Who would win in a 1980s ground war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s ground war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

  • NATO

    Votes: 42 80.8%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 10 19.2%

  • Total voters
    52

Saphroneth

Banned
With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.
Thing is, though, there were also NATO tech advantages which would be very useful in cancelling out the greater divisional strength of the Soviets. The examples I'm thinking of are Brimstone (which can basically do horrible damage to an armoured division's manoeuvring spearheads simply by being fired into a killbox) and the more general topic of PGMs (which could neutralize bridges and similar logistical chokepoints in a way it would have taken nuclear weapons to do in the 1970s).
The PGMs in particular were demonstrated in Iraq in 1991, when the Iraqi IADS was dismantled about as fast as you could have managed if the PGMs had been replaced by nukes.
 

nbcman

Donor
When you refer to the tech gap between NATO and the WP towards the end of the Cold War, are you referring specifically to precision guided munitions?
You can also include the improvements in the function and availability of Night Vision Tech, MLRS and the use of GPS both for navigation as well as guidance of strike packages.
 

Redbeard

Banned
I was serving in the Royal Danish Army from 1979 to 1981 and in active reserve until 2001. Had before that been a machine gunner in the Home Guard for two years but in the Army quickly ended up in an Artillery Regiment. Did all officer functions at battery level and was an Artillery Staff Officer (ARTO) at Combat Group/Brigade level when my last contract expired in 2001 and I went 100 % civilian. So in short - I was there :)

In general I agree that early 80s was very different from late 80s.

In the early 80s we still largely fought according to WWII doctrines and to a degree with WWII materiel. In my case US WWII howitzers/field guns in 105 mm, 155 mm and 203 mm calibre, M1 Garand rifles for the crews and slide rulers to compute data. Radios were US AN-GRC sets. But it actually worked, we had lots of (old) ammo and morale was fine.

The political system was hesitant however, to put it mildly, and I already then feared we would be overwhelmed, if not for other reasons then because we would be mobilised and deployed too late.

Already by mid 80s a lot had changed however. Politically it still was very diverse over the different NATO countries, but at least here in Denmark we had a Conservative-government which although often handicapped by a contrarian parliament was more trusted to take the necessary decisions in time. I also think the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the military coup in Poland very much increased alertness in NATO.

Next we slowly started to get new equipment and materiel. Not the big spectacular changes, still the same old guns, but with say new (VT) fuses for the shells and various electronics making us much more efficient.

Finally doctrines were much sharpened in these years. I was much impressed with how the Bundeswehr thought to tackle a potential attack, and this very much inspired the other NATO countries, at least on the North flank. Where we in the early 80s just dug in and waited for something to show up which we could shoot at we by mid 80s were much better in combining arms and actively channelling the enemy into positions favourable to our firepower and counter moves. Various and very effective anti armour systems were also introduced in these years.
 
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CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
When you refer to the tech gap between NATO and the WP towards the end of the Cold War, are you referring specifically to precision guided munitions?
In part.

Stealth was massive sea change, almost literally a world changer. The "secret" of stealth was pretty much a given fact, but the reality of it was unknown. The Soviets had no way of knowing what the F-117 (or the more expected F-19 or 23 and/or B-2) had in actual capability and just how many the U.S. had. The Soviets already knew that the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile was effectively unstoppable with their current defensive systems.

There was also the development of Chobham armor, a system that made American and British tanks close to invulnerable to Soviet anti-tank weapons, especially when facing the gun systems on the T-62/72 and T-64/80 MBT series (with similar advanced armor providing the same advantage to the BDR's Leopards). At the same time NATO tanks had a major jump in weapon effectiveness, both in ammunition and in gun laying, with what came down to one-shot-one-kill effectiveness and the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10 and Apache (in 1986), improved conventional munitions and next generation ATGM and the Soviet Army's tank heavy force went from an unstoppable flood to something approaching a target rich environment (albeit still a flood that could kill you in heartbeat if you weren't careful).

The other, rarely discussed but critical change was in computing power. The West went from an slight advantage there to overwhelming advantage that allowed better signal processing, radar intercept, tactical awareness, and a host of other Intel advantages.
 
BAOR from 78 to 83 and from what I saw I had the following opinions.

USA: some very good units and unfortunately some that made the Keystone Cops look efficent, a lot of the soldiers seemed to think more of getting home and going to college or using the army as a training camp for civilians.
Belgian: Very good we would have been happy for any Belgian unit to be at our backs.
Canadian: Ditto the Belgians.
Dutch: Armoured division was good the rest mmmmm well they went home on Thursday, didnt report back till Tuesday and no one missed them.
German: Regulars very good the conscripts were not interested and just waiting to go back to a well paid job at VW.
Britain: We knew we were well trained but we also knew if things went hot we had a lifespan of hours.
 

Redbeard

Banned
In part.

Stealth was massive sea change, almost literally a world changer. The "secret" of stealth was pretty much a given fact, but the reality of it was unknown. The Soviets had no way of knowing what the F-117 (or the more expected F-19 or 23 and/or B-2) had in actual capability and just how many the U.S. had. The Soviets already knew that the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile was effectively unstoppable with their current defensive systems.

There was also the development of Chobham armor, a system that made American and British tanks close to invulnerable to Soviet anti-tank weapons, especially when facing the gun systems on the T-62/72 and T-64/80 MBT series (with similar advanced armor providing the same advantage to the BDR's Leopards). At the same time NATO tanks had a major jump in weapon effectiveness, both in ammunition and in gun laying, with what came down to one-shot-one-kill effectiveness and the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10 and Apache (in 1986), improved conventional munitions and next generation ATGM and the Soviet Army's tank heavy force went from an unstoppable flood to something approaching a target rich environment (albeit still a flood that could kill you in heartbeat if you weren't careful).

The other, rarely discussed but critical change was in computing power. The West went from an slight advantage there to overwhelming advantage that allowed better signal processing, radar intercept, tactical awareness, and a host of other Intel advantages.

I was not at least impressed by new ways of quickly laying minefields - like from dispensers beneath jet aircraft or from artillery shells - in front of an advancing armoured column. Such minefields of course would be obvious to an attacker and possible to clear - but it would take time, effort and casualties, and would be perfect in both slowing and channeling an advance. And when in the "kill-zone" there simply were so many more effective ways in which to take out a tank by mid-80s.

By late 80s we learned of WAPA trying new doctrines of massive "air-land" battles with huge numbers of helicopter borne troops. In the first impression it appeared most impressive but I also recall we realised this was the last desperate kick from the monster. They had given up to make a traditional armoured trust and instead would "bypass" with massive airlandings. I could follow the idea, and it might have worked in the early 80s, but with the much improved AA capacity (Stinger SAM, just to mention some) we had by mid to late 80s it would have been a massacre.
 

SsgtC

Banned
In part.

Stealth was massive sea change, almost literally a world changer. The "secret" of stealth was pretty much a given fact, but the reality of it was unknown. The Soviets had no way of knowing what the F-117 (or the more expected F-19 or 23 and/or B-2) had in actual capability and just how many the U.S. had. The Soviets already knew that the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile was effectively unstoppable with their current defensive systems.

There was also the development of Chobham armor, a system that made American and British tanks close to invulnerable to Soviet anti-tank weapons, especially when facing the gun systems on the T-62/72 and T-64/80 MBT series (with similar advanced armor providing the same advantage to the BDR's Leopards). At the same time NATO tanks had a major jump in weapon effectiveness, both in ammunition and in gun laying, with what came down to one-shot-one-kill effectiveness and the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10 and Apache (in 1986), improved conventional munitions and next generation ATGM and the Soviet Army's tank heavy force went from an unstoppable flood to something approaching a target rich environment (albeit still a flood that could kill you in heartbeat if you weren't careful).

The other, rarely discussed but critical change was in computing power. The West went from an slight advantage there to overwhelming advantage that allowed better signal processing, radar intercept, tactical awareness, and a host of other Intel advantages.

Wasn't another key advantage that the NATO forces had was their vastly superior thermal imaging? If I remember correctly, the thermal sights on the M1 essentially rendered smoke useless as a screen and had double the effective range of the Soviet system. That would be a massive advantage in any kind of fight.
 
1980-84, Soviets 8 times out of 10. 1984-1986, flip a coin. 1987-1989, NATO 8 times out of 10. 1990-1991, NATO every time. Little of this has to do with technology. To the very end, Soviet weapons were at least competitive with their western counterparts, even in the field of E-Warfare. The big change was really organizational and structural, the changes in maintenance, training standards, overall morale, and so on and so forth... the intangibles that are far more difficult to measure then equipment statistics but which also matter far more.

By late 80s we learned of WAPA trying new doctrines of massive "air-land" battles with huge numbers of helicopter borne troops. In the first impression it appeared most impressive but I also recall we realised this was the last desperate kick from the monster. They had given up to make a traditional armoured trust and instead would "bypass" with massive airlandings.

Not really. The airborne landings were to be done in concert with an "traditional" armored thrust and were in no way replacements of them. Indeed, the Soviets still expected most of the facilitating of the main force to be done by forward detachments, that is combined arms mechanized units of roughly battalion size which infiltrate through NATO lines and by-pass the killzones to seize objectives using dash and initiative. The Soviets main worry ultimately wasn't so much technological developments as it was organizational and structural...
 
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Redbeard

Banned
1980-84, Soviets 8 times out of 10. 1984-1986, flip a coin. 1987-1989, NATO 8 times out of 10. 1990-1991, NATO every time. Little of this has to do with technology. To the very end, Soviet weapons were at least competitive with their western counterparts, even in the field of E-Warfare. The big change was really organizational and structural, the changes in maintenance, training standards, overall morale, and so on and so forth... the intangibles that are far more difficult to measure then equipment statistics but which also matter far more.



Not really. The airborne landings were to be done in concert with an "traditional" armored thrust and were in no way replacements of them. Indeed, the Soviets still expected most of the facilitating of the main force to be done by forward detachments, that is combined arms mechanized units of roughly battalion size which infiltrate through NATO lines and by-pass the killzones to seize objectives using dash and initiative. The Soviets main worry ultimately wasn't so much technological developments as it was organizational and structural...

Not really what?

I don't recall I said the air-land part was to stand alone, but that they had given up the traditional armoured trust.
 
...the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10...

There are actually surprisingly few situations where that range advantage could come into play. Even on the North German plain unobstructed sightlines beyond 1km or so are quite rare. I'm sure the equipment was capable of it, but actually being able to employ it in that way is not to be counted on.

As for the A-10, it has enjoyed phenomenally good public relations based mainly on its performance in Middle Eastern conflicts since 1991 - in other words, just about the most permissive air-defence environment it could have been used operationally in. If it had been used in its intended environment - over the Fulda Gap in 1984, or something - I think pilots would have needed all the survivability features the A-10 design incorporated. Even at the division level, Soviet forces had a plethora of SAM and gun systems available. From the SA-6 and SA-8/9/13 down to ZSU-23/4s and random hopeful munters with a SA-7 or 23mm cannon, there was a lot of unpleasantness to fly through. The life of any NATO CAS pilot would not have been easy (or necessarily long).
 
Initial entry wasn't so bad, they used their Airborne formations, which were (and remain to this day) the elite. The Airborne force is considered a separate branch of the Soviet/Russian military, and has a degree of unit cohesion that far exceeded the rest of the Soviet Army (a very rough Western comparative would be the Marine Corps, but the gap between the Corps and the Regular Army is much smaller than the situation with the Soviets/Russians). As the war progressed and expanded the number of Soviet troops needed also expanded, meaning that regular motor rifle formations were called up. Those units lacked the leadership, training, and professionalism the the Airborne Forces maintained, and thing went sideways in a hurry. Drug use among Soviet troops was massive, far worse than even the worst U.S. experience (in part because the Muj were channeling a LOT of high quality dope straight to the Soviet formations). The Soviet Army was also gradually exposed as having feet of clay as the war progressed. Badly trained troops with poorly trained equipment operating under the command of insufficiently prepared junior officer were getting their asses handed to them by the Afghans, and for the first time in decades U.S. observers were able to watch Soviet "A" formations in action. The MI-24 impressed the hell out of everyone, after that... not so much.

Afghanistan was very much the USSR's Vietnam, right down to mass protests by what came to be known as "Mother's committees" . Think about that for a second... It was such a disaster that people who didn't protest being unable to buy bread without queuing up for a couple hours, decided to stand up to the Kremlin because Afghanistan had gone total FUBAR.

Late '84, not that it was clear at the time since the degree of rot in the Soviet Army was not really understood until Yelsin allowed a degree of access to Western researchers. By mid-86 the Soviets would have gotten stuffed and everyone from DC to Moscow knew it.
You left the part out regarding the US supplying Stinger missiles and a lot of arms just like Russia did to North Vietnam. Russian learn what karma is
 
The Soviet military was better prepared. They were raring to go.The invasion of Afghanistan could be taken as an example. Compare it with US military. Recent Vietnam defeat had already shattered its morale. Even though rot had set in, in the Soviet army it still had the morale to initiate a series of quick manaouevers. However, once the initial elite troops are gone, the Soviet formations would have practically been finished.
 
If conventional war broke out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, who would win the ground war (assuming nukes aren't used)?

Which side is the aggressor here? Everybody is assuming it is the eastern one, but is is not implied anywhere.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Wasn't another key advantage that the NATO forces had was their vastly superior thermal imaging? If I remember correctly, the thermal sights on the M1 essentially rendered smoke useless as a screen and had double the effective range of the Soviet system. That would be a massive advantage in any kind of fight.
They did, although the counter to that system was found I think it was after the Soviets collapsed.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
There are actually surprisingly few situations where that range advantage could come into play. Even on the North German plain unobstructed sightlines beyond 1km or so are quite rare. I'm sure the equipment was capable of it, but actually being able to employ it in that way is not to be counted on.

As for the A-10, it has enjoyed phenomenally good public relations based mainly on its performance in Middle Eastern conflicts since 1991 - in other words, just about the most permissive air-defence environment it could have been used operationally in. If it had been used in its intended environment - over the Fulda Gap in 1984, or something - I think pilots would have needed all the survivability features the A-10 design incorporated. Even at the division level, Soviet forces had a plethora of SAM and gun systems available. From the SA-6 and SA-8/9/13 down to ZSU-23/4s and random hopeful munters with a SA-7 or 23mm cannon, there was a lot of unpleasantness to fly through. The life of any NATO CAS pilot would not have been easy (or necessarily long).
Undoubtedly writing life insurance for the A-10 drivers was not a popular assignment. That being said NATO had come up with a series of tactical plans that would have greatly enhanced the survivability of the CAS units, especially when co-operating with the rotary winged community. Probably the best illustration of just how dangerous the 'Hog was seen to be by the Soviet is the construction of the A-9ski (Su-25).
 
One of the problems the US military had through the late 70s and early 1980s was the National Guard and reserves for all the services were in poor shape. There was very little money for training and having t/o levels of equipment, even equipment a generation behind what the active duty had. Manning was piss poor as guard/reserve service through the end of the draft and the Vietnam War, when almost no guard or reserve personnel were activated, was seen as an alternative to active duty as a draftee and possibly going to Vietnam. When the war and the draft ended, recruiting for the guard and reserves dropped to almost nothing with folks leaving active duty not going in to organized units and no direct recruitment. One of the "sticks" in the guard/reserves was failure to maintain adequate drill participation would result in being called to active duty. With the drawdown and much reduced funding in the military, chasing non-participating drillers and calling them to active duty was simply not much of a priority. While there may have been folks on some list - not having completed their full obligation but in the IRR (non-drilling) reserve or recently retired and subject to recall - out of shape personnel, with skills rusty at best, and in no way integrated in to a unit are at best an asset useful in the medium term. Units scheduled for early use all had significant holes in them, and while stripping other units to fill the holes is doable, a unit starting combat with iffy cohesion is going to be hurting.

The above paragraph applies to folks like infantry, truck drivers, basic artillery crews and so forth. For areas where more skill/experience/cohesion is needed, starting with artillery fire direction centers through tank crews, all sorts of technical specialists (electronics, mechanics, corpsmen) to medical professionals and aircrew the shortages were even worse. Once the rebuild of the military began, in addition to the improved attitude towards the military, you had all sorts of incentive programs (monetary bonuses, scholarships, etc) to bring people in to and stay in the guard/reserves.

Most scenarios for a NATO-WP war generally think that if the conflict became protracted the economies of the USA and any parts of NATO not occupied by the WP (which would be pretty trashed) would be decisive. My point here is that, at least as far as the USA goes, since training an adequate infantryman takes 4-6 months at a minimum, let alone training for specialists, the weakness of the guard/reserve forces during at least the early 80s would make the ability of the USA to sustain a defense on the ground in the short-medium term after the initial few weeks very difficult.
 
Undoubtedly writing life insurance for the A-10 drivers was not a popular assignment. That being said NATO had come up with a series of tactical plans that would have greatly enhanced the survivability of the CAS units, especially when co-operating with the rotary winged community. Probably the best illustration of just how dangerous the 'Hog was seen to be by the Soviet is the construction of the A-9ski (Su-25).

Given the concentration of Soviet air defenses on the frontline, NATO expected double-digit loss rates among it's fixed wing CAS. Rotary wing loss rates were expected to be even worse. The issue remains that given the scale the battle was going to happen on, these CAS sorties might have been helpful tactically but were unlikely to be decisive operationally and (by extension) strategically, particularly given the effort that would have been required to sustain them in the face of Soviet IADS.

They did, although the counter to that system was found I think it was after the Soviets collapsed.

Eh? The counter to thermal imaging, any thermal imaging, is pretty straightforward... one just has to swamp it with heat. The Soviets had smoke generators that injected burning particulate matter to produce such effects.
 
The odds are that the war would not last much more than a few weeks before one side or the other goes nuclear. I don't think surrender on either sides agenda.
 
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