Why did the British and French public care more about Ethiopia than Czechoslovakia?

BigBlueBox

Banned
When the Hoare-Laval Pact was leaked, it was met with strong disapproval throughout the general public in Britain and France. When the Munich Conference occurred, public opinion was strongly in favor. What was the reason for this? Did the general public believe that Hitler would actually honor his word and not menace the rest of Czechoslovakia? Did the public feel that a second-tier power like Italy shouldn't be allowed to wage wars of aggression, but an 800-lb gorilla like Germany should be appeased?
 
When the Hoare-Laval Pact was leaked, it was met with strong disapproval throughout the general public in Britain and France. When the Munich Conference occurred, public opinion was strongly in favor. What was the reason for this? Did the general public believe that Hitler would actually honor his word and not menace the rest of Czechoslovakia?

The atrocities that Italy was committing in Ethiopia were no secret. In fact, they made for some grim reading in the newspapers. Mussolini was depicted as a barbarian in the British media for his deployment of poison gas against a country which was so weak a large part of it's army was still fighting with spears. Halie Selassie's speech to the League of Nations also shored up public support for Ethiopia. Mussolini didn't help matters by proclaiming that he wanted to restore the Roman Empire. When he wasn't a barbarian, he was a madman in the eyes of the Western public.

Hitler was more 'subtle'. He put his case forward that he was simply correcting the wrongs forced upon Germany at the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler portrayed himself as a respectable statesman, fighting for the rights of his people, the Volksdeustche who lived in territories that were stolen from Germany by the Entente. Of course, this image was bogus. Hitler wanted a war with Czechoslovakia and was frustrated when he was forced to negotiate with Chamberlain and Daladier in Munich.

To quote Lord Lothian during the Rhineland crisis, "they were just walking in their own backyard", To the British public, to quote George Bernard Shaw during that same crisis, "It was as if the British had reoccupied Portsmouth,”
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
The atrocities that Italy was committing in Ethiopia were no secret. In fact, they made for some grim reading in the newspapers. Mussolini was depicted as a barbarian in the British media for his deployment of poison gas against a country which was so weak a large part of it's army was still fighting with spears. Halie Selassie's speech to the League of Nations also shored up public support for Ethiopia. Mussolini didn't help matters by proclaiming that he wanted to restore the Roman Empire. When he wasn't a barbarian, he was a madman in the eyes of the Western public.

Hitler was more 'subtle'. He put his case forward that he was simply correcting the wrongs forced upon Germany at the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler portrayed himself as a respectable statesman, fighting for the rights of his people, the Volksdeustche who lived in territories that were stolen from Germany by the Entente. Of course, this image was bogus. Hitler wanted a war with Czechoslovakia and was frustrated when he was forced to negotiate with Chamberlain and Daladier in Munich.

To quote Lord Lothian during the Rhineland crisis, "they were just walking in their own backyard", To the British public, to quote George Bernard Shaw during that same crisis, "It was as if the British had reoccupied Portsmouth,”
If the public and the opposition didn't want to appease Italy, what did they think should have been done instead? The existing sanctions weren't working. Did they want stronger sanctions like cutting off oil and coal, and blocking the Suez Canal, even if it could potentially hurt the British and French economies which were already damaged by the Great Depression?
 
When the Hoare-Laval Pact was leaked, it was met with strong disapproval throughout the general public in Britain and France. When the Munich Conference occurred, public opinion was strongly in favor. What was the reason for this? Did the general public believe that Hitler would actually honor his word and not menace the rest of Czechoslovakia? Did the public feel that a second-tier power like Italy shouldn't be allowed to wage wars of aggression, but an 800-lb gorilla like Germany should be appeased?

That was part of it but the other part was that until he occupied Prague in March 1939 Hitler could plausibly argue that he was only seeking to unite Germans, and that the Austrians and Sudeten Germans wanted to come "home to the Reich."
 
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If the public and the opposition didn't want to appease Italy, what did they think should have been done instead? The existing sanctions weren't working. Did they want stronger sanctions like cutting off oil and coal, and blocking the Suez Canal, even if it could potentially hurt the British and French economies which were already damaged by the Great Depression?

This letter is from a anti-appeasement campaigner named Frank Laurence Lucas, a notable scholar, literary critic, poet and novelist. It was sent to the Daily Telegraph on 25 July 1935.

To the Editor of The Daily Telegraph

Sir,

Last Saturday's leading article on “Abyssinia: Our Duty” is welcome indeed after the advice liberally offered to the Emperor of Abyssinia by some sections of the English Press, urging him to submit to Italy, not because the Italian blackmail is just, but because it would be so inconvenient for ourselves if he resisted.

We might be called on to do more than lip-service to the League; and how extravagant would that be!

Twenty-one years ago, when the consequences of honouring our obligations were far more menacing, we were indignant enough at the suggestion that treaties were, after all, only “scraps of paper.” But geography plays strange tricks with justice. Italy is breaking at least three solemn pledges in her aggression on a fellow member of the League – the very type of aggression that the League was created to prevent: but many of us do not find it matters very much. The League has not yet called on us; but there are already plenty of voices busy finding pretexts for us to shuffle out of the whole thing.

It is not our duty to defend Abyssinia single-handed – no-one has suggested it; but it is our duty, if covenants mean anything whatsoever, to oppose this piece of brigandage at Geneva, and after. It is our duty to be concerting with whatever Powers retain some decency, particularly the United States, what measures may be needed.

Europe has at its disposal sanctions that Italy could not defy, provided we have the courage to use them. But instead of that the English Press, with a few honourable exceptions, has been taken up with nauseating discussion of our own interests. Later on, one gathers, we shall be very firm with Italy about the water of Lake Tana. Meanwhile, Ethiopian blood is a cheaper commodity.

If this is to be the way of our world, why make treaties at all? Let us at least have the courage of our cynicism. Let us have done with covenants, since they no longer serve to deceive anybody. Let us have done with the League, since “collective security” means simply the security of those strong enough to be secure. And then, if we perish in the chaos for which the world is heading, it will at least be without having canted to our last breath.

This jungle-law may have ruled between nations in the past; the time is rapidly approaching when either it ends or else the world. If the League cannot enforce one law for weak and strong, black and white, sooner or later we are finished. And if we flinch every time a test arises, we shall have deserved it.

So, in other words, nobody wanted war with Italy. That was out of the question. What they wanted was crippling sanctions against Italy, which could've included oil and coal shipments. The anti-appeasement movement believed that the war in Abyssinia spat in the face of the established world order and Italy should've been punished for their actions. But, of course, the British and French governments thought otherwise.
 

No.
Not in the sense that nobody was afraid of Germany; but rather in the sense that plenty were rather concerned about Italy, too.
Today we know who was an 800-lb. gorilla and who was a paper tiger; back in the day, the Regia Marina might be a headache in the Mediterranean, and the Regia Aeronautica had plenty of airplanes, just like the Luftwaffe.
 
When the Hoare-Laval Pact was leaked, it was met with strong disapproval throughout the general public in Britain and France. When the Munich Conference occurred, public opinion was strongly in favor. What was the reason for this? Did the general public believe that Hitler would actually honor his word and not menace the rest of Czechoslovakia? Did the public feel that a second-tier power like Italy shouldn't be allowed to wage wars of aggression, but an 800-lb gorilla like Germany should be appeased?

There were other differences, too.
Czechoslovakia was a very recent state, Ethiopia was ancient.
The Germans had some vaguely reasonable-sounding claim concerning the German-speaking minority in the Sudeten, the Italians had not even such a claim.
The Munich thing was (seemed to be) about a border region, not the whole country; the Ethiopian affair was correctly seen as something that wasn't about a border adjustment at Wal-Wal, but about ending the whole country's existence.
And one came before the other. If you have a bad tool, you might make an attempt at using it for the job it should be intended for, once. But after you fail, you will see further similar attempts as less and less promising.
 
They didn't.
Ethiopia was delt with sanctions and there never a serious possibility of going to war with Italy over Ethiopia.
Czechoslovakia was a case of deciding wether or not to go to war. The possibility of war, even when not turned real, shows more concern than just sanctions, even they are actually implemented.
 
Generally true, but not guaranteed.
In the case of Italy, for instance, the League of Nations might have decided for sanctions on oil too, and the British andf French, albeit with an abuse, could have denied use of the Suez Canal. That would not have amounted to war, per se, but who could say that Mussolini wouldn't break a gasket and do something stupid with his navy?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Monthly Donor
and the British andf French, albeit with an abuse, could have denied use of the Suez Canal.

by "albeit with an abuse" you mean "in violation of a commitment to keep usage of Suez unobstructed for all in peace and war"?

Did the Japanese aggressions on Manchuria in '31 and Shanghai in '32 spark similar outrage as Ethiopia? If not, why not? What about when Japan and China went at it fullscale in summer 1937?
 
That was part of it but the other part was that until he occupied Prague in March 1939 Hitler could plausibly argue that he was only seeking to unite Germans, and that the Austrians and Sudeten Germans wanted to come "home to the Reich."

Indeed. Much of what was done in Versailles and related treaties was declared to be "self-determination" for the people affected. For instance, Schleswig was partitioned on the basis of a plebescite, with the northern area, which voted for Denmark, ceded by Germany to Denmark. France held a plebescite in Alsace-Lorraine to justify its return to France. The south-east border of Silesia was tweaked per the results of a plebescite, with some majority-Polish territory taken from Germany.

But this principle seemed to be forgotten when it could have worked for Germans. The Polish Corridor was pre-emptively assigned to Poland, and the purely German city of Danzig was separated as a "free city" under Polish control. German South Tyrol was awarded to Italy. The Hungarian enclave in Transylvania was taken by Romania (along with the surrounding Romanian territory; this did not affect Germans, but it was another example of vae victis).

The Sudetenland was another complex case. It was included in Czechoslovakia, falling inside the traditional borders of Bohemia. But such borders had been ignored by the Allies elsewhere. (Schleswig, for instance, had never been part of Denmark (except briefly under Napoleon) - it had been an external possession of the kings of Denmark.)

By 1938, the Sudeten volksdeutsch were, apparently, eager to escape Czech domination and join the German state.

So Chamberlain (and Daladier; France was really the more important player in the negotiations) had no clear moral case to reject Hitler's demands.

And the Allied military position was weak; France and Britain were underarmed. German annexation of Austria left Czechoslovakia outflanked.

There was further dissent within Czechoslovakia: a lot of Slovaks wanted independence. And Czechoslovakia's other neighbors were not supportive. Poland wanted the Teschen district (seized by Czechoslovakia in 1919); Hungary wanted part of Slovakia and also Ruthenia.

In short, the Czech situation was much more ambiguous than Mussolini's blatant aggression against Abyssinia. Also, Abyssinia fought - winning admiration for their pugnacious patriotism. Even Hitler was impressed. When Abyssinia asked for help, he gave them a dozen 37mm guns and 2M deutschmarks for purchase of German arms and ammunition. (Germany and Italy were not yet allies.)
 
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