Who would win in a 1980s air war: NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s air war?

  • NATO

    Votes: 222 92.1%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 19 7.9%

  • Total voters
    241

Archibald

Banned
I know about that, and you certainly have a point. There is also the fact that Soviet jets were downgraded for Arabs. Still I think that Mig-23 is severely (technically) outclassed, even by Phantoms. The Mig-25 may fare better thanks to its powerful radar and missile and speed. Kind of hit-and-run attacks. Fly high and fast, catch a target on radar, throw a big R-40 at it, then turn and run away at mach 2.8.
 
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Soviet_aircraft_losses_during_the_Soviet–Afghan_War

Maybe a better source on Soviet Air Force during the period 333 helicopters and 118 planes lost

Not sure how an article on losses is any good when it comes to discussing sortie rates. But 118 fixed wing aircraft over 10 years is 11-12 aircraft a year. By comparison, coalition forces lost 75 aircraft in the 2-3 months of operation against Iraq in 1990-91. Of course, there is the fact the dynamics here were different: Iraq was a more conventional, if horrendously incompetent, foe with both fixed and mobile SAMs as well as fighter aircraft, while all the Mujaddeen had were handheld SAMs.
 
NATO wins the air war hands down from 1978 on - once the Eagles and Falcons started showing up at the front. What you are referring to is the old Soviet joke about a pair of Soviet generals drinking coffee in a Paris cafe and one of them asks who won the war in the air.

Ahh Post 10 before that 'joke' got rolled out - its not fact - its a joke ;)



On the other hand PACT forces made very heavy use of SAM Batteries and SP AAA so superior NATO aircraft would have this to contend with - US Experience over Vietnam and shared Israeli experience in the early 70s might mitigate this somewhat.
 
I mean, I wouldn't be surprised if that number was the case by the late-80s. The Soviet decline during the course of the decade was quite harsh.

What about the availability figures, and the difference between soviet and Indian availability?

I'm moving so don't have my books anymore so can't check this old stuff.
 
I think the airfield thing is a bit overblown, today in England alone there are about 65 airfeilds with paved surfaces over 5400' long, about 30 are military and 35 civil. Looking at the smallest of these it has a contol tower, hangars, refuelling for turboprop aircraft and good road and rail access.

If similar situation is true throughout western Europe then NATO airforces have plenty of options to withdraw to as the tanks advance.

the RAF had well developed dispered operations plans both from the V-Force as primary Nuclear weapons force pre -polaris and the Harrier force's disperal plans ...

IIRC the Jaguar while requiring a runway was also reasonably competent as dispersed operations
 
What about the availability figures, and the difference between soviet and Indian availability?

Not sure. I imagine they also dropped during the course of the decade, as Soviet maintenance standards fell with their worsening economic situation.
 
I wouldn't put too much stock in either the Iran-Iraq War or Bekaa being demonstrative of a Soviet vs NATO fight, as both of which are examples of competent vs incompetents. Arab pilots are really bad...

Although, hrm, who was training these Arab pilots?
 
Not sure. I imagine they also dropped during the course of the decade, as Soviet maintenance standards fell with their worsening economic situation.

Apparently the engines wore out faster and needed changing more often than western engines, reducing availability but India was using British derived operating systems and got better results.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
When discussing an air war I think we should consider what is on the ground. The soviets but also NATO would have filled the skies with triple a and missiles. Both had a lot of fixed and especially mobile air defence systems. New and old, that ordnance is filling the sky and hitting anything it can.
 
The whole joke about a Soviet general in Soviet-occupied Paris asking another who won the air war was well known even during the Cold War for a reason.
I don't know why this joke exists considering that if Soviet troops came close to France's border they'd be warned to retreat or else dozens of Soviet cities would be turned to ash by French nukes.
 
If conventional war broke out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s, who would win the air war (assuming nuclear war doesn't break out of course)?

Which side had the more competent/superior air force?

I read all the posts before posting here. If I still had my old references, I could have given you a response point by point on how a NATO v. Warsaw Pact War could have gone. I have to go by old memories here. Also, since you haven't given specifics on the pre-existing circumstances for this WWIII scenario, I have to point out that there are many possible ATLs you can set up, including:

Do the Soviets use gas? All indications at the time showed that the Soviets, in an invasion of NATO war, would have used them with no thought of circumstances, as they saw them as legitimate weapons of war. If war breaks out between the superpowers then all the pre-existing treaties go out the window, at least for the Soviets at the start. I know, I know. Hitler didn't use them. But he had a personal fear of gas due to his gassing in WWI.

Though admittedly, the Soviets also believed in the Axe Theory, which meant including nukes at the outset as well, so I'll stick to the OP's definition of conventional war as meaning no weapons of mass destruction. (to be continued)
 
Strategic Surprise:

The ultimate NATO nightmare. Peacetime circumstances, but somewhere in the depths of the Kremlin, the military overwhelms the Party and KGB, forcing them to launch a conventional strategic strike against the NATO powers (most unlikely). All Soviet forces launch within 48 hours, and catch the NATO air forces on the ground, the border forces are left to their own devices, and naval forces are caught by sneak sub-launched strikes (where possible). Heavy damage is done to NATO's Reforger sites, and to West Germany's lines of communications. Supply being the key. Soviet forces will be strangling for supplies, especially fuel, within 7-8 days, so its a question of how far can they get with what they have against scattered resistance.

Now, the Warsaw Pact is mobilizing fully and undamaged, while NATO forces are reeling. IOTL, the Soviets, against NO resistance, overwhelmed Czechoslovakia in 1968 using a conventional military force in far better shape than in the 1980s. Yet still, within hours of the complete occupation of the country, every Soviet tank in the country was immobilized by empty fuel tanks. These are the things you risk using strategic surprise. To lull the enemy (or AN enemy), you have to give them reasons to be lulled. Which means, hold off any real signs of mobilization until it becomes absolutely necessary. Not unlike Arab strategy in 1967 compared to 1973.

IMO, this scenario is the least likely, but if it happens, will result in Soviet air superiority for the time of the campaign (one to two weeks), but also the one most likely to see the opening use of tactical nukes by NATO, leading to a full WWIII. If its still conventional no matter what, then IMO the Soviets close up to the Rhine, while lacking the logistical mojo to get any further. Even Denmark and the Low Countries, despite their vulnerability, are unlikely to be taken. Yugoslavia and Austria will have to be left alone, as their neutrality protects the Soviets' southern flank. This is also the scenario that gives the best chance for doing major damage to the heaviest NATO forces, the American, in the center, while the main northern thrust goes forward.

However, Soviet war plans in the 1980s were largely unchanged from the 1950s, when the north of West Germany was still largely flat wide open farmland, ideal for Soviet armored warfare. In the 1980s, this region had become much more developed, making the usual grand tank army sweeps planned by the Soviets more problematical. OTOH, this region was defended by the Dutch and Belgians, who would not be deployed in their wartime stations in this scenario.

Better for the Soviets, even US readiness was horrible at the start of the decade. Though I believe the figure was during the Carter Administration, one US airbase had 72 F-15s stationed there, with 70 of them down for spare parts.:eek:

So, conventional only, the more surprise the Soviets get, the earlier in the decade, the better they do. No WMDs, and they're likely to secure much of West Germany, but little beyond that. A longer war following this is anybody's guess. It depends much on a complete X factor: Political cohesiveness in what remains of Western Europe. (to be continued)

EDIT 1: I know this is supposed to be about air power only, but NATO v. Warsaw Pact isn't the Battle of Britain.

EDIT 2: With this scenario, the Soviets are forced to use their Warsaw Pact "allies" to the utmost. And with what we know now about their lack of reliability (considering that every nation in it, including the so-called Pro-Russian Bulgaria, is in NATO today), they represent a wild card whose effect could be incalculable. With larger levels of mobilizations, they'd be cadre'd within larger Soviet formations. Not so here. And that includes air forces.

EDIT 3: Any NATO v. Warsaw Pact scenario post-1984 is ASB. Or at least Unspeakable Seamammal in terms of Soviet victory. In the air, it would be a near Marianas Turkey Shoot. Good Soviet pilots notwithstanding. Just consider NATO anti-air control capabilities against the obsessively centralized Soviet air control system.
 
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Ak-84

Banned
Would the 2 air forces cancel each other out? Raw numbers are only the roughest guide; numbers of sorties is the 'product' of airpower and Western airforces have consistently shown availability of ~90% in wartime conditions whereas Soviet/Russian availability was around ~50-60% and India was able to achieve ~70% with Soviet/Russian aircraft.
Indian problems with Su-30 MKI availability is well known. Its 50%, in a good month.
Quality is another key factor in air power and the Soviet fighter pilots in the 80s tended to fly only about 70 hours per year compared to 180 hours of a 'C' rated NATO air force for 250 hours for the better ones such as the RAF and ADLA.

I can't help but think that after a while these factors would come to bear and the NATO airforces would be able to bring their power to bear on the land battle with considerable influence.
These statistics have been bandied about. They miss one crucial point. That 50-70 hours is the minimum required, i.e the minimum required for a pilot who is trained but is not currently in a flying billet (IIRC it was 70 hours total flight time and 30 hours in type, as opposed to the RAF which was 30 hour in type; period). No of hours USAF pilots in non flying postings were permitted to do, zero.

250 hours a year sounds impressive, but its about 5 hours a week, or 2-3 sorties a week. Which as anyone who has served on an operational tour knows, is actually, not that much.
 
Strategic Surprise:

The ultimate NATO nightmare. Peacetime circumstances, but somewhere in the depths of the Kremlin, the military overwhelms the Party and KGB, forcing them to launch a conventional strategic strike against the NATO powers (most unlikely). All Soviet forces launch within 48 hours, and catch the NATO air forces on the ground, the border forces are left to their own devices, and naval forces are caught by sneak sub-launched strikes (where possible). Heavy damage is done to NATO's Reforger sites, and to West Germany's lines of communications. Supply being the key. Soviet forces will be strangling for supplies, especially fuel, within 7-8 days, so its a question of how far can they get with what they have against scattered resistance.

Now, the Warsaw Pact is mobilizing fully and undamaged, while NATO forces are reeling. IOTL, the Soviets, against NO resistance, overwhelmed Czechoslovakia in 1968 using a conventional military force in far better shape than in the 1980s. Yet still, within hours of the complete occupation of the country, every Soviet tank in the country was immobilized by empty fuel tanks. These are the things you risk using strategic surprise. To lull the enemy (or AN enemy), you have to give them reasons to be lulled. Which means, hold off any real signs of mobilization until it becomes absolutely necessary. Not unlike Arab strategy in 1967 compared to 1973.

IMO, this scenario is the least likely, but if it happens, will result in Soviet air superiority for the time of the campaign (one to two weeks), but also the one most likely to see the opening use of tactical nukes by NATO, leading to a full WWIII. If its still conventional no matter what, then IMO the Soviets close up to the Rhine, while lacking the logistical mojo to get any further. Even Denmark and the Low Countries, despite their vulnerability, are unlikely to be taken. Yugoslavia and Austria will have to be left alone, as their neutrality protects the Soviets' southern flank. This is also the scenario that gives the best chance for doing major damage to the heaviest NATO forces, the American, in the center, while the main northern thrust goes forward.

However, Soviet war plans in the 1980s were largely unchanged from the 1950s, when the north of West Germany was still largely flat wide open farmland, ideal for Soviet armored warfare. In the 1980s, this region had become much more developed, making the usual grand tank army sweeps planned by the Soviets more problematical. OTOH, this region was defended by the Dutch and Belgians, who would not be deployed in their wartime stations in this scenario.

Better for the Soviets, even US readiness was horrible at the start of the decade. Though I believe the figure was during the Carter Administration, one US airbase had 72 F-15s stationed there, with 70 of them down for spare parts.:eek:

So, conventional only, the more surprise the Soviets get, the earlier in the decade, the better they do. No WMDs, and they're likely to secure much of West Germany, but little beyond that. A longer war following this is anybody's guess. It depends much on a complete X factor: Political cohesiveness in what remains of Western Europe. (to be continued)

I know this is supposed to be about air power only, but NATO v. Warsaw Pact isn't the Battle of Britain.

I appreciate that it ruins the story but about 2/3rds of the war through your first paragraph tactical nukes are launched ending that story pretty sharpish

Also NORTHAG was a British Command so BAOR was slap bang in the path of any Pact thrust with CENTAG responsible for the Fulda and HOF gaps

By World War II standards these two formations were only armies, as they contained four corps each. NORTHAG consisted, from north to south, of I Netherlands Corps (I (NE) Corps), I German Corps (I (GE) Corps), I (BR) Corps, and I Belgian Corps (I (BE) Corps). Its commander was the British commander of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). CENTAG consisted, from north to south, of III GE Corps, V US Corps, VII US Corps, and II (GE) Corps in the extreme south of the Federal Republic of Germany. The commander of the U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army commanded CENTAG.

(Taken from this source - http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/nato-ag.htm)

Also a plane down during peacetime flying is not necessarily down during wartime flying
 
A few points...

For Soviets:

- I have my doubts against large scale use of BVR missiles by NATO planes due to fear of blue-on-blue incidents and chaotic air combat situation over Germany. Over North or Norwegian sea? Definitely. Most air-to-air combat would have been more likely been fought within visual range where Soviet missiles were equal or better than US ones. MiG-29 in particular would have been a potent threat against NATO planes in VWR combat
- Soviet SAM's could cover a lot of Western German territory as well, as BDR was a rather narrow country. S-200, for example, had a range of some 300km's making it a potential threat against AEW and refuelling assets, thus negating some of their effects.
- Soviet GBAD was nothing to be laughed at, especially as NATO's planes were expected to go against it. AH-64's, A-10, Alpha Jets et al would have been most likely a toast for Soviet air defenses if 1991 and 2003 against much lesser a threat are to be used as example

For NATO:

- NATO had a significant AD assets, such as three tiers of SAM's (Nike, Hawk, Redeye) ands AAA, not an inconsequential asset
 
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