Why did Stalin station troops so close to the front?

Why did Stalin station troops so close to the front?

  • To attack Germany

    Votes: 22 30.6%
  • To protect Soviet economic heartland

    Votes: 34 47.2%
  • Other (pls specify)

    Votes: 16 22.2%

  • Total voters
    72
Why did the Soviet high command, headed by Stalin, station the bulk of Soviet troops so close to the front, allowing them to be encircled and wiped out by the Germans in the first phase of Barbarossa?


Was he trying to attack western Europe, like it had been claimed by the Nazis and some historians, thus Barbarossa preempted the Soviet invasion by "just days";

Or was it because the Soviets tried to protect their industrial and agricultural heartland from being taken, just like what the Poles tried to do?
 

Deleted member 1487

Who voted to attack Germany? Without a doubt it was to deter invasion and protect the Soviet heartland.
 
Voted "other". The second option is rather vague (given the immense depth available to the USSR, they could have drawn their first Main Line of Resistance line much further back then they did and still have it be quite far west of their economic heartland) while the first one has never had anything more then circumstantial evidence despite nearly 30 years of intensive research into Soviet archives. The answer is really dead simple: it's because that was what Soviet doctrine dictated. A first strategic echelon of fortified regions on the border plus covering forces and a mobile operational reserve with a second strategic echelon mobilizing behind them to provide a defense-in-depth is how the Soviet forces were arranged. That was also precisely what Soviet theorists in the 1930s had managed to come up with before Stalin had most of them shot. Had he not done that and basically deep freezed Soviet theory in doing so, they might have elaborated on the ideas and come up with some better thought-out stuff, but that's speculative.

And in terms of theory there wasn't anything wrong with such dispositions. The problem was that the Red Army in 1941 lacked the equipment, the logistics (especially in the frontier region), and above all, the skill to successfully pull it off. Oh, and a whole bunch of detailed nuts-and-bolts detail stuff that needed elaborating on but the guys who might have done that were dead so the Soviets had to figure them out the hard way.
 
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Why did the Soviet high command, headed by Stalin, station the bulk of Soviet troops so close to the front, allowing them to be encircled and wiped out by the Germans in the first phase of Barbarossa?
In addition, Stalin ordered Soviet units NOT TO fight back in the first hours of the Nazi attack hoping upon hope that it was all a mistake and merely the action of the local Nazi commander.
 
Was he trying to attack western Europe, like it had been claimed by the Nazis and some historians, thus Barbarossa preempted the Soviet invasion by "just days";

There's only one 'historian' to postulate this, Viktor Suvorov, whose conspiracy theories have been thoroughly debunked.
 
Sounds like a World War I mentality of building up the front not learning from and adapting to what had happened in Poland and France.
 
Sounds like a World War I mentality of building up the front not learning from and adapting to what had happened in Poland and France.

There were multiple operational and stratigic defense echelons, but the lack of a war alert negated their ability to execute their roles. That is the German mechanized groups penetrated them before they could deploy from their assembly areas and assume proper defense positions. The lack of orders & direction from STAVKA & Stalin in the opening days also crippled the Red Armys ability to react & adjust plans to counter a German attack.

To have better countered the German attack the Red Army needed to be alerted and ordered to war deployment a week, or at least 3-4 days before the Germans attacked. AND, timely orders via STAVKA needed to be issued even before the German attack started.
 

ATP45

Banned
Why did the Soviet high command, headed by Stalin, station the bulk of Soviet troops so close to the front, allowing them to be encircled and wiped out by the Germans in the first phase of Barbarossa?


Was he trying to attack western Europe, like it had been claimed by the Nazis and some historians, thus Barbarossa preempted the Soviet invasion by "just days";

Or was it because the Soviets tried to protect their industrial and agricultural heartland from being taken, just like what the Poles tried to do?
Becouse soviets plan to attack Hitler.And they plan to do it in 1941 - they did not plan to build shelter for ammo.schells was laid on earth.One winter and they would have duds.Besides,Stalin arleady betray Hitler - he promised him attack Poland 1.09.39,but wait to 17.
 

Deleted member 1487

There were multiple operational and stratigic defense echelons, but the lack of a war alert negated their ability to execute their roles. That is the German mechanized groups penetrated them before they could deploy from their assembly areas and assume proper defense positions. The lack of orders & direction from STAVKA & Stalin in the opening days also crippled the Red Armys ability to react & adjust plans to counter a German attack.

To have better countered the German attack the Red Army needed to be alerted and ordered to war deployment a week, or at least 3-4 days before the Germans attacked. AND, timely orders via STAVKA needed to be issued even before the German attack started.
David Glantz in Stumbling Colossus actually addresses the point of the OP and decisively refutes Suvurov's thesis, but in doing so makes a strong case that the USSR's DP41 was actually not workable in 1941. They couldn't really deploy as planned due to lack of equipment, supplies, the serviceability of equipment, and modernization of equipment (i.e. swapping out of old for new) as they expanded, while they actually lacked concrete plans for all armies. They improvised on the fly during the war, with disastrous results, but even with the declaration of open mobilization, all the echelons were not able to be put into place with equipment and be combat capable.
 
Voted "other". The Stalin Line was unfinished, so the troops were posted forward until it was completed. But Hitler beat him to the punch...
 
David Glantz in Stumbling Colossus actually addresses the point of the OP and decisively refutes Suvurov's thesis, but in doing so makes a strong case that the USSR's DP41 was actually not workable in 1941. They couldn't really deploy as planned due to lack of equipment, supplies, the serviceability of equipment, and modernization of equipment (i.e. swapping out of old for new) as they expanded, while they actually lacked concrete plans for all armies. They improvised on the fly during the war, with disastrous results, but even with the declaration of open mobilization, all the echelons were not able to be put into place with equipment and be combat capable.

Nevertheless less actually alerting and deploying would be better than getting caught in camp. To paraphrase Rommel; any action is superior to inaction. A idea that was reflected in German army tactical and operational doctrine.
 

Deleted member 1487

Nevertheless less actually alerting and deploying would be better than getting caught in camp. To paraphrase Rommel; any action is superior to inaction. A idea that was reflected in German army tactical and operational doctrine.
Without a doubt being alert is better than being unaware, but even as I went back and flipped through the combat readiness section of Glantz's book, there actually were commanders that were ready and secret mobilization had been started (some historians dispute the level to which that was already in place more than 1 month later). So the Soviets weren't exactly caught with their pants down, but they weren't as ready as they could have been...but they also could only have been so ready given the overall situation. DP41 was unworkable given the state of Soviet forces as of June 1941 even if full mobilization had been ordered. As it was the actions they did take lowered combat capabilities according to Glantz as well, as the half measures actually reduced ability to fight (working on defenses meant less time for training of reserves and overpromoted officers, dispersions without sufficient radios reduced ability to actually fight a coordinated battle and distribute equipment and supplies, mobilizing 800k reservists without requisitioning trucks from the civilian sector actually overburdened the supply system, etc.), so in some cases action without proper planning can hurt combat readiness. Soviet doctrine wasn't really set up trust lower level officers with responsibility in 1941...or even as late as Kursk in some cases due to the damage inflicted by the purges on the officer corps.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2016.1232563
 
Even if we assume a absolutely ahistorically high quality performance on their part, the Soviet frontier forces would at best have only held a few days before being overrun as a result of running out of ammunition and fuel. They only had a few days on hand to begin with, a result of being in some cases nearly 1,000 kilometers from their depots. The only real difference is that they would gut German forces in going down and while that would radically alter the outcome of the Battles of Leningrad, Smolensk, and/or Kiev in favor of the Soviets, it still means the frontier battles are a catastrophic loss for the Red Army.

More realistically, their forces would only do a little more damage then OTL and pose no noticeable delays. While a "little" more damage combined with additional preparation might again be enough to help the second echelon forces to alter the outcome of the battles around Leningrad, Smolensk, and Kiev (they were very close-run fights as it was), it would again make little difference up in among the first echelon.
 

ATP45

Banned
Voted "other". The Stalin Line was unfinished, so the troops were posted forward until it was completed. But Hitler beat him to the punch...
Stalin Line was finished before 1939.After 1939 bunkers was disarmed,and some even destroyed.
 

ATP45

Banned
Bad decision making, and garrisoning territories with risk of Polish partisans.
What polish partisants? NKWD send all Poles from "suspicious" families to Gulag or grave.In 1941,when soviets run without a fight,Polish partisants did not attack them - becouse they did not exist.Or exists in Gulag.
 

ATP45

Banned
What polish partisants? NKWD send all Poles from "suspicious" families to Gulag or grave.In 1941,when soviets run without a fight,Polish partisants did not attack them - becouse they did not exist.Or exists in Gulag.
There was 2 surviving small polish groups in 1941,but they accompish nothing.
 
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