Nebogipfel
Monthly Donor
In addition to stealth and smart weapons ?a few absolutely stunning technology breakthroughs (some of which are still more rumor than documented fact) like Stealth and Smart/Brilliant weapons
In addition to stealth and smart weapons ?a few absolutely stunning technology breakthroughs (some of which are still more rumor than documented fact) like Stealth and Smart/Brilliant weapons
Thing is, though, there were also NATO tech advantages which would be very useful in cancelling out the greater divisional strength of the Soviets. The examples I'm thinking of are Brimstone (which can basically do horrible damage to an armoured division's manoeuvring spearheads simply by being fired into a killbox) and the more general topic of PGMs (which could neutralize bridges and similar logistical chokepoints in a way it would have taken nuclear weapons to do in the 1970s).With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.
You can also include the improvements in the function and availability of Night Vision Tech, MLRS and the use of GPS both for navigation as well as guidance of strike packages.When you refer to the tech gap between NATO and the WP towards the end of the Cold War, are you referring specifically to precision guided munitions?
In part.When you refer to the tech gap between NATO and the WP towards the end of the Cold War, are you referring specifically to precision guided munitions?
In part.
Stealth was massive sea change, almost literally a world changer. The "secret" of stealth was pretty much a given fact, but the reality of it was unknown. The Soviets had no way of knowing what the F-117 (or the more expected F-19 or 23 and/or B-2) had in actual capability and just how many the U.S. had. The Soviets already knew that the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile was effectively unstoppable with their current defensive systems.
There was also the development of Chobham armor, a system that made American and British tanks close to invulnerable to Soviet anti-tank weapons, especially when facing the gun systems on the T-62/72 and T-64/80 MBT series (with similar advanced armor providing the same advantage to the BDR's Leopards). At the same time NATO tanks had a major jump in weapon effectiveness, both in ammunition and in gun laying, with what came down to one-shot-one-kill effectiveness and the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10 and Apache (in 1986), improved conventional munitions and next generation ATGM and the Soviet Army's tank heavy force went from an unstoppable flood to something approaching a target rich environment (albeit still a flood that could kill you in heartbeat if you weren't careful).
The other, rarely discussed but critical change was in computing power. The West went from an slight advantage there to overwhelming advantage that allowed better signal processing, radar intercept, tactical awareness, and a host of other Intel advantages.
In part.
Stealth was massive sea change, almost literally a world changer. The "secret" of stealth was pretty much a given fact, but the reality of it was unknown. The Soviets had no way of knowing what the F-117 (or the more expected F-19 or 23 and/or B-2) had in actual capability and just how many the U.S. had. The Soviets already knew that the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile was effectively unstoppable with their current defensive systems.
There was also the development of Chobham armor, a system that made American and British tanks close to invulnerable to Soviet anti-tank weapons, especially when facing the gun systems on the T-62/72 and T-64/80 MBT series (with similar advanced armor providing the same advantage to the BDR's Leopards). At the same time NATO tanks had a major jump in weapon effectiveness, both in ammunition and in gun laying, with what came down to one-shot-one-kill effectiveness and the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10 and Apache (in 1986), improved conventional munitions and next generation ATGM and the Soviet Army's tank heavy force went from an unstoppable flood to something approaching a target rich environment (albeit still a flood that could kill you in heartbeat if you weren't careful).
The other, rarely discussed but critical change was in computing power. The West went from an slight advantage there to overwhelming advantage that allowed better signal processing, radar intercept, tactical awareness, and a host of other Intel advantages.
By late 80s we learned of WAPA trying new doctrines of massive "air-land" battles with huge numbers of helicopter borne troops. In the first impression it appeared most impressive but I also recall we realised this was the last desperate kick from the monster. They had given up to make a traditional armoured trust and instead would "bypass" with massive airlandings.
1980-84, Soviets 8 times out of 10. 1984-1986, flip a coin. 1987-1989, NATO 8 times out of 10. 1990-1991, NATO every time. Little of this has to do with technology. To the very end, Soviet weapons were at least competitive with their western counterparts, even in the field of E-Warfare. The big change was really organizational and structural, the changes in maintenance, training standards, overall morale, and so on and so forth... the intangibles that are far more difficult to measure then equipment statistics but which also matter far more.
Not really. The airborne landings were to be done in concert with an "traditional" armored thrust and were in no way replacements of them. Indeed, the Soviets still expected most of the facilitating of the main force to be done by forward detachments, that is combined arms mechanized units of roughly battalion size which infiltrate through NATO lines and by-pass the killzones to seize objectives using dash and initiative. The Soviets main worry ultimately wasn't so much technological developments as it was organizational and structural...
...the ability to engage target a full kilometer beyond the best Soviet gun. Throw in the A-10...
You left the part out regarding the US supplying Stinger missiles and a lot of arms just like Russia did to North Vietnam. Russian learn what karma isInitial entry wasn't so bad, they used their Airborne formations, which were (and remain to this day) the elite. The Airborne force is considered a separate branch of the Soviet/Russian military, and has a degree of unit cohesion that far exceeded the rest of the Soviet Army (a very rough Western comparative would be the Marine Corps, but the gap between the Corps and the Regular Army is much smaller than the situation with the Soviets/Russians). As the war progressed and expanded the number of Soviet troops needed also expanded, meaning that regular motor rifle formations were called up. Those units lacked the leadership, training, and professionalism the the Airborne Forces maintained, and thing went sideways in a hurry. Drug use among Soviet troops was massive, far worse than even the worst U.S. experience (in part because the Muj were channeling a LOT of high quality dope straight to the Soviet formations). The Soviet Army was also gradually exposed as having feet of clay as the war progressed. Badly trained troops with poorly trained equipment operating under the command of insufficiently prepared junior officer were getting their asses handed to them by the Afghans, and for the first time in decades U.S. observers were able to watch Soviet "A" formations in action. The MI-24 impressed the hell out of everyone, after that... not so much.
Afghanistan was very much the USSR's Vietnam, right down to mass protests by what came to be known as "Mother's committees" . Think about that for a second... It was such a disaster that people who didn't protest being unable to buy bread without queuing up for a couple hours, decided to stand up to the Kremlin because Afghanistan had gone total FUBAR.
Late '84, not that it was clear at the time since the degree of rot in the Soviet Army was not really understood until Yelsin allowed a degree of access to Western researchers. By mid-86 the Soviets would have gotten stuffed and everyone from DC to Moscow knew it.
If conventional war broke out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, who would win the ground war (assuming nukes aren't used)?
I don't recall I said the air-land part was to stand alone, but that they had given up the traditional armoured trust.
They did, although the counter to that system was found I think it was after the Soviets collapsed.Wasn't another key advantage that the NATO forces had was their vastly superior thermal imaging? If I remember correctly, the thermal sights on the M1 essentially rendered smoke useless as a screen and had double the effective range of the Soviet system. That would be a massive advantage in any kind of fight.
Undoubtedly writing life insurance for the A-10 drivers was not a popular assignment. That being said NATO had come up with a series of tactical plans that would have greatly enhanced the survivability of the CAS units, especially when co-operating with the rotary winged community. Probably the best illustration of just how dangerous the 'Hog was seen to be by the Soviet is the construction of the A-9ski (Su-25).There are actually surprisingly few situations where that range advantage could come into play. Even on the North German plain unobstructed sightlines beyond 1km or so are quite rare. I'm sure the equipment was capable of it, but actually being able to employ it in that way is not to be counted on.
As for the A-10, it has enjoyed phenomenally good public relations based mainly on its performance in Middle Eastern conflicts since 1991 - in other words, just about the most permissive air-defence environment it could have been used operationally in. If it had been used in its intended environment - over the Fulda Gap in 1984, or something - I think pilots would have needed all the survivability features the A-10 design incorporated. Even at the division level, Soviet forces had a plethora of SAM and gun systems available. From the SA-6 and SA-8/9/13 down to ZSU-23/4s and random hopeful munters with a SA-7 or 23mm cannon, there was a lot of unpleasantness to fly through. The life of any NATO CAS pilot would not have been easy (or necessarily long).
Undoubtedly writing life insurance for the A-10 drivers was not a popular assignment. That being said NATO had come up with a series of tactical plans that would have greatly enhanced the survivability of the CAS units, especially when co-operating with the rotary winged community. Probably the best illustration of just how dangerous the 'Hog was seen to be by the Soviet is the construction of the A-9ski (Su-25).
They did, although the counter to that system was found I think it was after the Soviets collapsed.