Who would do best if given independent command in the CSA, Jackson or Longstreet?

Who?

  • Jackson

    Votes: 15 31.9%
  • Longstreet

    Votes: 32 68.1%

  • Total voters
    47
I've listening to Gary W. Gallagher's lecture "Robert E. Lee and his high command" and his comments on Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet and the got me rethinking some ideas for a TL I have. He gives a few points on their successes and shortcomings and his opinions on how well they would have performed if having been made full generals.

Since I've been thinking about alternate careers for both these men, including the idea of putting one in charge of the Army of Tenn., I'd like to hear what others have to say on how well they think either man could preform if given such a responsibility and why.
 
I've listening to Gary W. Gallagher's lecture "Robert E. Lee and his high command" and his comments on Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet and the got me rethinking some ideas for a TL I have. He gives a few points on their successes and shortcomings and his opinions on how well they would have performed if having been made full generals.

Since I've been thinking about alternate careers for both these men, including the idea of putting one in charge of the Army of Tenn., I'd like to hear what others have to say on how well they think either man could preform if given such a responsibility and why.

Jackson had a pretty good record in the Shenandoah, but at the expense of an exhausted army and with the considerable benefit of consistently having poor opposition - the Federals may have outnumbered him overall, but they never acted in any coordinated fashion, leaving him facing odds that were at times favorable to him. He was also unable to effectively make Turner Ashby into a useful and effective cavalry commander (instead of an overpromoted natural captain level officer), which had serious consequences. Not fatal - but having more than two regiments of cavalry that were essentially performing as 26 independent companies was suboptimal at best and no use in the role of cavalry in pursuit at worst.

This isn't proof of how he'd deal with the cavalry problem in the West, but its not reassuring at his ability to get the most out of his subordinates.

And last but not least: Given his record of quarrels with his subordinates before, during, and after - I would be extremely leery of giving him the AoT. Someone with Jackson's lack of people skills would not be someone who would work well with the exceptionally terrible AoT generals and their attitudes. Whether he would be right to - say - arrest Polk isn't the point, Jackson would have no better luck than Bragg at making it work harmoniously.

This is ignoring the questions of strategy and tactics, as Jackson's performance is mixed there in any context we can judge him as acting on his own.

Not bad, but not consistently good - whatever weight one gives the Seven Days or not.

Add in the responsibility of independent command on a large scale (50,000+ men instead of less than half that ever before), and it would be chancy. Not to say anyone promoted from lieutenant general is obviously better, but that's not the point.

Longstreet in the West failed dismally against Burnside, also wound up unable to work with his subordinates (McLaws, specifically) and his favoritism of Jenkins over Law also caused friction. Again, not something you want in someone commanding the Confederacy's biggest collection of dysfunctional and arrogant insubordinate buttheads.

Longstreet's other period of independent command (Suffolk) isn't terribly inspiring either.

His performance as a subordinate was generally first rate, and his tactics and organizational skills were good. But as with Jackson, what he could do with a corps doesn't necessarily mean he's prepared for an army.


If I had to pick on pain of my dog being shot or Beauregard given command , I'd lean slightly to Longstreet if only because Jackson is likely to inspire his subordinates to act like they did to Bragg - does anyone see Jackson handling the case of Asa Lewis any differently, to pick an example of Bragg being in the right (by military law, at least) but still leading to a feud?

Given the AoT's problems, neither man would fill me with confidence.
 

Flubber

Banned
For many of the reasons Elfwine already stated, neither is a good choice but if forced I'd go with Longstreet.

While Jackson's Shenandoah campaign was fought against generals and troops who couldn't even make the junior varsity and Longstreet was beaten soundly by Burnside of all people, Jackson is fundamentally ill-suited to handling subordinates, something a general in an independent command must be able to do.

Placing a loony like Jackson in charge of the collection of egotistical assclowns who comprised the Army of Tennessee's upper officer ranks would quickly make people miss Braxton Bragg.
 
Choosing between the two, I'd go with Longstreet. Putting Jackson in charge of the Arrmy of Tennessee would be like pouring gasoline on a bonfire to put it out. Looking at all of Lee's Corps commanders, Richard Anderson, Wade Hampton, or Richard Ewell seem to have potential.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Jackson was a brilliant (if overrated) commander, but he assuredly did not have the personality to handle the difficult personalities that made up the Army of Tennessee high command. Longstreet was not good as an independent commander, but would have done better than Jackson did.

Fact of the matter is that so long as Leonidas Polk is a corps commander, no one is going to have an easy time of it as commander of the Army of Tennessee.
 
I'll go the other way and argue in favor of Jackson (although I agree that neither choice is likely to be particularly successful).

Jackson, unlike Longstreet, does have a prior record of success in independent command. While he was facing inferior enemy commanders, the Shenandoah campaign went extremely well and will give him some prestige when he deals with his subordinates, as well as with Davis. It also gives him at least some experience with the logistical demands of independent operation.

Longstreet's campaign against Burnside (who, while significantly better than any of the opponents Jackson faced in his Valley Campaign, was still not exactly a top-tier Union general) on the other hand, was sufficiently disastrous to call into question his preparedness for that sort of operation. Command of the entire army instead is likely to result in worse outcomes. It's not like his presence in the Army of Tennessee resulted in a significant improvement in its internal politics either.

So, I vote the slim chance of success for Jackson over the almost non-existent chance of success for Longstreet. But, as many people have argued, the underlying problems with the Army of the Tennessee are much bigger than just which general gets the top seat.
 
Jackson, unlike Longstreet, does have a prior record of success in independent command. While he was facing inferior enemy commanders, the Shenandoah campaign went extremely well and will give him some prestige when he deals with his subordinates, as well as with Davis. It also gives him at least some experience with the logistical demands of independent operation.

Both have experience with the logistical demands, Longstreet at Knoxville was without 1st Corps's trains (back in Virginia), so that has to be counted as a burden he labored under that made things worse - not to excuse his mistakes, but it is not perfectly comparable in regards to logistics.

As for dealing with Davis, I'm not sure what that does that can lead anywhere - the AoT OTL got all reinforcements that it could reasonably have gotten, for example.

So, I vote the slim chance of success for Jackson over the almost non-existent chance of success for Longstreet. But, as many people have argued, the underlying problems with the Army of the Tennessee are much bigger than just which general gets the top seat.

Where is this slim chance coming from? Yes, Jackson has a better record in independent command - but his prestige isn't going do a lick of good of good at making up for the fact his command style is going to be about as pleasant as a slap in the face. And with subordinates acting like that, any chance of his plans working - which in previous campaigns required his subordinates to be willing to go along with being essentially kept in the dark - disintegrates into nothingness.

I don't want to Longstreet is a good choice - but I am missing how Jackson has any advantage at all in a situation where all his weaknesses are in play, and those weaknesses are ones that are particularly well suited to aggravating the AoT's problems.
 
Jackson had a pretty good record in the Shenandoah<snip> Given his record of quarrels with his subordinates before, during, and after - I would be extremely leery of giving him the AoT. Someone with Jackson's lack of people skills would not be someone who would work well with the exceptionally terrible AoT generals and their attitudes. Whether he would be right to - say - arrest Polk isn't the point, Jackson would have no better luck than Bragg at making it work harmoniously.

Add in the responsibility of independent command on a large scale (50,000+ men instead of less than half that ever before), and it would be chancy. Not to say anyone promoted from lieutenant general is obviously better, but that's not the point.

Jackson's biggest problem in command was that he established for his commanders the ideal that you did exactly what you were told to do and not one step further, or God help you. In some ways, there was just a little bit of Custer in the man in this regard.

This command style remained with his units long after his death, which really bit the AoNV in the ass on the First Day of Gettysburg, the corresponding actions of Ewell's Corps through the battle, and at North Anna River in 1864.

Longstreet in the West failed dismally against Burnside, also wound up unable to work with his subordinates (McLaws, specifically) and his favoritism of Jenkins over Law also caused friction. Again, not something you want in someone commanding the Confederacy's biggest collection of dysfunctional and arrogant insubordinate buttheads.

Horrendous terrain, a single line of approach, impossible logistics, atrocious weather, and Burnside having the month of his life.

Forrest was a prick, not a butthead. And Cleburne was good.

His performance as a subordinate was generally first rate, and his tactics and organizational skills were good. But as with Jackson, what he could do with a corps doesn't necessarily mean he's prepared for an army.

I haven't heard of him having problems with his colleagues in the AoT up to the Battle of Chickamauga, save for Bragg. If he could get along with them at the same level of command, would it be so difficult as their commander? And could he fire Polk himself?

If I had to pick on pain of my dog being shot or Beauregard given command , I'd lean slightly to Longstreet if only because Jackson is likely to inspire his subordinates to act like they did to Bragg - does anyone see Jackson handling the case of Asa Lewis any differently, to pick an example of Bragg being in the right (by military law, at least) but still leading to a feud?

Given the AoT's problems, neither man would fill me with confidence.

Actually, if wiki has it right, Bragg was a murderer.:mad: Asa Lewis' enlistment ran out, so he couldn't be considered a deserter. Especially of a state that was not officially in the CSA. But yeah, I'd see Jackson doing the same.

I agree about having poor confidence in both men. Consider what would have happened on the Third Day of Gettysburg had Lee listened to Longstreet and moved his corps around the Federal left flank?:eek: Not good. A rare case of my supporting Lee over Longstreet at Gettysburg.

And there's always Beauregard.:(

For many of the reasons Elfwine already stated, neither is a good choice but if forced I'd go with Longstreet.

Placing a loony like Jackson in charge of the collection of egotistical assclowns who comprised the Army of Tennessee's upper officer ranks would quickly make people miss Braxton Bragg.

Even 19th century Southrons in a revivalist age thought Jackson ran the gamut from slightly weird to totally nuts.;)

Choosing between the two, I'd go with Longstreet. Putting Jackson in charge of the Arrmy of Tennessee would be like pouring gasoline on a bonfire to put it out. Looking at all of Lee's Corps commanders, Richard Anderson, Wade Hampton, or Richard Ewell seem to have potential.

Anderson only had one outstanding moment on his whole career, his race for Spotsylvania Courthouse. That's pretty much it. Lee made the right choice when near the very end he fired Anderson and Pickett from the AoNV.

Wade Hampton was good, but you can't put a cavalry commander in charge of an ACW army. When Davis appointed Forrest to command of the surviving CSA forces after the Battle of Nashville, he didn't do it just because Forrest had the best record in the CSA Army in the Deep South. He did so because cavalry was most of what was left in that region for the Confederates.

Richard Ewell as a corps commander was a man who seemed to lose ability each time he got shot. And he relied far too much on the advice of the overly-aggressive Jubal Early.

Jackson was a brilliant (if overrated) commander, but he assuredly did not have the personality to handle the difficult personalities that made up the Army of Tennessee high command. Longstreet was not good as an independent commander, but would have done better than Jackson did.

Fact of the matter is that so long as Leonidas Polk is a corps commander, no one is going to have an easy time of it as commander of the Army of Tennessee.

Which comes back to the question: Will either Jackson or Longstreet have the power to fire Polk? I'm pretty sure Davis would interfere in that.

I'll go the other way and argue in favor of Jackson (although I agree that neither choice is likely to be particularly successful).

Jackson, unlike Longstreet, does have a prior record of success in independent command.

So, I vote the slim chance of success for Jackson over the almost non-existent chance of success for Longstreet. But, as many people have argued, the underlying problems with the Army of the Tennessee are much bigger than just which general gets the top seat.

I disagree. Depending on when it happens, if Longstreet takes over after Grant goes east, he might be able to exploit Sherman's less than expert tactical ability. Though Thomas and McPherson will still be there. OTOH, if Grant is still there...

Certainly Jackson's rep would help. But how much did Longstreet's rep (as a veteran of the AoNV) help him OTL in the Aot?

As for dealing with Davis, (1)

Where is this slim chance coming from? Yes, Jackson has a better record in independent command - but his prestige isn't going do a lick of good of good at making up for the fact his command style is going to be about as pleasant as a slap in the face. And with subordinates acting like that, any chance of his plans working - which in previous campaigns required his subordinates to be willing to go along with being essentially kept in the dark - disintegrates into nothingness. (2)

1) Especially Davis' tendency to micromanage the AoT in terms of the power to hire and fire.

2) See above about "shut up and do as you're told" & "similarities to Custer's command style with his immediate subordinates".

I don't want to Longstreet is a good choice - but I am missing how Jackson has any advantage at all in a situation where all his weaknesses are in play, (3) and those weaknesses are ones that are particularly well suited to aggravating the AoT's problems.

3) Another weakness that I haven't seen listed yet: More than any other ACW general (AFAIK) Jackson could not admit error and certainly not failure. Refusal to admit responsibility for defeat in battle and seeking to blame others is one thing. Common enough everywhere in the military. Court-martialing your subordinates for COWARDICE:mad: because YOU got the pants beat off of you:eek: by a clearly inferior opponent is another.:p The opponent a master swordsman fears the most is the worst swordsman. All too often, in chess, when a master unexpectedly loses to a neophyte, he cries "CHEATER!!" and kicks over the board.

When I think of that kind of egotistical personality being sent to rule over the roost of the AoT...:eek:
 
Jackson's biggest problem in command was that he established for his commanders the ideal that you did exactly what you were told to do and not one step further, or God help you. In some ways, there was just a little bit of Custer in the man in this regard.

This command style remained with his units long after his death, which really bit the AoNV in the ass on the First Day of Gettysburg, the corresponding actions of Ewell's Corps through the battle, and at North Anna River in 1864.

Yeah. I think we can defend certain aspects of what Ewell manfully admitted were his own mistakes as legitimate decisions, but it was not a good way to nurture potential successors or encourage the kind of performance that sees 1st Corps (ANV) kick more than its share of ass at Gettysburg.

That wasn't specifically because of Longstreet being less secretive, but it is why I'd list 1st Corps as the best damn corps in the army, the legendary Stonewall Brigade or no, for overall buttkicking.

Horrendous terrain, a single line of approach, impossible logistics, atrocious weather, and Burnside having the month of his life.

Not a combination that anyone could have done much with, honestly, however much it does have to be mentioned as what happened with Longstreet in fully independent command.

Forrest was a prick, not a butthead. And Cleburne was good.

Agreed. Cleburne was one of the few Confederate generals who seems to have been willing to focus on fighting the Yankees even if it meant missing opportunities to promote himself or fight his peers - most of them to a greater or lesser extent fell victim to that.

But by and large, the AoT is a dysfunctional army at any level above brigade command.

I haven't heard of him having problems with his colleagues in the AoT up to the Battle of Chickamauga, save for Bragg. If he could get along with them at the same level of command, would it be so difficult as their commander? And could he fire Polk himself?
I haven't either, but I am not as convinced as I'd like to be that he could get them to work as subordinates as opposed to colleagues.

They're simply too unreliable.
Actually, if wiki has it right, Bragg was a murderer.:mad: Asa Lewis' enlistment ran out, so he couldn't be considered a deserter. Especially of a state that was not officially in the CSA. But yeah, I'd see Jackson doing the same.

Yeah. I've heard that he was still enlisted - reenlisted after it ran out - so . . . :confused:

I think its telling though that it was treated as if it was Wrong (lawful or not), which says a lot about both Bragg and Breckinridge.

Neither of which is very reassuring from the standpoint of "can we make the AoT succeed?" threads.

I agree about having poor confidence in both men. Consider what would have happened on the Third Day of Gettysburg had Lee listened to Longstreet and moved his corps around the Federal left flank?:eek: Not good. A rare case of my supporting Lee over Longstreet at Gettysburg.

Yeah. I'm not convinced that would have been a disaster, but I agree. It would have been marching into the unknown at best, straight into the maw of Sixth Corps at worst.

Anderson only had one outstanding moment on his whole career, his race for Spotsylvania Courthouse. That's pretty much it. Lee made the right choice when near the very end he fired Anderson and Pickett from the AoNV.

In fairness, he did do a solid job as a division commander. But yeah, Anderson's record at a corps is at best forgettable.

Richard Ewell as a corps commander was a man who seemed to lose ability each time he got shot. And he relied far too much on the advice of the overly-aggressive Jubal Early.

I wonder what's up with that. Ewell was a fine division commander and at least started off his corps command in style - and then it all slipped down to mediocre. Not disastrous, but solidly mediocre.

3) Another weakness that I haven't seen listed yet: More than any other ACW general (AFAIK) Jackson could not admit error and certainly not failure. Refusal to admit responsibility for defeat in battle and seeking to blame others is one thing. Common enough everywhere in the military. Court-martialing your subordinates for COWARDICE:mad: because YOU got the pants beat off of you:eek: by a clearly inferior opponent is another.:p The opponent a master swordsman fears the most is the worst swordsman. All too often, in chess, when a master unexpectedly loses to a neophyte, he cries "CHEATER!!" and kicks over the board.

When I think of that kind of egotistical personality being sent to rule over the roost of the AoT...:eek:

Yeah. In other circumstances I might say Jackson wasn't a howling egomaniac, but in this context . . . this cements his utter lack of man-mamangement abilities.

Bragg may have blamed his subordinates for his defeats, but he didn't quite go there even on his worst days.
 
Jackson's biggest problem in command was that he established for his commanders the ideal that you did exactly what you were told to do and not one step further, or God help you. In some ways, there was just a little bit of Custer in the man in this regard.

This command style remained with his units long after his death, which really bit the AoNV in the ass on the First Day of Gettysburg, the corresponding actions of Ewell's Corps through the battle, and at North Anna River in 1864.

The First Day at Gettysburg was won by Ewell disobeying orders from Lee.
 
The First Day at Gettysburg was won by Ewell disobeying orders from Lee.

He did?:confused: The Union Army gained the high ground on the 1st day that if Ewell had attacked (under Lee's orders, "if practical") might of led to a different outcome of the battle.

I mean, sure, the Federal line eventually collapsed before they retreated to Cemetery Hill.....
 
He did?:confused: The Union Army gained the high ground on the 1st day that if Ewell had attacked (under Lee's orders, "if practical") might of led to a different outcome of the battle.

I mean, sure, the Federal line eventually collapsed before they retreated to Cemetery Hill.....(0)

0) Culps Hill was the key, tho. Without both Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill, the ridges south of Gettysburg are untenable.

Precisely. If Lee had said "at all costs", (1) Culps Hill falls to the AoNV, Lee enjoys a moderate victory, (2) and the Battle of Pipe Creek (3) is fought instead. Probably resulting in the destruction of the AoNV!:eek:

1) Not Lee's style. He tended to defer to the man on the scene.

2) I & XI Corps are even more destroyed than IOTL

3) A far stronger position than Gettysburg. The AoNV would have had to launch a Picketts Charge using the entire army.:eek:
 
The First Day at Gettysburg was won by Ewell disobeying orders from Lee.

If anybody disobeyed Lee's orders, as opposed to merely seizing the opportunity presented, it was divisional commander Henry Heth of Hill's Corps. If Ewell had failed to avail himself of XI Corps' wide open right flank would have been relieved, assuming Jubal Early didn't just slip the reins and launch his attack wholly on his own. I've seen that terrain, and believe me its insane to think that anyone could have held it. Howard should have been relieved of his command.
 
0) Culps Hill was the key, tho. Without both Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill, the ridges south of Gettysburg are untenable.

Precisely. If Lee had said "at all costs", (1) Culps Hill falls to the AoNV, Lee enjoys a moderate victory, (2) and the Battle of Pipe Creek (3) is fought instead. Probably resulting in the destruction of the AoNV!:eek:

I am not sure if it would be or not - Ewell's available forces for an immediate assault are pretty limited, and more forces would either take more time, or Lee releasing Anderson's division, or both.

3) A far stronger position than Gettysburg. The AoNV would have had to launch a Picketts Charge using the entire army.:eek:

On the other hand, its a much longer line. Its not perfect.

I'm not going to argue Lee would have won there, but there's a lot more to it than being a great position.

Still. Lee at Pipe Creek is very unlikely to be able to take advantage of its problems, such as they were, given the limits of the ANV on the offense (yes, that is "Pendletonnnnnnn . . ." you can hear in the distance).
 
I am not sure if it would be or not - Ewell's available forces for an immediate assault are pretty limited, and more forces would either take more time, or Lee releasing Anderson's division, or both.

Do you really think that Anderson's Division could arrive in a timely manner on the First Day before sunset, considering their line of march?

On the other hand, its a much longer line. Its not perfect. (1)

I'm not going to argue Lee would have won there, but there's a lot more to it than being a great position. (2)

Still. Lee at Pipe Creek is very unlikely to be able to take advantage of its problems, (3) such as they were, given the limits of the ANV on the offense (yes, that is "Pendletonnnnnnn . . ." you can hear in the distance). (4)

1) Still, with pretty much unflankable positions, it allows Meade and Halleck to more readily draw on elements of VIII Corps, and to exploit both the AotP's superior numbers and Southern exhaustion (with the cavalry arriving perhaps a full day later with all but dead horseflesh). ITTL the Union troops do less marching and the Southrons more, letting the AotP fall back on their supply lines while Lee gets ever more over-extended.

2) Add on that the Southern soldiery will probably be spending July 2nd just marching to Pipe Creek while getting ever more strung out due to straggling, leaving only July 3rd for real battle with a very tired army.

3) Not to mention General Rainstorm and Admiral Flood coming in on the early afternoon of July 4th, pretty much shutting things down offensively. What Lee would do in a battle where he has hit mighty blows on Meade at Gettysburg on the First Day, yet cannot effectively attack on the "Fourth Day", and has not "wrecked" his own army, I cannot guess.

4) You're right. I hadn't considered what a logistical clusterfuck Pendleton would make of such a situation.
 
Do you really think that Anderson's Division could arrive in a timely manner on the First Day before sunset, considering their line of march?

Honestly? I wouldn't want to count on it. But Lee did halt it at 4 PM, which meant that any chance of it coming in time to assist Ewell was squashed.

1) Still, with pretty much unflankable positions, it allows Meade and Halleck to more readily draw on elements of VIII Corps, and to exploit both the AotP's superior numbers and Southern exhaustion (with the cavalry arriving perhaps a full day later with all but dead horseflesh). ITTL the Union troops do less marching and the Southrons more, letting the AotP fall back on their supply lines while Lee gets ever more over-extended.

All of those definitely play to Meade's strengths and Lee's problems.

Meade being both the general as someone of specific strengths and as a stand in for his army.

I think the issue of the exhaustion of Stuart's cavalry is definitely a problem. Given fresher horsemen, I might argue that it could be flanked in the right circumstances. But Stuart's men are falling out of their saddles and their horses are in poor shape even OTL.

2) Add on that the Southern soldiery will probably be spending July 2nd just marching to Pipe Creek while getting ever more strung out due to straggling, leaving only July 3rd for real battle with a very tired army.

I'm not sure how much this particular part is an issue, but if its pushed, it will hurt the ANV.

3) Not to mention General Rainstorm and Admiral Flood coming in on the early afternoon of July 4th, pretty much shutting things down offensively. What Lee would do in a battle where he has hit mighty blows on Meade at Gettysburg on the First Day, yet cannot effectively attack on the "Fourth Day", and has not "wrecked" his own army, I cannot guess.

4) You're right. I hadn't considered what a logistical clusterfuck Pendleton would make of such a situation.

#3 I have nothing to add to.

As for Pendleton: Sufficient to say, eveni f he doesn't actively screw the pooch, Pendleton is not a Hunt. And Alexander cannot be given the entire army's guns.

So the ANV's artillery is going burn up a lot of powder and accomplish little, as OTL, I fear.
 
Honestly? I wouldn't want to count on it. But Lee did halt it at 4 PM, which meant that any chance of it coming in time to assist Ewell was squashed.

I suspect the reason for the halt was to allow to straighten out forces jammed up on a single road, not to mention making sure supplies got to Heth's and Pender's Divisions, which were already actively engaged in the fight. Fog of war may have been playing a part as well, with Lee not knowing precisely what was going on in front of him.

All of those definitely play to Meade's strengths and Lee's problems.

And Lee's apparent underestimation of Meade's abilities. Though this is fully understandable considering the mettle of his previous adversaries.

Meade being both the general as someone of specific strengths and as a stand in for his army.

Would you mind expanding on this?:confused:

I think the issue of the exhaustion of Stuart's cavalry is definitely a problem. Given fresher horsemen, I might argue that it could be flanked in the right circumstances. But Stuart's men are falling out of their saddles and their horses are in poor shape even OTL.

A fact most non-serious historians of the battle (and speculation of a possible ATL Battle of Pipe Creek) seem to want to overlook, preferring to play blame games instead.

I'm not sure how much this particular part is an issue, but if its pushed, it will hurt the ANV.

Well, in an ATL Battle of Pipe Creek, it won't just be Confederate horseflesh that will have been pushed too far.

#3 I have nothing to add to.

Nothing?:( I was hoping more for your brilliant insight on this more than on any other part of the post.

As for Pendleton: Sufficient to say, even if he doesn't actively screw the pooch, Pendleton is not a Hunt. And Alexander cannot be given the entire army's guns.

Personally, I would suggest to the pooch that he not bend down to pick up the soap...:p

So the ANV's artillery is going burn up a lot of powder and accomplish little, as OTL, I fear.

Pretty much.

The elan of the Union Army was seeping out of the infantry, and moving over to the cavalry. The Union artillery never lost theirs in the first place. But while the Confederate Army's elan in its infantry and cavalry kept pace for most of the war, their artillery never really amounted to much compared to their enemies. Mind, I am talking about the war in the east here.
 
I suspect the reason for the halt was to allow to straighten out forces jammed up on a single road, not to mention making sure supplies got to Heth's and Pender's Divisions, which were already actively engaged in the fight. Fog of war may have been playing a part as well, with Lee not knowing precisely what was going on in front of him.

All true, and I've seen the last specifically mentioned. But it does mean that a fresh, strong division is not available to help Ewell, leaving him stuck with the men immediately available from Rodes's tired division and Early's busy one.

And while two full divisions might matter, 2,500 men aren't enough.

Would you mind expanding on this?:confused:
Meade was a tough and level headed fellow. That's not someone you want to take on in a position like this.

He might not have been as exceptional and certainly not as aggressive as Grant, but the five o'clock in the morning aspect of courage was very strong in him - so both bamboozling and intimidating him are going to be very difficult at best.


A fact most non-serious historians of the battle (and speculation of a possible ATL Battle of Pipe Creek) seem to want to overlook, preferring to play blame games instead.
Unfortunately. I think it might be possible to have an ATL Pipe Creek that addresses this, but certainly not one where Stuart's men keep riding yet another day to join the army before being expected to do something aggressive.

Well, in an ATL Battle of Pipe Creek, it won't just be Confederate horseflesh that will have been pushed too far.
True. Its surprising how wilted the Union horseflesh is - Buford and Gregg are looking decidedly scrawny, and Kilpatrick only better because his two brigades are bigger than average in the first place.

But from the standpoint of the battle,

Nothing?:( I was hoping more for your brilliant insight on this more than on any other part of the post.
You flatter me too much my friend. I think you hit the nail on the head - and my best guess on what Lee would do is "something ineffectual".

Lee may never have made the comment Grant did about how its better to do something than not, but it seems to have been just as much in his style of generalship on these offensives - thus Pickett's Charge OTL, which makes no sense except from the standpoint that taking chances is better than conserving forces.

I have no idea what exactly that something would be - and how far it would go before Admiral Flood and General Mud thwart it - but Lee is not the sort of general to sit on his hands and wait for the ground to dry. Even if his supplies permit it (arguable, but not certain), its not in his character.

Personally, I would suggest to the pooch that he not bend down to pick up the soap...:p
Well put.

Pendleton had a fine mind for organization off the battlefield, and a tolerable grasp of logistics, but he should never have been made a true artillery chief in the sense of authority.

Hunt, meanwhile, was one of those sorts that made the Army of the Potomac a lot more formidable than the ANV was willing to admit before or after.

Pretty much.

The elan of the Union Army was seeping out of the infantry, and moving over to the cavalry. The Union artillery never lost theirs in the first place. But while the Confederate Army's elan in its infantry and cavalry kept pace for most of the war, their artillery never really amounted to much compared to their enemies. Mind, I am talking about the war in the east here.
It had its moments, but it seems to have played little role in the ANV's successes compared to the infantry.


On the West, I recommend this book if you don't have it already: http://www.amazon.com/Cannoneers-Gray-Artillery-Tennessee-1861-65/dp/0817304819
 
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