Who Leads SAC without LeMay?

Delta Force

Banned
What if Curtis LeMay had gone into commercial aviation, been sidelined or retired with more severe Bell's Palsy, been killed in action in World War II, or simply retired after the war? Who could have gone on to lead Strategic Air Command in the early Cold War period?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Doolittle.

What if Curtis LeMay had gone into commercial aviation, been sidelined or retired with more severe Bell's Palsy, been killed in action in World War II, or simply retired after the war? Who could have gone on to lead Strategic Air Command in the early Cold War period?

Doolittle.

He'd commanded the 8th in the ETO and PTO, had the education to oversee the transition to jets, air refuelling, and missiles, and was widely respected.

LeMay was ten years younger than Doolittle, of course, but Doolittle was active in the USAFR until 1959, and was chairman of TRW after that...

Best,
 
Doolittle.

He'd commanded the 8th in the ETO and PTO, had the education to oversee the transition to jets, air refuelling, and missiles, and was widely respected.

LeMay was ten years younger than Doolittle, of course, but Doolittle was active in the USAFR until 1959, and was chairman of TRW after that...

Best,

Was just gonna say that. I'd like to see Jimmy as the early head of SAC.

Though I doubt he's loony enough to get parodied in Dr Strangelove, so I lose one of my favorite movies. Sigh.
 
The air force was chock full of capable generals, multi skilled in engineering and organizational talent. There were over two dozen with in depth experience in organizing and executing large scale long range bomber operations. Anderson was one of those, Kenny another. The pool of talent was so rich you could have drawn the name from a hat and had a similar ability.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yep; man earned a MS and a doctorate from MIT

Was just gonna say that. I'd like to see Jimmy as the early head of SAC.

Yep; man earned a MS and a doctorate from MIT, so he was significantly better educated, had a much wider experience in aviation, and was a more effective combat commander than LeMay, considering the enemy the 8th faced and won against vs. the enemy the 20th faced; and being a Reserve, he could tell various and sundry to take a hike and let the chips fall where they may...

Given his record, the "overkill quotient" of SAC probably would have been avoided, as well.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Actually, there were three who had led strategic air forces successfully...

The air force was chock full of capable generals, multi skilled in engineering and organizational talent. There were over two dozen with in depth experience in organizing and executing large scale long range bomber operations. Anderson was one of those, Kenny another. The pool of talent was so rich you could have drawn the name from a hat and had a similar ability.

Actually, there were really only three who had led strategic air forces successfully...

Doolittle with the 8th Air Force, Twining with the 15th, and LeMay with the 20th; Spaatz would qualify as well through USSTAF, but given he was Arnold's obvious sucessor, seems unlikely choice for SAC.

Best,
 
Actually, there were really only three who had led strategic air forces successfully...

Doolittle with the 8th Air Force, Twining with the 15th, and LeMay with the 20th; Spaatz would qualify as well through USSTAF, but given he was Arnold's obvious sucessor, seems unlikely choice for SAC.

Best,
Twining could be interesting - he took over the 20th from LeMay on 2nd August 1945, so was clearly thought to have potential. In fact, he became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1953, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1957.

Yet, in 1947, he was posted from command of Air Materiel Command to command the Alaskan Air Command - seems like an odd move. Sending him to SAC in place of LeMay seems very plausible to me, though I've no idea about his command style.

Incidentally, when talking of Doolittle as CINCSAC as less bloodthirsty than LeMay - remember who wrote these words: 'It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" msut be reconsidered.'

I doubt whether you'd see much difference in the broad strokes of policy between LeMay, Twining and Doolittle - all three were a product of the time. The difference would come in the nuances of how they implemented their policies; I doubt whether LeMay's attitude towards failure would be repeated, for instance.
 
How about Thomas Power ? he was SAC deputy and as much as a loony asshole as LeMay himself.
Probably needed a tour as a deputy commander before heading up a major command - which was in fact what happened.

There is a difference between Power and LeMay - LeMay was an asshole, but a human one and rational to the point of a fault. Power was considered by LeMay to be a dangerous psychopath.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
To give Doolittle his due,

Twining could be interesting - he took over the 20th from LeMay on 2nd August 1945, so was clearly thought to have potential. In fact, he became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1953, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1957.

Yet, in 1947, he was posted from command of Air Materiel Command to command the Alaskan Air Command - seems like an odd move. Sending him to SAC in place of LeMay seems very plausible to me, though I've no idea about his command style.

Incidentally, when talking of Doolittle as CINCSAC as less bloodthirsty than LeMay - remember who wrote these words: 'It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" msut be reconsidered.'

I doubt whether you'd see much difference in the broad strokes of policy between LeMay, Twining and Doolittle - all three were a product of the time. The difference would come in the nuances of how they implemented their policies; I doubt whether LeMay's attitude towards failure would be repeated, for instance.

To give Doolittle his due, (IIRC) there were enough 8th AF units in the Pacific before VJ Day to mount an operation to "blood" the 8th AF in the Pacific.

To his credit, he said no.

Couple that with his reserve status and civilian career and education, and a fairly progressive attitude (for the time) regarding racial integration of the armed forces and officer-enlisted relations in a draftee force, and Doolittle is coming from a different point of view than the typical regular.

Best,
 
Couple that with his reserve status and civilian career and education, and a fairly progressive attitude (for the time) regarding racial integration of the armed forces and officer-enlisted relations in a draftee force, and Doolittle is coming from a different point of view than the typical regular.
Perhaps - and I certainly don't see him as an 'Iron-Ass LeMay' clone, though LeMay apparently did care a great deal for the welfare of his personnel. He insisted on perfection, and decent conditions when off duty mean better performance on duty.

But nor do I see any of the three candidates promoting a doctrine significantly different from OTL for Strategic Air Command. They were all bomber commanders, steeped in Douhetian theory. Nuclear weapons promised to make that theory work. The Soviet Union presented, in the then-current view, an implacable enemy that had to be stopped. Given the context, SAC is almost inevitably going to be turned into a nuclear delivery force optimised to take out Soviet cities en masse.
 
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