Why couldn't Louis XVI use a lit de justice?

The unwritten constitutional setup of France during the Ancien Regime seems horrendously complex, so it would be great if someone with greater knowledge could enlighten me.

From what I have read the problem the King had with reforming the taxation system was that it was repeatedly blocked by the provincial parlements, who could refuse to register royal edicts in their domains. However, I understand the King had the power to use a lit de justice to force compulsory registrations. Why couldn't Louis XVI do this to fix the French finances before the revolution?
 
I know virtually nothing about French monarchical law. Could Louis XVI also have just used a letrre de cachet to overrule provincial parlements? I thought that this had been the problem with French parlements; that they had little actual power because the monarchy had the power to overrule any decisions they made.
 
The unwritten constitutional setup of France during the Ancien Regime seems horrendously complex, so it would be great if someone with greater knowledge could enlighten me.

From what I have read the problem the King had with reforming the taxation system was that it was repeatedly blocked by the provincial parlements, who could refuse to register royal edicts in their domains. However, I understand the King had the power to use a lit de justice to force compulsory registrations. Why couldn't Louis XVI do this to fix the French finances before the revolution?

That's a good question. I think Louis XVI didn't use lit de justice because he was reluctant to force it through like Louis XIV and Lois XV. Sadly that's precisely that he should have done.
 

Vitruvius

Donor
I believe it was a combination of factors. For one Louis XVI dithered too much and never gave his whole hearted support to serious reform, so the aristocracy was less inclined to give way on the issue. A lot of time was wasted trying to bring around the Assembly of Notables (whose members had been hand picked by the King and Calonne and yet who still resisted) while French finances continued to deteriorate. Lefebreve called it the first capitulation because 'the King was consulting the aristocracy instead of notifying it of his will'.

Then when reform became a matter of necessity Louis was confronted with the opposition of a patchwork of 13 different provincial Parlements. This came out of the fact that reforms in taxation went hand in hand with reforms in administration that would have curtailed some provincial rights in favor of a more streamlined and thus more centralized government. Overruling them all would have been a long and exhaustive affair. This was the rub, the reforms called for were deep structural reforms not just the imposition of a new tax and the aristocracy and the clergy forsaw the ways it could threaten their positions and enhance the power of the King so for once they dug in their heels and for the first time since maybe the Fronde they proffered real resistance.

When the French state became insolvent it was deprived of strength had little leverage to use against he Parlements. The Parlements led, I believe, by the Parlement of Paris issued an interpretation of the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom that simultaneously pronounced their opposition to the reforms and also essentially abdicated their competence, ie they said no and then said that even if the King overruled them it was moot because neither the King nor the Parlements had the authority to do anything without consulting the Estates. Louis XVI did in fact attempt a de facto lit de justice in 1787 under a 'royal session' of the Parlement of Paris over which he personally presided but Orleans led the opposition against him and it broke up with declarations that the King's actions were illegal and his registration was null and void. This sparked serious rebellion among the other Parlements and the aristocracy in general in which they disclaimed the power of the King to act outside of consulting the Estates per French tradition.

In reality it was a power play by the aristocracy to curtail absolutism in France and weaken the monarch by taking advantage of the financial crisis. The first and second estates were willing to submit to greater taxation but only in exchange for more political autonomy and guarantees on their traditional privileged status. They saw the Estates as a vehicle to gain back those rights from the King, obviously things didn't work out as they anticipated.

So I suppose the short answer is if Louis XVI was more determined and showed a little more steel he could have, with difficulty, forced through reforms in 85-86 but by 88-89 it was too late to force the issue by royal fiat.
 
I believe it was a combination of factors. For one Louis XVI dithered too much and never gave his whole hearted support to serious reform, so the aristocracy was less inclined to give way on the issue. A lot of time was wasted trying to bring around the Assembly of Notables (whose members had been hand picked by the King and Calonne and yet who still resisted) while French finances continued to deteriorate. Lefebreve called it the first capitulation because 'the King was consulting the aristocracy instead of notifying it of his will'.

Then when reform became a matter of necessity Louis was confronted with the opposition of a patchwork of 13 different provincial Parlements. This came out of the fact that reforms in taxation went hand in hand with reforms in administration that would have curtailed some provincial rights in favor of a more streamlined and thus more centralized government. Overruling them all would have been a long and exhaustive affair. This was the rub, the reforms called for were deep structural reforms not just the imposition of a new tax and the aristocracy and the clergy forsaw the ways it could threaten their positions and enhance the power of the King so for once they dug in their heels and for the first time since maybe the Fronde they proffered real resistance.

When the French state became insolvent it was deprived of strength had little leverage to use against he Parlements. The Parlements led, I believe, by the Parlement of Paris issued an interpretation of the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom that simultaneously pronounced their opposition to the reforms and also essentially abdicated their competence, ie they said no and then said that even if the King overruled them it was moot because neither the King nor the Parlements had the authority to do anything without consulting the Estates. Louis XVI did in fact attempt a de facto lit de justice in 1787 under a 'royal session' of the Parlement of Paris over which he personally presided but Orleans led the opposition against him and it broke up with declarations that the King's actions were illegal and his registration was null and void. This sparked serious rebellion among the other Parlements and the aristocracy in general in which they disclaimed the power of the King to act outside of consulting the Estates per French tradition.

In reality it was a power play by the aristocracy to curtail absolutism in France and weaken the monarch by taking advantage of the financial crisis. The first and second estates were willing to submit to greater taxation but only in exchange for more political autonomy and guarantees on their traditional privileged status. They saw the Estates as a vehicle to gain back those rights from the King, obviously things didn't work out as they anticipated.

So I suppose the short answer is if Louis XVI was more determined and showed a little more steel he could have, with difficulty, forced through reforms in 85-86 but by 88-89 it was too late to force the issue by royal fiat.

Very interesting. Why were the nobility in the parlements so gung-ho about having a calling an Estates-General? Wouldn't it have been better for their own interests to work out a deal with the King directly? They go from having 100% control of the parlements, to having 33% or 25% (depending on whether double representation is used) in the Estates-General?
 
Very interesting. Why were the nobility in the parlements so gung-ho about having a calling an Estates-General? Wouldn't it have been better for their own interests to work out a deal with the King directly? They go from having 100% control of the parlements, to having 33% or 25% (depending on whether double representation is used) in the Estates-General?

Because the Clergy and Nobles where essentially aligned in their goals, meaning that they either would have 66% of the vote or 50% of the vote, thats a fairly powerful majority. That and the estates general was a restoration of their traditional powers which they wanted back.
 
Because the Clergy and Nobles where essentially aligned in their goals, meaning that they either would have 66% of the vote or 50% of the vote, thats a fairly powerful majority. That and the estates general was a restoration of their traditional powers which they wanted back.

Even if they were entirely aligned, moving to a situation where you have 100% control to possibly 50% control seems a high risk strategy.

What traditional powers did they want back that they couldn't pass through the parlements of the Assembly of Notables?
 

Vitruvius

Donor
Very interesting. Why were the nobility in the parlements so gung-ho about having a calling an Estates-General? Wouldn't it have been better for their own interests to work out a deal with the King directly? They go from having 100% control of the parlements, to having 33% or 25% (depending on whether double representation is used) in the Estates-General?

That's the big question. I'm not entirely sure. I wouldn't say they were gung-ho and to some extant I think that events just got away from them, as happens in a heated argument, and once someone called for the Estates it was a point they couldn't back down from them. I also assume they thought it would work to their advantage because working in tandem with the clergy (who were also up in arms in 87-88 over the proposed reforms that including selling off manorial land held by the Church) they could secure 66.6% of the vote. Double representation didn't come up until after the decision for an Estates General was made and I believe the Parlement actually made some pronouncement that the Estates should be convoked and then vote separately so there certainly was the expectation that they could dominate the proceedings.

Plus the crux of their legal argument against the reforms was that the King would have to go back to the old tradition of essentially asking permission for any new tax from the Estates rather than simply telling (or forcing) the Parlement to register it. If they (re)established that precedent it could dramatically weaken the King's position. In order to get money (and thus power to do anything) he would have to ask the Estates, a more timely process in a forum where he had less power to force through his will. Unfortunately I think they kind of woke a sleeping giant by arousing such opposition to the King and then getting the third estate involved in the political battle via the Estates General. So its maybe a hard question for us to answer with the benefit of hindsight but in the heat of moment I think things just escalated past the point where either side was willing to strike a deal.
 
That's the big question. I'm not entirely sure. I wouldn't say they were gung-ho and to some extant I think that events just got away from them, as happens in a heated argument, and once someone called for the Estates it was a point they couldn't back down from them. I also assume they thought it would work to their advantage because working in tandem with the clergy (who were also up in arms in 87-88 over the proposed reforms that including selling off manorial land held by the Church) they could secure 66.6% of the vote. Double representation didn't come up until after the decision for an Estates General was made and I believe the Parlement actually made some pronouncement that the Estates should be convoked and then vote separately so there certainly was the expectation that they could dominate the proceedings.

Plus the crux of their legal argument against the reforms was that the King would have to go back to the old tradition of essentially asking permission for any new tax from the Estates rather than simply telling (or forcing) the Parlement to register it. If they (re)established that precedent it could dramatically weaken the King's position. In order to get money (and thus power to do anything) he would have to ask the Estates, a more timely process in a forum where he had less power to force through his will. Unfortunately I think they kind of woke a sleeping giant by arousing such opposition to the King and then getting the third estate involved in the political battle via the Estates General. So its maybe a hard question for us to answer with the benefit of hindsight but in the heat of moment I think things just escalated past the point where either side was willing to strike a deal.

Hmmm. So I wonder what the moment of realisation that they had overplayed their hand was? When double representation was first announced? I have read that double representation happened in numerous provinces so it wasn't that new a concept. Why did the King feel he had the power to invoke double representation, and, having had the power to do that, what sudden leverage did the nobility have to get him to take it back via voting by estate?
 
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