Who Had the Better Generals, the Union or the Confederacy?

[Anaxagoras]

One of the long-running "facts" taught in the history of the American Civil War is that the Confederacy, on average, had better generals than did the Union. This stems largely from the Lost Cause school of Civil War historiography, with Southerners wanting to see their generals as knights in shining army who only lost the war due to superior Northern numbers.

So, what's the real answer? Obviously, both sides had gifted commanders and some very lousy ones. But taken in total, did the Union or the Confederacy have the superior generals?

For the Union, you have some outstanding army commanders like Grant and Thomas, along with some solid ones like Meade and McPherson and those who get little attention like Ord. (Sherman and Sheridan have always struck me as being greatly overrated.) Even Hooker and McClellan had some strengths in their position, primarily in terms of organization and logistics. Hancock is certainly one of the war's greatest corps commanders and Logan was also very good. On the division level, you have several outstanding leaders like Gibbon and Buford, and some mid-level ones like Schofield. On the division and brigade level, most of the Union commanders are not especially bad but not especially good.

But then, of course, you have walking disasters like Burnside, Banks, Butler, Kilpatrick, and others. The fact that major commands were still being given to the likes of Burnside and Butler at the opening of the 1864 campaign reveals how weak the senior leadership of the Union armies actually was.

On the Confederate side, Lee certainly was a gifted army commander but his reputation over the last century-and-a-half has been greatly inflated by Lost Cause mythology. He was tactically and in some sense operational very good, as Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Overland Campaign prove, but he lacked strategic sense and was far too aggressive given his limited resources. Of other army commanders, only Joseph Johnston can be described as competent and he lacked the aggressiveness necessary to achieve strategic objectives (when it came to caution vs. boldness, a halfway medium between Lee and Johnston would have been ideal). Beauregard had some military gifts, but other Confederate army commanders like Bragg and Hood were walking disasters. On the army command level, I don't really think the South had much of an advantage over the Federals.

To me, it's on the corps and division level that the South military talent really shines. On the corps level, Jackson, Longstreet, Hardee were very good. Early was an outstanding independent commander of a corps-sized unit. Hill would have been better kept at the divisional level and Ewell should have been retired after his 1862 wound. There are obvious exceptions such as Polk, of course. In the cavalry, I think the long-established view that the Southern troopers were better isn't actually that far off, for they had Stuart, Hampton, Forrest, and Morgan at their head (others, like Wheeler, were quite overrated). On the divisional level, you have outstanding leaders like Cleburne and Gordon and brigade leaders like Cockrell, who were better than any comparable Union leaders.

So if I had to choose, I would say that the military leadership of the South was better than that of the North, though not nearly so much as the Lost Cause myth-makers would have us believe and concentrated on the division and brigade level. The problem for the South was that it was not enough to compensate for the North's material leadership, or the immense gap in political leadership at the top between Lincoln (and his brilliant Cabinet) and Davis (with his mediocre Cabinet).

What are your thoughts?

 

[History Learner]

One of the long-running "facts" taught in the history of the American Civil War is that the Confederacy, on average, had better generals than did the Union. This stems largely from the Lost Cause school of Civil War historiography, with Southerners wanting to see their generals as knights in shining army who only lost the war due to superior Northern numbers. So, what's the real answer? Obviously, both sides had gifted commanders and some very lousy ones. But taken in total, did the Union or the Confederacy have the superior generals?

The Lost Cause Mythology has certainly been proved wrong in its generalizations of both sides but, at the macro level, that the South probably did have a larger batch of quality Officers seems reasonable. In 1860, the Southern states held about 15% of the nation's industry and were outnumbered 4:1 in total theoretical manpower according to the Census that year; that it took four years for the North to defeat the Confederacy could only be explained by the inability of the Union cause to utilize these advantages effectively.

For the Union, you have some outstanding army commanders like Grant and Thomas, along with some solid ones like Meade and McPherson and those who get little attention like Ord. (Sherman and Sheridan have always struck me as being greatly overrated.) Even Hooker and McClellan had some strengths in their position, primarily in terms of organization and logistics. Hancock is certainly one of the war's greatest corps commanders and Logan was also very good. On the division level, you have several outstanding leaders like Gibbon and Buford, and some mid-level ones like Schofield. On the division and brigade level, most of the Union commanders are not especially bad but not especially good.

Care to explain why you think Sherman is overrated? I've always personally thought him much better than Grant, myself.

But then, of course, you have walking disasters like Burnside, Banks, Butler, Kilpatrick, and others. The fact that major commands were still being given to the likes of Burnside and Butler at the opening of the 1864 campaign reveals how weak the senior leadership of the Union armies actually was.

There definitely needs to be some revision concerning Burnside in my view, as his only real disaster was Fredericksburg. Outside of that, he utterly demolished Longstreet in East Tennessee and damn near cut Confederate supply lines into Virginia while operating in North Carolina in 1862.

On the Confederate side, Lee certainly was a gifted army commander but his reputation over the last century-and-a-half has been greatly inflated by Lost Cause mythology. He was tactically and in some sense operational very good, as Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and the Overland Campaign prove, but he lacked strategic sense and was far too aggressive given his limited resources. Of other army commanders, only Joseph Johnston can be described as competent and he lacked the aggressiveness necessary to achieve strategic objectives (when it came to caution vs. boldness, a halfway medium between Lee and Johnston would have been ideal). Beauregard had some military gifts, but other Confederate army commanders like Bragg and Hood were walking disasters. On the army command level, I don't really think the South had much of an advantage over the Federals.

Lee, in my view, definitely deserves criticisms for his various failures (McClellan and Rosecrans pushing him out of West Virginia in 1861, for example), but overall I rate him very highly. His aggressiveness was definitely needed, as he realized that the longer the war dragged on, the more defeat became likely as the North raised larger, better equipped armies with increasingly better cadres of leaders. It was this thinking that drove his invasions into the North, and such very nearly paid off as we now know concerning the points Anglo-French intervention nearly came.

Largely agreed on Johnston and Hood, but Bragg is another figure that I think needs revision. His Kentucky invasion in 1862 was largely successful, and would've rendered great strategic gains had his subordinates not undermined it repeatedly (In particular, Marshall and Van Dorn). The failure to pursue at Chickamauga is understandable in light of the immense losses he had taken and the ultimate failure of the siege at Chattanooga can be laid squarely at Longstreet's feet, as he was essentially acting like a petulant child by that point.

To me, it's on the corps and division level that the South military talent really shines. On the corps level, Jackson, Longstreet, Hardee were very good. Early was an outstanding independent commander of a corps-sized unit. Hill would have been better kept at the divisional level and Ewell should have been retired after his 1862 wound. There are obvious exceptions such as Polk, of course. In the cavalry, I think the long-established view that the Southern troopers were better isn't actually that far off, for they had Stuart, Hampton, Forrest, and Morgan at their head (others, like Wheeler, were quite overrated). On the divisional level, you have outstanding leaders like Cleburne and Gordon and brigade leaders like Cockrell, who were better than any comparable Union leaders.

Honestly, Jackson and Longstreet both are vastly overrated, especially Jackson. Both were, in general, competent but the view of them both as simply outstanding has always boggled my mind. Polk, however, certainly sets the standard for sheer incompetence and might as well have been offered a commission by Lincoln for all the good he did for the North.

So if I had to choose, I would say that the military leadership of the South was better than that of the North, though not nearly so much as the Lost Cause myth-makers would have us believe and concentrated on the division and brigade level. The problem for the South was that it was not enough to compensate for the North's material leadership, or the immense gap in political leadership at the top between Lincoln (and his brilliant Cabinet) and Davis (with his mediocre Cabinet).

Agreed.

 

[Zorqal]

I think that as a whole the South had better commanders. This isn't necissarily looking only at the big name Generals, since I feel that the debate is a lot closer when looking only at them. But the southern states had far more of a military culture than the north, with so many of the younger plantation owner sons becoming professional military men, so down the ladder the Confederates had better leaders as a whole. So I agree with you.

Kind of unrelated, but I feel like the Lost Cause argument can be misused sometimes. I think that in the most basic sense the Civil War was a lost cause for the South, it never was able to compete with the pure manpower and production capabilities of the north. The fault with the Lost Cause mythos is that they understate the point of slavery in causing the war in favor of states rights (yes, the Civil War was fought over states rights, but it was the debate about a states' right to own slaves that was the big problem). Basically what I'm getting at with my point is that Lost Cause is wrong, but the other side sometimes goes too hard against it.

 

[Alex Zetsu]

I'm going to go with the North.

I'd say Sherman was an overrated tactician even though he's not known as a genius but the few secondary sources seem to give him more credit than he deserves.

Was Lee a good general? Yes absolutely. How about as a tactician? Yes. However, once Sickles accidentally foiled his plans as Gettysburg, he had no way to win the battle. He decided to surprise the North with the least expected method... a moronic frontal assault into the teeth of the North's trenches. This only worth when you outnumber the enemy, never mind the fact that the North outnumbered the South in this battle! So I'd have to give Eugene Pinrcoe of Savoy or Napoleon better marks than Lee, even though Lee gets an A overall (and a D at Gettysburg).

George McClellan was cautious, but he's not as bad as people think. In the Peninsular Campaign, he was foiled by his own administration, being hampered by supplies. it's noteworth that in 1864, the Army of the Potomac scored some success after getting everything McClellan originally asked for. in the Peninsular Campaigne Apparently Marvalin Hill was a trap, because advancing on Richmond after that battle would result in being cut off from powder... ooops.

And also, the South had their share of dumbass generals more than the North. Want proof? Meet the future Southern General Gideon Pillow who doesn't get how forts work http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...onepage&q=gideon pillow camargo ditch&f=false It's noteworthy that if Grant capture him later, he would have let Pillow free

 

[ReenX]

North had better generals by far. Lee was a charismatic man, but he utterly lacked the ability to lead an army. He contributed greatly to the failure of his troops by failing to demand supplies, money and other things from the south. He attempted to lead a war detached from reality and regular people. Hid "demands" for men, supplies and other support read more like a polite question, with plenty of room to refuse it since it doesn't seem urgent.

Grant meanwhile pursued such an effective strategy that US has had no civil wars since then. He utilized the strengths of the union and utterly crushed his oposition.

 

[Alex Zetsu]

I think that as a whole the South had better commanders. This isn't necissarily looking only at the big name Generals, since I feel that the debate is a lot closer when looking only at them. But the southern states had far more of a military culture than the north, with so many of the younger plantation owner sons becoming professional military men, so down the ladder the Confederates had better leaders as a whole. So I agree with you.

OK, I wasn't counting brigade commanders and below. At the brigade or platoon level you might be right, but at the division not so much.

The Germans said after WW2, between an Americna division or a British division both with air support, they don't know which they'd rather face. But between 4 American Infnatry Companies or 3 British ones (both cases the units not in contact with each other and with no air support) they'd take the larger number of Americans every goddam time.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Care to explain why you think Sherman is overrated? I've always personally thought him much better than Grant, myself.

Sherman's tactical record is quite poor. At Chickasaw Bluffs and Kennesaw Mountain, he simply threw his men at Confederate entrenchments and received a bloody repulse. At Chattanooga, he outnumbered the defenders on his portion of the line something like 5-1 and still couldn't break them, leaving it up to Thomas to win the battle at the enemy center with what was supposed to be a diversionary attack. (In Sherman's defense, the division opposing him at Chattanooga was commanded by Cleburne, the South's best division commander without exception).

Operationally, Sherman made several unforgivable errors. He used McPherson's smaller Army of the Tennessee to push through Snake Creek Gap behind the Confederate position rather than take Thomas's advice and use the Army of the Cumberland, which caused the offensive push to lack the necessary strength. He could have ended the campaign (and the war) had he thought this question through more carefully. In September, the Army of Tennessee was divided into three weak corps scattered over several dozen miles south of Atlanta, in positions of certain defeat had Sherman simply moved against them. Instead, he decided to take the army back to Atlanta and end the campaign, leaving the enemy army to recover and fight another day.

On three separate occasions - at Cassville in May of 1864, during the approach to Atlanta that July, and before Bentonville in March of 1865 - Sherman allowed his army to become dangerously divided into formations too far apart to be mutually supporting, allowing the Confederates to concentrate their forces and attempt to defeat him in detail. On the first occasion, he only avoided suffering a severe defeat through luck and Confederate incompetence. On the second, it was only through the hard fighting of the Army of the Cumberland and errors in the Confederate attack plan that defeat was avoided. In the latter, his troops actually were roughly handled by Johnston's men on the first day, but the Confederate lacked the forces to defeat even the half of Sherman's army that they had isolated, and it wouldn't have made any point by then anyway.

it's noteworth that in 1864, the Army of the Potomac scored some success after getting everything McClellan originally asked for.

But it also left Washington dangerously unprotected, to the point that it was nearly captured by Jubal Early in July, which would have had disastrous consequences for the North. I think the greatest failing of Grant's military career was his failure to take Early's threat seriously almost until it was too late. A further delay of even a few hours in ordering Ricketts's division to Baltimore on July 6 or the balance of the VI Corps to Washington on July 9 might have made all the difference.

 

[History Learner]

Sherman's tactical record is quite poor. At Chickasaw Bluffs and Kennesaw Mountain, he simply threw his men at Confederate entrenchments and received a bloody repulse.

But that's exactly what Grant did at Spotsylvania for 12 straight days, and again at Cold Harbor for 13 days.

Operationally, Sherman made several unforgivable errors. He used McPherson's smaller Army of the Tennessee to push through Snake Creek Gap behind the Confederate position rather than take Thomas's advice and use the Army of the Cumberland, which caused the offensive push to lack the necessary strength. He could have ended the campaign (and the war) had he thought this question through more carefully.

Is the Gap even large enough to allow the rapid movement of the Army of the Cumberland through it? There's also the question of, while the main portion of the Army is redeploying, if the Army of the Tennessee could sufficiently hold the Confederates in place.

In September, the Army of Tennessee was divided into three weak corps scattered over several dozen miles south of Atlanta, in positions of certain defeat had Sherman simply moved against them. Instead, he decided to take the army back to Atlanta and end the campaign, leaving the enemy army to recover and fight another day.

He was at the end of his logistics network (hence, why the March to the Sea later occurred) and Hood's army, although battered, was more mobile by virtue of being smaller. Hood's repeated raids on Sherman's supply network and the inability of any Federal commander to catch him certainly shows this.

On three separate occasions - at Cassville in May of 1864, during the approach to Atlanta that July, and before Bentonville in March of 1865 - Sherman allowed his army to become dangerously divided into formations too far apart to be mutually supporting, allowing the Confederates to concentrate their forces and attempt to defeat him in detail. On the first occasion, he only avoided suffering a severe defeat through luck and Confederate incompetence. On the second, it was only through the hard fighting of the Army of the Cumberland and errors in the Confederate attack plan that defeat was avoided. In the latter, his troops actually were roughly handled by Johnston's men on the first day, but the Confederate lacked the forces to defeat even the half of Sherman's army that they had isolated, and it wouldn't have made any point by then anyway.

North Anna and the maneuver over the James River for Grant.

 

[Anaxagoras]

But that's exactly what Grant did at Spotsylvania for 12 straight days, and again at Cold Harbor for 13 days.

Yeah, and look where it got him.

Is the Gap even large enough to allow the rapid movement of the Army of the Cumberland through it? There's also the question of, while the main portion of the Army is redeploying, if the Army of the Tennessee could sufficiently hold the Confederates in place.

Maybe not the whole of it, but even half of the Army of the Cumberland would be bigger than the Army of the Tennessee. And what would be left behind (the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio, and whatever part of the Army of the Cumberland that doesn't move through the gap, would have easily been enough to hold Johnston in place at Dalton.

He was at the end of his logistics network (hence, why the March to the Sea later occurred) and Hood's army, although battered, was more mobile by virtue of being smaller. Hood's repeated raids on Sherman's supply network and the inability of any Federal commander to catch him certainly shows this.

I understand why he did it, but it certainly seems like one of those moments where boldness rather than caution was called for. Look at Vicksburg, for example.

North Anna and the maneuver over the James River for Grant.

True, North Anna was an error for Grant. But the crossing the James was a calculated risk to achieve a specific objective, rather than simply a mistake he blundered into.[/QUOTE]

 

[History Learner]

Yeah, and look where it got him.

Yes, his Army locked into a nearly year long siege of Petersburg after taking about as many casualties as were in Lee's Army. Sherman, however, managed to take Atlanta without such losses or prolonged trench warfare.

Maybe not the whole of it, but even half of the Army of the Cumberland would be bigger than the Army of the Tennessee. And what would be left behind (the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio, and whatever part of the Army of the Cumberland that doesn't move through the gap, would have easily been enough to hold Johnston in place at Dalton.

But that is the point, since the Army of the Cumberland is so much bigger, can it quickly and effectively move through the gap? The Army of the Tennessee, by virtue of being smaller, is much more mobile and thus able to rapidly move through the gap.

I understand why he did it, but it certainly seems like one of those moments where boldness rather than caution was called for. Look at Vicksburg, for example.

I just don't see how it can work, Hood demonstrated he could rapidly move out of the way of Sherman's thrusts and Sherman just didn't have the means of supporting such a major movement without leaving Atlanta exposed.

True, North Anna was an error for Grant. But the crossing the James was a calculated risk to achieve a specific objective, rather than simply a mistake he blundered into.

Couldn't you argue the same for Peachtree Creek?

 

[Arnold d.c]

I gave much thought to the subject at hand, and offer my opinion of the quality of Union and Confederate command:
Independent Command:
For Union high command, we have many generals who achieved greatness and failure. We have successful generals like Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Rosecrans, Curtis, Sheridan (ugh), Meade, Sam Curtis, and James G. Blunt.
Ulysses S. Grant stood out to be the best Union general in my book, displaying an brilliance in grand strategy, strategy, and operations (Vicksburg, Overland Campaign). In addition, Grant displayed flexibility and an incredible understanding of the mindset of politicians. To demonstrate, before Grant became Lieutenant General, Grant proposed a very radical strategy. Grant suggested that they abandon the lines of attack previously adopted against Lee, and try a new approach. Grant proposed landing 60,000 men at Suffolk, Virginia, and having them march into North Carolina, with their objective being to break the railroads into Virginia, and capture the city of Wilmington. Meanwhile forces would move through Western and Southwestern Virginia to eliminate lines of supply from that area. Effectively, Virginia would be isolated, and Grant believed Lee would be forced to fall back to defend his dwindling supply lines. From that point on, the Union would dictate the action, and Union naval superiority could be used to shuttle forces around. It was essentially a version of Grant's Vicksburg Campaign applied to the Eastern theatre. It was bold, aggressive, targeted enemy supply lines and logistics rather than armies, and meant the Rebels would have to dance to a Federal tune for once. What this plan shows is a skilled strategic and operational commander proposing a plan that avoided a direct confrontation with the main enemy army, and forced that army to react to his own moves, therefore seizing the initiative. When Halleck rejected it, Grant understood that the politicians demanded a direct assault onto Richmond, and promptly redrew his plans to capture Richmond. In terms of casualties the myth of 'Grant the butcher' is destroyed. Throughout Grant's career as a general, Grant inflicted about 184,000 casualties and suffered about 137,000 casualties; ironically, Robert E. Lee inflicted 220,000 casualties and suffered 210,000 casualties. I dare say, among all the generals of the American Civil War Ulysses S. Grant was the best of the lot.

Thomas was an excellent tactician and battlefield commander, he performed very capably as the commander of about 2/3rds of Sherman's infantry. In addition, he seemed to have displayed a fine understanding of operations, demonstrated in his suggestion to Sherman to seize Snake Creek Gap. However, Thomas never got the opportunity to demonstrate any strategic skills that he may or may not have had.

Strictly as a military strategist, Sherman can stand alongside Grant, and in theory, could have been as great a general-in-chief. However, Sherman could not stand political interference and greatly despised politicians and reporters. I admittedly find Sherman to be overrated in a few aspects, but cannot deny his brilliance in strategy and logistics. Operationally, Sherman handled the movement of his army very finely and did have good operational ideas. However Sherman does suffer several very severe flaws. Tactically, Sherman was very mediocre at best, he suffered disasters like Chickasaw Bayou, Kennesaw Mountain, and was incredibly careless at Bentonville. Sherman was also poor at using cavalry in general.

Meade does not receive enough credit as a commander, I will cite an old post as to what I thought about him:

Considering that Meade took over an army in the middle of a campaign, I would say he deserved a lot more credit than what he is usually given. During the first-twenty four hours of his command, Meade effectively concentrated his army, prepared an advance of over twenty miles the next day, and got the men started early, as well as making other preparations. Andrew A. Humphreys, Meade's future chief of staff and not an easy man to impress, stated, after discussing the difficulty of moving a great army, "I take it too that this army has never been moved so skillfully before as it has been during Meade's command".

After a grueling march the next day, Meade fanned out his army in a manner that protected his wings and let him concentrate the army in case of emergency. On June 30th, Meade learned that Longstreet and Hill were near Chambersburg, moving in the direction of Gettysburg, and Ewell was at York. Meade concluded that the Confederates would advance towards Gettysburg, and sent the II and III Corps to back up Reynolds. Meade assigned Reynolds temporary command of about a third of his army to watch the left flank, the point of danger. With Buford in position, Reynolds possessed good information about the enemy's movements.

Meade issued two important orders; one for a general advance on July 1st, in the direction of Gettysburg, and the infamous Pipe Creek Circular, which was a contingency plan for a withdrawal to a very strong position just across the Maryland border.

Meade definitely factored in Gettysburg in his plans; he sent I and XI Corps to the town, the II Corps to Taneytown but with the option of moving to Gettysburg or Emmitsburg as the situation dictated, the V Corps to Hanover, the III Corps to Emmitsburg, and the XII Corps to Two Taverns. Two corps to Gettysburg and four within supporting distance on roads that lead into Gettysburg.

In conclusion, I would say Meade had acted with prudence but sufficient boldness. Coddington calls Meade's movements and plans a beautiful strategic pattern.

Meade's pursuit of Lee after Gettysburg has received a lot of criticism, unjustly so in my opinion. Meade was constrained by the Lincoln administration's instruction to remain between Lee's army and Washington D.C. and was hampered by a serious loss rate in his corps commanders.

After Lee withdrew across the Potomac, Meade pursued, and came within a hairsbreadth of cutting off Ewell's II Corps at Manassas Gap; thanks to "Blinky" French, Ewell got away. Meade planned a fall offensive, but got preempted by Lee in the Bristoe Campaign; not wishing to fight in a position that offered him no advantages, Meade retreated to Centreville to avoid being flanked after a couple of engagements, including one where A.P. Hill got badly bloodied at Bristoe Station.

About two weeks later, Meade succeeds in surprising Lee at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford, capturing two entire Confederate brigades at the former engagement, and crosses the Rappahannock.

Later that year, Meade began the Mine Run Campaign, a planned surprise attack through the Wilderness with his entire army on Lee's divided army, targeting the flank south of the Rapidan River. Once again, French's III Corps ruined Meade's timetable by getting bogged down in fording the river. Lee managed to withdraw to prepared fortifications at Mine Run; II Corps commander Warren concluded they were too strong to attack, and after taking a look for himself, Meade reluctantly agreed, and pulled back before Lee could counterattack, which indeed he was planning to do. Meade deserves more credit for than he gets is the decision not to launch a pointless and suicidal attack at Mine Run. In many ways, Meade's situation at Mine Run was a lot like Burnside's at Fredericksburg; he was making the last offensive move that could be made that year, and he was under enormous political pressure to at least appear to be aggressive. Despite the political consequences for himself, he had the moral courage to call off the attack and pull back, unlike Burnside a year earlier. He never received any thanks for it, indeed losing his independence as a commander entirely for his trouble, but he made the right decision.

Meade, on the south side of the Rappahannock at this point, wanted to winter the army in Fredericksburg; by doing so, he can avoid the Wilderness the next year, and advance on Lee in open terrain where his artillery superiority can be used effectively. Halleck refuses however, probably believing Meade won't be able to screen D.C. from Fredericksburg.

It's difficult to judge him too much on his role in the Overland Campaign; he was often more hindrance to help, but it's an open question as to whether anyone else could have done better in his frustrating role. I think that's why Grant never uttered a word of criticism about Meade's role in his campaign; having been in a somewhat similar situation under Halleck for a while, he had some idea what it was like to be in Meade's position (Siege of Corinth).

May 1864 must have been a very frustrating month for George Gordon Meade. Though he was still the commander of the Army of the Potomac, he had been growling as Ulysses S. Grant intervened more and more in the army’s operations. Nor was he pleased with the performance of Ambrose Burnside, who headed the independent Ninth Corps under Grant’s direction as a sop to Burnside’s seniority. Thus far Burnside has proved a disappointment in the field. Meade had predicted that if things went well, the press would laud Grant, while if things went badly, it would be Meade’s fault. After the Battle of North Anna, Charles A. Dana, the assistant secretary of war, read a telegram from William T. Sherman expressing the hope that Meade’s army would achieve the same successes thus far enjoyed by Sherman, Meade snapped. Sherman’s missive, he fumed, was an insult to his men and himself: the Army of the Potomac needed no one to tell it how to fight. As a result, Grant was going to allow Meade to direct the operations of his army.

The two major failures, that I can fault him for, are the Battles of Cold Harbor and the Crater. While I must put Grant at fault for ultimately being in charge of Meade, Meade was exercising tactical control at that time, and both Meade and the corps commanders failed to follow Grant's orders to examine the ground before launching an assault, and they failed in coordinating it. Meade bizarrely boasted about ordering the attack in a letter to his wife. Grant should have called off the assault earlier than he did once it was apparent nothing was going right, but it was Grant who stepped in to call it off while Meade was still urging his commanders to press the attack.

However, we have failures like Burnside, John Pope, Benjamin Butler, Buell, and Sigel.

I feel like John Pope is perhaps getting more of a bad rap then he deserves, per the second Manassas discussion. Everything he does for most of August 1862 is at least defensible, and he deserves some credit for being the first Union army commander in the East to use volunteer cavalry brigades; he was the first officer in the East to do so, and arguably none of his successors exceeded him here. The value of said cavalry was made apparent when Buford's men enabled Pope to escape Lee's first trap south of the Rappahannock. Where Pope really does fall apart is his refusal in the last phase of the campaign to accept information that he doesn't want to believe, but his experience up to that point had given him some basis for distrusting certain subordinates, and the fact that both Halleck and McClellan left him out to dry didn't help. As Jackson jumped the gun a bit at Brawner's Farm, Pope's overall strategy of rushing on Jackson before Longstreet could come up was not necessarily the wrong one, albeit his piecemeal attacks were foolish. At the end of the day, Pope did rise to the moment of crisis (which he was responsible for, admittedly) and fight his way out of the situation he had created, and then parried another attempt Jackson made to flank him at Chantilly. Pope reminds of Joe Hooker in that if you excise a couple of weeks, he had a good overall military record, and he died a respected major general in the regular army. Unlike Hooker, his problematic personality mellowed over time and he was trusted with important department commands near the end of the war and for decades afterwards. None of this to deny Pope performed quite poorly overall during the actual battle, but other Civil War generals were given considerably more latitude for their failures than he was.

Ambrose Burnside was never an impressive commander. As an army commander, he deserves credit for maneuvering Lee in the initial stages of the Fredericksburg, and was stopped only due to a failure by the Union War Department to provide him the pontoon bridges necessary to cross over to Fredericksburg. The idea that Burnside should have gone to other fords is rather silly as it ignores the fact that the lower Rapphannock fords (the path Joe Hooker took) were impassable due to the rain and any Union force that crossed the U.S. Ford would be completely isolated if the rain continued (As it turned out, the rain actually continued. Burnside was right about his decision not to cross there). By the time Lee got to Fredericksburg, Burnside should have admitted defeat and enter winter quarters or change his plans. However, Burnside lacked either the flexibility or moral courage to do so. In the actual battle of Fredericksburg, he performed poorly, failing in communicating the importance that Franklin was to storm the heights and thus dooming his own plans.

Butler and Sigel were both political generals that were incredibly inept at doing their jobs. As commander of the Army of the James, Butler's performance was a failure of epic proportions. By all means, the Confederate garrison at Petersburg should have been routed, and Petersburg be in Union hands while Lee and Grant were fighting it out in Spotsylvania Court House. Sigel did no better, getting routed at New Market.

Now for the Confederates, other than Lee, most of their army commanders were very lackluster. Uncle Joe is competent: he's particularly talented at organization; he got the Army of Tennessee back in shape after Bragg's disaster at Chattanooga and he was a fairly good judge of talent, he's partially responsible for the rise of Longstreet and Stuart, but can't get along with Davis and isn't one to seize the initiative. Beauregard is quite competent but highly erratic and has an even worse relationship with Davis. Bragg can't carry a good campaign idea through to fruition, practices cronyism, is a martinet, and absolutely cannot work with anyone. Van Dorn, Price, and Sibley were pretty much unmitigated disasters. Gideon Pillow was probably the least competent general in the entire war. Pemberton was more bureaucrat than soldier. Crittenden and Zollicoffer flunked one minor battle, with one of them dying in the process and the other pretty much vanishing into obscurity. Richard Taylor was actually quite competent and did a nice job during the Red River Campaign, he's probably second-best to Lee as an independent commander. Kirby Smith is something of an enigma; he directly commanded two tactical engagements. One of them was a crushing victory that routed his opponent (Richmond KY) and the other was a complete fiasco (Jenkins' Ferry.) He also ran what was virtually an independent subdivision of the Confederacy in the trans-Mississippi. Strategically I'm a little unsure about him. He also tends not to play well with others though; Taylor hated him, and Smith absolutely refused to cooperate with Bragg during the Kentucky campaign.

As for Robert E. Lee, on the campaign level, Lee is undoubtedly a superb strategist. While serving as Davis' military advisor, Lee actually devises the only plan the Confederates implement in Virginia that represented a reasonable use of the operational art with his usage of Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign to keep Union reinforcements from reaching McClellan near Richmond. Jackson of course, plays his part in Lee's vision perfectly here. Then, Lee further displays sound judgement at the end of the Valley Campaign; when Jackson wants to continue north and continue threatening Washington, as appealing as this might have sounded, Lee correctly judges that Jackson's diversion has served its purpose and brings his troops to Richmond in time to achieve near-parity with McClellan's forces for the Seven Days Campaign. The resulting campaign was not coordinated very well, but Lee's strategy plays out and McClellan is neutralized for the time being. Lee plans well and across a broad area, incorporating multiple forces, and seizes the initiative and does not relinquish it. On the minus side, new to his army, his forces don't coordinate terribly well during the Seven Days, and somewhat by accident, he ends up launching costly frontal assaults at Malvern Hill.

The Second Manassas Campaign is in many ways Lee's crowning achievement strategically. Faced with the dual threat of McClellan still on the James and John Pope's advance in Northern Virginia, Lee carefully manages his forces, detaching enough troops to blunt Pope's advance. When McClellan shows signs of withdrawing, Lee acts immediately and decisively, racing north with most of his army to confront Pope. Pope conducts a competent withdrawal behind and defense of the Rappahannock line, preventing any major clash initially, so Lee takes a risk to seize the initiative again, detaching Jackson to strike into the rear of Pope's army at his supply lines, and causing Pope to lose control of the campaign. Lee and Longstreet follow, and at the Battle of Second Manassas, a battle fought on as even terms as Lee ever gets, he decisively defeats Pope and brings the Union war effort in the east to its nadir.

Overall I think Lee was a superb operationalist and his campaign ideas were certainly good.

However, Lee's primary flaw was his insistence to give battle whenever the opportunity presented itself, and his strategic idea to win the war was rather flawed. Lee's strategy was consistent: defend Virginia against Union advances, then take the war north to keep the enemy off balance, subsist off their land, and try to win victories to damage Northern morale and destroy their armies. This is where Lee's flaws start to show: Lee had the opportunity to escape Sharpsburg a few days before the battle began, but instead of withdrawing he ordered the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrate at his position, and in fact, thought of attacking McClellan's right flank. The result was 10,000 casualties that the Confederates could not replace. In addition, once Lee's strategy of annihilation starts breaking down from the casualties suffered, Lee still pursued this strategy for some time after it had ceased to hold any true promise for the Confederacy.
Looking at the whole war the Union had far more generals who were successful in roles of independent and higher command than the Confederates.

I suppose I'll post the rest of my thoughts later, writing this down burned me out a bit.

 

[Arnold d.c]

But that's exactly what Grant did at Spotsylvania for 12 straight days, and again at Cold Harbor for 13 days.

I would have to point out the fact that Grant did not simply keep assaulting Lee for 12/13 straight days in Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor respectively. In Spotsylvania Court House, Grant's assaults only happened on May 8,10,12 and 18, and achieved a varying degree of success unlike Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain. There was a significant reason why Grant waited at Spotsylvania for so long being that he was repositioning troops and ensuring that Lee could not reinforce Petersburg, which was supposed to be assaulted by Butler's Army of the James. In Cold Harbor, Grant only attacked on June 1st and June 3rd, the rest of the days were used to send orders to Hunter's Valley force, dispatching Sheridan's cavalry corps to distract Lee, and prepare to cross the James River.

I've always personally thought him much better than Grant, myself.

Out of curiosity, how did you come to this conclusion?

 

[wcv215]

after taking about as many casualties as were in Lee's Army.

?

Huh? Spotslvania saw 18,000 Union casualties. Cold Harbor 12,000. Heavy sure, but nowhere near the size of Lee's army.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Huh? Spotslvania saw 18,000 Union casualties. Cold Harbor 12,000. Heavy sure, but nowhere near the size of Lee's army.

I think he was talking about the Overland Campaign as a whole.

 

[Shinsu]

Sherman, however, managed to take Atlanta without such losses or prolonged trench warfare.

To be fair, Johnson traded space for better defensible positions/areas that gave him some leverage over Sherman. That's what eventually got him canned and Bragg put in his place.

 

[History Learner]

I would have to point out the fact that Grant did not simply keep assaulting Lee for 12/13 straight days in Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor respectively. In Spotsylvania Court House, Grant's assaults only happened on May 8,10,12 and 18, and achieved a varying degree of success unlike Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain. There was a significant reason why Grant waited at Spotsylvania for so long being that he was repositioning troops and ensuring that Lee could not reinforce Petersburg, which was supposed to be assaulted by Butler's Army of the James. In Cold Harbor, Grant only attacked on June 1st and June 3rd, the rest of the days were used to send orders to Hunter's Valley force, dispatching Sheridan's cavalry corps to distract Lee, and prepare to cross the James River.

That is true, but it only took Sherman and Burnside, for comparison, a day or so of assaults in similar situations to realize how pointless it was to bash their heads against entrenched Confederate lines. That Grant managed to do this multiple times during the campaign is inexcusable, no matter the purpose; his army was sufficiently large enough to divide it into two parts, one with which to keep Lee pinned and another to maneuver around him. That Grant trusted Butler to manage such an operation is another mark against him.

Out of curiosity, how did you come to this conclusion?

Grant's performance out West was, sans his serious Pre-Battle failures at Shiloh, good but his performance in the East, in the form of the Overland Campaign, was downright pathetic.

At the very outset of the campaign, Grant, despite having a two to one advantage in men, gets checked within two days by Lee at the Wilderness. Not only is he halted, but Lee is able to collapse not one, but both of his flanks. At that point Grant realizes he's beat, and decides upon a movement to Spotsylvania in order to draw Lee out into an open battle, where Grant will have an advantage. Not only does Lee manage to avoid such, he's able to beat Grant to the position and entrench, thus forcing the Federals to spend nearly two weeks pointlessly bashing their heads into his lines. Concurrent to this, Butler is checked in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign and Siegel repulsed at New Market; as overall Union commander, Grant bares some responsible for both of these failures, especially in terms of commander choice.

Thereafter, in another attempt to draw Lee out, Grant attempts to use Hancock's Corps as bait. Here, once again, Lee is able to outwit Grant by taking the bait, but doing so in such a way that Grant is forced to scramble to rescue Hancock and thereby abandon his previous plan. From here, Lee is able to pull off a solid withdrawal from Federal lines (At one point, his forces passed within a mile of sleeping Federals) and then occupy the excellent defensive position along the North Anna. Grant is forced to divide his army into three portions, and once again very nearly manages to bash his army against entrenched Confederates. Compounding his error here is the fact that the North Anna position is a trap set by Lee, as he (Lee) had formulated an excellent plan that could've destroyed half of the Army of the Potomac; Lee, however, is prevented from doing such due to a bout of dysentery. Grant is then, to his credit, able to withdraw excellently and trick Lee as to his intentions, allowing him to move towards the James, which he is able to cross. Cold Harbor then occurs, where Grant again precedes to bash his head into Lee's defenses.

Ultimately, Grant does reach Richmond, but is unable to take the city nor has he been able to achieve his goal of destroying the Army of Northern Virginia. Further adding to this is the fact he has taken in the vicinity of 60,000 casualties, half of his total force starting out and twice the number he is able to inflict on Lee. Such losses come close to shattering Northern morale, as contemporary reporting shows, and as late as August (IIRC) Lincoln believes he will lose re-election. Ultimately it comes down to Sherman taking Atlanta to restore Northern morale, thus ensuring the war can be brought to its historical conclusion.

Huh? Spotslvania saw 18,000 Union casualties. Cold Harbor 12,000. Heavy sure, but nowhere near the size of Lee's army.

Meant the Overland Campaign as a whole.

 

[Arnold d.c]

That is true, but it only took Sherman and Burnside, for comparison, a day or so of assaults in similar situations to realize how pointless it was to bash their heads against entrenched Confederate lines. That Grant managed to do this multiple times during the campaign is inexcusable, no matter the purpose; his army was sufficiently large enough to divide it into two parts, one with which to keep Lee pinned and another to maneuver around him. That Grant trusted Butler to manage such an operation is another mark against him.

I take it you never read Gordon Rhea's Overland Campaign series?
Grant did not simply bash his head against the Confederate defenses for no reason: in each of the assaults Grant saw opportunities to continue the attack. The fighting on May 8 was a meeting engagement between the V Corps and Longstreet's Corps (now R.H. Anderson's) in which the Confederates barely got to the top of the hill, May 9 was spent bringing the troops up, May 10 saw Meade launching an attack with the V and VI Corps, the attack was repulsed but the success of Emory Upton's assault and news of the weakness of the Mule Shoe Salient leads Grant to reposition II Corps to attack the salient. May 12 saw II Corps and IX Corps using Upton's tactics to storm the salient, annihilating an entire division, but II Corps was held back by Gordon's division and Burnside failed in his assault. May 18 was the final assault, and it was done after Grant constantly repositioned his forces. Grant surprised Lee as he did not expect an assault, though the attack was repulsed. In short, Grant did not simply keep attacking at the same location, he changed the location of attack depending on the chance of success.

As for North Anna, it is noteworthy to point out that Lee was surprised when Grant crossed at North Anna. Grant did not launch any major assault in the battle, and most of the battle was spent skirmishing.

As for Cold Harbor, I would like to point out the fighting at June 1st was rather successful for the Union (a number of Confederate were captured) and both Meade and Grant were convinced that the Army of Northern Virginia was on the verge of collapse. On June 3rd, the infamous assault was launched by Meade. Meade, having tactical control of the battle, failed to coordinate the attack, resulting in 3,500 casualties in the main attack and suffering 6,000 casualties for the whole day. The rest of Cold Harbor was spent issuing orders, and preparing to cross the James River.

Grant's performance out West was, sans his serious Pre-Battle failures at Shiloh, good but his performance in the East, in the form of the Overland Campaign, was downright pathetic.

At the very outset of the campaign, Grant, despite having a two to one advantage in men, gets checked within two days by Lee at the Wilderness. Not only is he halted, but Lee is able to collapse not one, but both of his flanks. At that point Grant realizes he's beat, and decides upon a movement to Spotsylvania in order to draw Lee out into an open battle, where Grant will have an advantage. Not only does Lee manage to avoid such, he's able to beat Grant to the position and entrench, thus forcing the Federals to spend nearly two weeks pointlessly bashing their heads into his lines. Concurrent to this, Butler is checked in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign and Siegel repulsed at New Market; as overall Union commander, Grant bares some responsible for both of these failures, especially in terms of commander choice.

Grant's flanks in the Wilderness did not collapse. The fighting at the Wilderness was much more close run than you think. Grant was hampered by Warren's disobedience and Burnside's incompetence, and yet virtually routed A.P. Hill's Third Corps, which was saved by Longstreet's arrival. While II Corps was pushed back badly, they did ultimately build a stable line which repeled another assault from Lee. As for the other flank, it was merely flanked by Gordon's brigade, no collapse there.

Regarding the Race to Spotsylvania Court House, Lee was only able to beat Grant to it because of the Army of the Potomac's march being a comedy of errors. I have already explained the rest of Spotsylvania Court House.

As for Sigel and Butler, Grant did not want these generals, but Lincoln saddled him with them anyway. Grant placed two experienced Corps commanders in hopes that it would offset Butler's incompetence, though in the end, Butler still failed.

Thereafter, in another attempt to draw Lee out, Grant attempts to use Hancock's Corps as bait. Here, once again, Lee is able to outwit Grant by taking the bait, but doing so in such a way that Grant is forced to scramble to rescue Hancock and thereby abandon his previous plan. From here, Lee is able to pull off a solid withdrawal from Federal lines (At one point, his forces passed within a mile of sleeping Federals) and then occupy the excellent defensive position along the North Anna. Grant is forced to divide his army into three portions, and once again very nearly manages to bash his army against entrenched Confederates. Compounding his error here is the fact that the North Anna position is a trap set by Lee, as he (Lee) had formulated an excellent plan that could've destroy half of the Army of the Potomac; Lee, however, is prevented from doing such due to a bout of dysentery. Grant is then, to his credit, able to withdraw excellently and trick Lee as to his intentions, allowing him to move towards the James, which he is able to cross. Cold Harbor then occurs, where Grant again precedes to bash his head into Lee's defenses.

Where did you get the impression that Lee knew about the bait? Gordon Rhea showed that Lee didn't even take notice of this though, and instead immediately headed for his favored defensive position at the North Anna River. Grant raced him for it, and at one point, Lee dangerously exposed a large portion of his army outside entrenchments when he marched it past Grant's front. The lack of Sheridan's cavalry cost Grant here, but Fifth Corps pickets also detected the movement; by some stroke of bad luck, this information did not make it back to Grant's HQ for some reason. Thanks to his effective head start here, Lee managed to get into his defenses. However, I am incredibly sceptical about the idea that North Anna was a trap for several reasons:
1) The only source we have that there was a trap comes from a single staff officer: Charles Venable in 1873
2) Mark Grimsley also states that Lee's formation was a poor offensive one, lacking depth. Colonel Vincent J. Esposito of the USMA points out that Hancock's men were well dug in by the 24th, and a assault by the Confederates would not have been a sure thing.
3) Looking at the maps of Lee's deployment, several things occur to me. For one, Lee's smallest corps at this point is the Confederate II Corps; it was decimated by nearly 8,000 casualties on May 12 at Spotsylvania Court House alone. It had received reinforcements in two brigades of John C. Breckinridge's Valley forces (Which are actually assigned to III Corps), somewhere around 2,500 men, bringing the battered II Corps to around maybe 8-9,000 effectives, by adding Breckenridge to Rhea's figures for the II Corps. But these relatively fresh troops are in the rear of the II Corps positions. The II Corps and I Corps are the units that oppose Hancock.
The other reinforcements Lee has received are three brigades from George Pickett's division. But on May 24th, these seem to form Lee's reserve, with only Kershaw and Field's I Corps divisions facing Hancock's position. The Confederate I Corps hasn't suffered as heavily as the II Corps, but the two divisions positioned against Hancock, which numbered perhaps 10,000 at the start of the campaign, can't exceed 8,000 after the fighting at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. Immediately positioned against Hancock, who has something in the area of 20,000 or slightly less men, are possibly 16-18,000 Confederates. If we assume I'm missing something here, my margin of error doesn't seem to be off by more than a few thousand, even if you factor in Pickett's men. Lee's freshest formations in Pickett and Breckenridge are held just south of the Virginia Central Railroad, and Hill's III Corps opposes Warren and Wright.

Ultimately, Grant does reach Richmond, but is unable to take the city nor has he been able to achieve his goal of destroying the Army of Northern Virginia. Further adding to this is the fact he has taken in the vicinity of 60,000 casualties, half of his total force starting out and twice the number he is able to inflict on Lee. Such losses come close to shattering Northern morale, as contemporary reporting shows, and as late as August (IIRC) Lincoln believes he will lose re-election. Ultimately it comes down to Sherman taking Atlanta to restore Northern morale, thus ensuring the war can be brought to its historical conclusion.

I must point out that Grant almost captured Petersburg but was let down by 'Baldy' Smith and Hancock. Grant's crossing of the James River was his objective throughout the Overland Campaign and caught Lee totally off guard. To be fair on Lee, the pontoon bridge over the James River was the longest in history. It was only when both 'Baldy' Smith and Hancock decline to storm Petersburg, that the opportunity to capture it fades away.

As for casualties, your figures are rather wrong. Grant's casualties were 55,000 while Lee suffered 33,500. I would also have to point out the fact that though Lee's army started with 65,141 troops, he received about 45,000 replacements through out the campaign, and had a total of 98,000 troops serve under him throughout the campaign.

 

[BlondieBC]

I think that as a whole the South had better commanders. This isn't necissarily looking only at the big name Generals, since I feel that the debate is a lot closer when looking only at them. But the southern states had far more of a military culture than the north, with so many of the younger plantation owner sons becoming professional military men, so down the ladder the Confederates had better leaders as a whole. So I agree with you.

Kind of unrelated, but I feel like the Lost Cause argument can be misused sometimes. I think that in the most basic sense the Civil War was a lost cause for the South, it never was able to compete with the pure manpower and production capabilities of the north. The fault with the Lost Cause mythos is that they understate the point of slavery in causing the war in favor of states rights (yes, the Civil War was fought over states rights, but it was the debate about a states' right to own slaves that was the big problem). Basically what I'm getting at with my point is that Lost Cause is wrong, but the other side sometimes goes too hard against it.

That roughly matches my understanding. We can argue if the Northern Generals or Southern Generals were better, I side with the Southern by a decent margin. What I have never seen anyone seriously dispute is south had better regimental officers. The field grade officers of South were better due to the military academies and the slave enforcement patrols. It is also the reason the South had better horsemen despite inferior material situation.

 

[Kerney]

I would generalize here and say the Confederates had better tacticians, Lee, but also a large number of Corps and Division commanders.
But, other than Lee, the Army of Tennessee never had a great commander (AS Johnston early and Hardee over Hood might have been those people atl) and the best, Joe Johnston, couldn't get along with Davis and the worst (Hood, Bragg) did so badly that the U.S. Military named major military bases after them undoubtedly to honor their contribution to the Union victory.
Hardee as an Army Commander, with Cleburne as a Corps commander as he deserved would have been awesome.

Fun idea for a PoD. Forrest puts a fatal knife in Bragg's gut after Chickamunga. Does the Confederacy gain or loose from the exchange?

That said, the Union had better strategists from 1863 on. Sherman was not a great general tactically, but the march to the sea was brilliant strategy. Grant wearing down Lee, was great (and he was the Union's best commander) strategy.

 

[Anaxagoras]

What I have never seen anyone seriously dispute is south had better regimental officers. The field grade officers of South were better due to the military academies and the slave enforcement patrols. It is also the reason the South had better horsemen despite inferior material situation.

This is a very important point that is all too often overlooked. I recall reading in the book Two Great Rebel Armies by Richard McMurry (and I don't have the book in front of me, so I might be slightly off) that the South had eight major private military academies like the Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute, while the North had only one. This means that, setting aside the West Point graduates who resigned and joined the Confederacy, there was a core of hundreds of men who had received a solid military education and these were the men who would rise to command of the regiments, brigades, and divisions in the Confederate army. I believe this was the major reason that the South was able to hold out against the North for four years, despite its material disadvantages. When people argue about which side had the better generals, they tend to look at army commanders. Perhaps we should be looking at the brigade level, instead.