Who would win in a 1980s ground war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s ground war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

  • NATO

    Votes: 42 80.8%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 10 19.2%

  • Total voters
    52
If conventional war broke out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, who would win the ground war (assuming nukes aren't used)?
 

SsgtC

Banned
NATO. Depending on when in the 80s the war kicks off, they might not even get pushed out of their original defensive positions.
 

CalBear

Moderator
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Monthly Donor
As noted, when?

In 1980, NATO planned to go Nuclear almost from the start, the correlation of forces as such that the general belief was that the Pact Armies would roll their NATO counterparts up like a rug (Soviet performance in Afghanistan started to change this view in late 1981).

By the end of the Cold War, post Wall, NATO would have hammered the Soviets flat, the tech gap was so wide at that point as to be close to unbridgeable and the Soviet military was almost literally a shell of the once awesome force it had been. Throw in the fact that the Soviets had almost as much to fear from their supposed "allies in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia as the did from NATO and a war in 889 would have been extremely one sided (and likely to have the Soviets go nuclear as a result).
 
You can't say "side X goes nuclear" as I think that violates the OP's request. Also, in-universe (where we don't have a referee to say they can't do certain actions), the stated policy of USA was to only use WMDs in response to the same kind, not a conventional attack. Too much collateral damage
 

SsgtC

Banned
In 1980, NATO planned to go Nuclear almost from the start, the correlation of forces as such that the general belief was that the Pact Armies would roll their NATO counterparts up like a rug (Soviet performance in Afghanistan started to change this view in late 1981).

I may be wrong here, but wasn't part of NATO's thinking in going Nuclear almost immediately the fact that US Military morale was terrible at this point? With, I vaugely remember, a drug issue? I had been led to believe that the US Military as a whole, and the US Army in particular, didn't really recover from Vietnam till the mid 80s. Though a shooting war in 80/81 would have certainly sped that up
 
WarPac doctrine also assumed almost instant usage of nukes if WWIII was to break out in Europe, if Seven Days to the River Rhine is anything to go by.

Putting that aside, I'll have to agree with the rest of the thread and say that it depends on when the war breaks out. Early 80s, you have a U.S. military in flux, still suffering from Vietnam-era shellshock, using a mismatch of equipment, etc. facing down a Red Army with better morale, more men and equipment, more secure supply lines, etc.

Late 80s, you have a confident NATO with better tech facing a decaying WarPac wracked with internal dissension, on the bad end of an extending technological gap, led by Soviets war-weary from Afghanistan.

Here's something to consider: no matter what, both sides will face certain difficulties that could make or break them. The Warsaw Pact always chafed under Soviet oppression and any WWIII scenario might see a few try to break away (Poland in particular). Meanwhile, NATO still has a major problem in that no matter what, the main military power in the alliance (the U.S.) is an ocean away from Europe, while the Soviets are just a day's drive away from the French border.
 
While, I voted for NATO in general, I would agree that a lot would depend on when the war happened. 80 Through 83 or so the Soviet Union 84 had the advantage thru about 86 it could go either way but after 86 the Soviet Army was in a deep hole. But will make one comment, even in the early eighties it could go against the Soviet Union simply because it command structure. It was rigid beyond belief and I could easily see the leadership of the Soviet Army not taking actions quickly enough to take advantage of the situation on the battlefield. Also the longer the mobilization goes on the less the advantage would be for the Soviet Army. There are many variables that can influence what happens on the battlefield.
 

CalBear

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I may be wrong here, but wasn't part of NATO's thinking in going Nuclear almost immediately the fact that US Military morale was terrible at this point? With, I vaugely remember, a drug issue? I had been led to believe that the US Military as a whole, and the US Army in particular, didn't really recover from Vietnam till the mid 80s. Though a shooting war in 80/81 would have certainly sped that up
The U.S. military was, in general, not ready to fight a major European War in 1980-81. Way too much money had gone into equipment for Vietnam, much of it simply left behind when the U.S. withdrew. Most of the rest of the Budget had gone into the Nuclear Triad. The result was the U.S. was a generation behind in tanks and IFV

There were some pretty serious issues with drugs, but the real issue was that the U.S. military, especially the Army (which tended to be the service that found recruiting to be the most difficult at the time) had sort of lost its way in the early years of the All Volunteer Force. Things went from too rigid (which was okay for 24 month draftees, but was not the way that you could treat folks who had an actual choice in the matter) to too permissive, something that cost the service a lot of junior officers and NCOs who couldn't perform their responsibilities with the very permissive atmosphere, and it took some time to strike a balance. It was also 5-6 years before the "Vietnam" mindset worked its way out of both the Services AND the general population. The military was looked down upon, in a really serious way for pretty much all of the 70s, not really getting back into favor until Reagan entered office.

Once Reagan was in office, well, things really changed. Money started to pour in (some of it was even spent wisely), new equipment like the M-1 Abrams and M2/3 Bradley started to rebuild the Army's war fighting capability, new aircraft, a few absolutely stunning technology breakthroughs (some of which are still more rumor than documented fact) like Stealth and Smart/Brilliant weapons, all started to appear. At the same time the military branches had figured out the way to handle a volunteer force (including extending training, some MOS have training lengths that exceed half of the old draftee's term of service) and took what had been pretty much a broken spear and turned it into what is arguably the most lethal and effective combat force ever fielded by the end of the 80's. The force that rolled up Saddam's army like a rug in 1991 was the direct result of the changes that rolled through the Branches in '81-'85.
 
In 1980, NATO planned to go Nuclear almost from the start, the correlation of forces as such that the general belief was that the Pact Armies would roll their NATO counterparts up like a rug (Soviet performance in Afghanistan started to change this view in late 1981).
Their performance in Afghanistan was that poor?
 
Prior to the actual collapse beginning in 1989, my money's on the Pact. Soviet divisions didn't have the same firepower as their American equivalents, but the way their forces were structured, they got significantly more fighting power per man. While an American division might have, say, 50% more firepower, its division slice could be twice or three times as large as a Soviet division's. On the division level, the Soviets also would put 30% of their force in the first line, compared to 18% for American divisions; assuming the Soviets are attacking and thus have the initiative, this could be a significant advantage. The Soviet reserve pool is frankly ludicrous; doubling the size of the ground forces would only take about 5% of it. With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.
 
The U.S. military was, in general, not ready to fight a major European War in 1980-81. Way too much money had gone into equipment for Vietnam, much of it simply left behind when the U.S. withdrew. Most of the rest of the Budget had gone into the Nuclear Triad. The result was the U.S. was a generation behind in tanks and IFV

That said, the US forces of 1980/81 were significantly better than the US forces of 1976/77. 1976 marked the nadir, and there were attempts to climb out of the hole. It was, however, a pretty deep hole.

The US Marines weren't as badly off as the US Army (I'm not in a position to speculate why that might be).

Drug use was a monster problem in the mid-late 1970s, as was horrible morale.

At least, that's how I saw it at the time.
 
Prior to the actual collapse beginning in 1989, my money's on the Pact. Soviet divisions didn't have the same firepower as their American equivalents, but the way their forces were structured, they got significantly more fighting power per man. While an American division might have, say, 50% more firepower, its division slice could be twice or three times as large as a Soviet division's. On the division level, the Soviets also would put 30% of their force in the first line, compared to 18% for American divisions; assuming the Soviets are attacking and thus have the initiative, this could be a significant advantage. The Soviet reserve pool is frankly ludicrous; doubling the size of the ground forces would only take about 5% of it. With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.

Yeah, the thing is that the reserve pool counts a ton of people who are needed in industry and the supporting economy and thus can't be called up, at least not without net damage to the Soviet war effort, and also a lot of people so far removed from service that they basically can't be usefully employed.

Having huge advantages in training and equipment (after a few years of Reagan), a superior navy, defensive advantage, and not having to worry about your vassal armies turning on you are very significant. Quantity over quality never actually got the USSR/Russia in particular and Communist forces in general very far.
 

SsgtC

Banned
The US Marines weren't as badly off as the US Army (I'm not in a position to speculate why that might be).

I can speculate, but not sure how accurate it'll be. My SWAG is that the Corps wasn't as bad off as the Army due to the fact that the Corps wasn't nearly as reliant on the draft as the Army was. So they had an easier time adjusting. Just my .02
 

SsgtC

Banned
Prior to the actual collapse beginning in 1989, my money's on the Pact. Soviet divisions didn't have the same firepower as their American equivalents, but the way their forces were structured, they got significantly more fighting power per man. While an American division might have, say, 50% more firepower, its division slice could be twice or three times as large as a Soviet division's. On the division level, the Soviets also would put 30% of their force in the first line, compared to 18% for American divisions; assuming the Soviets are attacking and thus have the initiative, this could be a significant advantage. The Soviet reserve pool is frankly ludicrous; doubling the size of the ground forces would only take about 5% of it. With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.

Defense vs offense. On defense, it makes sense to deploy only a fraction of your forces forward while keeping the bulk as a reserve able to reinforce or counterattack where needed. Not too mention, as a general rule, for a successful attack, a 3-1 advantage in men in considered the minimum (heavily generalising here). So if you're defending, theoretically, a 10,000 man force can hold off a 30,000 man force. Just one more reason why fewer men were needed.
 

CalBear

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Monthly Donor
Their performance in Afghanistan was that poor?

Initial entry wasn't so bad, they used their Airborne formations, which were (and remain to this day) the elite. The Airborne force is considered a separate branch of the Soviet/Russian military, and has a degree of unit cohesion that far exceeded the rest of the Soviet Army (a very rough Western comparative would be the Marine Corps, but the gap between the Corps and the Regular Army is much smaller than the situation with the Soviets/Russians). As the war progressed and expanded the number of Soviet troops needed also expanded, meaning that regular motor rifle formations were called up. Those units lacked the leadership, training, and professionalism the the Airborne Forces maintained, and thing went sideways in a hurry. Drug use among Soviet troops was massive, far worse than even the worst U.S. experience (in part because the Muj were channeling a LOT of high quality dope straight to the Soviet formations). The Soviet Army was also gradually exposed as having feet of clay as the war progressed. Badly trained troops with poorly trained equipment operating under the command of insufficiently prepared junior officer were getting their asses handed to them by the Afghans, and for the first time in decades U.S. observers were able to watch Soviet "A" formations in action. The MI-24 impressed the hell out of everyone, after that... not so much.

Afghanistan was very much the USSR's Vietnam, right down to mass protests by what came to be known as "Mother's committees" . Think about that for a second... It was such a disaster that people who didn't protest being unable to buy bread without queuing up for a couple hours, decided to stand up to the Kremlin because Afghanistan had gone total FUBAR.
What was the earliest-ish time frame that this improved situation would have helped NATO avoid a nuclear fallback to a seven days to the Rhine/Fulga gap type move by the USSR?
Late '84, not that it was clear at the time since the degree of rot in the Soviet Army was not really understood until Yelsin allowed a degree of access to Western researchers. By mid-86 the Soviets would have gotten stuffed and everyone from DC to Moscow knew it.
 
Yeah, the thing is that the reserve pool counts a ton of people who are needed in industry and the supporting economy and thus can't be called up, at least not without net damage to the Soviet war effort, and also a lot of people so far removed from service that they basically can't be usefully employed.
In WWII, the U.S. was able to keep about 10% of its population under arms and produce arms for not only its own massive army but those of its allies as well. The Soviet army increasing by about 1% of population isn't going to overturn the industrial economy, especially since the goal in mobilization is to establish a decisive advantage quickly and exploit it to the fullest.

Defense vs offense. On defense, it makes sense to deploy only a fraction of your forces forward while keeping the bulk as a reserve able to reinforce or counterattack where needed. Not too mention, as a general rule, for a successful attack, a 3-1 advantage in men in considered the minimum (heavily generalising here). So if you're defending, theoretically, a 10,000 man force can hold off a 30,000 man force. Just one more reason why fewer men were needed.
3-1 ratio is a meme; the practice of attacking with the next larger unit, and military units being by and large triangular, produces a situation where 3-1 ratios for attackers are common, but it's by no means a military law one can depend on, and military history is overflowing with examples that defy strict ratios. Furthermore, even in the context of the 3-1 trope, it's more that the defender will get destroyed slowly enough that outside forces have time to act, rather than that the attackers will be decisively repulsed outright. The risk in excessive echelonment is that the reserves won't have anything to reinforce if the front line is overrun with more violent attacks.
 

MrP

Banned
Late '84, not that it was clear at the time since the degree of rot in the Soviet Army was not really understood until Yelsin allowed a degree of access to Western researchers. By mid-86 the Soviets would have gotten stuffed and everyone from DC to Moscow knew it.
Coincidentally, late '84 is when James G's story Going West: Four Days To The River Rhine, Eight Days To The English Channel takes place. I've been reading it with interest and would like to know your opinion of the way things play out in it.
 
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