Hannibal didn't immediately march on Rome after Cannae because his army was exhausted and he didn't have the necessary siege equipment. The Senate in Carthage was filled with enemies of his family, the Barcids, and Hannibal had conducted most of the war by himself. It was mainly Rome fighting Hannibal than Carthage, until Rome struck back.
Hannibal lost because his brother lost at Metaurus. Simple as that-if the Carthaginians win there, they win the war.
Your post has two misconceptions there.But what if Hannibal had attacked Rome just after Cannea or if the Senate had send reinforcements. If he had attacked Rome, it would have been an easy victory, as Rome hardly had any army left. And why did the Senate not send reinforcements? Sure, he had enemies in the Senate, but did they really prefer a Roman victory?
My impression is that Rome hardly had any army left and that Hannibal did not even have to siege Rome, but could attack it and win an easy victory.
Not at all. Rome had a couple legions in the city and there was another force marching around somewhere in Italy I believe. Had he sieged Rome, he would have been trapped. The Servian Walls were impressive, and Hannibal, while great at every other form of warfare, proved himself to be mediocre when it came to sieges-he probably knew his limitations and he recognized the key to beating Rome lied in detaching their Italian allies.But what if Hannibal had attacked Rome just after Cannea or if the Senate had send reinforcements. If he had attacked Rome, it would have been an easy victory, as Rome hardly had any army left. And why did the Senate not send reinforcements? Sure, he had enemies in the Senate, but did they really prefer a Roman victory?
My impression is that Rome hardly had any army left and that Hannibal did not even have to siege Rome, but could attack it and win an easy victory.
I had actually forgotten that there were actual Roman soldiers in that battle and figured that it was only mercenaries.
However I think its still the exception that proves the rule as the battle relied heavily on having the 3 to 1 advantage, and on bribing the Celtic mercenaries with a large amount of treasure and fortune. That's especially questionable when at the same time Hannibal was stuck in Italy and desperately trying to raise war funds.
And again, that is a single example, in almost 20 years of warfare. That's not exactly a record of success.
In the end Rome was fighting a fundamentally different war from Hannibal. In the classical era war was 'fight a battle or two, maybe besiege a place. Winner gets some concessions from the enemy.' Rinse repeat. With Rome, it was closer to 'We die before we even consider giving an inch. And we will do our damndest to drag you to hell with us.' And that raw endurance in the face of insane setback basically exhausted the Carthaginian powerbase to death.
So comparing possible Carthaginian child sacrifice, to definite Roman sacrifice plus the huge scale of the gladiatorial death factory, I would say that the Roman system was worse. (I wonder how the Empire-wide Roman Games compares to the Aztec sacrificial rites in numbers of deaths?)
Actually most gladiatorial matches were mock-ups, not unlike modern wrestling matches. Gladiators being expensive to train and to maintain.
All in all there seems to be something very unattractive to contemporaries about Carthage compared to Rome.
Not directly related, but I always thought that the wrong side won that war. I think it was John Keegan who said that the only comparable ancient Empire to that of the Romans, in terms of sheer ruthless brutality, was that of the Assyrians. He said that while the Classical world was far from peaceful, the Romans in particular seemed to have a pathological need to destroy at least one city and enslave its inhabitants, every single year. A record that only the Assyrians before them, and the Mongols after them, came close to matching.
Of course the Romans gave a negative account of the Carthaginian state and society, but I cannot help but think that this is almost entirely Roman propaganda and self-justification for their own atrocities.
Maybe that Carthaginians traveled on an elephant's back and Romans on the winner's bandwagon.
Military speaking, it's not like marching south after Cannae was a bad plan. The defection of Capua and Tarentum, and other Italic groups doubled the size of Hannibal's operating army. Plus he was expecting reinforcements to come by sea. If he tried to attack Rome instead he loses those troops because Marcellus is going around crucifying everyone and burning everything down. And then he still doesn't have a plan for breaking through the walls.Not at all. Rome had a couple legions in the city and there was another force marching around somewhere in Italy I believe. Had he sieged Rome, he would have been trapped. The Servian Walls were impressive, and Hannibal, while great at every other form of warfare, proved himself to be mediocre when it came to sieges-he probably knew his limitations and he recognized the key to beating Rome lied in detaching their Italian allies.
Now, that's not to say marching on Rome won't work. It might work to get the Romans to agree to a peace (a close run thing after Cannae that they narrowly rejected) but it's unlikely and I don't think Hannibal is going to risk complete annihilation in the hopes that Rome might come around.
The plan of the Fabian strategy was much more intricate than simply avoiding Hannibal. The Romans were more than willing to fight, just as long as Hannibal wasn't personally in command. The idea was being able to defeat Carthage without having to actually defeat Hannibal. That's why there was the campaigns in Iberia and Sicily (Roman victories), the naval campaigns to block African reinforcements (Roman victories), Metaurus to block off Hannibal's reinforcements from the north (decisive Roman victory), or even attacking Hanno when Hannibal wasn't able to personally supervise him (another Roman victory). Even invading Africa itself when Hannibal wasn't looking (Roman victory even when Hannibal himself joined the fight).Because the Romans basically refused to fight a pitched battle, the Fabian strategy worked and by denying Hannibal a battle they slowly bled him to death. In Spain the Romans were fortunate enough to have there very own genius commander and veteran troops.
Which simply isn't true. The Roman's were far more scrupulous about fighting Hannibal and far more cautious after Cannae but on a few occasions Roman armies were still defeated in the field by Hannibal well after Cannae. Here are some of Hannibal's victories after Cannae:Because the Romans basically refused to fight a pitched battle, the Fabian strategy worked and by denying Hannibal a battle they slowly bled him to death. In Spain the Romans were fortunate enough to have there very own genius commander and veteran troops.
Agreed.Military speaking, it's not like marching south after Cannae was a bad plan. The defection of Capua and Tarentum, and other Italic groups doubled the size of Hannibal's operating army. Plus he was expecting reinforcements to come by sea. If he tried to attack Rome instead he loses those troops because Marcellus is going around crucifying everyone and burning everything down. And then he still doesn't have a plan for breaking through the walls.
He did. And was defeated at Metaurus. If Metaurus is either avoided or a decisive Punic victory, then the war is pretty much over for Rome.Wasn't Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, not arriving with re-enforcement's and equipment so the ultimate cause of defeat for Hannibal?