Which one was more crucial and decisive: United States intervention in WWI, or WWII?

More important/decisive/crucial/critical?

  • US intervention in First World War

    Votes: 67 23.7%
  • US intervention in Second World War

    Votes: 133 47.0%
  • Both are crucial/critical

    Votes: 60 21.2%
  • Neither, the Entente and the Allies would stil win in WWI and WWII respectively

    Votes: 23 8.1%

  • Total voters
    283

Redbeard

Banned
All the resources in the world don't help if you can't deliver them where you need to. Hence the importance of the railway systems.[1] .

Exactly, which is why the attacker will be in much bigger trouble.

BTW even if the BEF manages to pull back behind the Somme (imho far from certain) it's still worse off logistically. Previously, half of it was supplied via Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, the other half via Rouen, Le Havre and Dieppe. If it pulls back as it hoped to, it has to write off the first three of those ports. That means that totally reequipping it is going to be an even harder job.



Huh?

I didn't know it was a "legend" that Ludendorff was a somewhat second-rate commander. I had always understood that to be a reasonably well-established fact.


[1] Horses were also important, but a high proportion of these were imported from the US, so in a "No US" situation the Entente will also have fewer of them than OTL.

Same comment as above, the attacking army will be in worse logistic condition.

I take you next question my phrase "Dolkenstosslegende" (Stab in the back legend). That has nothing specifically to do with Ludendorf, but refers to a very popular legend in the interwar years in Germany basically saying that the German army was perfectly fine by November 1918, but that a conspiracy from inside had it collapse. Hitler very much used this legend to gain support for his quest for resurrecting German pride, but since 1945 huge loads of serious historic research has showed that the German army was a spent ball very short into the spring offensive of 1918 and that Germany by that time fast was closing on a disaster - people were starving as food production declined due to no fertilisers. horses or people to work the land.

But back to the origin of this discussion: the significance of US actions on WWI.

We will probably not agree, and why should we, but basically my claim still is:

The US intervention was not significant in the Entente stopping the German Spring offensive of 1918 and thus eliminating the last (if any) chance of a CP victory.

The loans and supplies going from USA to the Entente would have been flowing in some form anyway, perhaps at a higher price, but no matter the rethorics no US Government would allow the Entente to collapse. Likewise Alanbrooke wasn't significant in WWII for not strangling Churchill even though he often was very annoyed with him ;)

Put in another way - WWI would in most "reruns" be won by the Entente even if USA doesn't get militarily involved, as long as USA just follow its basic political interests. That can't be said about WWII, here US military intervention was indeed significant.
 
I take you next question my phrase "Dolkenstosslegende" (Stab in the back legend). That has nothing specifically to do with Ludendorf, but refers to a very popular legend in the interwar years in Germany basically saying that the German army was perfectly fine by November 1918, but that a conspiracy from inside had it collapse. Hitler very much used this legend to gain support for his quest for resurrecting German pride, but since 1945 huge loads of serious historic research has showed that the German army was a spent ball very short into the spring offensive of 1918 and that Germany by that time fast was closing on a disaster - people were starving as food production declined due to no fertilisers. horses or people to work the land.



I'm perfectly familiar with the term, but couldn't quite make out what relevance it had to Zabecki, whose book is about the German offensives in the earlier part of the year, not about the runup to the Armistice.




The loans and supplies going from USA to the Entente would have been flowing in some form anyway, perhaps at a higher price, but no matter the rethorics no US Government would allow the Entente to collapse.
In March/April 1917 the Wilson Administration had no expectation of an Entente collapse. As far as they knew they were joining the winning side. In fact, the Entente was in worse shape than it looked in various ways, but this was unknown in Washington until the US was committed to war. In the Winter of 1916/17 Wilson was getting quite concerned that financial considerations were tying America too closely to the Entente, and opposed unsecured loans for precisely that reason. He knew of course that a recession was likely when the wartime orders stopped, but this was likely whenever the war ended and whoever won it.
 

Redbeard

Banned
In March/April 1917 the Wilson Administration had no expectation of an Entente collapse. As far as they knew they were joining the winning side. In fact, the Entente was in worse shape than it looked in various ways, but this was unknown in Washington until the US was committed to war. In the Winter of 1916/17 Wilson was getting quite concerned that financial considerations were tying America too closely to the Entente, and opposed unsecured loans for precisely that reason. He knew of course that a recession was likely when the wartime orders stopped, but this was likely whenever the war ended and whoever won it.

Exactly - they were joining the winning side :D

But being more serious, Wilson's "threats" in this context were rather free. If it had come to a situation, where the Entente were in desperate need for US loans and supplies but USA was not in a position to enter the war, I'm certain they would have found a way - like they did in WWII until Tojo and Hitler cut the crap and declared war. In many ways US isolationism appeared much stronger in before WWII than before WWI.

I agree that the Entente had a crisis in 1917, but we probably disagree about how serious. The British indeed had serious problem with U-boat sinking merchant ships in early 1917, but basically the problem was solved by introducing the convoy system, not by a new ally adding extra resources. The French had to give up all hopes of attacking the Germans into submission, but the French army at no time was close to collapsing, and the most significant factor to its resurrection also was internal - Petain etc.

I in no way negate, that it must have given the Entente fresh hope that they could expect millions of fresh American troops and that this was exploited fully in propaganda - on both sides of the Atlantic - I just don't see any signs of an Entente collapse.

In Germany however, the effects of the blockade started to hurt for serious and would only get worse day for day. The collapse of Russia gave some hope and freed up extra Divisions but not enough quality troops to have a realistic chance of pushing the Entente into collapse by 1918.

IMHO the best chance of a CP victory was in 1914 - if the French stumble in the first battle of the Marne. It quite a chaotic encounter battle - anything could happen. Again, not so much the operational consequences, but the political panic of 1870 appearing one more time.

Had Russia collapsed one year earlier (but I'm in doubt how plausible that would be), a major offensive coinciding with a U-boat crisis and French mutiny and perhaps a Wilson overdoing his public Entente-sceptisism - might bring about the political panic in the Entente to end the war on favourable conditions for the CP. OTOH I'm certain Wilson in such a situation would be very careful not to overplay his anti-Entente role.

All in all I think the most implausible outcome of OTL WWI was the Germans beating back the Russians in 1914, and 15 and 16. It was a huge gamble to hope to keep the Russians back until the French were beaten and it only happened because of incredible Russian incompetence. A plan counting on the enemy doin certain things, certainly when that includes incompetence, is a very vulnerable plan.
 

Deleted member 1487

You're forgetting the blockade on the CPs only became airtight and really dangerous with US entry, cutting off trade at the source and bringing a whole new navy and source of political leverage to shut down transhipments. Also the British had run out of money to enforce to blacklist by buying up excess international trade. So without the US entry in 1917 Germany's trade position is vastly better than IOTL. Plus without USW, which is a precondition for no US intervention, then the merchant submarine fleet buying built by private companies can be finished and export to the US:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_Deutschland
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_submarine#Other_boats
 
I agree the Spring Offensive was the last shot for the CP in our history - but it seems mad to assume the Germans will gamble quite so hard when there's not quite so pressing a need to attack. Which extends the war, and maybe results in Germany mopping up Salonika or somesuch rather than going for the high-risk & high-reward target in the West.

The question therefore becomes, to me: can the Entente obliterate the German army if it doesn't throw away all its best troops in a single gamble?

And about that, I have my doubts.
 
You're forgetting the blockade on the CPs only became airtight and really dangerous with US entry, cutting off trade at the source and bringing a whole new navy and source of political leverage to shut down transhipments. Also the British had run out of money to enforce to blacklist by buying up excess international trade. So without the US entry in 1917 Germany's trade position is vastly better than IOTL. Plus without USW, which is a precondition for no US intervention, then the merchant submarine fleet buying built by private companies can be finished and export to the US:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_Deutschland
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_submarine#Other_boats

They are an interesting aside but their cargo capacity is not great so while they can bring in an amount of critical supplies and can circumvent a blockade, but I can't imagine that they would break it by any stretch. I would have thought that trying to build enough merchant submarines to replace the surface traffic and lift the blockade would have 3 significant effects:
1) Takes up steel production that could be better used for war production
2) Although privately financed, that same private finance would otherwise be buying government bonds resulting in less money in Germany's war chest
3) Encourages the Royal Navy to improve on their Anti-Submarine capabilities, which as the submarines could not be stopped and inspected in the normal way, would lead to them being forced to the surface with depth charges, (or the WWI equivalent of such), and if they refuse to surface and stop they're liable to be sunk. That's assuming that the Royal Navy don't just sink them out of hand.
 

Deleted member 1487

They are an interesting aside but their cargo capacity is not great so while they can bring in an amount of critical supplies and can circumvent a blockade, but I can't imagine that they would break it by any stretch. I would have thought that trying to build enough merchant submarines to replace the surface traffic and lift the blockade would have 3 significant effects:
1) Takes up steel production that could be better used for war production
2) Although privately financed, that same private finance would otherwise be buying government bonds resulting in less money in Germany's war chest
3) Encourages the Royal Navy to improve on their Anti-Submarine capabilities, which as the submarines could not be stopped and inspected in the normal way, would lead to them being forced to the surface with depth charges, (or the WWI equivalent of such), and if they refuse to surface and stop they're liable to be sunk. That's assuming that the Royal Navy don't just sink them out of hand.

Not by themselves, but by being able to get things out to the US it does remind them of what they are foregoing to allow the British blockade; likely Wilson breaks the blockade by the end of 1917 to restore trade and force an end to the war by bringing the Entente to the negotiation table; Wilson had had it with the Entente refusing to negotiate and wanted to restore normal trade with Europe that the blockade was preventing; as the Entente runs out of cash to buy then the cut off CP market is much more attractive, especially as their chemical industry had things to sell to the US that the US needed.

Otherwise your points don't really hold water; why would merchant subs encourage the Brits to do any better at anti-sub warfare when they were already badly threatened by the Uboat threat? That changes nothing. The merchant subs actually brought more into the German economy than they took out, because the cost to build them was returned several fold by the value of the cargo they brought back each run, while the money used to build them is spent at a German manufacturer, so doesn't exit the economy; I have no idea where you get the idea that by building private items there is less money in the economy. Also by this point the government was financing the war by printing money so bond issues weren't a problem. The value of the steel for the subs was less than a drop in the bucket of overall steel production/consumption. The value they brought in FAR exceeded what was spent.
 

Redbeard

Banned
You're forgetting the blockade on the CPs only became airtight and really dangerous with US entry, cutting off trade at the source and bringing a whole new navy and source of political leverage to shut down transhipments. Also the British had run out of money to enforce to blacklist by buying up excess international trade. So without the US entry in 1917 Germany's trade position is vastly better than IOTL. Plus without USW, which is a precondition for no US intervention, then the merchant submarine fleet buying built by private companies can be finished and export to the US:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_Deutschland
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_submarine#Other_boats

The blockade was as tight as it could get and the USN force joining the Grand Fleet made no real difference and BTW found out they were way behind the RN in doctrines and gunnery.

NB: Won't reply for a couple of days, go on a business trip.
 

Asami

Banned
Had the USA kept its snout out of WW1 there would have been no WW2.

Pretty bloody sure that we were the ones who suggested that the Allies go easy on Germany and not shove a dictative treaty down it's throat; the French government wanted no such part of an idea, and rammed the Versailles Treaty down Germany's throat.

Don't blame us for that.

My opinion is that the U.S. was pretty important to both (no matter how many European ultra-nationalists cry and argue the US was ebul sobsob crycry); but I believe the US' intervention was far more decisive in World War II than World War I. Yes, the Soviet Union absorbed the majority of the manpower losses in World War II; nobody's saying the Russians didn't do their fair share of the war and moreso -- but the US was a pretty instrumental part to the post-war reconstruction, and an important source of money, guns, and other things.
 
Exactly - they were joining the winning side :D

But being more serious, Wilson's "threats" in this context were rather free. If it had come to a situation, where the Entente were in desperate need for US loans and supplies but USA was not in a position to enter the war, I'm certain they would have found a way - like they did in WWII until Tojo and Hitler cut the crap and declared war. In many ways US isolationism appeared much stronger in before WWII than before WWI.

But when does he become aware that the Entente is in desperate need?

Probably only with the German offensive in 1918 - whether that still occurs in March or a bit later - and by then it's probably too late to consider intervening, as the issue will be decided before he can do anything.




I agree that the Entente had a crisis in 1917, but we probably disagree about how serious. The British indeed had serious problem with U-boat sinking merchant ships in early 1917, but basically the problem was solved by introducing the convoy system, not by a new ally adding extra resources.
Actually the convoy system could have been seriously delayed without the participation of the US Navy.

But in any case, if lack of credit in the US is forcing the Entente to import from places two or three times as far away, that cuts the number of voyages that each ship can make by a corresponding factor. So you get a reduction in supplies far greater than the U-boats ever came near achieving - and one moreover which convoys can do nothing to rectify.


The French had to give up all hopes of attacking the Germans into submission, but the French army at no time was close to collapsing, and the most significant factor to its resurrection also was internal - Petain etc.
But what is Petain waiting for without the US?

The Entente holds no German soil bar a tiny sliver of Alsace and some mostly worthless scraps of colonial territory. OTOH Germany holds virtually all Belgium and a massive chunk of France, not to mention extensive conquests in the East. So a stalemate is effectively a defeat.

This was the crucial effect of US intervention. It "turned the war around" and put time on the side of the Entente instead of the CP. It was now the Entente which need only hang in, until the arrival of American manpower rendered them invincible. Hence Ludendorff's gamble in 1918.


Had Russia collapsed one year earlier (but I'm in doubt how plausible that would be), a major offensive coinciding with a U-boat crisis and French mutiny and perhaps a Wilson overdoing his public Entente-sceptisism - might bring about the political panic in the Entente to end the war on favourable conditions for the CP. OTOH I'm certain Wilson in such a situation would be very careful not to overplay his anti-Entente role.
It mightn't have needed to be a year. Had it happened any time before Germany committed herself to USW that would give the opponents a far stronger hand - why saddle themselves with a new enemy when they might well be about to lose an old one? And no USW means no declaration of war, whatever private sympatgies Wilson might have.
 

Deleted member 1487

The blockade was as tight as it could get and the USN force joining the Grand Fleet made no real difference and BTW found out they were way behind the RN in doctrines and gunnery.

NB: Won't reply for a couple of days, go on a business trip.
Ah no, Germany was transshipping and spending money throughout the 1914-1916 period, its only in 1917 after the US joined that it got tight.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany#Effects_during_the_war
Even in 1916 they were still getting nearly 50% of pre-war imports and exports were at 53%.
The big problems Germany was having was self inflicted due to the Hindenburg Programm that caused the Coal Crisis of 1916, which caused the Transport Crisis, and then the Turnip Winter. Once they dropped that things got a lot better, even with the US entry dropping imports even more.
 
Otherwise your points don't really hold water; why would merchant subs encourage the Brits to do any better at anti-sub warfare when they were already badly threatened by the Uboat threat?

That was an interesting response and aside from the above I'm pretty much happy to concede the points as they make a great deal of sense.

Regarding the above the answer is both simple and ultimately complex.

Money.

Not so much the amount that they actually brought in as the British wouldn't have that information, it's more the fear of what they can do. Actual combat submarines were no real threat, the vast majority of that threat dissipated with the introduction of the convoy system, especially as realistically the Submarines, (on all sides), would need to surface to have any real effect. Against an escorted convoy, they would be committing suicide.

The merchant subs on the other hand don't have to surface, so unlike regular vessels that could be stopped, boarded and seized, these couldn't. They instill a fear of the unknown. While in terms of what they can actually do is going to be not that great, the effect they will have on the Admiralty is going to be out of all proportion.
Britain is an Island Nation, command of the seas back then was beyond vital, hence the huge Navy, bigger than the next two largest Navies combined.
Work on underwater noise detection was already underway by 1915 so if the fear factor is high enough, the motivation is there to push. Depth charges, while not great at this point, were in use. All the RN really need at this point is a rough way to aim them at any Submarine.
I suppose attacking Merchant shipping without the opportunity was a bit naughty, (these days piracy or a war crime), but as the RN are likley to believe that they will win, they would just go ahead and brush it under the carpet afterwards. Not nice, but then neither is war and fear is quite the driver.
 

Deleted member 1487

That was an interesting response and aside from the above I'm pretty much happy to concede the points as they make a great deal of sense.

Regarding the above the answer is both simple and ultimately complex.

Money.

Not so much the amount that they actually brought in as the British wouldn't have that information, it's more the fear of what they can do. Actual combat submarines were no real threat, the vast majority of that threat dissipated with the introduction of the convoy system, especially as realistically the Submarines, (on all sides), would need to surface to have any real effect. Against an escorted convoy, they would be committing suicide.

The merchant subs on the other hand don't have to surface, so unlike regular vessels that could be stopped, boarded and seized, these couldn't. They instill a fear of the unknown. While in terms of what they can actually do is going to be not that great, the effect they will have on the Admiralty is going to be out of all proportion.
Britain is an Island Nation, command of the seas back then was beyond vital, hence the huge Navy, bigger than the next two largest Navies combined.
Work on underwater noise detection was already underway by 1915 so if the fear factor is high enough, the motivation is there to push. Depth charges, while not great at this point, were in use. All the RN really need at this point is a rough way to aim them at any Submarine.
I suppose attacking Merchant shipping without the opportunity was a bit naughty, (these days piracy or a war crime), but as the RN are likley to believe that they will win, they would just go ahead and brush it under the carpet afterwards. Not nice, but then neither is war and fear is quite the driver.

That's the problem though, you cannot really hunt down individual subs with 1918 tech. You can negate their combat potential by guarding their targets (arming merchant ships, Q-ships, convoys), but not target them in the Atlantic or North Sea, which is why they tried to put the Dover and North Sea Barrage in place (only viable with US entry).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Sea_Mine_Barrage

Even in WW2 until 1943 with the advent of advanced ASV radar from aircraft and ULTRA intelligence the Hunter-Killer groups were a huge failure and cost the British dearly by leaving convoys under escorted. Its a fools errand to try and put together HK groups in 1917-18 and would in fact make the killer Uboats hunts easier as there are less British ships escorting convoys, while bleeding off surface ships to fight/screen the large German surface fleet.

Merchant Uboats are effectively untouchable by hunting surface ships, but are still vulnerable to mines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-boat_Campaign_(World_War_I)#Allied_countermeasures
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-boat_Campaign_(World_War_I)#cite_note-Tarrant_p24-16 Offensive measures were less effective; efforts were made to use nets to find submerged U-boats, and explosive sweeps to destroy them, but these were largely failures.[17] Attempts were also made to close routes like the Straits of Dover with boom nets and minefields, the so-called Dover Barrage; to lay minefields around U-boat bases, and station submarines on patrol to catch them leaving or entering port. These measures required a huge expenditure of effort and material, but met with little success. Just 2 U-boats were sunk by these measures in 1915.[16]
 
Another important point to any (even sporadic) contact between the CP and USA is that the British spin doctoring will be much harder if the CP/Germans can inject their own newspapers and such into the American conciense.

Blaming the Hun for everything and the neighboors dead cat is all good and dandy as long as the Germans can not retaliate. That was also one point for the extended colonial adventures of the Entente. As they cut the German radio towers that could theoreticaly reach someone of the other side of the pond.


As for finding the subs? Hard in a WWI scenario. There is no radar and little to no arial recon. So the Subs should be relatively save.
 
The Soviets will probably not stop with Germany and Italy after the end of the war without US involvement. They will need to liberate France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other locations. I imagine they will want to wipe out any trace of fascism and Hitler's allies in Europe after marching on Berlin in 1946. Fascist Spain will be a target too and wiped out by 1947. All of continental Europe will be under Soviet occupation by 1948. The USSR probably makes satellite states out of most of them, establishes communist governments, and does the same for western European colonies in Asia and Africa. Non-British Africa is pretty much all communist by the 1950's.

A neutral US probably means that Britain signs an armistice by 1943 because it doesn't have the resources needed to fight on.

The Soviet Union will detonate the atomic bomb first. British spies probably inform the Americans who are concerned with the creation of such a new weapon. The British Empire pulls its resources to detonate its own atomic bomb to counter the threat of the Soviets.

The Japanese will control French Indochina, Dutch colonies, and coastal China. Just like in OTL, the Reds will support communist insurgents in China, Vietnam, and other places. Japan will have decades of guerrilla war in its newly acquired territories. It'll probably make an attempt at nuclear weapons too after learning that the Soviets and British have them as well. Perhaps it even uses them in parts of China and Indochina to serve as a warning to end communist resistance. Hanoi may be nuked in another version of the Vietnam War.
 
The blockade was as tight as it could get and the USN force joining the Grand Fleet made no real difference.



It wasn't the USN that strengthened the blockade. It was the fact that the main loophole in it was the Northern Neutrals (the Scandinavian countries plus Holland), which got most of their imports from the US.

This meant that the US, once in the war, could control supplies to the NN at source, by imposing export regulations, thus making a naval blockade of those countries largely superfluous. As a result, following US entry into the war, American exports to the NN dropped to less than 10% of the 1915-16 figure, and in 1918 Dutch food deliveries to Germany almost halted.


See D Stevenson 1914-1918, Ch16, pp454-5
 
This meant that the US, once in the war, could control supplies to the NN at source, by imposing export regulations, thus making a naval blockade of those countries largely superfluous. As a result, following US entry into the war, American exports to the NN dropped to less than 10% of the 1915-16 figure, and in 1918 Dutch food deliveries to Germany almost halted.

See D Stevenson 1914-1918, Ch16, pp454-5

Weren't you rather critical of the RN blockade policy re neutrals?:)
 
I see the difference before and after USA entry as such:
before the RN hindered the trade between neutrals. Yes it would (highly likely) end up in Germany. But still.

After the belingerent did stop its trade with a neutral. That is the decicion of the belingerent USA. Not that of the belingerent Britain imposed on neutrals.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Soviets will probably not stop with Germany and Italy after the end of the war without US involvement. They will need to liberate France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other locations. I imagine they will want to wipe out any trace of fascism and Hitler's allies in Europe after marching on Berlin in 1946. Fascist Spain will be a target too and wiped out by 1947. All of continental Europe will be under Soviet occupation by 1948. The USSR probably makes satellite states out of most of them, establishes communist governments, and does the same for western European colonies in Asia and Africa. Non-British Africa is pretty much all communist by the 1950's.

A neutral US probably means that Britain signs an armistice by 1943 because it doesn't have the resources needed to fight on.

The Soviet Union will detonate the atomic bomb first. British spies probably inform the Americans who are concerned with the creation of such a new weapon. The British Empire pulls its resources to detonate its own atomic bomb to counter the threat of the Soviets.

The Japanese will control French Indochina, Dutch colonies, and coastal China. Just like in OTL, the Reds will support communist insurgents in China, Vietnam, and other places. Japan will have decades of guerrilla war in its newly acquired territories. It'll probably make an attempt at nuclear weapons too after learning that the Soviets and British have them as well. Perhaps it even uses them in parts of China and Indochina to serve as a warning to end communist resistance. Hanoi may be nuked in another version of the Vietnam War.

The Soviet economy was half that of the Germans in 1942 due to their economic losses, it was US and UK LL that kept them going and eventually turned them into a juggernaught in 1944-45; without US intervention the UK cannot supply the USSR and they go into famine in 1943 while their economy continues to collapse instead of recovers. Without LL Britain is definitely out in 1942 then the 50% of its military spending Germany was doing to fight Britain until then can be shoved into anti-Soviet weaponry; IOTL the Germans spent so much on FLAK they could have doubled their artillery park without US or UK strategic bombing from 1942 on. Also they could have used all that captured Soviet material against the Soviets rather than as makeshift AAA. Then add in all the extra stuff the Italians could send east, especially merchant shipping. Without US entry or LL then the Finns would be willing to be more aggressive in their help against Murmansk and Leningrad.
In WW2 the game changes if its the Axis vs. just the Soviets without LL. For one thing the collective European Axis/occupied territories had an economy several times higher than the USSR even while it was getting LL and Europe was blockaded; remove the UK from the war and LL, then the Axis is not blockaded and able to import they have an economy in Europe that is 4-5x higher than the USSR by 1942.
 
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