royal Navy's role in the maintenance of the SLOCs in the North Atlantic, which leads back to the original thread topic regarding the fact that Britain abandoned conscription 50 years before Germany.

We are now entering the field of semantics and miss-understandings stemming from English not beeing everyones first language.

I just finish my part in this with my personal view:
During the Cold War all of the frontline forces in Europe were significant, each in their own way.
 
I'd strongly recommend downloading the 1957 White Paper from the National Archives (free) and reading it - Sandys gets a bad reputation for what he did to the RAF and some of his more questionable judgements about missiles, but the fundamentals of the review strike me as very sound indeed and the only problem with ending conscription was that it wasn't done earlier.

Bluntly, you can't effectively fight imperial (i.e. brushfire-type) wars with conscripts, and conscripts need regulars to train them. If your likely threat is from small wars, then you need a professional army and said army will only be hindered by the need to train large numbers of conscripts. The effect on the peacetime economy was also very significant indeed - not just the loss of trained manpower but the large fraction of the industrial base of the UK going to support a large set of conventional forces.
In my opinion he was right to cancel most of the manned aircraft as well. The UK could not afford the Fairey Delta 2, Hawker P.1121 and Saunders Roe 177. It might have been able to afford one of them, but IMHO even that was borderline. I know that here I'm in a minority of one on for holding that opinion.

A professional army might have done it better, but the Army managed in Cyprus, Kenya and Malaya with conscripts. IIRC there were 18 infantry battalions in Cyrpus at the height of that little local difficulty.
 
We are now entering the field of semantics and miss-understandings stemming from English not beeing everyones first language.

I just finish my part in this with my personal view:
During the Cold War all of the frontline forces in Europe were significant, each in their own way.
Transcript of my copy of the draft 1958 White Paper on Defence, which I downloaded from the National Archives in 2011
(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference: CAB/129/91 Image Reference:0030

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the Cabinet. February 1958



C (58) 30 Copy. No.
5th February, 1958

CABINET
DEFENCE WHITE PAPER , 1958
NOTE BY THE MINISTER OF D EFENCE


I circulate for the consideration of the Cabinet a draft of the White Paper on Defence, 1958.
D. S.
Ministry of Defence, S.W. 1,
4th February, 1958.

SECRET
DEFENCE
Britain's Contribution to Peace


Presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence by Command of Her Majesty
February 1958

LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
NET
Cmnd.​


CONTENTS
Balance of Power
Disarmament
Talks with Russia
Collective Defence
Nuclear Deterrent
Ballistic Rockets
Conventional Forces
Command Structure
Sea Power
Naval Dockyards
Contraction of Forces
Regular Recruitment
Pay and Allowances
Accommodation
Reserve Forces
Civil Defence
Economies in Administration
Expenditure​

Britain's Contribution to Peace

Introduction

1. [To be drafted].

Balance of Power

2. The concept of " national defence " has now almost ceased to have any meaning.

3. Present-day military preparations can no longer be planned on a national basis, since no country is strong enough or large enough to stand alone. Nor can they properly be described, as defence. For there remains no effective protection against global war, save the threat of devastating retaliation; and it is by this crude method that the peace of the world is now being maintained.

4. Russia's successful launching of artificial satellites is evidence of her remarkable progress in rocket development. But it should not be thought that this has upset the balance of military power.

5. In fact, the overall superiority of the West is likely to increase rather than diminish, as a consequence of the advent of medium-range ballistic rockets. These weapons, against which there is at present no answer, could, from sites in Europe and elsewhere, dominate practically every target of importance in the Soviet Union.- The possession by Russia of rockets of equal range will not, for reasons of geography, afford her any corresponding strategic advantage. It would be of no use to her to attack Western Europe, unless she could simultaneously knock out the vital strategic air bases in the United States. She could at present have no reasonable hope of achieving this with manned bombers and it will still take her several years to complete the development of an accurate inter-continental rocket and produce it in sufficient numbers. By then, the United States, which has now also successfully launched an artificial satellite, will have inter-continental rockets also; and strategic rocket weapons of all ranges will, in due course, be made relatively invulnerable by siting underground. Meanwhile, both sides are proceeding with the development of submarines, capable of firing nuclear missiles from under water.

6. There is thus no military reason why peace should not continue to be maintained for another generation or more through the balancing fears of mutual annihilation. In fact, there is no reason why all this should, not go on almost indefinitely. But that would indeed be a mournful prospect. To-day no country can hope to gain anything by war; and all would derive incalculable benefit from the restoration of mutual confidence and real peace.

7. There can, however, be no mutual confidence or real peace so long as the arms race continues with ever accelerating momentum. Means must be found to halt and reverse this ruinous process.

8. It is not necessary to stress the practical difficulties of reaching agreement on disarmament and of enforcing the agreement, once made. The issue is further complicated by the possibility that additional nuclear powers may emerge in a few years' time. Nor is the problem confined to reaching agreement between Russia and the West. In the next decade, the vast potential resources of China will have to be reckoned with as an increasingly important element in the balance of power.

9. The ultimate aim must be complete disarmament by all nations, coupled with complete inspection and control by a world authority with a world police force. Nothing less than this makes sense. That may seem a long way off. But it is just as well to recognise it and proclaim it as the final objective.

10. It would, of course, be too much to hope that complete disarmament could be brought about all at one stroke. The objective will have to be pursued by stages. If the safety of humanity is not to be imperilled, great care must be taken to maintain, at each successive stage, the balance of military power and deterrents, which, for the present, constitute almost the sole safeguard of peace.

11. In seeking a basis for agreement, account must be taken of the entirely different military positions of the two sides.

12. Russia has been making great strides in the field of nuclear weapons and rockets. But her real strength lies in her overwhelming superiority in conventional armaments and military manpower. The Soviet Union and her satellites have over 200 active divisions, some 20,000 aircraft, and a fleet which includes some 500 submarines.

13. The West, on the other hand, relies for its defence primarily upon the deterrent effect of its vast stockpile of nuclear weapons and its capacity to deliver them. These constitute the only real protection which the free world possesses. The democratic Western nations will never start a war against Russia. But it must be well understood that, if Russia were to launch a major attack on them, even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the strategy of N.A.T.O. is based on the frank recognition that a full-scale Soviet attack could not be repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia. In that event, the role of the allied defence forces in Europe would be to hold the front for the time needed to allow the effects of the nuclear counter-offensive to make themselves felt.

14. It is best that these facts should be stated plainly ; since the one thing which might conceivably tempt the Soviet Union into military adventure would be the erroneous belief that the West would flinch from using its nuclear power.

Disarmament

15. Against this background, it is easy to understand why the Soviet Government constantly demands a total and immediate ban on nuclear weapons, without offering any equally far-reaching or rapid disarmament on the conventional side. In taking this line Russia also derives an immense propaganda advantage, since she is able to exploit the natural revulsion with which normal people everywhere regard weapons of mass destruction.

16. The Western nations, although they know that their entire safety rests upon the possession of nuclear power, have never resisted the idea that nuclear weapons should be progressively reduced. But they obviously cannot agree to this without fully compensating reductions in conventional forces. Otherwise Russia would be left in a position to dominate the world.

17. On the other hand, it must be recognised that, however carefully the balance of armaments is held, there always remains a possibility that some unforeseen circumstance or miscalculation might spark off a world-wide explosion. Therefore, since there are risks in leaving things as they are it was felt justifiable, within reasonable limits, to accept risks in trying to bring about a settlement. It was in this spirit and with these considerations in mind that Britain, Canada, France and the United States put forward, through the United Nations, a balanced and controllable plan for disarmament by stages which could begin to take effect even in the absence of progress in the solution of major political problems. Their main proposals can be summarized as follows:-—
(a) nuclear tests to be immediately suspended;
(b) production of fissile material for weapon purposes to be stopped;
(c) existing military stocks of military fissile material (including material already in completed weapons) to be progressively transferred to civil purposes;
(d) conventional armaments and military manpower to be progressively reduced;
(e) an effective system of inspection to be instituted, to ensure that the agreements are observed by both sides and to reduce the danger of surprise attack.​

18. This plan was endorsed by the United Nations by the overwhelming majority of 56 to 9. The only opposition came from the countries of the Soviet bloc, who not only voted against it, but subsequently declared their intention to boycott all further proceedings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Talks with Russia

19. More recently, the Governments of N.A.T.O. jointly declared in Paris that they are ready to discuss with the Soviet Government its proposals, together with the Western proposals and any other proposals from any other quarter. These discussions need not, of course, be confined to the subject of disarmament. The first step towards disarmament is not necessarily a disarmament agreement. If some progress could be made towards the settlement of one or more of the outstanding political problems, big or small, this would help to create a more favourable atmosphere in which the question of disarmament could be pursued with a better prospect of success.

20. If agreement could be reached the prize for humanity would be tremendous. Therefore, despite the frustrating experience of previous negotiations, which have been used as a sounding board for Communist propaganda, it would be unthinkable to give up trying, until every conceivable possibility has been exhausted.

21. Though optimism must be tempered by past disappointment. Her Majesty's Government will approach any further discussions without prejudice and with resolute determination to make them succeed. It would be unrealistic not to recognise the difficulties. But, provided both sides have a genuine will to reach agreement, it should not be impossible to find some fair and workable method of composing the differences which at present divide, impoverish and endanger the world.

22. Hope lies in the fact that disarmament is obviously just as much in the true interests of Russia as of every other country.

23. But, even with the best intentions, these negotiations are bound to be extremely complicated and consequently protracted; and when agreement has been reached, its full implementation will inevitably take a number of years.

24. Meanwhile, the free world cannot afford to lower its guard. Until disarmament is actually achieved, the utmost vigilance and preparedness must be maintained. There can be no letting up in anticipation of an international agreement which, however much the West desires it, may not necessarily materialise.

Collective Defence

25. The protection of the free world against the Communist threat must increasingly be treated as a single problem, and must be undertaken by the collective effort of all the countries concerned. This idea of collective defence inspired the creation of N.A.T.O., the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O. Through these three regional systems, which include other members of the Commonwealth, Britain will continue to make her main contribution to the joint task of preserving peace.

26. If the full benefits of collective defence are to be obtained, the members of the alliance must be prepared to accept that they will inevitably become more and more inextricably dependent on one another. The concept of interdependence in defence planning of all kinds was formally enunciated by President Eisenhower and the Prime Minister in Washington last October and was subsequently endorsed by the fifteen Governments of N.A.T.O. in Paris. The practical application of this principle will unavoidably raise, in each of the countries concerned, military, economic and political problems of varying kinds; but in view of the unquestionable benefits to the common cause, every effort must be made to find ways of overcoming them.

27. The policy of interdependence is particularly applicable to the North Atlantic Alliance, which has an international command with a joint planning organisation. Within this integrated structure, it should be possible gradually to get away from the idea that each member nation must continue to maintain self-contained national forces, which by themselves are fully balanced. Instead, each should seek to make the most useful contribution it can to the combined forces of the alliance as a whole.

28. Even greater advantages are obtainable from collective action in the technical and industrial fields. The members of N.A.T.O. possess between them the world's greatest manufacturing and scientific capacity. If research and production could be jointly planned, considerable economies in time and resources could undoubtedly be secured, particularly in regard to weapon development. [Insert passage about co-operation with U.S.A., Europe and Commonwealth.]

29. Within the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O. defence systems, it is equally desirable to secure effective integration of the efforts of the countries concerned, though circumstances make it impracticable to carry this process to the same lengths as in N.A.T.O. Central planning organisations and joint staffs have, however, been set up; and it will be the aim to develop progressively closer co-ordination of the available forces of the membpr States.

Nuclear Deterrent

30. These three regional defence organisations together provide a vitally important defensive shield along the frontiers of the free world. But by themselves they would be ineffective, were it not for the fact that behind them stands the immense nuclear power of the West. This continues to rest primarily upon the strength and constant readiness of the American Strategic Air Command, with its bases all round the world and its vast supply of megaton bombs.

31. Britain is now making an increasingly significant contribution to the nuclear deterrent. She has a substantial and growing stockpile of kiloton weapons, the design of which is being steadily improved as a result of the experience gained from the trials at the Maralinga proving ground in Australia. Following upon the successful thermo-nuclear tests at Christmas Island, British megaton bombs are now in production and deliveries to the Royal Air Force are beginning.

32. The British strategic bomber force, which is equipped to carry these bombs, provides a mobile and flexible form of military power. While based in Britain, its aircraft can be transferred within a few hours to stations overseas. The majority of the squadrons are equipped with Valiants; but the proportion of Vulcans and Victors, with their greater performance, is steadily increasing. These can fly as high and as fast as any bombers in service in any other country; and the accuracy of their navigational and bomb-aiming equipment is unsurpassed. In addition, good progress is being made with the development of propelled bombs, which can be released from a considerable distance, thereby making it unnecessary for the aircraft to fly into the more heavily defended target area.

33. Britain's nuclear power cannot, of course, be compared with that of the United States. Nevertheless, when equipped with megaton weapons, the British bomber force will in itself constitute a formidable deterrent.

34. If the deterrent influence of the bomber force is to be fully effective, it must not be thought capable of being knocked out on the ground by a surprise attack. Measures are accordingly being taken to raise its state of readiness, so as to reduce to the minimum the time needed for take-off. Other action is also being taken to increase the security of the bomber force. In order to obtain the earliest possible warning of the approach of hostile aircraft, the organisation of the radar watch is being improved and is being more fully linked with the system on the Continent.

35. Now that Britain has a substantial strategic bomber force and a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons of her own, it has become necessary to co-ordinate operational plans with the United States Air Force. With this object, the Air Staffs of the two countries have set up joint machinery for the allocation between them of tasks and targets.

36. Following upon the decision, announced a year ago, that it was not practicable to attempt to defend the country as a whole against nuclear attack. Fighter Command now has the more limited task of protecting the bomber bases; and its strength is being correspondingly reduced. When the Russians, in addition to their manned bomber force, have ballistic rockets in sufficient numbers capable of knocking out airfields in Britain, the value of a fighter defence system will obviously decrease; and the same will apply to a missile defence system, effective only against aircraft. But that stage has not yet been reached. Meanwhile, the squadrons of Fighter Command will continue to play their part in defending the deterrent. British short-range ground-to-air missiles will begin to be deployed during the coming year, and a longer range type is in an advanced state of development.

37. Britain's contribution to the strategic deterrent will represent less than one-fifth of the total Defence Estimates for 1958-59. This figure includes the cost of the strategic bomber force and its nuclear bombs and of the fighter force and radar system in Britain. It also covers the cost of research and development related to the deterrent and its defence, including guided missiles and ballistic rockets. About half the expenditure on the deterrent is at present going into forces and equipment for its defence. On the basis of present plans and estimates, it does not seem likely that the cost of the deterrent will increase significantly over the next few years.

Ballistic Rockets

38. The Western nuclear deterrent will shortly be supplemented by ballistic rockets. Her Majesty's Government have accepted the offer of the United States Government to supply Britain with American intermediate range ballistic missiles of the Thor type. In order to comply with United States law, the nuclear warheads will remain under American control.

39. These weapons will be operated by the Royal Air Force, who will be assisted during the period of introduction by an American training mission. The deployment of the missiles will be governed by technical and military considerations and they will be dispersed over an appreciable number of sites. It is planned to locate them on property already owned by the Government.

40. The financial arrangement is broadly that the United States will pay for the missiles themselves and for the special equipment connected with them; while Britain will meet the cost of constructing the sites and other necessary expenditure in this country. The British share is estimated to be about £10 millions. This will be financed out of sterling counterpart funds of United States defence aid.

41. These American rockets cannot, of course, be regarded as an element of independent British nuclear power, but they represent a valuable additional contribution by Britain to the combined strength of the Anglo-American nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, a British ballistic rocket of more advanced design is being developed in close co-operation with the United States on the highest priority. This will carry a megaton warhead, and is being designed for launching from underground. In the development of this weapon, the Woomera rocket range in Australia will play an invaluable part.

Conventional Forces

42. The strategic nuclear deterrent is the decisive factor in the prevention of major war; but it does not obviate the need for maintaining an adequate shield of land forces, with air and naval support, to defend the frontiers of the free world. Nor could it, of course, be used in localised wars or internal emergencies, still less for preserving order and stability, all of which tasks represent a large part of the present responsibilities of the British armed forces.

43. For these roles the primary need is for mobile, well-equipped, conventional forces. Apart from tactical nuclear aircraft bombs and artillery weapons for use in appropriate places and circumstances, the Army and the Navy will continue to be equipped with conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) weapons, and the greater part of the research and development effort for them is being devoted to projects of this kind.

44. The greater part of Britain's military effort will continue to go into conventional forces. After allowing for the withdrawal of British troops from Korea and Jordan and for the reductions in Germany, Libya. Malaya, Hong Kong and elsewhere, Britain is still maintaining forces of the three Services of over 200,000 men in support of her alliances and overseas commitments in the Far East, the Middle East. Europe and the Atlantic. These substantial forces represent a very considerable contribution by the British nation to the preservation of stability and peace throughout the world.

45. The widely dispersed nature of Britain's military responsibilities makes it essential for the Army to maintain a strong Central Reserve, together with an adequate fleet of aircraft to carry reinforcements rapidly to any part of the world. A proportion of this reserve will be kept at a high state of readiness, so that it can be moved at very short notice. In order to facilitate air transport, heavy equipment, vehicles and other supplies will be stored at focal points, such as Singapore.

46. At present R.A.F. Transport Command is equipped with Hastings and Comet aircraft for long-distance lifts and with Beverleys for transportation within the theatre of operations. These will be supplemented by Britannias, of which twenty have been ordered. This will greatly expand the Command's long-range troop-carrying capacity, which will be further increased on the route to the Far East when Gan airfield in the Maldive Islands comes into operation in 1959.

47. Close co-operation continues to be maintained between the armed forces of the United Kingdom and those of other members of the Commonwealth. Australia and New Zealand are sharing with Britain the task of helping Malaya in her resistance to Communist terrorism. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force is playing its part in Middle East defence, and a squadron is stationed at Aden. Discussions have recently been held with the Union of South Africa about the defence of the African continent. In Eastern waters the Royal Navy periodically carries out joint exercises with the naval forces of Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and South Africa.

48. By the end of March, the strength of the British Army of the Rhine will be about 64,000. This represents a reduction of 13,000 during the last twelve months. The Council of the Western European Union has agreed that the British troops in Germany should be further reduced to a total of 55,000. In offering to maintain a force of this size. Her Majesty's Government have stipulated that this is dependent upon satisfactory arrangements being made to meet local costs incurred in foreign currency. In this connection, the Government have, in accordance with the revised Brussels Treaty, asked the North Atlantic Council to consider the financial problem involved in maintaining their forces in Germany. The independent experts appointed by N.A.T.O. to examine the position, confirmed that this expenditure in Deutschmarks, estimated at £47 millions next year, would represent a heavy additional burden on Britain's balance of payments. Her Majesty's Government have accordingly made it clear that, in the event of adequate financial assistance not being forthcoming, they will reluctantly have to reconsider the size of the British land and air forces they can afford to retain in Germany.

Command Structure

49. A number of important changes have been made in the command structure in the Middle East.

50. The Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda have assumed joint responsibility for the local defence of their territories. At their request the General Officer Commanding and the majority of officers continue to be provided from the British Army. Any British troops of the Central Reserve who are stationed in Kenya will not form part of the local garrison and their use will be controlled from London.

51. As regards the remainder of the Middle East Command, conditions in that area make it no longer practicable to control from a single headquarters in Cyprus the British forces in the East Mediterranean as well as those in the Arabian Peninsula. It has, therefore, been decided to create an independent integrated Command, with headquarters at Aden. This will come into operation on April 1st next, and will be responsible for the British forces of all three Services in the Arabian Peninsula, together with the naval units allotted to the Persian Gulf.

52. The creation of this new Command will involve only a slight increase in the staff of the existing headquarters at Aden. On the other hand, the separation of the forces in the Arabian Peninsula from the Middle East Command will enable appreciable reductions to be made in the headquarters organisation in Cyprus.

Sea Power

53. During the past year, the Government have reviewed the role, composition and disposition of the Royal Navy. British naval forces must be fitted to perform three main tasks: —In peacetime, to help carry out Britain's responsibilities in colonies and protected territories, to defend British shipping and generally to contribute by their presence to the maintenance of peace and stability; in limited war, to protect sea communications, to escort troops and supplies to the theatre of operations and give them support in action; in global war, to make an effective contribution to the combined naval forces of the Western Alliance.

54. East of Suez it is proposed to maintain a balanced, all-purpose fleet of appreciable strength. This is necessary to enable Britain to discharge her obligations to S.E.A.T.O. and the Baghdad Pact alliances, and to fulfil her independent military commitments in that area.

55. This Eastern Fleet will be based on Singapore. It will be composed of one aircraft carrier (with a balanced complement of strike, fighter and anti-submarine aircraft), one cruiser, and a number of destroyers, frigates and smaller vessels. It will also include a converted carrier equipped to accommodate a Marine Commando force and capable of carrying helicopters for either the troop-carrying or anti-submarine role. These ships will operate singly or in groups, coming together at intervals for training.

56. In the Atlantic and Mediterranean, Britain must continue to play her part in N.A.T.O.; though, as was explained a year ago, this will be on a somewhat reduced scale. Since, apart from certain colonial responsibilities, the Royal Navy would, in war, operate together with other allied navies, the aim should be to make the most effective contribution to the combined forces of the Alliance, and not necessarily to provide a fully balanced all-purpose British fleet.

57. Russia's formidable submarine force constitutes a threat which has to be reckoned with, not only in global war in the Atlantic, but in situations short of global war anywhere in the world. This threat is of special concern to an island people, dependent upon sea communications for their food supplies and commercial life. For this reason the Government consider it desirable to concentrate the efforts of the Royal Navy to an increasing extent on the anti-submarine role. To fulfil this task, the naval forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean will include two carriers (equipped predominantly with anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters), two cruisers and a number of destroyers, frigates and submarines. [Here insert reference to maritime aircraft of R.A.F.]

58. In addition to the main operational fleets, a small number of frigates will, at all times, be stationed in the Persian Gulf to discharge British responsibilities in that area. Some light craft will be employed at Hong Kong for local defence, together with a frigate patrol to protect British shipping along the China Coast. A few frigates or destroyers will also be kept on the West Indies and on the South Aflantic Stations.

59. The plans for the Reserve Fleet are being reviewed and brought into line with the above policy. In so doing, it is proposed to follow the principle, that the Reserve Fleet should comprise only sufficient ships to keep the Active Fleet up to strength, allowing for accidents and long refits.

60. A number of important projects are in hand to ensure that the Royal Navy will in the years ahead continue to keep abreast of the times. A new comprehensive radar and aircraft control system for carriers, more advanced than any other in service elsewhere, has been introduced. A low-level tactical bomber is being developed for the Royal Navy, and its adoption by the Royal Air Force as a successor to the Canberra is being considered. The prototype win fly later this year. The development of a British nuclear submarine is proceeding, and in this much valuable information and assistance is being received from the United States.

Naval Dockyards

61. The naval construction and modernisation programmes are being aligned with this policy : and dockyard and base facilities are being curtailed to correspond with the planned reductions in the size of the Navy.

62. The base at Trincomalee was handed over to the Ceylon Government last October; and the British naval establishments in Ceylon will be progressively withdrawn over the next four years. As already announced, the dockyard at Hong Kong will be closed by the end of 1959. Thereafter the fleet East of Suez will be based on Singapore, and its maintenance and repairs will be mainly concentrated in the dockyard there.

63. In the Mediterranean, the facilities in Gibraltar will continue to be required. At Malta, the level of naval activity is likely to decline and certain British firms are examining the feasibility of taking over the dockyard for commercial use. In the light of the outcome of this examination, the future of the dockyard will be decided after consultation with the Maltese Government.

64. At home, it is planned to close the naval dockyards at Portland and at Sheerness. The closures will be spread over a substantial period; this will assist those who become redundant in finding other employment. It is expected that the closure of the dockyard at Portland will be completed by April, 1959, and that at Sheerness a year later. The Royal Naval Dockyards at Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham and Rosyth will be retained. [This assumes the closing of the dockyard at Malta.]

Contraction of Forces

65. In accordance with the policy approved by Parliament, the process of reducing the size of the Forces is continuing. At the end of the year 1957-58 the three Services will have a combined strength of 606,000 (Navy 99,000, Army 325,000, RAF. 182,000).* This represents an overall reduction of 83,000 during the current year.

66. An undertaking was given that those whose careers were prematurely terminated through the contraction of the Forces would be given fair compensation and would be helped in every way possible to find suitable employment in civilian life. Last July a scheme for compensation was published in Command Paper 231. The Royal Navy have completed the selection of those to be retired. Over 90 per cent, of the officers concerned, and 100 per cent, of the ratings, are voluntary applicants. The Army and the Royal Air Force, where the problem is larger, are not so far advanced; but it is already clear that it will likewise be possible to deal with a high proportion of the redundancies in both Services on a voluntary basis.

* Unless otherwise stated, manpower figures in paragraphs to relate to United Kingdom-based, adult, male personnel of all ranks, and do not include boys, women, Gurkas, Colonial troops or locally enlisted personnel.

67. A Regular Forces Resettlement Service has been set up, comprising officials of the Ministry of Labour and representatives of the appropriate voluntary associations. This Service has already given some 3,000 personal interviews, quite apart from providing more general information and advice. A Resettlement Advisory Board, including employers end trade unions, has also been established under the chairmanship of Sir Frederic Hooper to help those retired to find employment.

68. The reduction in the size of the Army necessitates the disbandment or amalgamation of a number of units. Last July, plans were announced for reducing the "teeth" units by 51. (The Royal Armoured Corps is to be reduced by 8 regiments; the Royal Artillery by 21 regiments; the Royal Engineers by 5 regiments ; and the Infantry by 17 battalions.) By the end of March 1958, 8 of these reductions will have been made. A further 22 will be carried out during 1958-59. Corresponding reductions will be made in the supporting and administrative units.

Regular Recruitment

69. As announced a year ago in Command Paper 124, the Government are planning to bring National Service to an end by December 1962 and to rely thereafter on small all-regular forces of a combined strength of about 375,000. By that date Britain's military commitments may quite possibly have increased or decreased; but nothing has so far happened to lead the Government to revise this figure or to alter its views about the prospects of recruiting the regulars needed.

70. The Services have been given authority to recruit up to the following ceilings: Navy 88,000; Army 165,000; R.A.F. 135,000. The fact that these three ceiling figures together total 388,000 does not mean that it is intended to increase the planned strength of the combined forces beyond the figure of 375,000 mentioned above. But the Government have felt it right for the present to maintain some flexibility.

71. The Royal Navy obtains all its regulars on initial engagements of nine or twelve years. During 1957 it recruited 2,800 ratings and 4,300 boys and apprentices. Of these 800 entered the Royal Marines. There is a need for some increase for recruits in certain branches, and also for the Marines who have a higher proportion of national servicemen to be replaced. If there were no change in the current trend of recruiting, the manpower strength of the Royal Navy would be about 84,000 by the end of 1962.

72. In regard to the Army, the picture cannot be presented so simply, since the whole pattern of recruitment has been radically altered by the decision to end, with few exceptions, the three-year engagement and to substitute for it an initial engagement of not less than six years. However, it is encouraging to observe that, in the first three months since the new scheme came fully into effect (November, December and January) long-term engagements have risen to , as compared with 685 in the corresponding period a year ago.

73. Any forecasts based upon statistics over so short a period must be treated with great caution. Nevertheless, certain points are worth noting. As was expected, recruitment of men for the " teeth " arm units presents less difficulty than for most other corps. Without any improvement in the present recruiting trend, the infantry, which is the basic arm, would by the end of 1962 be almost up to its planned strength.

74. As was foreshadowed in the Defence Statement a year ago, the recruitment of men for the Army's technical, professional and administrative units raises special problems, about which it is not possible to generalise. The Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers do not appear likely to have much difficulty in securing the numbers they need in certain trades. On the other hand, the present recruitment rates for most of the other administrative corps are well below requirements.

75. During 1957, the R.A.F. recruited about 5,600 airmen on long-service engagements, some 3,400 boys and apprentices and about 8,500 on short-service engagements. Recruiting both of men on 9-year engagements and of apprentices and boys showed a satisfactory increase over the previous year. As was expected, the announcement of the plan to end National Service led to a decline in recruiting on the shorter engagements. The present rate of recruiting of pilots is almost sufficient, but that of certain other aircrew duties will need to be increased. If there were no change in current recruiting rates, the regular strength of the R.A.F. would expand to about 120,000 by the end of 1962.

76. It is most desirable to increase considerably the strength of the W.R.N.S., W.R.A.C., and W.R.A.F., which will have an increasingly important part to play in the new all-regular forces. There is a wide range of duties open to them at home and abroad. It is hoped that the improvements in pay, allowances and other conditions will encourage more women to enter these Services.

77. The willingness of men and women to serve in the armed forces is determined by a wide variety of factors, psychological as well as material. In view of the importance of obtaining the regular recruits needed to enable national service to be ended, the Government thought it desirable to initiate a fresh and comprehensive study of this question. They accordingly set up, last November, an independent committee, under the chairmanship of Sir James Grigg, to examine the problem in all its aspects and to make recommendations. It is hoped that the committee will present their report by the end of the summer or early autumn.

Pay and Allowances

78. Meanwhile, the Government have felt it right to introduce, without further delay, certain increases in the rates of pay and allowances for regulars of all ranks, designed to narrow the gap which has developed between Service and civilian earnings. The new rates of pay will come into force early in April.

79. All regular other ranks will receive an increase in weekly pay of 14s., 17s. 6d., or 21s., depending on their length of engagement. In addition, the special low rate for recruits is to be abolished. In future they will receive the same rate as the "one-star private" or his equivalent. This will mean that a recruit enlisting on a six-year engagement will be paid 24s. 6d. a week more than at present. The effect of these changes will be to increase the pay of other ranks by an average of about 13 per cent. For recruits, the increase will be some 33 per cent.

80. The pay of officers will, on average, be increased by about 8 per cent. The junior officers will receive proportionately larger increases than those in the higher ranks. For example, the pay of a Second Lieutenant will be raised by £73 a year, and that of a Lieutenant-Colonel by £110.

81. There will be a special increase in the pay of the Women's Services, over and above the general increase. It will be raised to 85 per cent, of the new higher rates for male personnel, as compared with 75 per cent, of the existing rates. The woman recruit will receive 2 Is. a week more than at present, an increase of about 43 per cent.

82. The rents of Service quarters are at present abnormally low. One result of this is that married officers and men for whom quarters are not available are liable to suffer serious financial disadvantage. To remedy this, it has been decided to increase the rate of marriage allowance, while at the same time raising the rents of official quarters and to pay to other ranks the " out-of-quarters " allowance of 3s. a day now payable to officers. These three measures, taken together, will in most cases leave those occupying Service quarters in the same financial position as they are now and will bring those not in quarters broadly in line with them.

83. Steps have recently been taken to remove various grievances and anomalies connected with allowances. For example, the scheme, under which men serving in certain oversea stations, who are separated from their families, ate granted a period of home leave, has been extended to Aden, the Persian Gulf and Habbaniya. The regulations governing the issue of disturbance allowance have been relaxed, so that this allowance will now normally be payable for every move made for Service reasons, instead of only once in each normal tour of duty. The unpopular system, whereby rations were provided from Service sources fcr families in Germany, will shortly be changed. Certain restrictions on the use of leave travel warrants by Service personnel stationed in Britain have been removed. Certain increases are being made in the education allowances payable to all ranks.

84. The increases in pay and allowances, and other improvements referred to above, will cost about £33 millions in the year 1958-59, of which £23 millions is in respect of pay.

Accommodation

85. In addition, plans are going ahead for the improvement of accommodation of all kinds for the armed forces at home and abroad.

86. One of the attractions of Service life is the chance it offers to see the world. But this is largely nullified, if it entails living in sub-standard accommodation or family separation through lack of married quarters. The Government intend, as far as practicable, to remedy existing deficiencies. As evidence of this policy, plans have recently been approved for the construction of additional new accommodation for units in Kenya, Aden, Malaya and Hong Kong.

87. For the United Kingdom a comprehensive programme is being prepared for the replacement or modernisation of out-of-date barracks, messes and hospitals and the construction of considerably more married quarters at a cost of about £90 millions over the next five years. The reorganisation of the forces during the past year unavoidably delayed decisions on the building programme, which will have the effect of restricting the amount of construction in the coming year. However, a number of important projects will be commenced during the year. These include improvements in naval accommodation both afloat and ashore and new barracks at a number of R.A.F. stations. Important works already started for the Army at Colchester, Tidworth, Bovinglon, Windsor and Bicester will be pressed forward, and new barrack and housing schemes will be put in hand during 1958, including those at Woolwich, Arborfield, Aldcrshot and Bordon.

88. It is proposed to accelerate the provision of canteens and clubs, sports grounds, swimming baths and other recreational facilities. Particular attention will be paid to the needs of those serving overseas and at isolated stations at home. Work on these projects, estimated to cost £1 million, will be carried out during the coming year.

Reserve Forces

89. The Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve are being amalgamated in order to make the best use of training and other facilities. Its members will be given more specialised training so that, if mobilised, they will be ready for immediate active service. This single unified reserve will be known as the " Royal Naval Reserve."

90. The Territorial Army has been making good progress in recruiting volunteers, and the annual camps have now been restricted to the volunteer element. During the year, the number of direct volunteer entrants increased from about 8,000 to about 16,000. The total numbers of volunteers in the Territorial Army is now over 70,000.

91. The Royal Air Force needs reserves to bring operational units and the Control and Reporting System up to war establishment, and to reinforce overseas stations. Because of the short warning period likely in the event of attack, the reserves allocated to units in this country are being posted in peacetime to Reserve Flights attached to their operational stations. In the event of war, an important role in the Control and Reporting System has been allotted to the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

Civil Defence

92. Civil Defence will continue to form an integral part of the defence plan. The framework of the local civil defence services and of the regional organisation is being maintained. Further provision is being made for training schools and training equipment; and additional orders are being placed for instruments to measure radio-activity. Improvements have continued to be made in the communications, warning and monitoring systems.

Economies in Administration

93. The new Defence Administration Committee, composed of the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Defence and the Service Departments, together with the Principal Personnel Officers and Principal Administrative Officers of the three Services, is beginning to produce results.

94. Particular attention is being paid to the possibilities of entrusting one of the Services with responsibility for performing administrative functions on behalf of all three. For example, steps are being taken progressively to reduce waste of effort due to the transport and handling of rations by each Service separately. Small but useful savings have also been made in other fields, as for instance over the movement of freight. The possibility of pooling certain types of Service stores is being studied.

95. Hospital facilities are being replanned in accordance with a single co-ordinated scheme for all three Services. This will enable old and uneconomical hospitals to be eliminated.

96. The Government have decided Where practicable and economic to bring to an end the present system, under which each Service provides and maintains separate overseas trunk wireless networks with its own transmitting and receiving stations. The possibility of transferring these functions to civilian agencies is being examined.

97. The Defence Administration Committee have already sent investigation teams to study organisational problems in Malta and Aden, and a similar visit to Singapore is being arranged.

Expenditure

98. For the year 1957-58, the Defence Estimates, before the deduction of expected receipts from Germany and the United States, amounted to £1,483 millions, and, after their deduction, to £1,420 millions. The Admiralty and Ministry of Supply will require supplementary estimates amounting to £42 millions.

99. The Defence Estimates for 1958-59 amount to £1,465 millions before taking into account the payments in respect of the local costs of British Forces in Germany. As in previous years, these costs, estimated at £47 millions, have been included as appropriations in aid. The estimates to be presented to Parliament will thus amount to £1,418 millions.

100. Thus the Defence Estimates for 1958-59 are £2 millions less than in 1957-58 or £44 millions less than the original and supplementary estimates combined. Within these reduced estimates it has been found possible to absorb increased costs in civilian wages and prices amounting to about £50 millions, increases in Service pay and allowances and other improvements costing £34 millions, compensation to officers and men prematurely retired totalling £21 millions, and a reduction of £16 millions in respect of payments from Germany and the United States. It will therefore be seen that the new estimates imply reductions in the defence programme of the order of £120 millions.
 
We are now entering the field of semantics and miss-understandings stemming from English not beeing everyones first language.

I just finish my part in this with my personal view:
During the Cold War all of the frontline forces in Europe were significant, each in their own way.
I put the copy of the draft 1958 White Paper on as a reply to your post by mistake. Sorry!

It should have been to PDF in Post 33.
 
This is part of the 1951 Rearmament Programme from a Cabinet document dated 30th October 1950, which I also downloaded from the National Archives several years ago
THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE ARMED FORCES OVER THE
THREE YEARS BEGINNING 1951-52


REPORT BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

In this report we submit our new proposals for the Size and Shape of the Armed forces over the three years 1951-52, 1952-53 and 1953-54.

2. Our proposals are, in the main, determined, as to scope and timing, by supply possibilities on the assumptions laid down by the Government, (though the rate at which personnel can be recruited and trained is also a relevant factor). The resulting programme is, in our view, reasonably well balanced, and the distribution of resources is in harmony with the conclusion reached in our recent review of Global Strategy.

3. We must make it clear, however, that the programme:
(a) does not, in point of magnitude, provide our estimated share of the requirements of the Medium Term N.A.T.O. Defence Plan. In certain important respects it falls short of the contributions that the United Kingdom Government may be called upon, and may indeed feel obliged, to make;
(b) may not, in point of timing, meet the needs of the international situation.​

Its real effect will not be felt until 1953 and 1954.

4. It is essential that the programme now proposed should be authorised at once, so that planning and production can go ahead without delay and potential conflicts between defence claims and those of exports can be identified and resolved. The Government has already announced that, in the matter of priorities, defence and exports to dollar markets must now rank together at the top of the list.

5. Our proposals may be summarised as follows: —
(a) Navy
(i) The size of the Fleet for 1954 remains generally the same as that planned in 1949 but a larger part of the re-equipping and preparing the fleet for war, which it was originally planned should be carried out between 1950 and 1957, has been concentrated into the next three years; also a number of ships, particularly frigates, which it was planned to dispose of, have been retained in a low category of reserve.
(ii) By making good the deficiencies in mobilisation stores and equipment as quickly as possible, the Navy will be able to fight with the fleet that it has got should an emergency arise. At the same time the modernisation of the fleet will be accelerated, within the limits enforced by the production of new ships, weapons and equipment.
Details of the planned fleet will be found at Annex I.​
(b) Army
The Army proposals are essentially a compromise, as hitherto, between the conflicting claims of the Cold War and the need to provide as soon as possible the best equipment for our forces to use in the event of Hot War.

The revised proposals involve:
(i) The creation of a proper strategic reserve—to consist by mid1951 of one new armoured division, one new infantry division and the parachute brigade, with the addition of another division (partly armoured) by the end of the three year period.
(ii) The strengthening of B.A.O.R. early in 1951 by one armoured division and certain anti-aircraft and engineer units.
(iii) Such steps as are possible to improve the state of readiness and equipment of the Active Army and first contingents of the Reserve Army so that they can plan an immediate and effective part in the opening stages of a war. These steps will be progressive but, even by the end of the third year, equipment will only be available to the extent of 70 per cent, of requirements with maintenance scales at only half normal active operational scales.
(iv) Reducing the time that would be required to deploy available Anti-Aircraft guns and equipment for the Air Defence of the United Kingdom.​
A table* giving the deployment of the Active and Reserve Armies in mid-1951 is attached to this report.

(c) Air Force
The plan for the R.A.F. provides for an expansion of the front line by over 80 per cent. (i.e., from 1,344 to 2,450 aircraft) by March 1954. This expansion begins slowly and accelerates rapidly after the first two years. By the same date we should have some 2,700 modern operational aircraft in reserve behind the front line, and the training organisation should have expanded to a total of approximately 3,200 aircraft (i.e., 470 operational and 2,730 training types). Secondly, the plan provides for extensive re-equipment of the force with modern aircraft. Thirdly, it provides for building up a war reserve of air crews, aircraft and other equipment. This plan brings the force closer to the 'minimum strength required to meet its commitments, but there are the following important deficiencies: —
(i) The expansion of Bomber Command and B.A.F.O. is only enough for our contribution to the interim Western Union Tactical Air Force; the Tactical Air Force required under the Medium-Term plan is twice as large.
(ii) The report of the Maritime Air Defence Committee will show that a much larger maritime force will be required.
(iii) The rate of introduction of the F.3/48 and the Swift is unsatisfactory, and the front line of Fighter Command is some 20 per cent, short of that recommended by the Air Defence Committee.
(iv) There will be no reserves of Canberras; an inadequate reserve of ground attack aircraft; and a day fighter reserve consisting almost wholly of Meteors till 1954.
The note attached to this report sets out the salient points in the plan, and the tablet attached to the note gives details of the build-up year by year. The programme will be kept flexible. For example, the run-down of the Transport Force and the rate of expansion of Fighter Command and the T.A.F. will be kept under review, and the proposals in the Table will be improved if at all possible. Provision is made for extensive improvements to our infrastructure, including a comprehensive reconstruction of the United Kingdom radar chain by the earliest possible date.​

Man-Power

6. The active man-power strength of the three Services, including women and boys, had previously been planned to run down from 682,000 in April 1951 to 677,750 by April 1953. Under the present proposals, requirements are estimated to average about 810,000 in 1951-52, rising to about 840,000 in 1953-54. These estimates are based on the assumption that whole-time National Service v/ill remain at 2 years and that the present pay increases will continue to stimulate regular recruiting. *

* Annex II. t Annex III. t Enclosure to Annex III.

7. Individual Service requirements are as follows: —
(a) Royal Navy.—Instead of a strength of running down from 128,900 on 1st April, 1951, to a stabilised level of 124,000 by 1st April, 1952, the Royal Navy would now require 130,000 regulars and an annual national service intake of 2,000 to maintain the fleet at the proposed increased state of preparedness, making a total strength of 134,000.

(b) Army.—Previous plans provided for an active Army of 380,000 (including some 16,000 women and boys) in 1950 running down to about 355,000 by 1953. The revised Order of Battle would require some 420,000 men and 12,000 to 15,000 women and boys. Allowing for improved regular recruiting, this requirement could be met by 1st April, 1951, with no immediate increase in the rate of call-up of national servicemen, but between 1st October, 1951, and 1st April, 1952, there would be a drop in strength of 35,000 men if, as is likely, regular reservists are not detained beyond October 1951 and at the same time regulars cease to be held back from release.

(c) Royal Air Force.—Present proposals for the Royal Air Force would require a considerable increase in uniformed man-power. Strengths were to have been 198,000 on 1st April, 1951, and 206,000 on 1st April, 1953. Average requirements are now estimated to be 245,000 in 1951-52, 260,000 in 1952-53 and 275,000 in 1953-54. Although these figures may be reduced somewhat by civilianisation and despite the considerable increase which is hoped for in regular recruitment, the man-power requirement could only be met by a distinctly high degree of dilution with National Servicemen. Resources of skilled man-power would be strained to the utmost and the main limiting factor on the expansion of the force would be the provision of trained air crews.​

Production

8. The plan has throughout been related to supply possibilities, and represents in fact the best that can be done with the maximum deliveries which the Admiralty and Ministry of Supply consider possible on the assumptions currently laid down by the Government, e.g., no direction of labour, no requisitioning, &c. (CP. (50) 181). Bottle-necks will undoubtedly develop, particularly in the vital field of electronics. Special steps will have to be taken to prevent a general slowing down of the whole programme, including the planned diversion of effort from the home market and, where necessary, from export. No allowance has been made for export of tanks or aircraft to N.A.T.O. countries or elsewhere, except against orders already outstanding.

Tank Production

9. The War Office will absorb the total output of the tank factories at present in operation. That output is as follows: —
Tanks
1951-52
1952-53 500
1953-54 500​

This will provide 1,400 additional tanks, which, together with existing stocks, will barely cover the war equipment needs of the Active Army and the 1st Contingent of the Reserve Army plus 25 per cent, peace maintenance reserve. It will, however, leave the 2nd Contingent of the Reserve Army at training scales and make no provision at all for tanks for New Zealand, Australia, South Africa or any North Atlantic countries. Requirements to meet the needs of the Commonwealth countries and prospective demands from the North Atlantic Treaty countries are being taken up separately, as these would not be a charge on the Army budget.

Aircraft Production

10. Orders have already been placed with the Ministry of Supply for aircraft covered by the two "shopping lists" of £100 million each, and Treasury authority has been given for a limited number of further orders which are required immediately.

Other substantial orders will have to be authorised in a few weeks if the aircraft and equipment are to be available by the dates the programme requires.

11. The general aim is to provide a three months' reserve of equipment. The position can be summarised as follows: —
(a) Fighters.—There will be a three months' reserve of Meteors throughout the period, increasing rapidly after 1953 as the F.3/48 is introduced and Meteors are thrown up. The reserve of Vampires remains at about half a month until aircraft begin to be thrown up by rearming in 1954. Venom reserves rise to H months in 1954.
Only very few, if any, F.3's and Swifts will be available in reserve until 1954-55, unless production is accelerated.

The reserve of jet night fighters will gradually increase to 3 months by 1953.​

(b) Bombers.—There will be an ample reserve of Lincolns from 1951 onwards. Reserves of Washingtons should be available from the U.S.A. Virtually no reserve of Canberras can be accumulated until, 1954-55.
(c) Naval Aircraft.—Except in the case of the Naval anti-submarine aircraft the G.R. 17, it is intended to build up reserves progressively until there should be 3 to 4 months' war replacements in 1955. In the case of the anti-submarine aircraft, it is unlikely that more than 1 month's war replacements will have been built up by 1955.​

Research and Development

12. These proposals will necessarily entail an increased effort and expenditure on Research and Development.

13. The added cost has been included in the table at Annex IV:

Cost

14. The cost of the proposals outlined above has been roughly worked out by the three Service Departments and Ministry of Supply and figures under the three broad headings—Production, Works Services*and " Hard Core" (Pay, pensions, &c.)—are given in Annex IV.

15. It will be seen that, according to this estimate, the cost of the three-year programme works out at about £3,880 million. For various reasons, however, it seems probable that this estimate is at least £150 million too high. For example, experience shows that money spent on Works Services invariably falls short of programme figures, sometimes by a substantial amount.

Again it is doubtful whether the whole of the total sum of £1,600 million allotted to production will actually be spent in the 3-year period. All past experience indicates the likelihood of some lag in parts of the programme, with the result that some deliveries scheduled for the third year will not have to be paid for until the year following the conclusion of this programme. This is the usual shortfall allowance. Finally, in the case of the R A F . there is a reasonable hope that some of the items of equipment for which provision has been made on the programme will be obtained as " end items " under American aid.

16. It can be said, therefore, that after allowance has been made for these factors and for the effect of the more detailed estimating that will now be made, the actual cost of the programme may work out at about £3,700 million. Although this is some 2\ per cent, in excess of the £3,600 million figure, we think it would be a serious mistake to try to reduce Production estimates (which is the only way of making the reduction required) at this stage. The programme as now presented will have to be reviewed in detail, but this must take time. On the other hand, there are a number of essential orders which must be placed within a few weeks if the programme is to have any hope of materialising. In our view, the programme which we submit should be accepted in broad outline and authority should be given to place orders covered by it. If towards the end of the period it becomes clear that the programme as a whole is going to cost too much, steps can always be taken to retard deliveries and new Works Services so that the cost over the 3-year period can be kept broadly within a limit of £3,600 million.

Recommendations

17. We recommend that the Defence Committee: —
(1) Give general approval to the proposals outlined above.
(2) Authorise the immediate placing of production orders necessary to give full effect to this programme, subject to the proviso in paragraph 16 above.​

(Signed)
FRASER
W. J. SLIM.
R. A. COCHRANE (V.C.A.S.).​

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1,
12th October, 1950.​
 
Annex II of the Document in Post 36
ANNEX II
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ACTIVE ARMY

Shortly after 1st April, 1951, the Active Army to carry out its tasks, set out above, is planned to be ten equivalent divisions deployed as follows: —
B.A.O.R. (3⅓ equivalent divisions) —
one infantry division
two armoured divisions
one infantry brigade​
United Kingdom (2⅓ equivalent divisions) —
one armoured division
one infantry division
16 Independent parachute Brigade
(to be formed later in 1951—one armoured brigade)​
Middle East (1⅓ equivalent divisions) —
one infantry division
one infantry brigade
two infantry battalions​
Far East (2⅓ equivalent divisions) —
one infantry division
one infantry brigade group
Anglo-Gurkha Division​
Austria and Trieste (⅔ equivalent division) —
one infantry brigade each​
Caribbean & Gibraltar—
small garrison forces
Total ... 10 equivalent divisions

The Reserve Army
The Reserve Army is planned to contain 12 equivalent divisions in two categories: —
(a) 5 Equivalent Divisions in the First Contingent of the Reserve Army available as part of an Expeditionary Force: -
50 Division
51 (Highland) Division
53 Division
56 Armoured Division
9 Armoured Brigade
23 Armoured Brigade
161 Independent Infantry Brigade divisions​
(b) 7 Equivalent Divisions in the Second Contingent of the Reserve Army
42 Infantry Division
43 Infantry Division
44 Infantry Division
49 Armoured Division
52 (Lowland) Division divisions
16 Airborne Division
certain independent infantry and armoured brigades​
Total ... 12 equivalent divisions

Anti-aircraft Command and other Anti-aircraft Units
(a) Defence of the United Kingdom
14 Active Army and 156 T.A. Total 170 Regiments​
(b) Overseas in Peace
13 Active Army Regiments​
(c) Overseas after Mobilisation (some of them initially deployed in United Kingdom)
5 Active Army and 14 TA. Total 19 Regiments​
(d) T.A. divisions L.A.A. regiments (some on mobilisation deployed in non div. role)
9 T.A. Regiments​
(e) Total A.A. regiments
32 Active Army and 179 T.A. Total ... 211 regiments = 12 equivalent divisions

It is intended in the immediate future to raise two additional L.A.A. regiments for the Regular divisions now being raised.
 
I think I would have kept a Requirement that very Male between the ages of 18 to 21 do 12 Basic Training.
The Army is there to kill the Queen's enemies, not to sort out troubled young men who have been failed by the school system. Name one war fought by the United Kingdom since 1945 that could have been fought more effectively by National Servicemen than by Regulars?

* Two uncles did National Service, and I did 6 years in the TA.
 
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