Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
1. tobruk 41 was a tactical setback, not some sort of strategic debacle... he only lost 500 men and 25 permanent tanks; a lot of that could also be blamed on the italians not manuevering properly at the outset of the battle or bothering to provide rommel with accurrate maps of the place
2. stretching his supply lines to the limit made perfect tactical and strategic sense... by pushing the british far back, it stopped them from being able to fly direct to malta to improve it's supply situation, and it kept british aircraft out of range from attacking his convoys; so his streching of his supply lines also kept his supply lines more secure from attack... also, the british were always being reinforced much more rapidly than him, so any decision to stand on the defensive closer to supply bases would lead to this situation worsening; under the circumstances, his offensives was the best choice in a group of bad options
3. NOBODY disobeyed orders in 1942; NOBODY... Rommel's two pervious non compliances (sunflower and the rebound from crusader/2nd agehlia offensive) were early executions of approved orders, not strait disobeys... Guderian and Hoepner disobeyed orders in 1941 and they got themselves relieved, and in Hoepners case, thrown out of the army with loss of pension; it wasn't till after the stalingrad debacle that favorite sons took liberty with fuhrer orders
I believe Rommel's decisions and his own personal actions during Crusader threw away a great opportunity for a crushing Axis victory. Cruwell was determined to destroy the remnants of the British armour but Erwin decided to vacate over the wire. In that battle steady, unshowy Auchinleck outclassed flashy Rommel.