Why did China centralize and India did not?

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Like someone here said: Chinese geography is much more conductive for centralized places. The goodiest parts are very limited

Unlike India, whose goodies and therefore the potential power bases are rather spread out. If the Indus-Ganges watershed was a little more mountainous, that might do.
 
To use my India as Europe, China as USA analogy. It would be as if foreign armies small in number managed to occupy America east of the Mississippi, with the western half continuing to call itself the USA. Much later, a native New Yorker then reestablished the United States in the east and reconquered the western half of the country. That in a nutshell is the Sui unification.

Yes the “Five Barbarians” assimilated and you would be right to question whether it was still an occupation when the Sui state emerged. However there is no question it was an occupation when they invaded and the division was a result of this. Clearly this is distinct from a divison of the country due to internal cleavages. It is essential to the understanding of whether the Chinese centralized state was more inclined to unification or division.
The transition from Zhao to Sui was far more smooth than many native-to-native transitions, the idea that anything native was reestablished doesn't really seem to be the case, it's more akin to a shift in policy.

The idea that "foreigners" conquered the areas, occupied against locals will and somehow they are the only reason China was politically divided is evidently not the case, you cannot expect China to divide and somehow for militarily strong neighbours to not enter the scene and you also cannot pretend that foreign people coming in means that those cannot be treated as Chinese states in a geopolitical sense, at the very least you didn't make the argument for why they shouldn't be considered Chinese or why we should talk about the region as if it existed in a vacuum or pretend that only purely internal division is what matters, which is not the case considering that no big states in either India, nor China nor Rome or most other places purely fell out of internal division.
 
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The Chinese Plain is every bit as exposed to outside invasion say from the West and the North and Northeast as the Indo-Gangetic Plain. Furthermore, I wasn’t talking about securing the Chinese Plain, I was talking about securing Southern and Central China

Southern and Centeral China can't be easily divided geographically and are only vulnerable from one direction (the North). Let's say you have minor states in South China and the North is strong and united: they come down and subdue you unless you yourself are united, but if South China is united and strong than they can dominate the North who, if the locals don't have access to the resources of Southern China,are vulnerable to the powerful nomadic attacks that have to be large to get through the Gobi and be secure enough at home in the tumult of Steppe politics to even be attacking in the first place, since they can't hold all the fronts at the same time, and the new leadership can take their place at the top of the system left behind by the vanquished. If South China is left alone, with no outside force to keep attention focused on the area around them they would fight internally until one rose to dominance, and than could steamroll North.
 
Southern and Centeral China can't be easily divided geographically and are only vulnerable from one direction (the North). Let's say you have minor states in South China and the North is strong and united: they come down and subdue you unless you yourself are united, but if South China is united and strong than they can dominate the North who, if the locals don't have access to the resources of Southern China,are vulnerable to the powerful nomadic attacks that have to be large to get through the Gobi and be secure enough at home in the tumult of Steppe politics to even be attacking in the first place, since they can't hold all the fronts at the same time, and the new leadership can take their place at the top of the system left behind by the vanquished. If South China is left alone, with no outside force to keep attention focused on the area around them they would fight internally until one rose to dominance, and than could steamroll North.

I'm kind of skeptical about that. Southern China actually has quite a few mountains, especially around, say, the Sichuan area, which was known for being a pretty defensible position.

Besides, only one "southern" dynasty has ever "steamrolled" the north, and that's the Ming. Every single other dynasty that has come to power has come from the north. So I think that part of the argument needs a little more to back it up.
 
I'm kind of skeptical about that. Southern China actually has quite a few mountains, especially around, say, the Sichuan area, which was known for being a pretty defensible position.

Besides, only one "southern" dynasty has ever "steamrolled" the north, and that's the Ming. Every single other dynasty that has come to power has come from the north. So I think that part of the argument needs a little more to back it up.

Sichuan is well out of the way of the main resources, population centers, and routes of entry/exit into South China from the North (Which are far closer to the coast). If you're at the point you can compel the enemy to come after you that far east, you've already lost.

I'd argue that actually backs my point. When the South was subdued and the North was the area of the nomads who could threaten China, then they swept in and displaced the ruling dynasty when the watch on the North faded due to having to stomp on dissent in China proper. It was only when the area coulden't turn back on China, being in the internal conflicts of the Mongol Khanates and turned West rather than East, that the south was uncontested in being able to fight for control and move up into Beijing. Look at the 10 Kingdoms period, for instance: you'll notice the South is indeed divided while North China is not.

Though, I'll admit at this point we're getting into Chinese political history, not political geography, which isen't a strong suit of mine. I can't go very deep into this with any depth of understanding.
 
Nobody’s saying that geography is the sole factor that stopped unification in the Indian subcontinent. It’s that the ideological framework was the seed that was then exacerbated by the diverse landscapes. Not to say that there aren’t parralels but they aren’t fully cognate.

One can argue that India had its own Warring States period all the way from the seeding of the Second Urbanisation in c.800 CE to the Mauryan unity under Ashoka. However compare that to the relatively short period of 200 years the Chinese Warring States lasted and we can see that there is a larger memory of disunity. And remember the Zhou dynasty had already laid the groundwork for a unified Han state prior to Qin Shi Huangdi.

One can also argue that the dismantling of the Mahajanapada system had started years before Chandragupta’s victory with Ajatshatru’s conquest of Kosala and annexation of the state into Magadha’s rising empire all the way back in 470 BC. However no sooner than his passing his son Udayina rose to the throne but was killed in battle against the forces of Avanti. His popular rule gave way to that of a tyrant known as Nagadarshaka that caused the overthrow of the dynasty in favour of the Shishunagas. Then the Nandas. Then the Mauryas. All ruling from the one city of Pataliputra, even more legitimate to the previous rulers than the Chinese dynasties were, with their own Confucius in the form of Chanakya and an extremely centralised state.

So what the hell went wrong? Two things; Ashoka pushed too far in to spiritual and not the temporal, as well as the geography of such a disparate land needing a strong centralised state. Which the Mauryan Empire no longer was after Ashoka. He let an entire generation of his successors (including his heir and spare) either become renunciates or in Kunalas case become blinded and thus illegible for rule. Dasaratha, successor of Ashoka, kept up his grandfather’s civil policies and in the process allowed the vast amount of feudatory states within the empire, something Chanakya had advocated against in the Arthashastra in the first place break away. Dasaratha’s cousin Samprati managed to stop breakaways but the damage was done.

By the time Pushyamitra Shunga took power it seemed as if the cycle was about to start again and another imperial power was about to rise from Magadha to dominate India. However that dynamic no longer existed. The Indo-Greek kingdoms had taken over the northwest. The lands of the old Asmaka, Andhra, Mulaka and Vidharba kingdoms were no longer heavily-forested, backwater regions but an industrial complex within themselves as over the years droves of Indo-Aryan speaking settlers had moved south of the Vindhyas.

So the Shungas lost their opportunity. As there was no Mandate of Heaven concept there was no longer an effort or even ability to try and unite the sub-continent. The West was ruled by Mlechchas that saw no understanding or even approval of the concept of Aryavarta. The south was a New World, almost Wild West where people could start anew. As time went on the ability to reconquer these areas continued to drop as innovations were lacking till the Guptas and population centres continued to match the imperial heartland.

That's a pretty good and detailed argument. I'm pretty much in agreement, based off the little knowledge I have in Indian history. A few details, however: The Zhou were disunited in effect long before the warring states period. The Spring and Autumn period began around 771 BC, lasting to 476 BC. So from the Spring and Autumn period to the Qin unification, that was 500 years of effective disunity. You also point to the concept of Aryavarta, which seems itself something similar to a "Mandate of Heaven", though in a somewhat more compact form. Why didn't this foster a stronger unity in what is now Northern India and Pakistan, at the very least? Even then, could not the Shishunaga and Gupta be seen as the successors of the Maurya and Nanda?

This leads me to another point. I think a lot of the time, when we are talking of the unification of China, we mean the areas of the North China Plain, Gansu, Sichuan, south to Guangdong, whereas when we talk of Indian unity, we speak of almost all of modern India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. I feel this is quite the double standard. If we were to consider, say, Manchuria, the Tarim Basin, Yunnan, Guangxi, Northern Vietnam, or Tibet "core regions" of China, then the unity of China would become laughable. Here is a list of years of unity and disunity, if we include even Manchuria, Yunnan, and the Tarim basin as integral parts of China:

Qin (221-206): Nope
Chu-Han contention (206-202)
Han (202-220): Ok, we'll give it to you, though Manchuria remained mostly out of your grasp. (422 years)
3 Kingdoms (220-280)
Western Jin (280-317): Fine, but that's really generous. (459 years)
Eastern Jin (317-420): Definite nope.
Northern and Southern Dynasties (420-581)
Sui (581-618): You failed against Goguryeo. So nope.
Tang (618-907): Nope. You didn't conquer Nanzhao. You also lost Vietnam towards the end of your reign. Did pretty well in the Tarim department though.
5 Dynasties and 10 Kingdoms (907-960)
Northern Song (960-1127): Nope
Southern Song (1127-1279): Don't kid yourself
Yuan (1271-1368): Officially, you never had the Tarim Basin or Vietnam, but I'll give it to you. (556 years)
Ming (1368-1644): Ok, fine. (832 years)
Qing (1644-1911): Yes! (excepting Vietnam...) (823 years)

Still pretty high, but not as high as some other estimates. And I haven't even included areas such as inner Mongolia, North Korea, or Tibet. Just something to keep in mind.

What I disagree with is that I think there are some (not all, but some) people here that are implying that Geography is a sole or even major factor in unification or disunification, and using what I see as faulty logic to back this up. Granted, some arguments are quite fair, perhaps such as that of the North China plain being helpful. It's when people start throwing words like "inevitable", "pre-determined", or "someone was GOING to do it EVENTUALLY" around, or when they think it's one's duty to disprove their argument rather than for them to offer proof for such an argument that I disagree.

Still, I could be projecting some of my frustration with past threads that have trotted out these very arguments.

Again, @Shahrasayr, I commend your argument, as I think it is well done.
 
Sichuan is well out of the way of the main resources, population centers, and routes of entry/exit into South China from the North (Which are far closer to the coast). If you're at the point you can compel the enemy to come after you that far east, you've already lost.

I'd argue that actually backs my point. When the South was subdued and the North was the area of the nomads who could threaten China, then they swept in and displaced the ruling dynasty when the watch on the North faded due to having to stomp on dissent in China proper. It was only when the area coulden't turn back on China, being in the internal conflicts of the Mongol Khanates and turned West rather than East, that the south was uncontested in being able to fight for control and move up into Beijing. Look at the 10 Kingdoms period, for instance: you'll notice the South is indeed divided while North China is not.

Though, I'll admit at this point we're getting into Chinese political history, not political geography, which isen't a strong suit of mine. I can't go very deep into this with any depth of understanding.

Point 1: The Qin and Han actually projected power from Sichuan, something to take note of. Not sure how relevant that is, but it shows that Sichuan isn't just a pushover.

Point 2: I'm a little confused as to what your argument is. So what if the south was divided during the Ten Kingdoms period? That's the whole point: the south was not the place from which "China" projected power. Even if that was true, look at the failure of the Eastern Jin or Southern Song to face Northern neighbors. In the end, the Southern dynasty always lost.
 
The transition from Zhao to Sui was far more smooth than many native-to-native transitions, the idea that anything native was reestablished doesn't really seem to be the case, it's more akin to a shift in policy.

The idea that "foreigners" conquered the areas, occupied against locals will and somehow they are the only reason China was politically divided is evidently not the case, you cannot expect China to divide and somehow for militarily strong neighbours to not enter the scene and you also cannot pretend that foreign people coming in means that those cannot be treated as Chinese states in a geopolitical sense, at the very least you didn't make the argument for why they shouldn't be considered Chinese or why we should talk about the region as if it existed in a vacuum or pretend that only purely internal division is what matters, which is not the case considering that no big states in either India, nor China nor Rome or most other places purely fell out of internal division.

I don't think that "foreigners conquering the areas and this being the only reason for disunity" was what Richard was arguing. I think he was just pointing out that a "barbarian" occupation is different from internal division, and likely has different factors that must be understood in order to truly understand Chinese unity/disunity. But that's my interpretation, it's really up for him to say.

Also, neither the Zhao nor Sui were really "native" dynasties: in actuality, they were Sinicized semi-barbarians, eventual successors of the Tuoba Wei. Like Richard said, it could be conceived that the Sui were semi-barbarian, akin to the Goths in the Roman Empire. To use another analogy, the Sui situation would be closest to if a united pan-Gothic Empire formed in the west, then conquered the East and called itself Roman. However, had the Sui never come along, perhaps China would've remained divided into a North and South, with each calling itself the legitimate "China" and disdaining the other, similar to the Franks and Eastern Romans. Heck, this actually happened, with the Song practically acknowledging the Khitan Liao and later Jurchen Jin as equals and the Liao and Jin seeing themselves more and more as legitimately "Chinese". Who knows what would've happened had the Mongols not swept in and conquered both?
 
This leads me to another point. I think a lot of the time, when we are talking of the unification of China, we mean the areas of the North China Plain, Gansu, Sichuan, south to Guangdong, whereas when we talk of Indian unity, we speak of almost all of modern India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. I feel this is quite the double standard. If we were to consider, say, Manchuria, the Tarim Basin, Yunnan, Guangxi, Northern Vietnam, or Tibet "core regions" of China, then the unity of China would become laughable.
Manchuria and Yunnan and Tibet is NEVER part of China until 18th-19th centuries. That standard is excessive, what about this standard ?

China Core Areas : Wei River valley, ordos loop, fei river valley, Northern China Plain (between Yellow and Yangtze)
China Peripheral Areas in Unification : South of Yangtze, Sichuan, Shandong Pennisula, modern Beijing (coast of Yellow Sea), Fujian, Pearl River at Guangdong
non-Chinese Areas (not needed in unification) : Miao in Guizhou, Guangxi, Northern Vietnam, Yunnan, Tibet, Liaodong Pennisula, Manchuria, Qinghai and Tarim Basin, Taiwan

India Core Areas : Punjab (five Indus tributaries), Ganges River, Bengal (including Bangladesh), Indus River Sindh
India peripheral Areas in Unification : Deccan, middle India, Godameri river, Narmada river
non-India Areas (not needed in Unification) : Sri Lanka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu/Kaveri river, Assam and seven sister states, Chittagong Hill, Baluchistan, Pushtunistan, Afghanistan
 
Manchuria and Yunnan and Tibet is NEVER part of China until 18th-19th centuries. That standard is excessive, what about this standard ?

China Core Areas : Wei River valley, ordos loop, fei river valley, Northern China Plain (between Yellow and Yangtze)
China Peripheral Areas in Unification : South of Yangtze, Sichuan, Shandong Pennisula, modern Beijing (coast of Yellow Sea), Fujian, Pearl River at Guangdong
non-Chinese Areas (not needed in unification) : Miao in Guizhou, Guangxi, Northern Vietnam, Yunnan, Tibet, Liaodong Pennisula, Manchuria, Qinghai and Tarim Basin, Taiwan

India Core Areas : Punjab (five Indus tributaries), Ganges River, Bengal (including Bangladesh), Indus River Sindh
India peripheral Areas in Unification : Deccan, middle India, Godameri river, Narmada river
non-India Areas (not needed in Unification) : Sri Lanka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu/Kaveri river, Assam and seven sister states, Chittagong Hill, Baluchistan, Pushtunistan, Afghanistan

This seems much more reasonable. I was only using Manchuria, Yunnan, and Tibet to prove how absurd it would be to hold even the Deccan, let alone the Dravidian/Tamil States and such other peripheral areas as "core Indian areas". Just as Manchuria, Yunnan, and Tibet were never parts of core China, nor was Southern India ever part of a Northern Indian State. In fact, the first time Thanjavur and Delhi were ruled under the same authority was under the BEIC. Too often, I feel, people don't count the Nanda or Shishunaga, or even Haryanka, as central dynasties, nor do they see the Gupta, Pratihara, or Delhi Sultanate as such a dynasty. True, they don't hold a candle to the Maurya in terms of territorial extent, but I think it's telling that, again and again, polities managed to unite the Ganges and Ujjain area, often even extending their rule to the Indus or parts of the Deccan.

Even simply including the Ordos loop vastly decreases the amount of time "core China" has been unified. In much of the Han and Jin dynasties, for example, the Ordos loop was outside Chinese control. Now I'm not saying that just because the Ordos is outside Chinese control that China is not China, I'm just trying to demonstrate how absurd it is to hold India to the same standard by saying that just because parts of the Deccan or even the Indus is outside the dynasty's control doesn't mean there wasn't a recurring pattern in India.
 
I would argue there might be an issue of style, that occurs in China that is lacking in India. @Shahrasayr seems to be touching on this idea. With China, it wasn't necessarily "centralization" whatever that means, but it was more while Qin Shi Huang left a cultural idea of rulership to be emulated as Son of Heaven at least in the title, the Mauryans were unable to do so. Style, in this case, means that the traditions and symbols of a state are worth emulating. For example, Egypt had the Pharaohs that were emulated by Non-Egyptian dynasties even down to the cultural trappings.

So It would see it is less geography and more lack of cultural or at least cross-cultural idea of a state that transcends a mere dynasty.
 
I would argue there might be an issue of style, that occurs in China that is lacking in India. @Shahrasayr seems to be touching on this idea. With China, it wasn't necessarily "centralization" whatever that means, but it was more while Qin Shi Huang left a cultural idea of rulership to be emulated as Son of Heaven at least in the title, the Mauryans were unable to do so. Style, in this case, means that the traditions and symbols of a state are worth emulating. For example, Egypt had the Pharaohs that were emulated by Non-Egyptian dynasties even down to the cultural trappings.

So It would see it is less geography and more lack of cultural or at least cross-cultural idea of a state that transcends a mere dynasty.

Qin Shi Huang didn't leave this idea of the Mandate of Heaven, that was the Zhou.

I would also argue that the Maurya were neither the first nor the last state to reflect the idea of "India". I use "India" to mean the area covered by the concept of Aryavarta. The Nanda and Shishunaga before and Gupta after are just a few examples that (mostly) reflect this idea.
 
That's a pretty good and detailed argument. I'm pretty much in agreement, based off the little knowledge I have in Indian history. A few details, however: The Zhou were disunited in effect long before the warring states period. The Spring and Autumn period began around 771 BC, lasting to 476 BC. So from the Spring and Autumn period to the Qin unification, that was 500 years of effective disunity. You also point to the concept of Aryavarta, which seems itself something similar to a "Mandate of Heaven", though in a somewhat more compact form. Why didn't this foster a stronger unity in what is now Northern India and Pakistan, at the very least? Even then, could not the Shishunaga and Gupta be seen as the successors of the Maurya and Nanda?

snip

Again, @Shahrasayr, I commend your argument, as I think it is well done.

I would argue there might be an issue of style, that occurs in China that is lacking in India. @Shahrasayr seems to be touching on this idea. With China, it wasn't necessarily "centralization" whatever that means, but it was more while Qin Shi Huang left a cultural idea of rulership to be emulated as Son of Heaven at least in the title, the Mauryans were unable to do so. Style, in this case, means that the traditions and symbols of a state are worth emulating. For example, Egypt had the Pharaohs that were emulated by Non-Egyptian dynasties even down to the cultural trappings.

So It would see it is less geography and more lack of cultural or at least cross-cultural idea of a state that transcends a mere dynasty.

It's complicated but the history of becoming the equivalent of an emperor in pre-modern era even after the advent of Buddhism is intrinsically tied to the concept of suzerainty. This had a quasi-religious aspect to it with the performance of the Asvamedha Yajna. Successfully performing this rite (that meant to an extent where you could call on your tributary kings to attend the ceremony) had you recognised as the temporal lord and greatest Rajna in all of Aryavarta. However the gimmick was the title which this conferred, Cakravartin, was never inherited. If a prince wanted to live up to his predecessor he would have to extort tribute once again.

Yet as we know Janapadas started being eaten up by Magadha as I detailed in my previous posts, starting with the Haryanka dynasty. This precedent was a dangerous one in that it removed the ability for realms to be above things such as warfare and slowly dynasties began to be the identifying method in Indian historiography. It removed the ability for one to also legally claim the title of Cakravartin as detailed in the Jain traditions when Ajatshatru is not recognised as one.

The Mauryan emperors after were the only Cakravartins due to the sheer size of their realm. However in his rock edicts it is known that Ashoka never referenced himself by his own name or by his regnal title of Cakravartin, but by the nickname Priyadarsin or the epithet Devanampriya. Just like Caesar became a byword for ruler in the western hagiography tradition eventually evolving into a title, the challenge would be to get either of those titles to become synonymous with not just Ashoka but the rule over the entirety of Jambudvipa.

And the easiest way to achieve this would be Kunala's ascension to the throne. The crown prince Tivala seemed to have predeceased Ashoka, Mahendra was steadfast on expanding the Sangha and Jalauka was more intent on carving out his own realm (but that's the Rajatrangini's opinion and Kalhana is quite fanciful.) The Ashokavadhana's description of him literally makes him what Dara Shikoh was to the Mughals. A last attempt at greatness.
 
Actually, to turn a Diamondian point on its head, I would say that China's north-south division is a geographical impediment that lasted up to the Sui, who built the Grand Canal. Diamond argues that the unity of agricultural packages is essential to long-term large Empire, and yet China defies its rule. In the north, crops such as millet and barley were the norm, while the south grew rice. China's rivers also mainly run west-east, which would cause me to conclude that the most sensible China is one that is fractured on a north-south axis into two main states, maybe even three if a State develops around the Pearl River. Thus, by this argument, China should not have been able to effectively hold onto its south. So the question is: how did "China" manage to hold itself together long enough to form a State as strong as the Sui, which could create such an insane Canal? What geographic answer is there to that?

China also faced plenty of geographic rivals. Looked at one way, the Chinese were only invaded and outright conquered twice, but this ignores the Wu Hu, Tuoba Wei, Khitan Liao, and Jurchen Jin, all of whom seized core areas of "China", and should not simply be brushed aside. The Han were even forced to pay tribute to the Xiongnu, and I believe the Song was actually quite hated for admitting Imperial weakness and acquiescing to the reality of a "divided China". It's really only historiographical cover-up that has attempted to brush off these "minor inconveniences". Viewed in such a light, "China" has had at least five "barbarian" dynasties. Especially troublesome were the barbarians of the Mongolian steppe and Manchuria, both of whom threatened China numerous times and resisted attempts at subjugation (see the disastrous Sui-Goguryeo wars or the Tumu Crisis). The question here is: how come, even with all of these nomadic invasions or interventions, did a "Chinese civilization" have such a consistent trend of unity? And is this so-called unity really just historiographical interpretation?

There is more nuance that needs to be explored.

Not to mention that many of these barbarian dynasties assimilated...much slower than people insist today. Manchu assimilation was a bit slower than conventional wisdom suggests.

The question IMO is not why Chinese civilization held together, but why the Yuan, Ming, and Qing held together. Really, that's most of Chinese unity as we've discussed. To me, it simply seems that the Yuan governed pretty lightly and there wasn't that much of a good reason to secede. These empires also didn't really care much about religion. When you think about it, it's a very nomad way of ruling (give us some $$$ and we'll leave you alone). Similarly, nobody willingly seceded from the Holy Roman Empire, because what was the point?

People say Confucianism is what lead to China's unifying ideological framework, but what specifically about Confucianism does this?

My pet theory is that it's because "Confucianism" is religiously neutral. Confucianism is not a religion in any meaningful way; it explicitly makes no religious claims (Confucius himself disavows making such claims and promoted a pretty much "all religions are good" kinda thing). Thus, a "Confucian" state is actually quite religiously neutral, which also helps unity. Certainly gives the Qing Empire an advantage over say, the Mughal Empire.
 
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This is a really interesting question because it was one of the fundamental chapters for Fukuyama’s Origins of Political Order. His theory for the reason why India and China had such opposite political development was because of the balance of power between the state and civil society. In his opinion, China had no limit to state power, hence to the high level of centralisation whereas in India, the power of the Brahmin caste in performing ancestral rites for the warrior-caste kings stopped the latter from embarking on Shi Huang Di-levels of conquest due to the threat of sanction. His point was that the rise of Europe to global hegemony was due to them reaching the “sweet spot” between the state and society.

Not too sure how much I agree with this. It is interesting to note that the 2 kings who came closest to conquering the entirety of the subcontinent, Ashoka and Aurangzeb, were not Hindu and thus not bound by the Brahmin caste. Yet that also begs the question of why other non-Hindu dynasties did not manage to unify India.

There was another poster who commented on the remarkable resistance of Hindu India against Islamisation; despite waves of conquering Muslim dynasties over a prolonged period of time, the scale of conversion in India was nowhere close to that of South East Asia or the Middle East. Is it also possible that Hinduism gave Indian civil society resilience against not only conquering despots but also against cultural assimilation? I can’t remember the name of that poster but I would really like to hear their opinions on this.
 
The transition from Zhao to Sui was far more smooth than many native-to-native transitions, the idea that anything native was reestablished doesn't really seem to be the case, it's more akin to a shift in policy.

The idea that "foreigners" conquered the areas, occupied against locals will and somehow they are the only reason China was politically divided is evidently not the case, you cannot expect China to divide and somehow for militarily strong neighbours to not enter the scene and you also cannot pretend that foreign people coming in means that those cannot be treated as Chinese states in a geopolitical sense, at the very least you didn't make the argument for why they shouldn't be considered Chinese or why we should talk about the region as if it existed in a vacuum or pretend that only purely internal division is what matters, which is not the case considering that no big states in either India, nor China nor Rome or most other places purely fell out of internal division.

Only internal divisions can explain whether a society is prone to internal division or not. You can’t use foreign occupation to prove or disprove a theory on internal stability. History is complex enough but there are primary, secondary, tertiary factors for causation and they are not equivalent. It’s like using the existence of Vichy France as example of French disunity; after all Germany defeated France in WWII at least partially due to rivalry between the conservative French army and socialist government.
 
Only internal divisions can explain whether a society is prone to internal division or not. You can’t use foreign occupation to prove or disprove a theory on internal stability. History is complex enough but there are primary, secondary, tertiary factors for causation and they are not equivalent. It’s like using the existence of Vichy France as example of French disunity; after all Germany defeated France in WWII at least partially due to rivalry between the conservative French army and socialist government.
That's a bad example and I really don't need to explain why, also you make a assumption there, that "Only internal divisions can explain whether a society is prone to internal division or not", which is also not really true or self-evident, because you could argue that the North China plain is just so strong that it can keep a region like China together by itself and not that China is not prone to division, considering all the brief periods of civil war with various formally competing factions.

If you can exclude entire centuries of Chinese history because of nebeluous and anachronistic notion of "foreign occupation" then one can easily exclude periods of unity caused not by "tendency to unity" but by the disproportionate amount of resources on region has, it's terribly arbitrary.
 
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