Who Is Most To Blame For the Confederate Loss At Gettysburg? (Lost Cause Version)

The South lost at Gettysburg? Whose fault was it?

  • Ewell

    Votes: 10 16.9%
  • Stuart

    Votes: 34 57.6%
  • Longstreet

    Votes: 5 8.5%
  • Hill

    Votes: 3 5.1%
  • Some other Confederate (other than Lee)

    Votes: 7 11.9%

  • Total voters
    59

Anaxagoras

Banned
Yes, as Pickett said, "[T]he Yankees had something to do it." And Lee was a decent enough man to say, "It is all my fault." But let's have some fun with the debate that divided the Lost Cause South in the years after the Civil War, and killed untold thousands of trees as the former generals waged pen-and-ink wars with one another every bit as bitter as the war they had fought with rifles and bullets.

The South lost at Gettysburg? Whose fault was it? Of course, it had to be ONE nefarious individual, so that we can fixate all our rancor against that one person and therefore absolve everyone else.

Was it Ewell, for failing to take the crucial high at the end of the first day?

Was it Stuart, for riding off on a wild goose chase, leaving Lee blind?

Was it Longstreet, for dragging his feet before attacking?

Was it Hill, for failing to support Longstreet's attack on the second day?

Was it some other Confederate? (Not Lee, of course, seeing as he's a demigod who never made any errors and blaming him for anything would make us outcasts from society forever.)
 
Since I can't pick Lee I will pick Stuart. He left Lee blind and doing so in enemy territory is a recipe for disaster.
 
I thought Hill was incapacitated by illness at this time. Seems like it's Lee's fault for disregarding that problem and not replacing him.
 
I get the premise of this, but the overall commander is always responsible, in the absence of direct disobedience or really culpable negligence of a subordinate.

While Gettysburg was important, my understanding was that the campaign that led up to the battle was really a giant raid by the ANV, designed to raise havoc in part of the North and get the Army of the Potomac away from the farms of Virginia for awhile. The campaign actually succeeded on those terms. Whether this objective was worth the risk and/ or precluding the possibility of sending reinforcements to the Western armies is another question. Probably not, though the issue is fairly close, and Lee and Davis share responsibility or blame for authorizing the campaign in the first place. But I get the impression Lee would have been happy to return to Virginia without any battle, he probably would have wanted to blow up the bridge at Harrisburg first.

Once the battle happened, and this seems to have been more a matter of luck than anything else, it was more likely that the ANV would be trapped and destroyed in hostile territory than most of the other possibilities. Actually beating the Army of the Potomac instead on its own soil would have been icing on the cake. The best case for the Confederates would have been an Army of the Potomac retreat to cover Washington and Baltimore and the opportunity by the Army of Northern Virginia to raise more havoc. Maybe they could have treated Philadelphia, though that would have been very risky. The federal government would have had to pull reinforcements from the Western armies, and while that would not have saved Vicksburg, it would have shut down any chance for their armies to make progress in 1863. But the northern armies wound up making no progress in 1863 anyway, due to the losses to the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, which were quite severe, and also Chickamauga. So the historical outcome was a big boost to northern morale.

There are parallels with the World War I naval battle of Jutland, in the sense that the High Seas Fleet lost by having to had to fight the battle at all, though they did as well as they could expected in the battle itself. But Jutland gave no morale boost the British, and in fact a small one to the Germans, since no one expected the German fleet to be able to go toe to toe with the Grand Fleet. The situation at Gettysburg was that everyone knew and expected the Army of Northern Potomac could whip the Army of the Potomac, so any outcome where it was the Army of Northern Virginia retreating was a big northern win. But that situation was bound to happen at some point. Lee and Davis should have realized that before starting the campaign.

OK, having written all that, while the ANV corps commanders and Lee himself were unusually sluggish, in every case there was some justification. Probably the biggest effect was Ewell's not pressing the attack further at the end of the first day, something you see again and again in the American Civil War, and besides Ewell was pretty new to the job. So the vote goes to Stuart. He had the least justification for being absent, and the absence of the cavalry had a multiplier effect because of the loss of intelligence, it probably contributed to the sluggishness of the corps commanders.
 
Stuart did leave Lee blind, and his attacks around the flank were not well coordinated either. I say let's blame the flamboyant cavalryman.
 
I say let's blame the flamboyant cavalryman.
Given that this is meant to be the Lost Cause explanation, Stuart seems the best choice. In blaming him, you can also simultaneously absolve him- he was too flamboyant, too daring, too much the quintessential cavalryman. His fault was not actually a fault, but a virtue taken to extremes. Seems very Lost Cause-y to me.
 
I must put up a defense of both Generals Ewell, Longstreet and Stuart.

In the defense of Ewell, Early and Rodes' Divisions have been spent from long marches to Gettysburg and the casualties suffered in the fighting. A brigade of Early is used to round up prisoners in Gettysburg and Ewell had no artillery guns were prepared to bombard Cemetery Hill. Ewell hears reports from Cavalry scouts and William 'Extra' Billy Smith that Union troops are present to their left. By this point in time, Ewell can only muster 4,000 troops to assault Cemetery Hill. Ewell asks Lee if he could sent R.H Anderson's Division to move in to support him from its reserve. Lee refuses despite having both R.H. Anderson's Division and Thomas' brigade of Pender's division in reserve. In addition, Ewell' subordinates (Early) is urging him to eait for Johnson's Division come up. In the fog of war, Ewell's decision not to attack makes sense. Besides, 20,000 Union troops and 40 guns have been rallied to defend Cemetery Hill from the Confederates.

I dont see any real reason to criticize Longstreet during this battle aside from his idea of going around the Union left. His decision to wait for Law's brigade to arrive was incredibly timely. Longstreet finds the III Corps out of position and ripe for heavy damage. Despite incorrect information from Lee's staff and General Hood's injury, Longstreet wrecked the Union III Corps and inflicted severe damage on others with just two divisions, inflicting 2,000 more causalities than he took, a rarity in the Civil War. On July 3rd, lack of coordination between Longstreet and Lee led to the relative lateness of Pickett's Charge. It really didn't matter when the attack was launched however, Longstreet was completely correct when he told Lee no 15,000 men could take that hill.

As for my defense of Stuart, Stuart followed Lee's orders to the letter. Stuart split his cavalry in half and executed his scouting of the Army of the Potomac and raiding. When he ran into II Corps, he sent reports back to Lee AND Richmond about the incident.He'd already reported the Army of the Potomac was moving north. He had no reason to presuppose the information wouldn't reach Lee, as well as Robertson and Jones. He had very good reason to continue and execute the spirit of Lee's orders; by going into the enemy's rear, he could do damage to the enemy and collect provisions for the army along the way, exactly as Lee ordered. The only way Stuart could have reach Lee on July 1st was if Early's Division marched from York to Hannover about 8 miles away. Lee had used his cavalry to guard his posts and had Albert Jenkins' cavalry brigade with Ewell while Robertson and 'Grumble' Jones' Cavalry brigades were joining with him and Imboden's Cavalry brigade went sheep-stealing in a useless raid West of Gettysburg.

A.P. Hill really did not have much affect on the battle of Gettysburg and I can't blame Lee. So shame on him being sick and all that, I guess?
 
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B-29_Bomber

Banned
I thought Hill was incapacitated by illness at this time. Seems like it's Lee's fault for disregarding that problem and not replacing him.

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"In the defense of Ewell"

Yes, I'm very suspicious of narratives along the lines of "if they had only pressed the attack/ made one more attack." There almost always were good reasons not to!

Hey, they made one more attack at Cold Harbor. That is usually what happens when you do this.
 
Did not Lee say that he thought the Yanks had something to do with it?

Well, I think it follows from the Lost Cause bit that the dastardly Yanks can't have done something right, but simply got lucky and used overwhelming numbers, the latter not being something right.
 
Did not Lee say that he thought the Yanks had something to do with it?

That was Pickett and he was right. Part of the problem for the South was it was flat out out-generaled at the end. Grant was better than Lee, Thomas was better than Hood and Sherman was better than Johnston .
 
I must put up a defense of both Generals Ewell, Longstreet and Stuart.

In the defense of Ewell, Early and Rodes' Divisions have been spent from long marches to Gettysburg and the casualties suffered in the fighting. A brigade of Early is used to round up prisoners in Gettysburg and Ewell had no artillery guns were prepared to bombard Cemetery Hill. Ewell hears reports from Cavalry scouts and William 'Extra' Billy Smith that Union troops are present to their left. By this point in time, Ewell can only muster 4,000 troops to assault Cemetery Hill. Ewell asks Lee if he could sent R.H Anderson's Division to move in to support him from its reserve. Lee refuses despite having both R.H. Anderson's Division and Thomas' brigade of Pender's division in reserve. In addition, Ewell' subordinates (Early) is urging him to eait for Johnson's Division come up. In the fog of war, Ewell's decision not to attack makes sense. Besides, 20,000 Union troops and 40 guns have been rallied to defend Cemetery Hill from the Confederates.

I always thought a big part of the problem was Lee's wording of the orders which were to take the position "if practicable" but not to risk a general engagement. If I were in Ewell's place I would see it as Lee being cautious at the moment (Probably waiting for all of Longstreet's corps) and that I shouldn't try to take the position unless absolutely certain because every time you attack you risk a general engagement.
 
That was Pickett and he was right. Part of the problem for the South was it was flat out out-generaled at the end. Grant was better than Lee, Thomas was better than Hood and Sherman was better than Johnston .

Sheridan was better than Early, too.
 
Out of Character I'd have to say... Sickles.

Yes really. Lee had an unsound plan (attack a numerically superior force in the center), but due to a string of coincidences, the attack on the second day almost worked. Sickles decided to move forward, not realizing the Peach Orchard was not like Hazel Grove (which was a salient that was much more defensible).
 
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