Who would win in a 1980s air war: NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s air war?

  • NATO

    Votes: 222 92.1%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 19 7.9%

  • Total voters
    241

BlondieBC

Banned
The Nighthawks would be very interesting as well, and there are 2 squadrons of them in 1981. The Soviets would have literally no answer to them other than concentrated AAA fire and they would be routed to avoid the worst of those areas.

Good point. An their first night mission was supposed to be taking out the land based radars need to control the airplanes. The next day, we may be looking at a largely uncoordinated soviet air campaign. The Soviet AWAC then become irreplaceable assets.
 

SsgtC

Banned
And NATO's number 1 target. I'll put the over/under at 5 hours for their survival.

Good point. An their first night mission was supposed to be taking out the land based radars need to control the airplanes. The next day, we may be looking at a largely uncoordinated soviet air campaign. The Soviet AWAC then become irreplaceable assets.
 
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It should be noted that while Soviet high density air defense systems could at times inflict serious losses, they never stopped a full scale assault, not even in 1973 over Syria and Egypt.

Actually, the Soviet systems in '73 did pretty much shut down the IAFs initial assaults. But the effect was temporary and limited to the first few days as the IAF adjusted.

The Nighthawks would be very interesting as well, and there are 2 squadrons of them in 1981. The Soviets would have literally no answer to them other than concentrated AAA fire and they would be routed to avoid the worst of those areas.

The Serbs managed to down a Nighthawk with an SA-6, which was obsolescent even in the 80s, so it isn't necessarily that invulnerable. The techniques the Serbs used to track and down the stealth fighter were sound and could be repeated. The main reason there wasn't another shoot down is that the Serbs were grossly outclassed and had very limited air defense assets (just 22 SA-6 batteries defended the entire country) and NATO had total air supremacy over their small country. They couldn't afford to go toe to toe with the NATO air forces like the Soviets could have and had to wage guerrilla aerial warfare. With NATO placing its highest priority on avoiding losses, this left them with few good opportunities. They took the ones they got.

NATO attacks on the Warsaw Pact would have no choice but to accept much higher risks in far less favourable situations (certainly the stealths will not operate under an unbroken friendly air umbrella). If the Soviets develop the same techniques then Stealth flights into the vastly heavier defenses of East Germany, Poland, and the USSR will start taking serious losses. That is, admittedly, a pretty big "if" given how such innovation in the USSR was viewed as a top-down matter.

In any case, as the F117 would be primarily used in an interdiction role, the main Soviet defense against it would be the same as against most NATO interdiction attempts: camouflage, decoys, deception... maskirovka, in all it's totality and deviousness. These techniques worked almost perfectly for the Serbs in the 90s despite being employed against a even more overwhelming and sophisticated NATO force then what existed at any point in the 1980s so we do have a pretty good idea of how they'd work out in the 80s... assuming, of course, the falling Soviet standards don't undermine their attempts to employ them. If Private Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov fucks up setting up the camonetting and/or decoys because he hasn't been trained properly, or he just doesn't give a shit, then it doesn't really matter how much potential maskirovka has.
 
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As of 1979 the Dutch, Danes, Belgians, and Germans still had a lot of F104s.

Meh. Selling the F-104 to our allies was practically a casus belli. That plane reminds me of the Japanese J7W Shinden. A real killer. Both of enemy fighters and any pilot flying it who wasn't a master level pilot. Stupid thing (the Starfighter) couldn't even shoot down the Starship Enterprise (STTOS Tomorrow Is Yesterday), and that was only a wooden model!:rolleyes::happyblush

MANPADS like Redeye and Blowpipe did not have a good hit record.

In fact, in Vietnam Redeye was useless unless the enemy was moving right AT you. As to Blowpipe, also useless against anything the Argentine Air Force had in its inventory. (1)

1) EXCEPT: The homegrown Argentine counter-insurgency strike aircraft Pucara. It was initially feared that the Pucara could wreck bloody havoc among British troops off-loading from ships (2) or on the ground due to its tremendous firepower, or ordnance package. But events in the Falklands showed that the much maligned Blowpipe missile was death incarnate on the Pucara. AFAIK, no Pucara that ever tried to make a strike against a British Army unit lived to tell the tale. And the Argentines had sent a lot of Pucaras to the Falklands, and with high hopes for their success..

2) The Pucara had no anti-ship or anti-air capability.

The biggest problem for NATO is that an F15 can shoot down about as many MiGs as it has missiles (well, OK, probably half as many). But if the USSR has more planes than that, the Eagle's in trouble.

Suppose an Eagle has 8 missiles. Shoots down 4 MiGs, but is now out of missiles. If there are 3 MiGs left that haven't fired yet, the Eagle is probably toast.

Also. Sure the Eagle can land and rearm and refuel. As long as the supplies hold out. Which in this kind of warfare, might not be very long.

That's what the AWACS are for. Send them where they are needed, and where they can win.

A lot of Soviet fighters will be kept inside the USSR for PVO use, and this includes protecting a lot of area not just against NATO in the west, but the south (Turkey/Greek bases), the Pacific area, and even watching the Chinese. This subtracts from the raw numbers, OTOH the USA does not need to keep as big a percentage of its force at home.

That's another thing. China will almost HAVE to at least fully mobilize and close up to the Soviet border in this scenario. They wouldn't (and couldn't) attack Siberia. The side that attacks in a Sino-Soviet conflict loses. But Bejing cannot risk the idea of the USSR crushing its Western opponents, only to have its hands free against China.

Like much of the other bits of a conventional WP/NATO war, it comes down to NATO having a positive kill ratio over the WP tanks, aircraft & so forth and the WP probably having more supply issues, but will the ratio be enough to overcome the numbers advantage the WP has.

It all comes down to the circumstances. How much surprise does the WP enjoy? Less surprise, less advantage. And again, pre-1980s I see the Soviets with all the advantages. Early 80s is iffy. Though not enough has been mentioned of the deleterious effects of Soviet black marketing. I'll try to go over that when I can get to my "Extended Buildup" post.
 
How much did the Soviets know about the F-117 in the 1980s, anyway? The Serbs also had the advantage of seeing the F-117 in action over Iraq, and so knew it would be used against them. If the first knowledge the Soviets have of the F-117 is it blowing up something out of nowhere, than that's a much bigger problem than if they can know it's coming.
 
How many Soviet AAM had a proper frontal aspect capability in the early as opposed to late 1980's . We know how effective the AIM-9L was from the Falklands . The AA-8 or R 60 was not as effective in frontal aspect . It was a better dogfight AAm in my very unprofessional opinion however the frontal aspect really makes a difference in the early 80's .

One more vote for NATO...

- AIM-9L vs. AA-8 and AA-11. In 1982 the AIM-9L was superior in the Falklands and Lebanon, but the Syrians to this day indicate AA-8 shot down about 4 F-16's, and the one time the Argis actually employed their Daggers properly (air to air with Shafir missiles), they came within an ace of shooting down a Harrier.

IMO, after 1986 AA-11 with helmet mounted sight wipes the floor with anything NATO has. AIM-9L/AIM-7 combo otherwise rules the roost, with the lack of overall numbers of MIG-29/SU-27 with AA-11 being decisive.

(BTW - MIG-25/R60 was the hottest number on the Iraqi side in 1991)
 

Archibald

Banned
In fact, in Vietnam Redeye was useless unless the enemy was moving right AT you. As to Blowpipe, also useless against anything the Argentine Air Force had in its inventory. (1)

1) EXCEPT: The homegrown Argentine counter-insurgency strike aircraft Pucara. It was initially feared that the Pucara could wreck bloody havoc among British troops off-loading from ships (2) or on the ground due to its tremendous firepower, or ordnance package. But events in the Falklands showed that the much maligned Blowpipe missile was death incarnate on the Pucara. AFAIK, no Pucara that ever tried to make a strike against a British Army unit lived to tell the tale. And the Argentines had sent a lot of Pucaras to the Falklands, and with high hopes for their success..

Early MANPADS infrared sensors were really, really bad, locking on the Sun or whatever was hot hence emmitting IRs (including Earth solid ground). I once red that in Yom Kippur war the Arab forces fired 4500 SAM-7s which destroyed less than a dozen Israeli aircrafts. Talk about a useless weapon.
 

Archibald

Banned
I've heard that the F-117 shot over Serbia was either a) a lucky shot or b) a very stupid, overconfident pilot and flight plan.

The Nighthawks would be very interesting as well, and there are 2 squadrons of them in 1981

I think they entered service in October 1983 at Nellis AFB.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
I've heard that the F-117 shot over Serbia was either a) a lucky shot or b) a very stupid, overconfident pilot and flight plan.



I think they entered service in October 1983 at Nellis AFB.
I thought that it was a well crafted plan based on experience of previous flights, technical innovation and intelligence support. No?
 

BlondieBC

Banned
And NATO's number 1 target. I'll put the over/under at 5 hours for their survival.

Agreed. Interestingly enough, Tom Clancy got the intended effect of the F-117 correct in the book. These planes were to cripple the Soviet air defense radar control, he just happened to guess incorrectly that they would shoot down AWAC type planes instead of devastate land based radars. And to hazard a guess, the planes not tasked in destroy radars on the first night were tasked with blowing up Mainstays hangers at airbases or C&C at airbases.
 
I voted that NATO "wins" the air war- for most of that decade it's pretty obvious to me. All of the fanboysm about various individual weapon systems is pretty pointless. Capabilities were close enough that doctrine and C3 is the deciding factor, and NATO wins quite handily on that score. About the only truly significant individual system is AWACS where, again, NATO wins handily.

However, I'm not sure how quickly they would win, and significant impact on the ground war is far from certain in a non-WMD scenario given the truly impressive WarPac AAA and SAM capability at the time.
 
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F-117 shoot down was a combination of NATO getting lazy and using the same flight plan too often. The SA-3 battery knew where to be and when to look. The shootdown was never repeated presumably because NATO ceased being lazy and the battery could not be cued based on a predictable pattern. In terms of the method, I've heard optical guidance which would make sense.

I voted that NATO "wins" the air war- for most of that decade it's pretty obvious to me. All of the fanboysm about various individual weapon systems is pretty pointless. Capabilities were close enough that doctrine and C3 is the deciding factor, and NATO wins quite handily on that score. About the only truly significant individual system is AWACS where, again, NATO wins handily.

On the contrary, the West's advantage in IR missile engagement envelope and quality probably explains moreso than any other single variable the lopsided scores in air fighting in the 1960's-1980's. Add in the fact they had better electronics, planes and pilot training and doctrine and the Isreali ratios are the result.

C3I certainly started to become more important as the 1980's progressed. The 1982 Lebanon fighting was probably the perfect storm of superior missiles, training, electronics, C3I and doctrine. AA-11 sharply reversed the trend of superior western IR missiles. In dogfights with that system NATO losses would have been heavy and the only safe tactic would be to stay BVR.

In the 1991 war the combination of AIM-7/F-15/AWACS was dominant, then became supreme with AMRAAM shortly after the war, but the force densities in Europe would have made those tactics more difficult, with more scraps getting into IR missile range.

AWACS is a great system but it's vulnerable to long range SAM systems and high speed interceptors like MIG-25/31. I'd be concerned about it staying too far back, be vulnerable to jamming, (inverse square law vs jamming) and spend too much time on self defense.

However, I'm not sure how quickly they would win, and significant impact on the ground war is far from certain in a non-WMD scenario given the truly impressive WarPac AAA and SAM capability at the time.

Dominate, not win outright. NATO wins the air war, but Soviet air forces could always choose not to engage by staying out of range and Soviet SAM systems could always shut off their radar to avoid attack. Like in Vietnam and Serbia, the key was constant SEAD where the SAM system's capacity to hit the target was degraded to where the level of attrition the SAM's could inflict through SEAD was acceptable. Wildcards were SA-10/11.
 
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F-117 shoot down was a combination of NATO getting lazy and using the same flight plan too often. The SA-3 battery knew where to be and when to look.

That certainly gave the Serbs the opportunity to use the method, but the reality is that had NATO been running a less risk-averse campaign there would have been more opportunities for the Serbs to make such shoot downs. That would be the case against the Soviets, where NATO would have to run a less risk averse campaign to get any results.

Like in Vietnam and Serbia, the key was constant SEAD where the SAM system's capacity to hit the target was degraded to where the level of attrition the SAM's could inflict through SEAD was acceptable.

Except in neither case were the SAM's level of attrition degraded to that degree. Attacks on the Vietnamese SAM sites tended to be so difficult and involve such losses that the Americans found it more prudent to avoid such missions when possible while the Serbs never lost a single battery. I remember chatting with a NATO intelligence officer who recounted to me guncam video from a British Tornado under Serbian SAM attack. The strike package disintegrated, and the Serbs concentrated on this one Tornado at the tail end of the flight and must have flung a dozen missiles at it. All through the fight the escorting American SEAD planes were in turn spamming HARMs back at the Serbs, trying to shut them down. Neither side scored any hits, but the still intact SAM battery once the SEAD aircraft had exhausted their missiles meant the strike package had to abort... so that would be a solid win for the Serbs.

Now Serbia was a case where both sides were operating with extreme casualty aversion. NATO for political reasons and the Serbs because they had limited resources. Neither apply in a NATO vs WP fight, so we in such a case we can expect the NATO strike package to press the attack regardless and try to suck up the losses while getting some hits in themselves.
 
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During Vietnam the North Vietnamese rather rapidly learned that putting a SAM or AAA battery on a section of dike or abutting it would make in immune to attack, the ROE did not allow any attacks that might potentially damage/breach the dikes. There were other restrictions that allowed for SAM and AAA sites to operate with impunity and likewise for stashing of missile reloads and magazines. In the case of a NATO/WP war I doubt any SAM batteries would be immune even if they were on top of a hospital, next to a cathedral on one side and a kindergarten on the other.

I expect NATO AWACS would have a continuous escort, and very likely some dedicated SAM batteries dedicated to keeping them safe. Any attacking aircraft will be detected well before they get in range, and if things look too dicey the AWACS can run away and get very low. Is it possible there could be an AWACS lost, yes, but NATO has enough so a single loss is not as devastating as for the WP.

Don't forget that non-US NATO countries have various airborne radar/control assets besides the NATO E-3s. Also, the USN can loan some E-2s to the battle, not all would deployed on carriers. Speaking of the USN, F-14s with phoenix missiles would be ideal for attacks on WP AWACS. With a 100nm range these could be used outside of expected attack range at least the first time. The F-14, as a naval aircraft, would not be expected by the Soviets to be in the air over land. It would not be until the F-14 turned on the distinctive radar that somebody would begin to regret they did not wear their brown trousers that day. Vectored by AWACS or ground radar, the F-14 would not turn on radar until just before firing...
 
I think it all depends on what the REAL Pk value (percentage kill) for the air-to-air missiles is. (Less so SAMs, but them too.) In Vietnam the AIM-7 Sparrow claimed 59 kills for 612 launches, or less than 10% Pk, only two of which were beyond visual range (BVR). (That is partly because Vietnam rules of engagement limited BVR launches.)

I would imagine that a good chunk, if not the majority, of fighter vs. fighter engagements will be within visual range, while BVR attacks would be reserved for bombers. So the way the AIM-9 Sidewinder stacks up against the AA-2 Atoll and AA-8 Aphid will be a significant factor. Given general American superiority in electronics I would imagine -- these are out-of-a-hat numbers -- Pk for the AIM-9 being twice that of the AA-8 and 4 times that of the AA-2. The other battle is the AIM-7 Sparrow versus a host of Soviet SARH missiles, and again, I think Western radars and missiles might well have proven to be superior, even if they still only had Pks of 20% or so for BVR attacks. The AIM-54, although I don't think its reliability was questioned in OTL, won't be as much as a factor because where there are AIM-54s, there are Standard SAMs, and one could cover for the other if need be.

I do see the validity of the argument than an F-15 can only shoot down so many MiGs. You'd have a lot of situations where an F-15 was engaged by, say, five MiG-21s, and the Eagle scores, say, 2 Sparrow kills and a Sidewinder kill before it has to face the reality of four Atolls getting near the tailpipe. But all four might go off the rail unguided. And then it's down to guns, and pilot skill. Also, all this said, as long as the F-104s are kept to a minimum then NATO has a fighting chance. Ehh, one of those is a gate guardian at a nearby museum, it's a pretty plane but it does have to be said that half its aesthetics are due to the cute little tiny wings.
 
During Vietnam the North Vietnamese rather rapidly learned that putting a SAM or AAA battery on a section of dike or abutting it would make in immune to attack, the ROE did not allow any attacks that might potentially damage/breach the dikes. There were other restrictions that allowed for SAM and AAA sites to operate with impunity and likewise for stashing of missile reloads and magazines. In the case of a NATO/WP war I doubt any SAM batteries would be immune even if they were on top of a hospital, next to a cathedral on one side and a kindergarten on the other...

Most ROE restrictions on attacking SAM sites in Vietnam was actually military, not political. Early in the war the USAF made several direct attacks on NVA SAM sites and suffered terrible losses. The very first attack on a NVA SAM site cost the USAF six aircraft and the site was only temporarily disabled. Suffice to say that this was a poor exchange. It was decided it would be best to avoid them where possible, until more specialized SEAD weapons and tactics could be developed. Even then well emplaced and cunningly used SAM systems were always a chore to deal with, to say the least, and SEAD missions rarely ever succeeded in destroying them completely.

I'm fairly certain it was both.

This. The Serbs had the luck of being presented with an opportunity and both the capabilities and skills to identify and exploit it. In a WW3 situation, the possibility of the Soviets getting presented with such an opportunity is there and they certainly have the capability to exploit it. The only question is if they'd have the skill...
 
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I've heard that the F-117 shot over Serbia was either a) a lucky shot or b) a very stupid, overconfident pilot and flight plan.



I think they entered service in October 1983 at Nellis AFB.

The combat squadrons were officially created that year but officially had A7 Corsairs. The two test squadrons were operational 2 years before.

In any event, every F117 available would be have been sent to combat in this situation.
 
Most ROE restrictions on attacking SAM sites in Vietnam was actually military, not political. Early in the war the USAF made several direct attacks on NVA SAM sites and suffered terrible losses. The very first attack on a NVA SAM site cost the USAF six aircraft and the site was only temporarily disabled. Suffice to say that this was a poor exchange. It was decided it would be best to avoid them where possible, until more specialized SEAD weapons and tactics could be developed. Even then well emplaced and cunningly used SAM systems were always a chore to deal with, to say the least, and SEAD missions rarely ever succeeded in destroying them completely.

Which is why the Wild Weasel squadrons were created

It isn't about destroying the system. It is about wrecking its ability to coordinate a defensive scheme and suppressing the defense sufficiently to keep losses at an acceptable level.
 
It is about wrecking its ability to coordinate a defensive scheme and suppressing the defense sufficiently to keep losses at an acceptable level.

That is what "destroying the SAM system" means. A SAM system isn't just the missile battery, it's the entire defensive scheme within which the SAM battery exists as the shooting arm of said scheme. In a WW3 scenario, what's liable to happen is that NATO is just going to accept a different level of what constitutes "acceptable losses" then it did even in Vietnam for both SEAD and strike missions.
 
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