Why did apartheid South Africa collapse so suddenly?

[ivanotter]

I am not sure it was the number of "no to conscriptions", more that white middle class SA had had enough.

It is hard for a small town to see its sons coming home in a body bag and that, I believe, started to tell NP that time was up.

In many instances the gold and the diamonds shielded SA, but I think the gold price went down in the 1980's? Have to look it up, but NP found out that they could not pay their way out of trouble any longer.

There were many factors in the pot, but the economy and white middle class were clearly major things.

Ivan

 

[ingemann]

The primary factor for dropping Apartheit, was that the end of the Cold War, USA saw little reason to shield SA anymore.

 

[Shurik]

I've wondered about how southern Africa would turn out if the Cold War had fizzled out with the SU collapsing on itself when Stalin died: say by the mid-60's (internal political blood-sports and all)...

 

[TheMann]

I've wondered about how southern Africa would turn out if the Cold War had fizzled out with the SU collapsing on itself when Stalin died: say by the mid-60's (internal political blood-sports and all)...

I don't think that much would have changed in the end result, but it would simply change the way the independence movements came. Apartheid was gonna fall eventually, it was just a matter of how it all ended up.

 

[Shurik]

I don't think that much would have changed in the end result, but it would simply change the way the independence movements came. Apartheid was gonna fall eventually, it was just a matter of how it all ended up.

Oh, of course. No question there.
Merely, the way the various wars and ideologies which came into play (and has destroyed so much of post-colonial Africa) would be dramatically different.

 

[ivanotter]

The nuclear bombs (of which SA had six) were not supposed to be used in a regional conflict. According to Venter's book "How SA built six bombs.." those were for blackmailing the US.

SA believed itself to be the "southern flank of NATO" but not all NATO members liked that one.

SA also built a 3 and 4 stage interncontinental missile, capable of hitting Moscow (later it was supposed to carry satellites into orbit).

PW Botha, a complex character (who did not like anybody at all, black or white) probably saw it first. Apartheid had to go, somehow.

His Rubicon speech was a disaster, however. Whatever got into him, nobody knows even to this day.

Looking at his track record: Komatieport agreement with Moz, Cutting Ian Smith down to size, etc etc, all pointed towards some sort of movement on his part.

His stroke really affected him badly, especially as FW took over.

FW was also on the security council, authorising hits, so.. well,

The Soviet influence was felt in terms of creating a "red scare" but the reality, I think, was different.

As has been pointed out, the amount of troops involved in the border wars were very small.

One of my frends was in 32 batallion. According to him it was a desperado outfit to begin with. Driving unimogs in Angola, using AK47's and basically running away if they saw a tank, but creeping up to it at night and blowing it up.

Was there a real threat to the republic in the 1980's? not sure if the Soviets even wanted to incur the wrath of USA on this remote thing; hence they used the Cubans as their proxy.

Getting close to the late 1980's and into the 1990's saw the acceptance of apartheid as finished. When Mandela got released that was it. The white referendum just confirmed it.

It was more internal and economical (santions!) elements which killed apartheid more than Soviet scare.

An opinion

Ivan

 

[Shurik]

It was more internal and economical (santions!) elements which killed apartheid more than Soviet scare.

An opinion

Ivan

See, this is the crux of what I'm curious about. International and Economic sanctions.
I see the Cold War as driving a larger, international viewpoint of placing more emphasis on ideology and morality than on economic practicality.
I wonder if, without the moral orientation of political mindsets brought about by the Cold War (position on the political spectrum being more important than practical consideration), sanctions might have been far less meaningful. Money is no object when you're fighting a larger boogy-man on the other side of "The Wall".

But, without a SU to unite "Western" political and ideological thought, mightn't there be a larger number of Western states willing to do business with SA, rather than following the US and Britain's lead in attempting to ostracize rogue African apartheid states?
Hence, the sanctions would have had far less teeth in it's bite. With possible implications for Rhodesia as well as Portugal along the way. Added to this, there's no SU to fuel the anti-Imperialist movements.

On the other hand, perhaps the US/UK would then be directing their energies elsewhere, and (ironically) be taking the position of assisting the Independence parties...

Just a thought, and maybe I'm wrong?

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

Interesting.
I know SA was watching what was going on in Rhodesia, but that their offical policy was very much hands-off... [1]

I've always been curious why SA gold and diamonds are rarely brought up in the discussion about their situation. Economically they were indeed very much isolated due to the international situation, but West Africa demonstrated that diamonds and precious metals can go a very long way towards supporting ostricized regimes... [2]

1. It had to be, South Africa's foreign policy vis-a-vis the rest of Africa was strictly designed to avoid isolation from the rest of Africa, and of the world beyond that. The fact that you only started to see sanctions and economic isolation really start to kick in big-time by the 1980's is actually in some ways a testament to the success South Africa had in staving off the forces of moral outrage and punitive economic action as long as it did. Obviously the Cold War and other things helped them greatly and Washington was not inclined to leave a decidedly anti-communist state when there were communist independence movements on basically all sides of them.

What this meant for Rhodesia was a policy of muted support, Pretoria couldn't back up Salisbury openly because doing so would strain already difficult relations between the white regime in South Africa and the rest of the independent African states. You see towards the tail end of the Rhodesian Bush War a decisive pivot against the Rhodesians by the South African government, who among other things restricted their ammunition exports to the Rhodesians. Once the Portuguese left Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia was dependent on South Africa entirely for foreign support. The Bush War would have ended and Rhodesia would have fallen years before it historically did if it hadn't been for South Africa.

If South Africa had had the diplomatic chance to do it, it likely would have recognized Rhodesia and drastically stepped up its military support. The problem was that this chance never existed, and it's hard to create a situation where it would have. South Africa had to choose between Rhodesia and its relations with the rest of Africa, unsurprisingly, Rhodesia got the short end of that stick.

2. Chromium too, it's a crucial component in steelmaking. I will again say that the fact that it took the better part of four decades (and even then there was plenty of opposition to a growing consensus that South Africa was something that ought to be cut off from the world.

 

[Flocculencio]

Just how bad could it have ended?

In James Michener's novel of South African history, The Covenant, written in the early 80s, the general assumption (based on Michener's extensive in-country research) seemed to be that e whole system would break down in inevitable racial war with the white South Africans retreating to the Cape to basically create an Israel-like white republic.

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

In James Michener's novel of South African history, The Covenant, written in the early 80s, the general assumption (based on Michener's extensive in-country research) seemed to be that e whole system would break down in inevitable racial war with the white South Africans retreating to the Cape to basically create an Israel-like white republic.

Indeed.

Though in a worst-case scenario with total national collapse, once the Whites are neutralized as a problem, chances are the blacks of South Africa will turn on each other as well.

Half the reason Apartheid was so successful, domestically, was because at the start before they realized that it was just a means of exploitation, some members of the various black tribes and peoples of South Africa actually welcomed the idea of "homelands" for various peoples because it meant the end of ethnic violence amidst South Africa's blacks. And even when South African blacks started to realize the score, the Apartheid government was quite good at playing communities against each other and playing divide-and-rule.

 

[Kidblast]

Indeed.

Though in a worst-case scenario with total national collapse, once the Whites are neutralized as a problem, chances are the blacks of South Africa will turn on each other as well.

They already had turned on each other in the 1980s. The Inkata Freedom Party and the ANC were already at each other's throats and black on black violence killed as many more black people than the government forces did.

The fact that the Soviet Union dissolved was one of the final straws. Without the threat of Communism, South Africa had lost whatever small remains of the moral high ground it possessed in the 1980s; its conservative allies in the Western World could no longer say, "Well, Apartheid is bad, but at least South Africa is a bulwark against Communism".

Plus all the other, very important factors people mentioned.

 

[Kidblast]

In James Michener's novel of South African history, The Covenant, written in the early 80s, the general assumption (based on Michener's extensive in-country research) seemed to be that e whole system would break down in inevitable racial war with the white South Africans retreating to the Cape to basically create an Israel-like white republic.

I'd love to read those plans, but I imagine if they existed, they were probably all shredded in 1994.

 

[Marius]

In James Michener's novel of South African history, The Covenant, written in the early 80s, the general assumption (based on Michener's extensive in-country research) seemed to be that e whole system would break down in inevitable racial war with the white South Africans retreating to the Cape to basically create an Israel-like white republic.

I dunno about that, I'm not sure any white government would be prepared to abandon the gold and platinum mines etc.

I can see some sort of partition with the Cape, parts of Natal, the Free State heartlands, and what is today Gauteng being consolidated into a white homeland.

 

[Marius]

I think this topic has been pretty well covered in the this thread.

The reasons apartheid ended relatively quickly were a number of reasons. The writing was already on the wall in the 1980s, especially with the state of emergency of the 1980s.

These were the reasons in my opinion:

1. Demographics - the proportion of whites was shrinking and skilled jobs had to increasingly go to blacks, who could not carry on being treated as migrant workers.

2. Increasing black political awareness that history was on the side of the liberation forces.

3. The end of the Cold War.

4. The rise to power of a realist, in FW de Klerk (De Klerk was not a moderate, when he became President many people actually thought that reform would be put back a few years).

5. The increasing toll of sanctions, as the West started to withdraw support from SA.

 

[Falecius]

an uncooperative police force, political militia, ready made tin pot dictatorships, a few nukes,

Sounds recipe for disaster actually.

 

[Riain]

I'm a bit dubious of the claims that the white would eventually lose a race/civil war, or be pushed into a militarised corner of the country. I think that the SA military would have inflicted horrifying casulties on poorly armed opposition, so much so that the opposition would have run out of steam and negotiated with the powerful whites. I don't doubt that the whites would have lost ground but they could have held a significant part of the country, most probably the best bit.

 

[Marius]

I'm a bit dubious of the claims that the white would eventually lose a race/civil war, or be pushed into a militarised corner of the country. I think that the SA military would have inflicted horrifying casulties on poorly armed opposition, so much so that the opposition would have run out of steam and negotiated with the powerful whites. I don't doubt that the whites would have lost ground but they could have held a significant part of the country, most probably the best bit.

In the long-term the whites would have lost a military conflict.

The SADF was one of the best armies in the world at one stage, but logistics and sheer numbers would probably have counted against them. One of the reasons why the Border War was a draw was because the Cubans had air superiority, the South Africans not having access to the same quality of aircraft as the Cubans and their allies. This was mainly because of sanctions on SA I would imagine.

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

In the long-term the whites would have lost a military conflict.

The SADF was one of the best armies in the world at one stage, but logistics and sheer numbers would probably have counted against them. One of the reasons why the Border War was a draw was because the Cubans had air superiority, the South Africans not having access to the same quality of aircraft as the Cubans and their allies. This was mainly because of sanctions on SA I would imagine.

Pretty much this, by the final stages of The Border War the SAAF was taking significant losses to Cuban MiG's and SAM's, until then they had enjoyed a clear qualitative advantage over their opponents. It's interesting to think about what if the French hadn't sold SA the Mirage F1's and a whole heap of other modern weapons before the UN arms embargo finally kicked in, they would have lost that advantage several years earlier.

 

[Marius]

Pretty much this, by the final stages of The Border War the SAAF was taking significant losses to Cuban MiG's and SAM's, until then they had enjoyed a clear qualitative advantage over their opponents. It's interesting to think about what if the French hadn't sold SA the Mirage F1's and a whole heap of other modern weapons before the UN arms embargo finally kicked in, they would have lost that advantage several years earlier.

By the same token, what if there had been no arms embargo, or the French ignored it or something.

That could make things interesting...

 

[Winston Smith]

In the long-term the whites would have lost a military conflict.

The SADF was one of the best armies in the world at one stage, but logistics and sheer numbers would probably have counted against them. One of the reasons why the Border War was a draw was because the Cubans had air superiority, the South Africans not having access to the same quality of aircraft as the Cubans and their allies. This was mainly because of sanctions on SA I would imagine.

Everything I've read supports that; it was one of the rare cases where the Pro-Soviets had better CAS than the Pro-West side. Although I really wouldn't want to be a Cuban solider facing the SADF in it's heyday.