Who would win in a 1980s air war: NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s air war?

  • NATO

    Votes: 222 92.1%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 19 7.9%

  • Total voters
    241
Except the Serbs didn't actually learn anything from Desert Storm in terms of Maskirovka. They used nothing that wasn't already existant in the Soviet handbooks in the 1980s. There were creative applications, but nothing that was actually conceptually new.

Slight difference between book knowledge/theory and an actual test run of enemy capabilities.
 
The question with nukes is how much damage is a country willing to take. Sure the Soviets can take everything that France could throw at them, not be destroyed and be able turn all of France in to glowing green glass. However this would probably cost them Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and much more. Is the USSR willing to cross the French border if that will happen - of course are the French serious they are willing to be slagged.
 

longsword14

Banned
The French nuclear deterrent seems to have another angle in mind too. How willing would the US be to go all in, in case the WP makes a "selective strike" ?
Some might claim that Americans would be willing to risk their own cities for some destroyed ones in Europe, but there are reasons for France to doubt that.
There are many angles from which you may look at it.
 
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The French nuclear deterrent seems to have another angle in mind too. How willing would the US be to go all in in case the WP makes a "selective strike" ?
Some might claim that Americans would be willing to risk their own cities for some destroyed ones in Europe, but there are reasons for France to doubt that.
There are many angles from which you may look at it.

That indeed was a view that many Europeans and some American writers and people seemed to have. A lot of uncertainty, which is probably just as well as it probably helped with deterrence.
 
The question with nukes is how much damage is a country willing to take. Sure the Soviets can take everything that France could throw at them, not be destroyed and be able turn all of France in to glowing green glass. However this would probably cost them Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and much more. Is the USSR willing to cross the French border if that will happen - of course are the French serious they are willing to be slagged.
There's the possibility that even if the French dump their nuclear arsenal, the Soviets could still overrun the country and steal everything that isn't nailed down (and taking a claw hammer to everything that is) and use that to rebuild.
 
But to the OPs question - which side has F15 Eagles? That side wins then, That side wins today.
Makes one feel badly for the RAF, they're stuck with the FAA's castoff Phantoms. I suppose EE Lightnings aren't bad, but not by the mid-1980s. Once the Phantoms are replaced by the Panavia Tornado ADV in the late 1980s, the RAF has something to mix with the Soviets, well, their bombers anyway, don't dogfight. You can't not love the look of the Tornado.

tornado_adv4.jpg
 
The bulk of the fighting is in West Germany (Hartz Mountains and hills around Fulda plus Bavaria)

Only part of it. The main Soviet thrust was to be across the North German/European Plain. The Soviets planned Fulda mainly as a pinning thrust, to keep the Americans and West Germany from interfering with the North German Plain thrust. For a variety of reasons, they didn't expect the Fulda Gap assault to make much headway. I find it odd that a lot of Americans tend to gall at this, as if they believe it means the Soviets didn't take them seriously, when in fact one of the reasons for the Soviets placing their main thrust so far north is precisely because they took the Americans so seriously...

but East Germany, where the bulk of transport takes place, is all plains, particularly where the highways and railroads are.

As with West Germany, East Germany's terrain is quite mixed. The region north of Berlin is indeed part of the North European Plain, albeit a bit more broken up by lakes, but south of Berlin is really heavily forested and even swampy in places. Once one moves south of the Dresden-Leipzig line, the terrain also gets increasingly hilly and then mountainous until you outright hit an actual mountain range around the East German/Czech border.

Besides, that sort of stuff doesn't matter with bridges. Because it's a freakin bridge... it's whole purpose is to go over terrain, not through it. Tunnels are another matter, but you aren't gonna see many tunnels on flat land...

Actually, if the Soviets are as effective as the Iraqis I would be surprised. The Iraqis actually had combat experience fighting the Iranians, who used ballistic missiles and tactical strike aircraft for the entire duration of their war.

If the Soviets are as effective as the Iraqis, I too would be surprised. The Iranians were effectively little more then a light infantry army throughout the Iran-Iraq War and the few Iranian ballistic missiles and tactical strike aircraft were massively outweighed quantitatively and qualitatively by the Iraqis own, as they were likewise outweighed in terms of heavy armor and artillery. The Iraqis even actually had the advantage in manpower, contrary to popular myth. Their logistics chain was basically fully outsourced to both Superpowers while the Iranians had to scrounge off the black market and backroom deals. That the whole thing still devolved into stalemate is basically a function of Iraqis incompetence rather then

One should also be careful not to overstate the effects Coalition air campaign had on the Iraqis. For an air campaign, it certainly inflicted a lot of damage upon the Iraqis army and it's capabilities. It is very much the best showing air power has ever demonstrated. But inflicted damage is all it did. It did not destroy the Iraqis army and it's capabilities and at the end of the day, Iraqis logistics and C3 infrastructure was still functional if battered. It was the ground assault which actually delivered the blow that outright destroyed it. Had the Iraqis army had a witt of competence, it could have still inflicted hefty casualties upon the Coalition in spite of the damage they had taken by the NATO air campaign. That it did not chiefly boils down, once again, to that tragi-comic Iraqis incompetence.

No one has attacked the Soviets since World War II, and the last full scale test of one of their air defense systems was against the Israelis in Lebanon (where it failed badly).

Eh, the Syrians badly mishandled their equipment yet again and made no attempt at applying Soviet maskirovka-principles (the closest any Arab state has ever come was in the preparations for '73 and even then their attempt falls woefully short in matching maskirovka's ambitions), so it's still a failure of execution rather then concept. We do have a more recent example of the Soviets executing a conventional invasion (Afghanistan in 1979) which went extremely well (even if the guerrilla war that followed didn't) but the Afghans didn't even put up a token effort in the air so it's a nonstarter in terms of seeing how Soviet air defense efforts work out so meh...

The Iraqis also had French radars and weapons too, something the Soviets did not have.

Which, tellingly, faired no better then the Soviet equipment. Once again, in the immortal words of Chuck Yeager, "It's the man, not the machine."

The bulk of Soviet immediate stocks are in eastern Europe. They are attacking into Central Europe.

The bulk of Soviet stocks for their first echelon is in East Germany, which is generally regarded to be in Central Europe... although these geographic terms do get rather arbitrary. The Poles like to insist their in Central Europe, but a number of Geographers like to put them in Eastern Europe.

That is hundreds of miles of transportation distance,

Not really. East Germany as a whole is less then two hundred miles across. The distance from the Soviet main depots to Fulda are generally between 100-200 miles. To the Rhine, generally 200-300.

and most of their reserves are actually in the Soviet Union, which is much further away.

No it isn't. All of GSFG's depots are right there in East Germany.

Their fuel production is further away still and has to be moved forward by vehicles once it reaches the forward area.

I really don't get why we're talking about fuel production at all. The war simply isn't going to last enough for new production in anything to matter, on either side.

The Soviets would have to move thousands of tons of fuel forward daily.

Okay, and? I mean, you have to remember the context in which all the techniques I have described were developed: it was WW2, in 1942-43, when the Soviets had to move thousands of tons of fuel daily from their railheads usually two-three times the distances described above, to their armored spearheads over the Eurasian steppe (which makes the North European plain look fulsome), frequently having to traverse multiple rivers, in the face of concerted German air interdiction attempts. Compared to that, the distances and terrain. Only the opposition is tougher... but then, so are the means with which the Soviets have to apply against the opposition.

A scale that makes the Serbian effort the same as comparing a motorcycle to a tractor trailer in scale.

But the scale of the resources the Soviets have to put into their Maskirovka-techniques is likewise massively different then Serbia. It's the same as comparing a two man camping tent with a main circus tent. You can't use the greater scale of the problem to dismiss Soviet techniques without also considering the equally (if not more so) greater resources the Soviets have to use in implementing those techniques.

A dispirited conscript in the 1990s is little different from a dispirited conscript from the 1980s and the issues of training did not change from that time frame. The big problems were lack of money for parts and fuel, which the collapse of the Soviet Union did markedly wreck.

That presumes that the Soviet conscripts in the 1980s Soviet Union was as dispirited in the 90s, which is not actually in evidence. And the issue of training very much did change, in that the Soviets in the 80s had the funds to do it (although, again, this was less-and-less the case as the decade wore on) while the Russians in the 90s did not have the funds to even feed and house their troops, much less train them. Some of the issues consequently did not exist, while others were merely not as severe (but, yet again, got more and more severe as the Soviet Union neared it's death bed). Were they still severe enough? Best I can say is "maybe". But on this point it isn't how sound the Soviets concepts are that we're debating, but how well the Soviets can execute them. I should note that I agree that the failing training standards could undermine Soviet attempts at implementing their doctrine. It's effectively what I said here a few pages back:

Me said:
These techniques worked almost perfectly for the Serbs in the 90s despite being employed against a even more overwhelming and sophisticated NATO force then what existed at any point in the 1980s so we do have a pretty good idea of how they'd work out in the 80s... assuming, of course, the falling Soviet standards don't undermine their attempts to employ them. If Private Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov fucks up setting up the camonetting and/or decoys because he hasn't been trained properly, or he just doesn't give a shit, then it doesn't really matter how much potential maskirovka has.

The difference is that I do not assume this inevitably would happen because, quite frankly, the only way to prove that would have been for the Soviets to actually go and do it. And we should be probably thankful they didn't regardless of how this aspect of things went. So while I do accept the possibility, and in the case of the late-80s even the probability, of you being right on this point (in which case things would very much go as you say), but I don't think the evidence is solid enough that we could say you are guaranteed to be right on this point. I will say this though: the later in the 80s the war occurs, the greater the odds you are right are.

Slight difference between book knowledge/theory and an actual test run of enemy capabilities.

You would have a point if the Iraqis had done anything that gave the Serbs insight into how to counter NATO capabilities. But they didn't. So while the Serbs went in with an actual test of NATO's capabilities in running an air campaign, all they had in terms of actually countering that campaign was still the very same book knowledge/theory that the Soviets had in the 80s which you are deriding.

He's an Obsessed Nuker who commands 10 million men, be glad he's only marching the debate terms.

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The world shall fear my might! :evilsmile::p
 
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Ak-84

Banned
How is the VVS's ASM and Red Army Ground launched guided missile force in the 1980's. Today the Russians (and the Chinese in the Pacific) intend to employ those en mass againstNATO/Pac Command Air bases.

The Indo-Pakistani Wars and even Egyptian AF attacks in '73 showed that even a knock out of a few hours could have big effects on the battle.
 

Archibald

Banned
French forces mid 1980s
4 SSBN (1 on patrol, 1 ready to sortie if need be) w 16 Polaris each
2 CV w 1 squadron of strike aircraft each, aircraft can carry a relatively short range cruise missile with a nuclear warhead
18 IRBMs (Pluton missiles)

so no ICBMs, but all of their missiles could hit targets in European Russia

Plus of course battlefield missiles and tactical strike aircraft as well as a force of 62 Mirage IV bombers that could reach targets in European Russia.

We of course have no idea how reliable any of these systems were, because the missiles were always fired under controlled conditions (an issue that applies to EVERYONE, even now). I have seen guesses estimating 50-75% reliability regarding missiles, with outlier guesses both higher and lower.

The SLBMs on French submarines weren't Polaris but M1 / M20 / M4 / M45. Range 3000 miles, enough to strike Moscow and beyond.
Pluton is not IRBM.
Pluton is kind of Honest John tactical missile to be used in Germany
The IRBMs were the Plateau d'Albion S-3

French nuclear forces

Strategic
- Plateau d'Albion: 18 * S-3 IRBM
- 62 Mirage IV in nine squadrons with AN-52 free fall bombs. Later a single squadron with ASMP (100 miles range)
- 4 submarines with SLBMs
- 2 carriers with Super Etendards armed with ASMP

Tactical
- AN-52 free fall bombs on Mirage IIIE and Jaguar
- Pluton tactical missile, range 80 miles.
- Etendard IV could carry the AN-52, too

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force_de_dissuasion

total 450 warheads by 1990; nowadays, 300 or less.
 
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I don't think nukes work like that.

The French had sufficient stockpiles at the start of the decade to end the Soviet Union as a functional nation, and double the number at the end of the decade. The fact that the Americans had more nukes, and so did the Soviets did not in fact make them more scary. If the French decided nukes were the last hope for national survival, that was the end of the matter regardless of what the Uk or Americans thought.
Once French use Nukes they cannot hope for national survival. Their nation and state will be completely destroyed.
 
The SLBMs on French submarines weren't Polaris but M1 / M20 / M4 / M45. Range 3000 miles, enough to strike Moscow and beyond.
Pluton is not IRBM.
Pluton is kind of Honest John tactical missile to be used in Germany
The IRBMs were the Plateau d'Albion S-3

French nuclear forces

Strategic
- Plateau d'Albion: 18 * S-3 IRBM
- 62 Mirage IV in nine squadrons with AN-52 free fall bombs. Later a single squadron with ASMP (100 miles range)
- 4 submarines with SLBMs
- 2 carriers with Super Etendards armed with ASMP

Tactical
- AN-52 free fall bombs on Mirage IIIE and Jaguar
- Pluton tactical missile, range 80 miles.
- Etendard IV could carry the AN-52, too

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force_de_dissuasion

total 450 warheads by 1990; nowadays, 300 or less.

hmm, my understanding was that they were Polaris but in any event
I misquoted the names of those IRBMs.
 

Archibald

Banned
Once French use Nukes they cannot hope for national survival. Their nation and state will be completely destroyed.

But so will be the entire world, including Soviet Union. That's was the reasonning, really. Sounds stupid ? well, welcome to Cold War scarying logic.

We are lucky shit didn't the fan either in 1962 or far worse, in 1983.

It doesn't really matter, however, because just like US-USSR MAD dogma,the whole thing was kind of based on a suicidal bluff - hoping nuclear war would never happen in the first place. France knew perfectly that, once the first tactical nuke gets dropped, the world is doomed.
Just think about it: even if France got through intact, nuclear winter, all the radiation, plus complete collapse of society, global economy and everything else. What's the point of being intact in such a crapsack world ?

The Force de frappe had two major roles
Role 1 - dissuading invasion of the French territory. We have nukes, cross the Rhine and prepare to be nuked.
Then enter Role 2
Role 2 - France did knew it wouldn't destroy the entire USSR with only 500 nukes. What mattered was not to carpet bomb the Soviet Union with nukes (that role was for the United states), just to cripple them by hitting vital areas - St Petersburg, Moscow, Leningrad, plus strategic forces, industry, and the like. You don't need to machine gun a guy to kill him if you can slice his throat with a knife.

When you think about it further - while non-nuclear powers, countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy would be either nuked by the Soviet Union or (best case) ravaged in the afermath by radiations and everything else.
France reasonning was "we are screwed ? fine, we won't die without a vengeance, even a limited one. Take that in your face, Soviet Union" (send 500 nukes at them).
 
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Slight difference between book knowledge/theory and an actual test run of enemy capabilities.

That's why no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy. Which is why you have to be ready to improvise. Something the Soviets weren't exactly known for.

The French nuclear deterrent seems to have another angle in mind too. How willing would the US be to go all in, in case the WP makes a "selective strike" ?
Some might claim that Americans would be willing to risk their own cities for some destroyed ones in Europe, but there are reasons for France to doubt that.
There are many angles from which you may look at it.

Exactly. Both the full NATO military member (the UK) and France offered two wild cards the Soviets couldn't count on. IF the Soviets were so strategically blind as to laugh off the threat of individually controlled nuclear powers, then deterrence has failed. To claim that the French in particular would never use their nuclear deterrent, even tactically, is a political, not a military argument.

That indeed was a view that many Europeans and some American writers and people seemed to have. A lot of uncertainty, which is probably just as well as it probably helped with deterrence.

:)
And if you want to argue the political, meaning that the US would abandon its allies, and the nuclear powers in Western Europe are too timid to use their's to prevent national conquest, AND that the USSR would ignore any nuclear ultimatums against invading their sovereign territory, then you can argue anything you like.

I remember WWIII novels written in the 1980s that ran the gamut from:

a) ending with Soviet conquest of West Germany (political collapse in NATO)

b) to status quo ante-bellum

c) to defeat of the Warsaw Pact (political collapse, usually caused by internal problems in the USSR, possibly combined with a scenario where NATO suffered no surprise at all in a Soviet attack)

d) to WWIII begun when a totally surprised NATO was forced to launch three (British, in the case of the story in question) tactical nukes to stop a Soviet armored thrust where all opposition to them had been destroyed.

There's the possibility that even if the French dump their nuclear arsenal, the Soviets could still overrun the country and steal everything that isn't nailed down (and taking a claw hammer to everything that is) and use that to rebuild.

:) Good Point.

But so will be the entire world, including Soviet Union. That's was the reasoning, really. Sounds stupid ? well, welcome to Cold War scary logic.

We are lucky shit didn't the fan either in 1962 or far worse, in 1983.

In 1962 the odds were so much in favor of the USSR on the ground and so much in favor of the West regarding nukes that a conflict was assured of going nuclear. A WWIII wasn't going to be confined to the Caribbean, despite what that fool Curtis LeMay said. This was a fact both JFK and even more so Kruschev understood. Once the shooting started...

It doesn't really matter, however, because just like US-USSR MAD dogma,the whole thing was kind of based on a suicidal bluff - hoping nuclear war would never happen in the first place. France knew perfectly that, once the first tactical nuke gets dropped, the world is doomed.
Just think about it: even if France got through intact, nuclear winter, all the radiation, plus complete collapse of society, global economy and everything else. What's the point of being intact in such a crapsack world ?

It's likely that political pressure will demand a French Ultimatum not to invade France. The bluff served to insure there would never be another Occupation. If the Soviets called the bluff, then the French Card has to be played...the French of the 5th Republic were/are not cheese-eating surrender monkeys.:evilupset::mad::angry: They were/are more akin to the French of the pre-WWI 3rd Republic.:cool:

The Force de frappe had two major roles
Role 1 - dissuading invasion of the French territory. We have nukes, cross the Rhine and prepare to be nuked.
Then enter Role 2
Role 2 - France did knew it wouldn't destroy the entire USSR with only 500 nukes. What mattered was not to carpet bomb the Soviet Union with nukes (that role was for the United states), just to cripple them by hitting vital areas - St Petersburg, Moscow, Leningrad, plus strategic forces, industry, and the like. You don't need to machine gun a guy to kill him if you can slice his throat with a knife.

Unless you want to man the Soviet Politburo with a Doomsday Squad of Hitler, Strangelove, Curtis LeMay, Jack D. Ripper, & Groeteschele, the very prospect of risking such an attack would be enough to deter Moscow from going for France. Engulfing West Germany (and possibly Turkey, Greece, Austria, Denmark, the Low Countries, etc.) would be enough for a generation.

Indeed, in 1945 a politically disfavored Soviet general at a meeting with Stalin and his other generals suggested they attack in the West and take the rest of Germany & France. Stalin immediately slammed his fist on the table and growled: "And who will feed them?" The Soviets were not Bonapartists. If they became so, then it would mean the total crushing of the KGB and the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. Seeing the Soviets turning into an outright military dictatorship before the eyes of the world is the best scenario you could see for a conventional WWIII that starts with an "Extended Buildup Scenario" (see a later post).

When you think about it further - while non-nuclear powers, countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy would be either nuked by the Soviet Union or (best case) ravaged in the aftermath by radiation and everything else.
France reasoning was "we are screwed ? fine, we won't die without a vengeance, even a limited one. Take that in your face, Soviet Union" (send 500 nukes at them).

Personally I see an Ultimatum followed by a limited tactical nuclear response followed by a strategic exchange IF the Soviets keep going after that. Which I don't see happening. (1)

1) The one scary thing about this is that the greatest possibility for the failure of nuclear deterrence is the different state of minds of NATO and Moscow. NATO believed you could have a WWIII limited to conventional war, which the Soviets rejected (correctly IMO) as total nonsense.

Moscow OTOH seemed to see nukes as just like any other weapon of war, just representing Monster Artillery Shells. The ecological effects being seen as irrelevant. It seems as if the Soviets treated environmentalism as being just as much a "bourgeoise pseudo-science" as genetics, sociology, psychiatry (except as a means to suppress political dissent), and I don't remember how many others.:perservingface:
 
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WILDGEESE

Gone Fishin'
The question with nukes is how much damage is a country willing to take. Sure the Soviets can take everything that France could throw at them, not be destroyed and be able turn all of France in to glowing green glass. However this would probably cost them Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and much more. Is the USSR willing to cross the French border if that will happen - of course are the French serious they are willing to be slagged.

From Mr de Gaulle himself,

Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French.[4]

General Pierre Marie Gallois said "Making the most pessimistic assumptions, the French nuclear bombers could destroy ten Russian cities; and France is not a prize worthy of ten Russian cities." [5]

In his book La paix nucléaire (1975), French Navy Admiral Marc de Joybert explained deterrence as:

Sir, I have no quarrel with you, but I warn you in advance and with all possible clarity that if you invade me, I shall answer at the only credible level for my scale, which is the nuclear level. Whatever your defenses, you shan't prevent at least some of my missiles from reaching your home and causing the devastation that you are familiar with. So, renounce your endeavour and let us remain good friends.[6]

Regards filers
 
But so will be the entire world, including Soviet Union. That's was the reasonning, really. Sounds stupid ? well, welcome to Cold War scarying logic.

We are lucky shit didn't the fan either in 1962 or far worse, in 1983.

It doesn't really matter, however, because just like US-USSR MAD dogma,the whole thing was kind of based on a suicidal bluff - hoping nuclear war would never happen in the first place. France knew perfectly that, once the first tactical nuke gets dropped, the world is doomed.
Just think about it: even if France got through intact, nuclear winter, all the radiation, plus complete collapse of society, global economy and everything else. What's the point of being intact in such a crapsack world ?

The Force de frappe had two major roles
Role 1 - dissuading invasion of the French territory. We have nukes, cross the Rhine and prepare to be nuked.
Then enter Role 2
Role 2 - France did knew it wouldn't destroy the entire USSR with only 500 nukes. What mattered was not to carpet bomb the Soviet Union with nukes (that role was for the United states), just to cripple them by hitting vital areas - St Petersburg, Moscow, Leningrad, plus strategic forces, industry, and the like. You don't need to machine gun a guy to kill him if you can slice his throat with a knife.

When you think about it further - while non-nuclear powers, countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy would be either nuked by the Soviet Union or (best case) ravaged in the afermath by radiations and everything else.
France reasonning was "we are screwed ? fine, we won't die without a vengeance, even a limited one. Take that in your face, Soviet Union" (send 500 nukes at them).
An open question in my mind is if the U.S. would have allowed the NATO nations that had access to U.S. Nuclear weapons under "dual key" arrangements to use them in the event their home lands were in danger of being over run. If a NATO nation that was in danger of being over run wanted to use nuclear weapons that they had hosted I suspect the U.S. would have been under considerable pressure to agree.
 
An open question in my mind is if the U.S. would have allowed the NATO nations that had access to U.S. Nuclear weapons under "dual key" arrangements to use them in the event their home lands were in danger of being over run. If a NATO nation that was in danger of being over run wanted to use nuclear weapons that they had hosted I suspect the U.S. would have been under considerable pressure to agree.
Did these "Dual Key" powers include any NATO countries besides the nuclear ones?
 
From Mr de Gaulle himself,

Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French.[4]

General Pierre Marie Gallois said "Making the most pessimistic assumptions, the French nuclear bombers could destroy ten Russian cities; and France is not a prize worthy of ten Russian cities." [5]

In his book La paix nucléaire (1975), French Navy Admiral Marc de Joybert explained deterrence as:

Sir, I have no quarrel with you, but I warn you in advance and with all possible clarity that if you invade me, I shall answer at the only credible level for my scale, which is the nuclear level. Whatever your defenses, you shan't prevent at least some of my missiles from reaching your home and causing the devastation that you are familiar with. So, renounce your endeavour and let us remain good friends.[6]

Regards filers

A number of future dystopia novels (including science fiction) presupposed a world where you saw a strategic exchange, leaving China & India ruling the world. Not as specific empires, just as superpowers somewhere between 19th century imperialism and 20th century Cold War domination.

But don't get me started on that POS propaganda work War Day. Talk about a book with an agenda...
 
At the moment American nukes are hosted under a dual key nuclear sharing scheme in Turkey, Italy Belgium, Netherlands and Germany.

So I would assume the answer is yes.

There's an article about dual keys and Turkey here

https://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/20...nt-ankaras-interest-in-using-nuclear-weapons/

Interesting link. I had always been taught that as part of a Top Secret agreement with the Soviets, once the Soviets finished removing all their nuclear missiles and bombers from Cuba, and destroyed the sites permanently, a Soviet secret envoy was told that the US would remove all their missiles from Turkey. But only if the agreement was kept both secret and unofficial. AIUI, the US IRBM bases were removed some six months after the Soviets were finished with their IRBM bases in Cuba. It appears I was misinformed.
 
Interesting link. I had always been taught that as part of a Top Secret agreement with the Soviets, once the Soviets finished removing all their nuclear missiles and bombers from Cuba, and destroyed the sites permanently, a Soviet secret envoy was told that the US would remove all their missiles from Turkey. But only if the agreement was kept both secret and unofficial. AIUI, the US IRBM bases were removed some six months after the Soviets were finished with their IRBM bases in Cuba. It appears I was misinformed.
The Jupiter IRBM was removed and then later replaced. More details on the same site a with a timeline of nuclear factoids about Turkey.

https://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/turkeys-nuclear-timeline/
 
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