NATO. Depending on when in the 80s the war kicks off, they might not even get pushed out of their original defensive positions.
In 1980, NATO planned to go Nuclear almost from the start, the correlation of forces as such that the general belief was that the Pact Armies would roll their NATO counterparts up like a rug (Soviet performance in Afghanistan started to change this view in late 1981).
The U.S. military was, in general, not ready to fight a major European War in 1980-81. Way too much money had gone into equipment for Vietnam, much of it simply left behind when the U.S. withdrew. Most of the rest of the Budget had gone into the Nuclear Triad. The result was the U.S. was a generation behind in tanks and IFVI may be wrong here, but wasn't part of NATO's thinking in going Nuclear almost immediately the fact that US Military morale was terrible at this point? With, I vaugely remember, a drug issue? I had been led to believe that the US Military as a whole, and the US Army in particular, didn't really recover from Vietnam till the mid 80s. Though a shooting war in 80/81 would have certainly sped that up
>snip<
Their performance in Afghanistan was that poor?In 1980, NATO planned to go Nuclear almost from the start, the correlation of forces as such that the general belief was that the Pact Armies would roll their NATO counterparts up like a rug (Soviet performance in Afghanistan started to change this view in late 1981).
The U.S. military was, in general, not ready to fight a major European War in 1980-81. Way too much money had gone into equipment for Vietnam, much of it simply left behind when the U.S. withdrew. Most of the rest of the Budget had gone into the Nuclear Triad. The result was the U.S. was a generation behind in tanks and IFV
Prior to the actual collapse beginning in 1989, my money's on the Pact. Soviet divisions didn't have the same firepower as their American equivalents, but the way their forces were structured, they got significantly more fighting power per man. While an American division might have, say, 50% more firepower, its division slice could be twice or three times as large as a Soviet division's. On the division level, the Soviets also would put 30% of their force in the first line, compared to 18% for American divisions; assuming the Soviets are attacking and thus have the initiative, this could be a significant advantage. The Soviet reserve pool is frankly ludicrous; doubling the size of the ground forces would only take about 5% of it. With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.
The US Marines weren't as badly off as the US Army (I'm not in a position to speculate why that might be).
Prior to the actual collapse beginning in 1989, my money's on the Pact. Soviet divisions didn't have the same firepower as their American equivalents, but the way their forces were structured, they got significantly more fighting power per man. While an American division might have, say, 50% more firepower, its division slice could be twice or three times as large as a Soviet division's. On the division level, the Soviets also would put 30% of their force in the first line, compared to 18% for American divisions; assuming the Soviets are attacking and thus have the initiative, this could be a significant advantage. The Soviet reserve pool is frankly ludicrous; doubling the size of the ground forces would only take about 5% of it. With the NSWP essentially cancelling out the minor NATO allies, it comes down to 20 US, UK, and FRG divisions against 100 Soviet divisions, pretty unenviable odds if you ever saw them.
Their performance in Afghanistan was that poor?
Late '84, not that it was clear at the time since the degree of rot in the Soviet Army was not really understood until Yelsin allowed a degree of access to Western researchers. By mid-86 the Soviets would have gotten stuffed and everyone from DC to Moscow knew it.What was the earliest-ish time frame that this improved situation would have helped NATO avoid a nuclear fallback to a seven days to the Rhine/Fulga gap type move by the USSR?
In WWII, the U.S. was able to keep about 10% of its population under arms and produce arms for not only its own massive army but those of its allies as well. The Soviet army increasing by about 1% of population isn't going to overturn the industrial economy, especially since the goal in mobilization is to establish a decisive advantage quickly and exploit it to the fullest.Yeah, the thing is that the reserve pool counts a ton of people who are needed in industry and the supporting economy and thus can't be called up, at least not without net damage to the Soviet war effort, and also a lot of people so far removed from service that they basically can't be usefully employed.
3-1 ratio is a meme; the practice of attacking with the next larger unit, and military units being by and large triangular, produces a situation where 3-1 ratios for attackers are common, but it's by no means a military law one can depend on, and military history is overflowing with examples that defy strict ratios. Furthermore, even in the context of the 3-1 trope, it's more that the defender will get destroyed slowly enough that outside forces have time to act, rather than that the attackers will be decisively repulsed outright. The risk in excessive echelonment is that the reserves won't have anything to reinforce if the front line is overrun with more violent attacks.Defense vs offense. On defense, it makes sense to deploy only a fraction of your forces forward while keeping the bulk as a reserve able to reinforce or counterattack where needed. Not too mention, as a general rule, for a successful attack, a 3-1 advantage in men in considered the minimum (heavily generalising here). So if you're defending, theoretically, a 10,000 man force can hold off a 30,000 man force. Just one more reason why fewer men were needed.
When you refer to the tech gap between NATO and the WP towards the end of the Cold War, are you referring specifically to precision guided munitions?snip
Coincidentally, late '84 is when James G's story Going West: Four Days To The River Rhine, Eight Days To The English Channel takes place. I've been reading it with interest and would like to know your opinion of the way things play out in it.Late '84, not that it was clear at the time since the degree of rot in the Soviet Army was not really understood until Yelsin allowed a degree of access to Western researchers. By mid-86 the Soviets would have gotten stuffed and everyone from DC to Moscow knew it.