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The disastrous German attempt to invade Poland in the Autumn of 1939 has often been a source of derision and even comedy for western audiences, to the extent that the historical record of the German-Polish war itself has been blurred behind an internet blur of bombastic Hitler quotes before cutting to columns of German soldiers being mowed down by a handful of Poles before Germans jump out of their tanks and flee west at the sight of Polish cavalry to the tune of Luciano Michelini's Frolic. It is tempting just to laugh at what was the humiliating epoch of a monstrous regime which had already caused such pain and suffering to countless numbers of its own citizens, and intended to inflict even more on millions across Europe. This was a task they had the potential to accomplish had the early weeks of September gone slightly differently, and it is thus of great importance to understand how exactly Poland pulled off what seemed at the time to be an impossible task.


Prior to 1939, Poland had enjoyed surprisingly cordial relations with Germany, even as the Nazi regime had become increasingly amibtious and threatening in their demands upon their neighours to cede territory lost after the First World War and unite all ethnic Germans under the control of Berlin. Poland potentially fulfilled both of these requirements but had been wary of considering themselves to be Germany's next target, comforting themselves in Hitler's assurances that he saw Poland as an ally against Communism rather than a potential conquest. Poland had even taken a small role in the dismemberment of Czechslovakia in October 1938, having annexed the disputed area of Cieszyn to southern Poland alongside the German annexation of the Sudetenland that had effectively made what was left of Czechoslovakia a German client state. It would be barely a month after that the Germans began making requests on their right to connect the German Reich with East Prussia, that had been divided between the Danzig Corridor, Poland's only access to the sea, at the end of the First World War. The Poles turned down the German requests, only for the Germans to begin to demand a "resolution" to the Danzig Corridor backed up with military threats eerily similar to those made against the Czechs. The Poles continued to refuse, adamant that they would not become another German vassal state. They were reconciled to fight for their independence, even in the knowledge that they would likely only be able to hold off the Germans for a few months.


Most who have even a cursory knowledge of the Battle of Poland will be aware that Poland was badly outnumbered; the Poles could field a million men in September 1939 but these were almost entirely infantry based. What few tanks they had were undergunned and lightly armoured even by the standards of the day and their aircraft were largely obsolete. The country's eight cavalry regiments were the highlight of peacetime military parades but they appeared better suited to fight the last war rather than any impending conflict. The Germans on the other hand could field more than one and half a million men, alongside thousands of tanks concentrated in several mechanised divisions and with a modern air force that would assure complete dominance of the skies when the Germans invaded. To make matters worse, Germany bordered Poland to the north, west, and south by the Autumn of 1939 and had made a secret pact with the Soviet Union on Poland's eastern border that would ensure Poland would be threatened on all sides. These circumstances were not grounds for confidence on the part of the Poles, and despite what has been characterised as obstinate defiance in the face of the German invader, it was in fact a widespread panic at the heart of Poland's military and political establishment that would save the day.


When the Germans annexed the rest of Czechoslovkia in the Spring of 1939, the Polish military came to the realisation that their existing plan for the defence of the country had been rendered useless. The army had always predicated their strategy of fighting on the Polish border on the basis of the west of the country being the centre of Polish industry, however the new German threat from the south meant that such a defensive stance was now far too at risk of inviting encirclement, and the army now focused on a defence based around the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers that lay within the Polish interior. It is quite likely that had the Germans not annexed Czechslovakia that Spring, they would have been able to destroy the Polish army piecemeal on the border. Instead, when the Poles mobilised at the beginning of August their million men in 40 divisions were stationed on the Narew-Vistula-San Axis in compact formation. In this hedgehog of defence it was agreed that the best strategy would be to combine Poland's eight cavalry regiments with the army's only mobile brigade in the hope that a combined reaction force would be expedient in plugging any gaps that might appear in the line. No-one could have guessed that a mobile reserve would become a future staple of modern strategy at that time, for when the Germans invaded it still seemed that the Wehrmacht was the army of the future rather than an object of parody.


When the German invasion began on the first of September, it was in the form of a three-pronged offensive from the north, west and south that the Poles had tailored their strategy to. The Germans advancing east and north were surprised when they encountered only token resistance from local militia units, with their artillery having destroyed empty trenches and the Luftwaffe having left empty airfields full of craters. The German attempt to bomb Warsaw on the opening day of the war was met with contested skies over the city as the Polish air force went up against technically superior Luftwaffe having to operate from a far longer range. Most of the German bombers were dispersed before they could do any significant damage to the city. On that first day the only serious fighting was in the north, where the German Third Army clashed with the Polish Army Group Modlin in what would become known as the Battle of Przasnysz . After two days the Germans were forced to withdraw back to the East Prussian border after heavy fighting against a Polish force that outnumbered them three to one. It was the same day that Great Britain and France joined the war, a morale boost for the Poles that was only dampened by the news that in the south, Krakow had been surrendered without a fight. The next day the Germans reached the Vistula in the north and Lodz in the south. The battle for Poland had truly begun.


In spite of modern interpretations of an elite Polish force entrapping the German hordes, the battle up and down the front over the next four days was an ordeal that drove the Poles close to breaking point. Unlike at Przasnysz the Poles were outnumbered in both the west and south, as the German Fourth Panzer Army faced off against Army Group Chelmno, and the Eigth and Tenth Armies smashed into the Army Groups Bzura and Lodz. The German Luftwaffe had by now gained full control of the skies over Western Poland, and began to plague the Polish defenders from the skies as the German armour went up against Polish infantry who had often had nothing more than small arms and far-off artillery to rely on. The line was held with blood and though German casualties were heavy it was the Poles who were truly sacrificing themselves for every inch of ground, aware that any German breakthrough might spell the end for their country. Time after time the Germans would attempt to cross the Vistula only for their landing parties to be driven back into the blood soaked river. The German Panzers had still not landed on the eastern bank by the time General Erich Hoepner's Tenth Army ground over what was left of Army Group Lodz and began to prepare to envelop the Bzura force, before moving on to Warsaw with Guderian.


This strategy seemed clear to the Germans, but the Poles were more concerned with the fact that Warsaw was almost entirely undefended and concluded that Hoepner was making a dash for the capital. Army Group Bzura withdrew east frantically, whilst the fresh forces of Army Group San withdrew north. The mobile reserve was activated and headed to face the Germans, expected to spend its limited force in holding manoeuvre whilst the contracting Army Groups took their places around Warsaw. Instead they ran straight into a vast German supply dump near Tomaszow, where they took several high ranking prisoners captive. Thanks to poor communications, it was only established on the tenth of September that the General Hoepner they had captured had been in charge of the Tenth Army, which had now been trapped in between the three Polish forces.


In spite of Steven Berkoff's famously outraged portrayal of Hitler learning the news of the Tenth Army's encirclement, it was in fact the Wehrmacht who were panicking the next day. Visiting "liberated" Danzig, the German Fuhrer was rather bemused by the situated, but congratulated his forces on having gotten so close to Warsaw and enquired when the Fourth and Eighth Armies would be able to "resupply" the now beleagured Tenth. A panicked attempt was made that day, however the space left by the Polish withdrawl and their newly entrenched forces were unable to be dislodged from the south. The Poles were stretched thin, now that they were also defending against an encircled pocket of over a hundred thousand German soldiers, however the German Eighth Army had no armoured divisions and was now outnumbered by the Polish defenders to the north and west. In the north, the Fourth Army tried again to cross the Vistula but failed once more. For the next week they would launch five more attempts, each more desperate than the last, until their beleagured commander, General Heinz Guderian, informed Hitler that he had run out of sappers.


The German situation was perilous but remained salvageable, for the Fourteenth Army under General Ernst Busch was making its way north to the rescue having captured much of southern Poland west of the Bug river, his forces now launched their own relief attempt against the Poles southern flank. Once again, the Polish defenders lay down their lives in large numbers until finally Busch broke through on the fifteenth of September and ordered his panzers on as fast as possible towards the increasingly diminished pocket around the Tenth Army. The Second and Fifth Panzer Divisions under his command overran the infantry in their desperation, and joined hands with the German soldiers they had rescued. In the rear, the Polish mobile reserve unleashed the cavalry.


It was a great slaughter, as the German infantry advanced into the Polish sabres, unaware that there were any Poles left to fight. Army Group Lublin, solely responsible for the defence of Poland's eastern border, now counter-attacked at the backs of the Polish cavalry, before knocking back a desperate counter-attack by Busch's two Panzer divisions who had realised far too late that they had unwittingly entrapped themselves. The Lublin Poles held, and as the dust settled on the 16th of September, Busch was forced to limp back with his shattered army.


The German army had been robbed of most of its armour, and what was left of its offensive capability had been torn to shreds through repeated and costly attacks. Even the Luftwaffe, largely unchallenged from the air, had been forced to cannibalise many of its aircraft in an attempt to maintain as many sorties as possible. It hadn't all been for nought, the Polish army had suffered well over two hundred thousand dead and an even larger number wounded or missing. Had the Germans been able to renew their offensive, the Poles would surely have broken, but the Wehrmacht couldn't hope to do so before the beginning of the Autumn rains that would turn the Polish scenery into one large swamp. What was left of the Tenth Army surrendered on the 17th of September.


Hitler now cordially invited the Soviets to fulfill their promise to invade Poland from the east, only to receive a non-committal reply. As it turned out, the Soviet Union had no interest in rescuing the Germans whom they had expected would be able to walk over Poland for them. The only new offensive that took place that Autumn was by the French.


When contemplating the scale of the Polish victory through the mists of time it is easy to see why it is so easy to ridicule the Wehrmacht for their failure to defeat what was in every quantitative measure an inferior force but it does seem to take something away from that mixture of luck, panic, desperation, and sacrifice that drove the Polish army to victory. Though in what is still a heavily Catholic country, this second miracle of the Vistula has been celebrated ever since, it is hard not to see the blood that once turned the banks as red as the Nile.
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