Who would win in a 1980s air war: NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s air war?

  • NATO

    Votes: 222 92.1%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 19 7.9%

  • Total voters
    241
That is what "destroying the SAM system" means. A SAM system isn't just the missile battery, it's the entire defensive scheme within which the SAM battery exists as the shooting arm of said scheme. In a WW3 scenario, what's liable to happen is that NATO is just going to accept a different level of what constitutes "acceptable losses" then it did even in Vietnam for both SEAD and strike missions.

The impression I got from your initial statement is that destroying an air defense system was eliminating the batteries. If I misread you than so be it.

The real issue though is that in terms of density, the North Vietnamese, Egyptians and Iraqis had has dense an air defense system as anything the Pact had deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe (indeed only Moscow was more heavily protected) but yet their opponents successfully carried out missions at will with losses that were acceptable once counter tactics were developed and at the height of their being tested, their opponents were able to do whatever they needed to do in terms of missions.

It should be noted that initial losses during Linebacker II and in the October War were high (probably at a level we would have seen in Germany) but those losses dropped off very quickly. Losses in the Gulf War were minor (in terms of sorties, aircraft and missions carried out). While the Egyptians and Iraqis never really seemed to get the hang of the interceptor portion of the air defense mission, the PAVN Air Force was very good considering its small size.
 
The real issue though is that in terms of density, the North Vietnamese, Egyptians and Iraqis had has dense an air defense system as anything the Pact had deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe (indeed only Moscow was more heavily protected)

No, they were considerably thinner. And mostly older too. Only the Iraqis had density which came close to the Soviets, even if their equipment was still somewhat older then what the Soviets used, but the Iraqis proceeded to operate as a textbook of how not to run a air defense campaign which basically meant it didn't matter how dense their IADS was. Incompetency can render even what are otherwise the most powerful of systems impotent.
 
No, they were considerably thinner. And mostly older too. Only the Iraqis had density which came close to the Soviets, even if their equipment was still somewhat older then what the Soviets used, but the Iraqis proceeded to operate as a textbook of how not to run a air defense campaign which basically meant it didn't matter how dense their IADS was. Incompetency can render even what are otherwise the most powerful of systems impotent.

Really? Most of the systems that the PAVN had were concentrated around Hanoi, with a few batteries later deployed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Egyptians had the overwhelming majority of their batteries deployed at the Suez Canal.

I will have to dig up the actual order of battles but in terms of area being defended I would be interested in seeing your reasoning here. Orders of Battle for Warsaw Pact air defenses are available (through the table top wargaming hobby) for most of the time in question here.

So interested in seeing what your source is regarding this
 
Really? Most of the systems that the PAVN had were concentrated around Hanoi, with a few batteries later deployed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Egyptians had the overwhelming majority of their batteries deployed at the Suez Canal.

I will have to dig up the actual order of battles but in terms of area being defended I would be interested in seeing your reasoning here. Orders of Battle for Warsaw Pact air defenses are available (through the table top wargaming hobby) for most of the time in question here.

So interested in seeing what your source is regarding this

Sheer numbers, mainly. Ignoring MANPADs, the Vietnamese in late-1965 and the Egyptians in 1973 had 22-24 and ~680 total launchers, respectively. Similarly the Iraqis had around 7,000 total launchers. The Warsaw Pact had ~7,000 in mobile launchers alone in 1984 (I don't know how many static launchers they had). Suffice to say, a single Soviet 1980s motor-rifle division has more organic mobile surface-air missile launchers (36) then the entirety of the North Vietnamese Air Defences in 1965.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
I don't know why this joke exists considering that if Soviet troops came close to France's border they'd be warned to retreat or else dozens of Soviet cities would be turned to ash by French nukes.

Following the warning from the French, Moscow reacts in laughter and has its tanks carry on towards the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay.
They are fighting NATO with the Americans having tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at them; French threats to commit national suicide (the death of every single Frenchman & Frenchwoman in a Soviet leisurely counterstrike) pale in comparison to the risks they are already taking if they are going west.
 
Following the warning from the French, Moscow reacts in laughter and has its tanks carry on towards the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay.
They are fighting NATO with the Americans having tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at them; French threats to commit national suicide (the death of every single Frenchman & Frenchwoman in a Soviet leisurely counterstrike) pale in comparison to the risks they are already taking if they are going west.

I am not sure that is exactly how they would handle it but it is a very valid point and I am not sure De Gaulle and the other believers in the French Deterrent policy thought it through all the way.
 
AA-11 sharply reversed the trend of superior western IR missiles.

Unconvincing. I stand by my statement that the superior doctrine and C3 wins out, at least achieving air superiority though I admit that air supremacy seems unlikely over any weeks-long timescale. The AA-11 was not some sort of Magical Weapon System- it simply was not that superior, no matter what cute descriptions such as "sharply" you use. It only seemed to be a "sharp" change because of how incredibly inferior warpac missiles had been before that! Not to mention that it was far from universally fielded (I mean, Russia still uses the AA-8), especially when the first fielding was what, 1984? Mid-decade for the period we're talking about?

The Tiger was 'superior', too. But better doctrine and low fielded numbers made it moot.
 
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What is interesting is not the fighters and ground attack aircraft but the force multipliers . This includes tankers , transports and electronic warfare aircraft . Not including SAC tankers the NATO forces in Europe will include . well over a dozen E-3 AWACS supported by KC-135 tankers . In addition the odds of specialised ELINT aircraft like the RC-135 . The French Air force of the time was fairly well equipped and no slouch in any department . The German and RAF lacked specialised aircraft of several types but could operate in conjunction with the USAFE . Any scenario you bring out will involve the NATO air planners sending a massive night time strike into WP territory to drop bridges and tunnels , decimate the GCI Radar network and also remove certain airfields from operations . If the F-117 is available then it will drop bombs on certain locations ahead of the main ingress . F-15's , F-4's and Mirage fighters will dart in and engage any airborne fighters while EF-111's and F-4G's begin removing radar and SAM sites from ingress and egress corridors .
As the Corridors become open the F-111 and Tornado's will begin their ingress at high speed and low level . Within 20 minutes the targets in the German democratic republic will have been engaged and the egress either completed or begun . I would expect this raid to occur around 2 AM . The Warsaw Pact have a very dense air defence network that is completely reliant on C&C from GCI radar inputs . If these are knocked out then the skies become neutral during the day and NATO at night . The Mig 21 and Mig 23 squadrons will have a big problem operating as their airfields will have been hit .

I am not disparaging the Warsaw Pact Air Forces . Their long range strike capability would be terrifying . The Su-24 raids would be very hard to engage . The Backfire and Blinder stikes will also be difficult to defend against . In reality NATO's biggest concern would be how many conventional SCUD and SCARAB missiles are available to throw at their air bases . Also the AS-5 would be difficult to counter . The Sheer numbers of Mig's and Sukhoi's that will be in the air also make life difficult for the NATO forces .
 
How much did the Soviets know about the F-117 in the 1980s, anyway? The Serbs also had the advantage of seeing the F-117 in action over Iraq, and so knew it would be used against them. If the first knowledge the Soviets have of the F-117 is it blowing up something out of nowhere, than that's a much bigger problem than if they can know it's coming.

As a matter of fact, there WAS a lot of talk in the mid-80s of a "Stealth Fighter", designated the F-19. Spurious, of course, but the DOD put out some disinformation to allow airplane model makers to develop a "F-19 Nightrider" kit, with a design as unlike the real F-117 as you could possibly imagine. Think of a design that looks like a backwards manta ray with radically ROUNDED & OVOID (not flat & angular like the F-117) edges. In the overall shape of a B-70 Valkyrie, but fighter-sized.

I swear, it looked like it had the aerodynamics of an armadillo!

So, did the Soviets get a good laugh at that model kit themselves? Or did the Kremlin order their design people to "get to work"? The latter is not out of the question. When the Soviets back-engineered the B-29 they air-pirated from their "ally", Stalin's orders were so encompassing regarding making their "Boeing/Tu-4" a complete copy that Tupolev was forced to include the bullet holes put in the air-pirated B-29 by the Soviets! So much for air-pressurization on the Tu-4, I guess.:rolleyes:
 
The impression I got from your initial statement is that destroying an air defense system was eliminating the batteries. If I misread you than so be it.

The real issue though is that in terms of density, the North Vietnamese, Egyptians and Iraqis had has dense an air defense system as anything the Pact had deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe (indeed only Moscow was more heavily protected) but yet their opponents successfully carried out missions at will with losses that were acceptable once counter tactics were developed and at the height of their being tested, their opponents were able to do whatever they needed to do in terms of missions.

Until Gorbachev the Sovs were all but pathological about passing off to their 3rd World clients cast-offs, and then later 3rd tier, then 2nd tier equipment.

It should be noted that initial losses in the October War were high (probably at a level we would have seen in Germany) but those losses dropped off very quickly Losses in the Gulf War were minor (in terms of sorties, aircraft and missions carried out). While the Egyptians and Iraqis never really seemed to get the hang of the interceptor portion of the air defense mission, the PAVN Air Force was very good considering its small size.

IIRC the IDF lost 25% of their sortied tactical air forces in the October War because of two circumstances: The Egyptians (and I'm assuming the Syrians) had heavily modernized their SAMs, and no one on the other side realized to what a level they had taken things. The Israelis needed a particular ECM device for their aircraft to counter these SAMs, and apparently the US was either refusing to sell it to them or was still in the midst of deploying it to American forces. At least, until the shooting started, Nixon was made aware of this, and the arms flights began.

Following the warning from the French, Moscow reacts in laughter and has its tanks carry on towards the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay.
They are fighting NATO with the Americans having tens of thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at them; French threats to commit national suicide (the death of every single Frenchman & Frenchwoman in a Soviet leisurely counterstrike) pale in comparison to the risks they are already taking if they are going west.

Well, with that logic, you could have "Moscow" & "Peking" doing an armored thrust linkup in Kansas City. Because, you know, we wouldn't DARE shoot at them. It might make them mad at us. Deterrence includes the willingness to be able to use strategic weapons when an enemy attacks you for the sake of strategic conquest. With the Soviets being the aggressor, its either stop them with nukes (gradually I would think) or die. History has already shown us what happens to the behavior of totalitarian aggressors when they win. Their behavior doesn't get better, their behavior gets worse.

To think that the Soviets could so blithely blow off a Nuclear French ultimatum against invading their sovereign territory.... That's the argument that was made by Dr. Groeteschele (loosely based on Ed Teller) in the 1964 film "Fail Safe". Walter Matthau's character argued for a nuclear strike against the USSR (we did have an enormous ICBM advantage over the Soviets in 1964) on the basis that the Russians would surrender. That they were not human, but Communist Machines who would surrender before superior force (??).

To which a listening USAF general on speakerphone at SAC headquarters screamed: THAT'S A LOT OF HOGWASH! THERE ARE RUSSIAN GENERALS OVER THERE WHO KNOW THE SAME THING I DO! THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE! THEY SEE TROUBLE COMING THEY WON'T HESITATE! THEY'LL HIT US WITH EVERYTHING THEY'VE GOT AND THEY WON'T GIVE A DAMN WHAT MARX WOULD HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT! (he really was screaming)

If the French are this feeble, then we are talking a scenario in which the Warsaw Pact overruns Portugal by D+3. Days:rolleyes:
 
So, did the Soviets get a good laugh at that model kit themselves? Or did the Kremlin order their design people to "get to work"?

Best I can tell they didn't seem to take the model kit that seriously, but they did pick up on the fact that the US probably had a stealth fighter even if they didn't know any actual details about it.
 
Until Gorbachev the Sovs were all but pathological about passing off to their 3rd World clients cast-offs, and then later 3rd tier, then 2nd tier equipment.



IIRC the IDF lost 25% of their sortied tactical air forces in the October War because of two circumstances: The Egyptians (and I'm assuming the Syrians) had heavily modernized their SAMs, and no one on the other side realized to what a level they had taken things. The Israelis needed a particular ECM device for their aircraft to counter these SAMs, and apparently the US was either refusing to sell it to them or was still in the midst of deploying it to American forces. At least, until the shooting started, Nixon was made aware of this, and the arms flights began.



Well, with that logic, you could have "Moscow" & "Peking" doing an armored thrust linkup in Kansas City. Because, you know, we wouldn't DARE shoot at them. It might make them mad at us. Deterrence includes the willingness to be able to use strategic weapons when an enemy attacks you for the sake of strategic conquest. With the Soviets being the aggressor, its either stop them with nukes (gradually I would think) or die. History has already shown us what happens to the behavior of totalitarian aggressors when they win. Their behavior doesn't get better, their behavior gets worse.

To think that the Soviets could so blithely blow off a Nuclear French ultimatum against invading their sovereign territory.... That's the argument that was made by Dr. Groeteschele (loosely based on Ed Teller) in the 1964 film "Fail Safe". Walter Matthau's character argued for a nuclear strike against the USSR (we did have an enormous ICBM advantage over the Soviets in 1964) on the basis that the Russians would surrender. That they were not human, but Communist Machines who would surrender before superior force (??).

To which a listening USAF general on speakerphone at SAC headquarters screamed: THAT'S A LOT OF HOGWASH! THERE ARE RUSSIAN GENERALS OVER THERE WHO KNOW THE SAME THING I DO! THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE! THEY SEE TROUBLE COMING THEY WON'T HESITATE! THEY'LL HIT US WITH EVERYTHING THEY'VE GOT AND THEY WON'T GIVE A DAMN WHAT MARX WOULD HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT! (he really was screaming)

If the French are this feeble, then we are talking a scenario in which the Warsaw Pact overruns Portugal by D+3. Days:rolleyes:

I have seen Suvarov's assertion about "monkey models" being sold to the 3rd World clients. While tanks and other armored fighting vehicles lacked the more sophisticated fire control equipment (to name but one system), they were essentially the same vehicles otherwise, while the Migs and Sukhoi combat aircraft may have lacked the top line fire control radars etc, but once again the same airframes, as were the SAM2s and beyond.

Indeed special operations missions where staged during the War of Attrition in 1968-70 to grab Soviet radars. The constant refrain of the Third World nations misused what they had, were given second rate equipment, and lacked the skill of their Soviet betters is frankly horse dung. While many of their troops lacked the education of their Soviet counterparts, they were however generally speaking volunteers (or fired up for a national cause as in the case of the PAVN). While the average Soviet conscript, in his two years of service, had only limited training except for those men sent to Sergeant's school, while the rest spent more time painting their equipment than actually using. I recommend you read Cockburn's book "The Threat" sometime.

The true capability of the Soviet military was amply shown when they tried to use it. The mobilization attempted in 1981 when Poland was threatened with invasion is instructive. The Soviets couldn't even find many of their older reservists for their Category B and C Divisions. In the Invasion of Czechslovakia units got lost, had endless mechanical breakdowns, and and that was when invading without opposition. In Afghanistan the Category B and C units suffered serious losses in combat and were found to be lacking in effectiveness at every level.

The nations that have based their Air Forces on the Soviet model (both their air defense and frontal aviation forces) have had a very mixed result with only the PAVN really having notable success and even then they were buried by numbers and firepower.

As to the French nuclear deterrent. You are apparently missing the point. The point made was that if the French threaten a nuclear strike in the face of a Pact invasion of the West, the Soviets, already facing such real danger at the hands of the Americans and British are hardly likely to be any more impressed by the French in the face of the risks already being run. Compared to the American weapons committed to NATO forces and already available, but presumably not used (as clearly widespread use by one side means both sides use them and no one had an air force or army capable of operations very quickly).

So the French are a mere drop in the bucket compared to that threat and risk.
 
If ... the Eagles ... then disengage without loss I suspect NATO would consider that a good outcome if the Eagles can live to fight another day.
That's what the AWACS are for. Send them where they are needed, and where they can win.
AWACS is a great system but it's vulnerable to ... high speed interceptors like MIG-25/31. I'd be concerned about it staying too far back, ... and spend too much time on self defense.
I expect NATO AWACS would have a continuous escort... Any attacking aircraft will be detected well before they get in range, and if things look too dicey the AWACS can run away and get very low. Is it possible there could be an AWACS lost, yes, but NATO has enough so a single loss is not as devastating as for the WP.
I do see the validity of the argument than an F-15 can only shoot down so many MiGs. You'd have a lot of situations where an F-15 was engaged by, say, five MiG-21s, and the Eagle scores, say, 2 Sparrow kills and a Sidewinder kill before it has to face the reality of four Atolls getting near the tailpipe.
What is interesting is not the fighters and ground attack aircraft but the force multipliers . This includes tankers , transports and electronic warfare aircraft .
The discussion about quality vs quantity needs to take into account why there is an 'air war' happening at all. Fighters vs fighters doesn't change anything really. It's fighters vs strike aircraft and fighters vs force multipliers which matters. So sometimes the escorting F-15s (or whatever) just won't be able to disengage, because they're the only thing between the WP aircraft and their target(s) - and that's when the old cliché about 'quantity having a quality all of its own' comes into play.
For example, at one point during the Cold War, Soviet air doctrine for attacking an AWACS was to send at least one aviation fighter regiment (about 60 aircraft). NATO doctrine for defending an AWACS was to have two 4-ship CAPs (Combat Air Patrols) forward and one 'goalkeeper' CAP - so 12 aircraft vs 60. Even if you give the NATO missiles a PK of 100% and reduce the WP ones to 20%, the NATO aircraft will be overwhelmed by the numbers. There will probably only be about 10-12 WP aircraft left, but that's enough to shoot down an AWACS if it didn't start running away as soon as the attackers were spotted - which is a mission kill anyway and would disrupt the NATO response enough to make the figures even worse for NATO.*
So, NATO would probably lose a lot of aircraft early on just trying to stop the WP mass attacks. The good thing for NATO would be that the WP would be losing even more aircraft. And, coming back to my initial point, it doesn't actually matter if NATO loses all the fighters it has (and all its tankers, AWACS, etc) if the WP isn't able to conduct any more strike missions against NATO ground forces and if NATO can simultaneously retain the capability to strike at the WP ground forces.

To answer the original question, then: NATO in the long run, but it would be very painful as the Soviet/WP meat-grinder chewed up a lot of the NATO forces before breaking down. As others have said, earlier in the 80s is better for the WP, but the strategic depth that NATO has (had) would show in the end.


*Yes, I'm treating this scenario as if there aren't any other engagements/reinforcements/SAMs/etc in the vicinity - but it helps makes the point, I think.
 
The discussion about quality vs quantity needs to take into account why there is an 'air war' happening at all. Fighters vs fighters doesn't change anything really. It's fighters vs strike aircraft and fighters vs force multipliers which matters. So sometimes the escorting F-15s (or whatever) just won't be able to disengage, because they're the only thing between the WP aircraft and their target(s) - and that's when the old cliché about 'quantity having a quality all of its own' comes into play.
For example, at one point during the Cold War, Soviet air doctrine for attacking an AWACS was to send at least one aviation fighter regiment (about 60 aircraft). NATO doctrine for defending an AWACS was to have two 4-ship CAPs (Combat Air Patrols) forward and one 'goalkeeper' CAP - so 12 aircraft vs 60. Even if you give the NATO missiles a PK of 100% and reduce the WP ones to 20%, the NATO aircraft will be overwhelmed by the numbers. There will probably only be about 10-12 WP aircraft left, but that's enough to shoot down an AWACS if it didn't start running away as soon as the attackers were spotted - which is a mission kill anyway and would disrupt the NATO response enough to make the figures even worse for NATO.*
So, NATO would probably lose a lot of aircraft early on just trying to stop the WP mass attacks. The good thing for NATO would be that the WP would be losing even more aircraft. And, coming back to my initial point, it doesn't actually matter if NATO loses all the fighters it has (and all its tankers, AWACS, etc) if the WP isn't able to conduct any more strike missions against NATO ground forces and if NATO can simultaneously retain the capability to strike at the WP ground forces.

To answer the original question, then: NATO in the long run, but it would be very painful as the Soviet/WP meat-grinder chewed up a lot of the NATO forces before breaking down. As others have said, earlier in the 80s is better for the WP, but the strategic depth that NATO has (had) would show in the end.


*Yes, I'm treating this scenario as if there aren't any other engagements/reinforcements/SAMs/etc in the vicinity - but it helps makes the point, I think.

Are you considering the rather large number of aircraft from the US Air Forces in North America, not NORAD units, but the dedicated 4 numbered Air Forces that were assigned to NATO missions consisting of active as well as US Air Force Reserve and US Air Force National Guard units?

There is a lot of depth to NATO air forces and unlike the ground forces, they can self deploy.

If you look at servicability rates, the NATO advantage remains high as well. Of those 60 aircraft in that Soviet Fighter Regiment, only about half are operational, while of the 24 aircraft in a USAF squadron, 60-75% will be so it is more like 16 vs 30. The odds look even less daunting when you consider that the number of flying hours for the NATO pilots are usually twice or more what the Pact pilots have, and the reliability of their weapons is similar to the servicability rates (when you talk missiles).
 
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I don't disagree with any of what you say and yes, I had thought about the various points you raise.
One point I was trying to make is that if there is an element of surprise to the Soviet/WP attack (not complete surprise, as that's almost impossible to achieve, but a level of uncertainty so that NATO forces aren't at full alert and reinforcements aren't in place), then the initial phases of the war will see the air battles being largely quantity vs quality. As time goes on (and that time will be measured in days - weeks at most) NATO will get some quantity as well, so it becomes quantity vs (quality and quantity) - which is a guaranteed win for NATO.
The other point I had was that it's common to think of an air war as being fighters vs fighters, but that it's actually the strike aircraft which matter - on both sides. So it's how well NATO can react to WP strikes and how well it can mount strikes into WP territory which ultimately matters - not how well an F-15 does against a MiG-25. At the time, we in NATO thought that the WP was a well-oiled machine just itching to push west, but we now know that there were a lot of command and control problems, so NATO's strengths in this aspect of warfare would have told extremely quickly.

Essentially, I think we're in agreement - just presenting our arguments a bit differently.
 

WILDGEESE

Gone Fishin'
I've heard that the F-117 shot over Serbia was either a) a lucky shot or b) a very stupid, overconfident pilot and flight plan.



I think they entered service in October 1983 at Nellis AFB.


Right bear with me, I'm doing this from memory.

In 2000, I was in WH Smiths on my lunch break purchasing a UK daily tabloid newspaper (not the Daily Sport before you ask) when I happened to look up and spotted either The Economist or New Scientist and read the article about how the Serbs shot down the F-117.

"Shag me sideways and call me Marge" but until then I was under the impression that Stealth aircraft where invisible to Radar. NO! THEY ARE NOT!!!

From what I gathered from the article, the Serbs being tipped off by a French informer at NATO HQ plus bombing the same area more or less continually where advised by the Russians to drop their entire Radar system in that area and just go passive apart from one Radar emitter on full power.

As the aircraft came into range the emitting Radar system couldn't see bugger all from his returns, but the rest who where on passive kept getting intermittent traces from the returns of the aircraft's angled sides which looked like a nocturnal bird.

After some time they then launched between 3 or 4 Infra-Red homing missiles into the F-117's area armed with proximity fuses.

All it needed was for one missile to be close enough for the missiles warhead to explode which it did bringing the F-117 down.

As I said I'm going from memory so if I've got some details wrong, apologies.

Regards filers.
 
I don't disagree with any of what you say and yes, I had thought about the various points you raise.
One point I was trying to make is that if there is an element of surprise to the Soviet/WP attack (not complete surprise, as that's almost impossible to achieve, but a level of uncertainty so that NATO forces aren't at full alert and reinforcements aren't in place), then the initial phases of the war will see the air battles being largely quantity vs quality. As time goes on (and that time will be measured in days - weeks at most) NATO will get some quantity as well, so it becomes quantity vs (quality and quantity) - which is a guaranteed win for NATO.
The other point I had was that it's common to think of an air war as being fighters vs fighters, but that it's actually the strike aircraft which matter - on both sides. So it's how well NATO can react to WP strikes and how well it can mount strikes into WP territory which ultimately matters - not how well an F-15 does against a MiG-25. At the time, we in NATO thought that the WP was a well-oiled machine just itching to push west, but we now know that there were a lot of command and control problems, so NATO's strengths in this aspect of warfare would have told extremely quickly.

Essentially, I think we're in agreement - just presenting our arguments a bit differently.

The strike aircraft are indeed the major player here, and the ability of NATO aircraft to wreck bridges and tunnels would have been the major element as to airpower influencing the ground battle. While close air support will matter (especially when committed in quantity to a critical ground action), it is the strike aircraft that will screw up the ability of Soviet follow up echelons to reach the battle area in a timely manner and more importantly, the ability of the Soviets to move POL, ammunition and vital parts forward.
 
The strike aircraft are indeed the major player here, and the ability of NATO aircraft to wreck bridges and tunnels would have been the major element as to airpower influencing the ground battle.

Except Soviet techniques in Maskirovka proved well and able to prevent NATO from doing just that in Serbia...
 
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