Why did the Ottomans fight so well in WW1?

The Ottoman army was astonishingly capable in WW1. Besides the famous victory at Gallipoli, the Ottomans eliminated a British army of 45,000 troops with an army half its size (the Siege of Kut) in Iraq. The Ottomans kept the British at bay for three years in Palestine, winning the First Battle of Gaza in March 1917 (again despite being outnumbered) and the Second Battle of Gaza a month later until final defeat in November. And ultimately, no matter how battered and tired, the Ottoman army had survived as a fighting force in 1918, long after the rest of the Central Powers had succumbed to mutinies. It fought off the invaders in the final act of WW1, the Turkish War of Independence, and assured the creation of a territorially extensive Turkish Republic.

This was the same army that had lost the First Balkan War catastrophically only two years before, and one disparaged as the "Sick Man of Europe" for almost a century.

Why were the Ottomans so successful?
 
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It was mostly fighting on the defensive in a war where defensive fighting had the advantages and often against second line forces commanded by incompetents on stretched communication lines (Kut being the prime example here).

When the Ottoman army tried offensives in the Caucusus and against Suez it failed badly and by 1918 it was getting heavily defeated.
 
A valid question given that I believe they were disregarded before the war and during it likely underestimated too often. They appear to punch above their weight for an Army that should have succumb to even second string Entente forces. We can chalk up some to being on the defensive and some to the inept British sent out to the East, but somewhere in that math is still an Ottoman Army in the fight. Do we credit our illustrious Germans?
 
The active Ottoman Army was well-trained and had the luck to have an effective Officer Corps down to Company commanders. These guys were well-formed and close to their troops (personally leading them during assaults, sharing their difficult daily life): not only the lieutenants but also the colonels and Divisional commanders. Mustafa Kemal wasn't an isolated case in that regard. This helped the Ottoman Infantrymen to remain disciplined and quite motivated despite hardships until roughly 1917 when desertions, lack of weapons/food and trained officers (after casualties not being replaced) really began to take their toll.
So the Ottoman Soldier was really an effective one, well trained and motivated for at least 3 years. The Arabs used to call the British Soldier "father of a thousand guns" (due to their equipment), the Turkish soldier was called "father of courage" (even by the rebels). That's saying something. And the Arab soldiers in the Ottoman Army was very effective and disciplined fighters until 1917, where the Arab Revolt and the hardships lead to massive desertions. Gallipolli was won by Turkish AND Arab soldiers (Kemal commanded some and they were recognized as very brave).
 
It's all a matter of perspective, isn't it? The Ottomans couldn't maintain territorial integrity even as their foes were bled white on the Western front or collapsed into civil war.
 

FBKampfer

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The Turkish military has a history of core competency, despite overlaying problems with logistics and equipment.

Good soldiers, often excelent marksmen, well led, just not enough in the way of heavy equipment and industry to sustain a modern conflict.

The Ottoman empire was the sick man for political and demographic reasons, not due to a lack of military competency.
 

raharris1973

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Not really. The troops in Rumelia were 2nd string reserve 'Redif' units and the Greeks controlled the Aegean Sea so 1st rate troops couldn't be sent or supplied.

Color me skeptical on this explanation. Why would the Ottomans not have most of their first-rate troops in Europe, where their capital and most threatened/rebellious frontiers are? Leaving Europe to only reservists seems reckless.
 
Color me skeptical on this explanation. Why would the Ottomans not have most of their first-rate troops in Europe, where their capital and most threatened/rebellious frontiers are? Leaving Europe to only reservists seems reckless.

Because the Ottoman Army was still deployed to fight and defend against the Italians in the Italo-Turkish war as well as the biggest military threat being from the Russian direction. Plus, the Redif units were usually better at Gendarme services as opposed to front-line combat services, which is more useful for dealing with a wary civilian population.
 
Fighting on home turf and that their country is actually being invaded probably did not hurt espirit de corps either. Germany and Austria-Hungary were often fighting on someone else's yard.
 
Color me skeptical on this explanation. Why would the Ottomans not have most of their first-rate troops in Europe, where their capital and most threatened/rebellious frontiers are? Leaving Europe to only reservists seems reckless.
There was rebellion way down south in Yemen and this had drawn off many troops. Since 1904 it had been costing the Ottoman Empire about £500,000 per year to suppress uprising in Yemen. The Balkan League poured in from 3 sides, probably something a 1st rate army would struggle with.
 

raharris1973

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I bow to your superior arguments - I suppose land forces for Russian-based contingencies would have been prioritized to the northeast border rather than towards weaker Russian clients in Europe - especially because they great powers were talking alot about Armenian reform in these years. And the Italy fighting made Tripoli, the Red Sea and Aegean a priority. (Although I would think it would have encouraged reinforcement of Albania).
 
Well, nothing was wrong with Ottomans fighting capabilities, as long as they were properly led they were capable of doing a lot.BUt, they were hobbled by their lack of industrial capacity, and had to rely on Germans for a lot of things.

Does anyone even know how much Ottomans produced during the war, and how much aid they received? Also, since I am interested in other CP members other then Germany, does anyone know Ottoman TOE during the war, for divisions and regiments and so on? I have tried to find it, but I was unable.
 
I suppose land forces for Russian-based contingencies would have been prioritized to the northeast border rather than towards weaker Russian clients in Europe - especially because they great powers were talking alot about Armenian reform in these years.
The lack of rail infrastructure in the East meant that any armies along the Russian border were fixed there. The Greeks knew that it would take the Turks months to redeploy them to the west and only by shipping that was available in the Black Sea.
 
Well, nothing was wrong with Ottomans fighting capabilities, as long as they were properly led they were capable of doing a lot.BUt, they were hobbled by their lack of industrial capacity, and had to rely on Germans for a lot of things.

Does anyone even know how much Ottomans produced during the war, and how much aid they received? Also, since I am interested in other CP members other then Germany, does anyone know Ottoman TOE during the war, for divisions and regiments and so on? I have tried to find it, but I was unable.

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire comprised about 15m Turks, 10m Arabs, 1.7m Greeks and 1.1m Armenians. This multi-ethnic empire's population of 28 million was a religious mix of 80% Muslim to 20% non-Muslim. Three quarters of the population lived in the Anatolian core. The GDP of the empire was about £ 233m pounds. National debt stood at £140m pounds or about 60% GDP (half held by the French) but this can't have been too much risk as bond rates were at 0.78% and this is a tenth of the rates on Greek bonds.

The war cost 6 times more than expected at about 3m lira per month. Part of the terms for the August 1914 Turko-German Alliance was a 5m lira loan (100m gold marks) at 6% interest from the Germans which was supplied in October 1914. Even this wasn't enough for the Turks to declare war and Souchon took it apon himself to provoke the Russians, with tacit approval of the War Minister, by having the navy attack the Russians at the end of the month to cement the alliance. The economic measures being imposed saw the resignation of the Finance Minister on November 2nd 1914. A further 80m gold marks were supplied in April 1915 by which stage the Turks had also run up 150m gold marks in credit with German arms manufacturers. In addition to money printing (qualitative easing) and 50m lira worth of requisitions, the Ottomans also borrowed a total of 235m lira from Germany (about 4 billion gold marks). The resilience of Turks was quite impressive. For GB the war doubled prices, France they tripled and Germany quadrupled before collapse. Turkish prices went up 18 fold. By 1918 GDP had declined 40% and the cost of living had risen by 2000% since 1914, impoverishing anyone on a fixed salary. Even if Germany had won the war, Turkey would have been reduced to economic servitude to pay back these massive debts.

Army
Ottoman Army 1914 36 divisions

1st Army (HQ Selimiye Barracks - Istanbul)
I. Corps Thrace (Istanbul) [1st, 2nd & 3rd Inf Div]
II. Corps Thrace (Tekfur Dağı) [4th, 5th & 6th Inf Div]
III. Corps Thrace (Kırklareli) [7th, 8th & 9th Inf Div]
IV. Corps Thrace [10th, 11th & 12th Inf Div]
V. Corps Anatolia (Ankara) [13th, 14th & 15th Inf Div]

2nd Army (Aleppo HQ)
VI. Corps Thrace [16th & 26th Inf Div]

3rd Army (Erzincan HQ)
IX. Corps Erzurum [17th, 28th & 29th Inf Div]
X. Corps Erzincan [30th, 31st & 32nd Inf Div]
XI. Corps Van [18th, 33rd & 34th Inf Div]

4th Army (Baghdad)
VIII. Corps Damascus [23rd, 25th & 27th Inf Div]
XII. Corps Mosul [35th & 36th Inf Div]

6th Army
XIII. Corps Baghdad [37th Inf Div]

VII. Corps (Yemen, Red Sea) [39th & 40th Inf Div]
 
Excellent information, thank you. Do you perhaps know anything about their TOEs and how did it change (if it changed at all), during the war. I tried to look it up online, but I was unable to find anything.

I don't think it will be in English sources - if at all. Try Google translate of "osmanlı ordu ekipmanı 1914" or variations there of and you may come across what you are looking for.

An infantry division was to be composed of three infantry regiments, a sharpshooter battalion, a field artillery regiment and an army band. Divisions had operations, intelligence, judiciary, supplies, medical and veterinary departments.

All 35 Regular divisions 1914 were at only 40% strength with mobilised reservists required to build up an active service strength of 10,000 men per infantry division. They possessed different kinds of guns, mountain guns, mortars and howitzers. Those used by the field artillery had calibres varying between 75-105 mm, whereas the heavy artillery had 105-305 mm guns, which were mostly used in fortified zones and coastal defences. Each artillery battery had four guns.

The Ottoman Army’s most modern rifle was the 7.65-mm M1903 Mauser bolt-action rifle. It was issued to the Ottoman Army’s best front-line infantry units. Just over 200,000 were received before the war. In 1914 the Ottoman Army had almost 800,000 7.65-mm Mauser bolt-action rifles and carbines (shortened versions made especially for use by cavalry). Obsolete weapons like the 9.5-mm Mauser M1887 rifle and the single-shot Peabody-Martini 11.43-mm M1874 rifle were issued to second-line units, Kurdish and Arab auxiliaries and the paramilitary Jardama. The standard handguns used by officers were 7.63-mm Mauser C96 and 9-mm FN-Browning M1903 pistols.

Each Ottoman infantry division was supposed to be supported by six batteries of field guns, but in reality they had to make do with three or four at most. The 75-mm Krupp M03 L/30 Field Gun had a range of 6000 m; 648 were purchased from Germany in the period before the First World War, although many were lost in the Balkan Wars. After 1916 Germany supplied the Turks with both types of the standard German Army field gun: the 77-mm Krupp M96 L/27 nA (range 7800 m) and the 77-mm Rheinmetall M16 L/35 (range 9000 m).

The Ottoman Army went to war in 1914 with significant gaps in its arsenal, particularly machine guns and field artillery. When neutral Bulgaria and Greece closed their borders and the Russian, British and French navies imposed a blockade on maritime trade, the Ottoman Empire was cut off from its German arms suppliers.

This isolation prevented the Ottoman Army fully replacing the losses in artillery it had suffered during the Balkan Wars. Stocks of artillery shells also fell to dangerously low levels. The Ottoman field armies had to fight their battles without the intensive use of artillery fire that the armies of the other Great Powers came to rely on.
 
The Ottoman Army had a history of performing above expectations. There were a number of conflicts with Russia in the 19th century. Russia was expected to roll over the Turk but was unable to do so.
 

Thank you, this is great amount of information. It is a shame that there is so little info availlable about other members of Central Powers aside from Germany, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian information is also very hard to come by, which is truly a shame. Especially when one considers how many men other members of CP had under arms, and that without them Germany would have been even more outnumbered and would not have lasted as long.
 
the Ottomans eliminated a British army of 45,000 troops with an army half its size (the Siege of Kut) in Iraq. The Ottomans kept the British at bay for three years in Palestine, winning the First Battle of Gaza in March 1917 (again despite being outnumbered) and the Second Battle of Gaza a month later until final defeat in November. And ultimately, no matter how battered and tired, the Ottoman army had survived as a fighting force in 1918, long after the rest of the Central Powers had succumbed to mutinies. It fought off the invaders in the final act of WW1, the Turkish War of Independence, and assured the creation of a territorially extensive Turkish Republic.

I think this is putting their performance in the best possible light, the following is another way of looking at it. The Ottoman's didn't eliminate a British army of 45,000. They held off a relieving force until the remnants of an encircled division (about 6-10,000) surrendered through starvation. This encircled division had outrun its supply lines and been confronted by a more numerous enemy. There are repeated examples throughout WW1 of smaller forces successfully defending static positions, especially when the attacking force lacked tanks or heavy artillery. The British didn't make any attempt on Palestine until 1917 because most of their attention was focused on the Dardanelles, so until then keeping them at bay mostly meant sitting on the far side of the desert (except for occasional Turkish attacks that were defeated by the British). The Ottomans surrendered before Germany, and technically before Austria-Hungary rather than long after the rest of the Central powers had succumbed. Regarding the Turkish war of independence, yes, it defeated the Italians (who had largely demobilised) and the Greeks, while discouraging the British and the French from taking any more than their 1916-17 objectives. These objectives had mostly expanded because of the complete collapse of the Ottomans in 1918. Neither country had really expressed much/any interest in further gains and both had mostly demobilized and were finding it hard to contain Arab uprising.
 
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