Who would win in a 1980s air war: NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

Who would win in a 1980s air war?

  • NATO

    Votes: 222 92.1%
  • Warsaw Pact

    Votes: 19 7.9%

  • Total voters
    241
And neither of those were available in the 1980s.

Kontakt-5 didn't become widespread until the mid 90s when the Russians saw how easily American, French and British APFSDS rounds defeated the armor on T-72 tanks.

And early generation ATGMs fired from tank barrels had attrocious hit rates. With it's biggest problem being the time it takes to go from the barrel to the target. Over 17 seconds for maximum range. In that amount of time, a good, well trained tank crew can fire 2 APFSDS rounds and will be firing their third in less than a second. Your tank that fired that ATGM died about 15 seconds ago and the one next to you died 9 seconds ago and the one next to it is about to die. Meanwhile your ATGM lost guidance and slammed into the ground without hitting anything.

Using a tank to launch ATGMs is really only useful in an ambush. Once you're in combat, your best option is conventional main gun rounds. And for the Soviets, who are expecting to be on the attack during the war, I seriously doubt you'll see tanks launching ATGMs.

If you read the wiki, then you'll see that both of these were available in the 80's. The late 80's, but still.
 
You are seriously underestimating NATO here. Do you honestly think the ground commanders won't be SCREAMING to the Air Force that their interdiction efforts weren't worth jack shit and the Soviets are still pouring in men and supplies? That right there will trigger them to look again. And they'll know to disregard the previously hit target because that obviously wasn't the real one. And here's your other problem with camoflauge. People tend to fall into habits. They stick with what works. Pretty soon, analysts will know exactly what to look for. That last point, btw, applies equally to both sides.

I don't think I'm underestimating them at all. In fact, I'm very much basing that on actual NATO air forces (and their corresponding intelligence functions) performance vs actual properly applied Soviet deception techniques. The outcome doesn't look very good for NATO.

Again, you're overlooking a few factors. Once the Soviets start committing their Category B and C reserve formations, there is a drastic drop off in the quality of equipment compared to they're first line stuff.

Cat-Cs certainly, but if it gets to the point where their being put into frontline combat instead of mop-up then the Soviets have probably already lost. Cat-Bs are more mixed, with some just as good as the Cat-As and others only somewhat worse. But by the time even the Cat-Bs start showing up, NATOs forces are also liable to be pretty shredded, with much of their first line stuff gone as well. And NATO doesn't have as much of their second-line stuff. And if it gets to the point where both sides are being forced to roll out third-line stuff, then the Sovs have won because their the only ones who still even have their third-line (and fourth line) stuff in meaningful numbers.

The more first line equipment is irrecoverable, the quicker they need to go to their reserves. You're also ignoring another factor. Fire control means more than just keeping the gun locked on target. It means actually being able to see your target. And in that regard, NATO equipment is generations more advanced. Particularly with thermal sights. NATO thermal sights had nearly double the effective range of WP sights. NATO will be able to engage well beyond the effective range of WP tanks.

Not given the terrain. The North German Plains is a series of gentle slopes broken up by tree lines. The Fulda Gap is mostly a series of forested valleys. In both cases, the ground and foilage is gonna ruin line of sight, including that of thermal and IR sights, which will be compounded by camouflage efforts. Given that, both sides will probably see and shoot at each other the majority of the time at roughly the same ranges they did in WW2 under similar circumstances: 5-800 meters on the North German Plains, as little as 200 in the Fulda Gap. Both will be well inside the effective ranges of their rank and anti-tank ranges.

This just seems really condescending if not borderline racist.

It's a statement based on the historical performance of Arab State fighter pilots in particular and their militaries in general, which has been uniformly degrees of poor. Some are worse then others, but all have been pretty bad. By all accounts, the Jordanians and Egyptians have been the best, the Saudis and Iraqis the worst.

It's more-so the fact that the Iranian Air Force was pretty much the most well trained branch of any in the Iranian military, considering it was the 'golden child' of the Shah, not to mention the kind of equipment that was had.

The equipment had little to do with it. The Revolution had cut off supplies so the Iranians were only able to keep a fraction of their equipment going via improvisation and what minute quantities came from black market arms deals. Given this poor maintenance quality, Iranian equipment was actually likely qualitatively inferior to the Iraqis whose logistics and maintenance was being freely provided by both Superpowers. That the Iraqis managed such a poor sortie rate and a poor showing in air-air combat says a lot about both their skills as a organization and as pilots (although the latter is inextricably linked to the former). Many of the pilots had also been jailed or dismissed due to their connections with the Shahs regime, although admittedly many were called back into active service.
 
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SsgtC

Banned
If you read the wiki, then you'll see that both of these were available in the 80's. The late 80's, but still.

The two ATGMs you mentioned weren't introduced until the 90s. They had other, older missiles. Just not the ones you mentioned.

Kontakt-5, yeah, they had it in the late 80s. But it didn't see widespread use until after the Gulf War when NATO rounds were going through WP armor like a hot knife through butter.
 
Well a lot of Arab states are heavily incompetent due to various reasons.

But somethings that cause that...

Lack of initiative and discouraging that.
A lot of yes men.

Purposely withholding training and information in order to be sought by your subordinates. (The US had this issue when training ME allies). Officers will withhold this, which leads to pretty damn terrible armed forces.

Examples such as Iraqi artillery firing on a position the US gave up hours ago, and various other things. The discouragement of competence is due to the yes man and possible threats.

Along with current problems existing such as Iraqi forces bailing out of tanks when only facing AK-47s and weapons that won't do much.

It honestly really depends. But from what I remember Iran was pretty damn competent during the war even when it was facing issues such as lack of foreign weapon sales and the element of suprise. And IIRC lacking a lot of motorized forces.
 
It honestly really depends. But from what I remember Iran was pretty damn competent during the war even when it was facing issues such as lack of foreign weapon sales and the element of suprise. And IIRC lacking a lot of motorized forces.

The Iranians were okay, although they had a lot more hiccups in the 80s then they do today because they were fighting with a military that had just undergone revolutionary purges and were having establish new supply chains from scratch. The main thing was they were going up against total scrubs so being merely "okay" was more then adequate to force a stalemate despite drastic numerical and material inferiority.
 
Again, doubtful. F-14s would be needed with their carrier groups to defend against Soviet long-range air and missile attack and provide air supremacy at sea for NATO fleets. Only if they were evacuated off say a sunk carrier then could their use to supplement land theaters become feasible. And then, given their specialised role of long-range fleet air intercept and defense, they would be hampered muuch like the MiG-25 - long range only, and much weaker in dogfighting. albeit probably still a reasonable combatant.

F-15s weren't designed to handle the AIM-54. In fact I believe only the Tomcat can mate with the Phoenix. (which is somewhat ironic given that the Eagle could probably looking at the stats in Wikipedia handle a full Phoenix load better than the F-14 did...)

In any event, the Phoenix's effectiveness in combat is disputed. I doubt they would bother using it; take too long to re-train pilots for shorter range combat , and the Navy would probably want theirs back at some point, along with their hardware. Even if F-14s were on the front lines, they'd use AIM-7s and AIM-9s. Western sources have not attributed any kills or impacts to the few times it was recorded as being used. (However, Iran is rumoured to have destroyed some fifty aircraft with it before their stockpiles were depleted.

Others have commented re the possible use of F14's over the central front and the use of the F14's by the Iranians.

Re AIM54 being used by the F15 I read in the 1980's that the USAF had studied this but decided not to proceed. Presumably if the USAF wanted to it could have been done. That being said the process may well have taken to long to be useable during WW3.
 
I don't think I'm underestimating them at all. In fact, I'm very much basing that on actual NATO air forces (and their corresponding intelligence functions) performance vs actual properly applied Soviet deception techniques. The outcome doesn't look very good for NATO.



Cat-Cs certainly, but if it gets to the point where their being put into frontline combat instead of mop-up then the Soviets have probably already lost. Cat-Bs are more mixed, with some just as good as the Cat-As and others only somewhat worse. But by the time even the Cat-Bs start showing up, NATOs forces are also liable to be pretty shredded, with much of their first line stuff gone as well. And NATO doesn't have as much of their second-line stuff. And if it gets to the point where both sides are being forced to roll out third-line stuff, then the Sovs have won because their the only ones who still even have their third-line (and fourth line) stuff in meaningful numbers.



Not given the terrain. The North German Plains is a series of gentle slopes broken up by tree lines. The Fulda Gap is mostly a series of forested valleys. In both cases, the ground and foilage is gonna ruin line of sight, including that of thermal and IR sights, which will be compounded by camouflage efforts. Given that, both sides will probably see and shoot at each other the majority of the time at roughly the same ranges they did in WW2 under similar circumstances: 5-800 meters on the North German Plains, as little as 200 in the Fulda Gap. Both will be well inside the effective ranges of their rank and anti-tank ranges.



It's a statement based on the historical performance of Arab State fighter pilots in particular and their militaries in general, which has been uniformly degrees of poor. Some are worse then others, but all have been pretty bad. By all accounts, the Jordanians and Egyptians have been the best, the Saudis and Iraqis the worst.



The equipment had little to do with it. The Revolution had cut off supplies so the Iranians were only able to keep a fraction of their equipment going via improvisation and what minute quantities came from black market arms deals. Given this poor maintenance quality, Iranian equipment was actually likely qualitatively inferior to the Iraqis whose logistics and maintenance was being freely provided by both Superpowers. That the Iraqis managed such a poor sortie rate and a poor showing in air-air combat says a lot about both their skills as a organization and as pilots (although the latter is inextricably linked to the former). Many of the pilots had also been jailed or dismissed due to their connections with the Shahs regime, although admittedly many were called back into active service.
I'm also doubtful that the Soviet / Warsaw Pact deception measures would have been particularly successful in concealing supply columns and reinforcements in a WW3 setting where they were trying to sustain an advance against NATO. If they were intitally successful I expect NATO would figure this out quite quickly and use special forces or other similar assets to find targets and assess the results of their air strikes.

The introduction of PGM's would also allow multiple key aim points to be hit without much trouble. (Ie. The soviets have one real and five decoy bridges over a key water obstacle. Prior to PGMs taking out six bridges via air strikes would have been a major issue (perhaps one or more squadron per bridge would have been needed ?). With PGM's simply hitting all six is practical for a squadron of aircraft.
 
Great answer. Most of it is pretty much what I figured, but I never properly researched this subject. You have a half-ton missile doing mach 5, it's not going to turn very quickly. If I have one coming at me head-on, I would much rather be driving an SU-30 than a Badger or Backfire.

There`s a couple of problems for the defending pilot. First, the speed of the missile and the fact the motor has burned out long before entering visual range also prevents the pilot from having much of a chance of seeing it. With the last 10 miles taking only about 12 seconds or so, that means any evasive stuff is done blind. Not like with an SA-2 where the thing is smoking like mad on ascent and the pilot has quite some time to see it and plan how to avoid it.

The AIM-54 was active radar homing. That means that the cue you might be under attack is the F-14 has locked onto you. But did it fire - this is unknown until the Phoenix missile itself goes active and locks onto you. Until then, the F-14 just might be goofing with you.

Next, the F-14 carried about 4 of these as a standard load out. If firing at a missile stream or a bomber, then 1 AIM-54 might be the appropriate number. But, against a fighter target, it might be more appropriate to fire 2 or 3, the idea being that if the fighter burns a lot of energy avoiding the first missile then it`s not as able to avoid the second.
 
The introduction of PGM's would also allow multiple key aim points to be hit without much trouble. (Ie. The soviets have one real and five decoy bridges over a key water obstacle. Prior to PGMs taking out six bridges via air strikes would have been a major issue (perhaps one or more squadron per bridge would have been needed ?). With PGM's simply hitting all six is practical for a squadron of aircraft.

You're not thinking like a Soviet military theorist. If the Soviets do have a single bridge they need to defend, what they do isn't simply put out five decoys and watch NATO bomb all six. What they do is more multi-step: first they camouflage the bridge and build a decoy right next to it. That way, the bomber sent after the bridge see's the more visible decoy and hits that. Then the Soviets dismantle the wreckage of the decoy, remove the current camouflage, and replaces it with new camo that makes the bridge look like this:
h3dsfue.jpg

That way, when NATO does follow up reconnaissance, they see a bridge they believe they have already hit without a span and go "alright! We took out it's span! No way Ivan drives his tanks across that! Scratch it off the target list."

If they have to, the Soviets can then further play to the deception by occasionally throwing fake pontoon bridges over the river nearby and letting NATO bomb that. Throw in some fake air defenses to make it look more convincing or, alternatively, some real air defenses so as to possibly bag one or more NATO strike fighters. Such moves also further complicates proposed post-target reassessment: "How are Soviet reinforcements and supplies still getting through with that bridge down?!" "We took a look and it turns out they built a pontoon bridge nearby. Don't worry though, we bombed it so things should be good now. They'll probably throw up more pontoon bridges but we'll bomb those too if we have to!"

Now I've mainly used bridges as a detailed example, but the reality is a lot of the essential principles here still works for other things: when leaguring a mechanized column, for example, you camouflage the column and lay out an equal number of more visible decoys nearby so when NATO comes snooping for the mechanized column they were told were by their intel was in the area they see the decoys and bomb them then go back home and report mission success. Moving to an example that involves the use of other then decoys or camouflage completely, one can lay down smoke over roads when your moving convoys across them so they can't be seen and when your not moving convoys across them so NATO can't be sure (and before you reply, yes this does work against more modern imaging technology: the Soviets developed smoke that carries particulate matter with it so as to blind IR and thermal). These aren't even the tip of the iceberg in examples, but the point here is that you don't simply decoy and hope for the best. You also don't simply camouflage and hope for the best. Camouflage, decoys, smoke, and everything else are merely the tools used to achieve the intent to deceive. What you do is anticipate enemy actions and intentions so as to apply the tools in such a manner so that the enemy see's what he expects to see and subsequently do what you want him to do. It's that kind of sleight of hand that separates workaday deception efforts from real artistry.
 
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You're not thinking like a Soviet military theorist. If the Soviets do have a single bridge they need to defend, what they do isn't simply put out five decoys and watch NATO bomb all six. What they do is more multi-step: first they camouflage the bridge and build a decoy right next to it. That way, the bomber sent after the bridge see's the more visible decoy and hits that. Then the Soviets dismantle the wreckage of the decoy, remove the current camouflage, and replaces it with new camo that makes the bridge look like this:
h3dsfue.jpg

That way, when NATO does follow up reconnaissance, they see a bridge they believe they have already hit without a span and go "alright! We took out it's span! No way Ivan drives his tanks across that! Scratch it off the target list."

If they have to, the Soviets can then further play to the deception by occasionally throwing fake pontoon bridges over the river nearby and letting NATO bomb that. Throw in some fake air defenses to make it look more convincing or, alternatively, some real air defenses so as to possibly bag one or more NATO strike fighters. Such moves also further complicates proposed post-target reassessment: "How are Soviet reinforcements and supplies still getting through with that bridge down?!" "We took a look and it turns out they built a pontoon bridge nearby. Don't worry though, we bombed it so things should be good now. They'll probably throw up more pontoon bridges but we'll bomb those too if we have to!"

Now I've mainly used bridges as a detailed example, but the reality is a lot of the essential principles here still works for other things: when leaguring a mechanized column, for example, you camouflage the column and lay out an equal number of more visible decoys nearby so when NATO comes snooping for the mechanized column they were told were by their intel was in the area they see the decoys and bomb them then go back home and report mission success. Moving to an example that involves the use of other then decoys or camouflage completely, one can lay down smoke over roads when your moving convoys across them so they can't be seen and when your not moving convoys across them so NATO can't be sure (and before you reply, yes this does work against more modern imaging technology: the Soviets developed smoke that carries particulate matter with it so as to blind IR and thermal). These aren't even the tip of the iceberg in examples, but the point here is that you don't simply decoy and hope for the best. You also don't simply camouflage and hope for the best. Camouflage, decoys, smoke, and everything else are merely the tools used to achieve the intent to deceive. What you do is anticipate enemy actions and intentions so as to apply the tools in such a manner so that the enemy see's what he expects to see and subsequently do what you want him to do. It's that kind of sleight of hand that separates workaday deception efforts from real artistry.
I don't doubt these measures would have considerable effect.

The thing is that vehicles need to move forwards to sustain an offensive and I seem to recall NATO had sensors designed to detect movement along with the ability to fuse the data from those sensors with other data. Deception measures for stationary targets such as bridges are some what less useful when NATO can see evidence of moving vehicles crosssing seemingly non existent bridges :)

Add in the strong likely hood of special forces units being tasked to confirm the sensor data, combined with the force multiplier effect of PGM's, combined with IMHO a willingness on the part of NATO to sustain considerable losses to interdict Soviet supplies and reinforcements and I believe NATO's efforts would have had some success. If they would have been successful enough to win the war is an open question in my view.

Even if the Soviets had enough vehicles and fuel to run dummy convoys I'm doubtful there were enough suitable roads (and rail lines ?) to make this feasible. Conceivably I suppose the Soviets might have been able to defeat the NATO sensors thru electronic means but I'm doubtful they could figure out how to do this quickly enough to make a difference.
 
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The thing is that vehicles need to move forwards to sustain an offensive and I seem to recall NATO had sensors designed to detect movement along with the ability to fuse the data from those sensors with other data. Deception measures for stationary targets such as bridges are some what less useful when NATO can see evidence of moving vehicles crosssing seemingly non existent bridges :)

JSTARS isn't detailed enough to pick out vehicles in such individualized locations like that, so in all likelihood it gets attributed to the pontoon bridge. It can also be subject to jamming and, initially since the Soviets have the aircraft numbers to do it, direct attempts at attack. The latter can be minimized by keeping the aircraft way back, but in that case it would only be able to peer into the direct frontlines and not the rear areas.

Even if the Soviets had enough vehicles and fuel to run dummy convoys I'm doubtful there were enough roads (and rail lines ?) to make this feasible.

I never said anything about dummy convoys, merely using certain techniques that could be used to hide convoys when there aren't any convoys just to keep NATO confused and make them waste resources. Decoy vehicles could be used, but they would be set-up as stationary in locations and at times when it would make sense for them to be stationary.

Conceivably I suppose the Soviets might have been able to defeat the NATO sensors thru electronic means but I'm doubtful they could figure out how to do this quickly enough to make a difference.

Uh... sensors fundamentally work on scientific principles that are universally known, so the Soviets very much had the relevant countermeasures already all figured out. Hell, by the mid-80s the Soviets even had a few GPS jammers in anticipation of GPS guided bombs despite the fact those were still around a decade off. The Soviets were quite aware of the prospects of PGMs and what they entailed and very much made the requisite alterations in their handbook. In fact, looking back, they overreacted. In the mid-80's NATO PGMs weren't nearly as good or as widespread as the Soviets feared they were and most of what they were responding to was NATO's "wish list" for what it would need to wage the Air-Land Battle concept as opposed to what NATO actually had at the time.

In fact, on that subject, the Soviets do also have options to directly defend targets from PGMs that don't involve shooting down the attacking aircraft given that the only PGMs available in the 1980s to NATO demanded LOS for accuracy. The aforementioned smoke scatters lasers and directly blinds TV-guided weapons, for instance.
 
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In an air war over Europe, using a small number of F-14s to hit fighters with AIM-54s is a waste of an asset. The aircraft/missile system was designed to take out larger aircraft at a distance. Therefore, using the F-14 against Soviet AWACS aircraft or tankers or transports is the most appropriate use of this. It could also be part of a system to defend against long range MiG-23 attacks on NATO AWACS as the AIM-54 outranges the Soviet missiles, and as noted the MiG-23 is not good at dodging. As far as F-14 against Soviet fighters, between sparrow and sidewinder missiles, aircraft capabilities, and the advantage of the radar system and the 2 man crew if it gets in a situation of fighter vs fighter it has a decent shot. Except by the F-14 pilots being stupid or the Soviets getting very lucky, a close in dogfight between an F-14 and Soviet fighters is unlikely.
 
JSTARS isn't detailed enough to pick out vehicles in such individualized locations like that, so in all likelihood it gets attributed to the pontoon bridge. It can also be subject to jamming and, initially since the Soviets have the aircraft numbers to do it, direct attempts at attack. The latter can be minimized by keeping the aircraft way back, but in that case it would only be able to peer into the direct frontlines and not the rear areas.



I never said anything about dummy convoys, merely using certain techniques that could be used to hide convoys when there aren't any convoys just to keep NATO confused and make them waste resources. Decoy vehicles could be used, but they would be set-up as stationary in locations and at times when it would make sense for them to be stationary.



Uh... sensors fundamentally work on scientific principles that are universally known, so the Soviets very much had the relevant countermeasures already all figured out. Hell, by the mid-80s the Soviets even had a few GPS jammers in anticipation of GPS guided bombs despite the fact those were still around a decade off. The Soviets were quite aware of the prospects of PGMs and what they entailed and very much made the requisite alterations in their handbook. In fact, looking back, they overreacted. In the mid-80's NATO PGMs weren't nearly as good or as widespread as the Soviets feared they were and most of what they were responding to was NATO's "wish list" for what it would need to wage the Air-Land Battle concept as opposed to what NATO actually had at the time.

In fact, on that subject, the Soviets do also have options to directly defend targets from PGMs that don't involve shooting down the attacking aircraft given that the only PGMs available in the 1980s to NATO demanded LOS for accuracy. The aforementioned smoke scatters lasers and directly blinds TV-guided weapons, for instance.
With some exceptions (perhaps Gps being one of them, but I don't believe Gps was widely used in the 1980's) I'll bet on NATO winning the initial stages of an ECM / ECCM battle invoking modern electronics with the Soviets in a ww3 Scenario. The existence of "war reserve" modes for US electronic systems is well established in my view (although I don't have any specific insights re JSTARS.)

Re the dummy convoys, in my view that would be hard for NATO to counter but I'm doubtful the Soviets could pull that off to the extent needed to sufficently confuse NATO while sustaining an offensive. I didn't mean to imply you had suggested that tactic. Sorry.

I think at this point I will agree to disagree with you re this topic.

I will say that if NATO was attacking and the Soviets were defending that I suspect the Soviet deception measures would have been much more effective.

All the best

Edit to add...

Re ECM / ECCM I recall there were considerable concerns that the legacy NATO non frequency hopping field radios were vulnerable to Soviet ECM. IMHO that probably would have been one of the more troublesome ECM issues for NATO in a 1980's WW3. I believe the air forces had some ability to deal with this (HAVE Quick UHF ?) but I suspect the ground forces with VRC 12's, GRC106's etc would have had issues.
 
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Re ECM / ECCM I recall there were considerable concerns that the legacy NATO non frequency hopping field radios were vulnerable to Soviet ECM. IMHO that probably would have been one of the more troublesome ECM issues for NATO in a 1980's WW3. I believe the air forces had some ability to deal with this (HAVE Quick UHF ?) but I suspect the ground forces with VRC 12's, GRC106's etc would have had issues.
The battle for control of the electronic spectrum is one of the most overlooked parts of modern warfare. Vast amounts of information about capabilities on both sides is still classified at various levels*. Essentially both sides would have had difficulties with communications**, which would have had a knock-on impact on Command & Control (C²) capabilities. Since the NATO C² system was generally more willing to delegate decision making to lower levels, this would probably have benefited NATO a bit more than the WP. There would have been a bit of a loss of coordination between units (at all levels) but if one side is permitted to act without direct orders from above it will generally be a little faster to act/react than an opponent who isn't.

*Just take my word for it - I'm not going into any more details, sorry :noexpression:
**Air forces tend to be more negatively affected by this as land forces can always fall back on wired comms if it's absolutely necessary - bit tricky to run old-fashioned phone cable to an aircraft in flight :p.
 
Yeah really. Fire control for the Soviets was inferior, but not to an extent that really matters at the ranges that will be taking place. So long as their training holds up (always the big unknown here), their still solidly in "if you can see it, you can hit. If you can hit it, you can pen it" territory given the terrain these fights will be occurring. That a T-72 or T-80 loss has a higher chance of being irrecoverable to a pen is true, but then a number of NATO recoverable losses are likely to become irrecoverable because they have to be abandoned in their position if it's overrun which helps even things out.

I know this thread is about the air war, but I thought I would just a couple of comments for a guy who was stationed in Germany from 79-84, and had a chance later in my career to actually test the M72.
On of the most difficult things to conduct in warfare is conducting a withdrawal in contact. NATO practiced this over and over and over, and we excelled.
Because we worked in "teams"; team one had to have time to fire, withdraw to the next bound, and take up defensive positions so team two could fire and withdraw. Our preferred initial engagement range was normally around 2000 meters, sometimes a bit less, because "ground dictates".
The reason I mention this is that the NATO tanks would be primarily firing from static positions, while WP tanks would primarily be firing on the move. And the T72's FCS during the early 80's just sucked on the move. Hitting a tank turret size target, even at 500 meters, would be almost impossible while moving cross county.

Another small point....NATO owned the night. No IR sights for us by then, although the WP still made extensive use of IR.

Another thing, I have been in WP vehicles, dressed in my NBC gear. Good luck fighting in that, seriously. The vehicles are very uncomfortable and tiring to operate. Dress yourself up in NBC gear, and you're next to useless.

Last point, NATO intelligence was awesome, and doesn't get anywhere near the credit they deserve. When the SU invaded Afghanistan, there was obviously a build up and movement of forces. NATO knew all about it, and we were on high alert for a few days.
 
<snip>Ever since the one cave man saw a knife in his enemy's hand and picked up a rock to throw outside stabbing range, there is a fundamental principle to warfare; to find a way to hit the other guy when he cannot hit back. Successful C3I, at the basic level, is just a fancy rock. It's purpose is to create a zone of immunity where the enemy can be destroyed but cannot hit back. The safest way is if the enemy doesn't even know you're there.<snip>

Ardipithecus and Australopithecus would both like a word with you.:mad: They are both considered at the branching out point from "human-like apes" & "ape-like humans" respectively (far too primitive to be considered "cave men" as we understand them). The former having developed for the first time the use of whole rocks as throwing weapons, but not in any way as worked tools. Australopithecus were the first to discover the simplest forms of tool-making and weapons. In a meeting between the two over territory, the "Ardips" would have as their only option whole rocks, which offer a superior rate of fire (provided there were rocks sitting around). The "Australos" had the choice of whole rocks or finished rock tools (knives or chipped stones), superior weapons for getting in close. If there are no rocks handy, the "Ardips" were meat against the "Australos'" tooled weaponry.

So it all comes down to supplies. If the "Ardips" have rocks, with equal numbers, they at least have a fighting chance to withdraw. If not...:eek:

The key to successful warfare is sticking to the rock solid basics.:evilsmile:
 
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