Which of these potential US Presidents in 1945 would have used atomic bombs against Japan?

Which of these potential US Presidents would have used atomic bombs against Japan in 1945?


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Neither the Casablanca or Cairo Declarations were binding on the US President or Congress. Whether Okinawa or Formosa were included in post was Japan was a detail few Americans cared about. The President was free to negotiate whatever terms he desired. As Wilson learned the Senate would have its say over them but that is how it would have played out. FDR cared about China and Chaing most Americans did not. Surrender of the IJA And IJN would have been enough for most Americans.
I don't think this is true at all.
 
Truman did not negotiate with Japan. After the bombs were dropped, Japan said they would surrender on the condition that it did not prejudice the prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler, and Truman responded by saying that the authority of the emperor would be subject to Allied command. Notably that does not promise to allow the emperor to remain in place. It was deliberately worded in an ambiguous way so the Allies could use the emperor if he cooperated or remove him if he didn't. Before the bombs were dropped Japan, the Japanese ambassador to the USSR told the war cabinet that it was unlikely that the Soviets would mediate, and that even if they did the best Japan would get would be keeping the emperor in a ceremonial role as part of an otherwise unconditional surrender; the Japanese government rejected this. Without either the bombs or Operation Downfall, you're not going to get a peace that the Allies would find acceptable, and there were very few Americans in 1945 who would have chosen operation Downfall over dropping Little Boy and Fat Man.

It is true that no "promise" was made. But the statement from the Allies was issued knowing that the Japanese would interpret this as allowing the Emperor to remain on the throne, which is ultimately what occurred. This in contrast to simply saying, "no," or ignoring Japan's request — either of which the Allies could have chosen to do. Saying that, "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms," effectively allows the Emperor to remain in power at least temporarily following the surrender. This isn't quite violating unconditional surrender, as it is not expressly indicated that Japan is surrendering on the condition that the imperial system remain in tact, but it removed the one remaining obstacle to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.

I agree that, behind the scenes, the U.S. played with the Unconditional Surrender idea, the Postsdam Declaration itself was actually a set of conditions, But a wink and a nod that "we aren't going to hang Hirohito on the Ellipse on Thanksgiving Day" is a LONG WAY from allowing them to retain large areas of territory belonging to what had been stated was a major U.S. Ally.

With this, I agree. But is there any evidence that Taft actually proposed such a nonsensical course of action?
 
I don’t really see how Truman allowing Japan to keep their emperor makes it a conditional surrender. Unconditional surrender made it so that the allies got to dictate the terms of surrender, and I was under the impression Truman kept the emperor for domestic stability, and to allow MacArthur to govern through Hirohito as a proxy. This decision seemed more like a calculated realpolitik decision that the benefits outweighed the costs, versus then conceding to Japan.
 

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It is true that no "promise" was made. But the statement from the Allies was issued knowing that the Japanese would interpret this as allowing the Emperor to remain on the throne, which is ultimately what occurred. This in contrast to simply saying, "no," or ignoring Japan's request — either of which the Allies could have chosen to do. Saying that, "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms," effectively allows the Emperor to remain in power at least temporarily following the surrender. This isn't quite violating unconditional surrender, as it is not expressly indicated that Japan is surrendering on the condition that the imperial system remain in tact, but it removed the one remaining obstacle to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.



With this, I agree. But is there any evidence that Taft actually proposed such a nonsensical course of action?
Taft wasn't even in the mix for the nomination in 1944. He had, however indicated he was in favor of a negotiated end of the War Against Japan.

He was an interesting guy in a lot of ways. HATED the Internment of Japanese-Americans, opposed, strenuously, the Nuremberg Trials as a concept, vigorously opposed the Marshall Plan and NATO (props for consistency, he was an"isolationist" pre WW II, and that little kerfuffle did nothing to change his perspective) and late in his life (he died in 1953) he introduced a bill that would have defunded the U.S. war in Korea.

Pretty much wanted to pretend the rest of the world didn't really matter.

I don’t really see how Truman allowing Japan to keep their emperor makes it a conditional surrender. Unconditional surrender made it so that the allies got to dictate the terms of surrender, and I was under the impression Truman kept the emperor for domestic stability, and to allow MacArthur to govern through Hirohito as a proxy. This decision seemed more like a calculated realpolitik decision that the benefits outweighed the costs, versus then conceding to Japan.
Very much so. Still, a surprising number of people in the U.S., and from I've read even more in Australia and the UK, were really unhappy that Hirohito was "let off the hook". To this day his role in the conduct of the war is more than somewhat controversial. Some see him as a tragic figure who really didn't have any control until he finally made a stand at the very end; other see him a being, at minimum, a willing passenger on the war machine, and at maximum a cheerleader who, to the end, was mainly concerned about his own skin. Truth is somewhere in the middle, but exactly where? Open Question.

The Army he "commanded" as Commander in Chief matched the Waffen SS atrocity for atrocity, including running the largest scale organized mass rape scheme the world has ever seen (and hopefully ever will see) which sort of makes him a Category A War Criminal if he was actually in charge. The flip side of the coin is that his senior Army and Navy officers ignored his orders on an ongoing basis, including his decision to end the War. His War Minister was trying to find a way to wiggle out until the Emperor recorded his address to the Japanese people, same goes for his Navy Minister and much of the rest of the High Command. Even his field grade officers frequently thought themselves to be above taking orders from superiors (Yamashita ordered the officer in charge of defending Manila to declare it an Open City and withdraw to the main defensive positions to the north. He refused destroyed much of the city in the fighting while his personnel went totally medieval on the population of the City). That being the case was Hirohito even somewhat in charge?
 
I don't think this is true at all.
The Constitution imposes no limits on the President's ability to negotiate such terms as he or she desires "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur"
 
The Constitution imposes no limits on the President's ability to negotiate such terms as he or she desires "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur"
Legally, sure, but politically no. The US President exists inside a complex network power politics both internally and externally. This was never more true then the waning days of WW2.
 
And why would they?
There is a huge leap between "The Senate rejecting the treaty" and "impeaching the President of the US on the charge of treason because he tries to negotiate the end of the war." Whether it would be a good idea or not , it wouldn't be treason. It is the prerogative of the President to negotiate treaties and the Senate to ratify them or reject them not to impeach him for treason if they don't like the terms.
 
All of them. The debate over the Bomb came later, not in the moment.
It’s interesting that one of the greatest moral decision debates of our time, really wasn’t even a debate. I can’t see how one who truly studies the political situation in August 1945, can possibly criticize Truman for his decision.
 
It’s interesting that one of the greatest moral decision debates of our time, really wasn’t even a debate. I can’t see how one who truly studies the political situation in August 1945, can possibly criticize Truman for his decision.
The fact that it wasn't a debate at the time, doesn't mean it isn't a worthy one to discuss or linger over. We are far better placed then Truman was to consider the finer points of the usage of nuclear weapons. He, or any other president, had virtually no choice and would be forced by circumstance to use these dreadful weapons.
 
Taft wasn't even in the mix for the nomination in 1944. He had, however indicated he was in favor of a negotiated end of the War Against Japan.

He was an interesting guy in a lot of ways. HATED the Internment of Japanese-Americans, opposed, strenuously, the Nuremberg Trials as a concept, vigorously opposed the Marshall Plan and NATO (props for consistency, he was an"isolationist" pre WW II, and that little kerfuffle did nothing to change his perspective) and late in his life (he died in 1953) he introduced a bill that would have defunded the U.S. war in Korea.

Pretty much wanted to pretend the rest of the world didn't really matter.

Well, at least on internment he was correct. Interestingly his uncompromising isolationism cost Taft the presidency. Had Taft agreed to support NATO, Eisenhower would not have run in 1952. Taft would have been nominated and he might even have been elected given the unpopularity of the Korean War.
 
Legally, sure, but politically no. The US President exists inside a complex network power politics both internally and externally. This was never more true then the waning days of WW2.
Obviously the President lives in a political zoo. I would suggest the waning days of WW2 were not particularly political, Remember the July 28, 1945 Senate vote approving teh UN Charter was 89-2.
 
I don't know if this has been bought up by others, but the mass bombing of Japanese cities and resultant civilian casualties was already well underway with the firebombings, of which LeMay was an enthusiastic proponent. There was no particular will to not use them; the few who objected were dismissed as timewaster, cranks or worse. So the simple answer is: all of them.
 
I would think all of them, though I've not ticked the three whose names I don't recognise.

Why would they not?
I think this probably explains, more than anything, the percentage differences. I also think anyone would have used them, but did not check the names I did not recognize.
 
I don't know if this has been bought up by others, but the mass bombing of Japanese cities and resultant civilian casualties was already well underway with the firebombings, of which LeMay was an enthusiastic proponent. There was no particular will to not use them; the few who objected were dismissed as timewaster, cranks or worse. So the simple answer is: all of them.

While the question of whether the atomic bombs were needed to force Japan's surrender is certainly an important one to answer, I don't think any American President would not have dropped at least one bomb on Japan. The U.S. had spent two billion dollars on a weapon that, if used, could bring the war to a quicker end. It is worth noting that in Truman's diary, which you can read online through the Truman library, the President wrote that he viewed Hiroshima as a military - not a civilian - target due to the presence of a military base in the city. Until the bomb's first usage, the full extent of the atomic bomb's destructive capability was not known. As far as the Americans were concerned, the atomic bomb was a weapon that was just as appropriate to use in war as any other. Only after it was deployed against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the bomb's horrific effects known, and Truman ordered a halt to the bombings. As Japan surrendered on August 15, this prevented a third bomb from being used on August 19.

It is possible that a different President would have ordered a demonstration of the bomb first before using it militarily; this was suggested at the time by scientists like Leo Szilard and Robert Oppenheimer. However, no American President would have refused to use the bombs at all. I agree with historians who argue that even without the atomic bombs, Operation Downfall was not likely to take place anyway due to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria (which ruined Japan's strategy to fight a war of attrition with the Allies and use the Soviets as mediators) as well as effectiveness of Operation Starvation in bringing Japan's economy to its knees (making it impossible for Japan to hold out until November 1945 when the dreaded invasion was supposed to take place). But Americans were still fighting Japan in the Pacific when the atomic bombs were dropped. Civilians were still dying under Japan's oppressive rule in China and Korea. Millions of Japanese were expected to starve due to the American blockade. From the viewpoint of the U.S., the atomic bomb - while horrible - was a way to prevent further suffering by shocking Japan into an earlier surrender.

While the usage of the bomb could have played out differently, the answer to the OP's question - as many have said before me - is "all of them."
 
If anything, some of them might have used more depending on who was still in their administration. i.e. maybe Kyoto burns if Stimson isn't in the President's Cabinet for whatever reason...
 
Suffice it to say one can ask questions about the morality of the use of nuclear weapons on Japan without taking any opinion on the answers - but even if you think it was a wicked act, it was a wicked act that had broad, bipartisan support and years of historical precedent.
 
Yep, and this was at a time when JCS was expecting it to be not noticeably worse than Okinawa (40,000 KIA, 150,000 WIA) for BOTH Olympic and Coronet and estimates gave the Olympic landing/follow-on force a numerical advantage.
I never understood where that estimate came from or the methodology behind it. In fact, if we actually go through the math it suggests that there would be 2,000 more KIAs but 20,000 fewer wounded on the Kanto plain than in southern Kyushu. It looks like someone's wild guess written on the back of a napkin in order to placate Truman at a time when the Army was concerned the President's support for the invasion might be wavering.

On the other hand, if we look at the Army Service Force's actual planning documents from around that time it's immediately obvious they expected things to go much differently. From "History of Planning Division, ASF" vol. 7, part 7 - "Redeployment of the United States Army after the Defeat of Germany" (15 January 1945):

Replacements for Battle Casualties - The estimated average rate of replacements required for dead and evacuated wounded during the 18 months of the redeployment period is 43,000 per month.​
- p. 330​

This is for the Army only during the period from July 1945 to December 1946, and presumably doesn't include wounded who could have been treated in-theater and returned to their units within the 30-day (later 120-day) limit.

In part 8, from pages 372 to 374 there is a detailed breakdown of projected Army strength in the various active theaters vs. Japan, and page 391 gives the replacement and rotation schedule from the mainland United States. If I've interpreted correctly, after taking rotation into account what's left over are replacements to cover 267,000 dead and missing and about 598,000 WIAs evacuated to the US through the first part of 1947. Of these, 224,000 dead and 499,000 evacuated wounded would have been prior to the end of 1946. This matches well with D.M. Giangreco's quote that in the Spring of 1945 ASF General Somervell was working with figures of "approximately 720,000 replacements" for "dead and evacuated wounded" through 31 December 1946.

Furthermore, the ASF estimates - in addition to not saying anything about the other services for obvious reasons - appear to operate on the best-case scenario that total forces for Coronet would not have exceeded 25 divisions: neither the 3 division theater reserve is shown leaving the Philippines nor the 17 division strategic reserve in the US. Though, the 11 December 1944 version of Coronet (Volume 6, part 1, p 28) made it clear that up to the full 45 division force (2 million men) would be committed, comprising 2 Army Groups and 5 Armies.

As for the bombs, while their historical use was a moral atrocity, I cannot see any American politician of the time period deciding not to drop them.
 
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Suffice it to say one can ask questions about the morality of the use of nuclear weapons on Japan without taking any opinion on the answers - but even if you think it was a wicked act, it was a wicked act that had broad, bipartisan support and years of historical precedent.
Indeed

We should separate our ongoing post-war debate on the morality of dropping the Atomic bombs from the historic evidence on why it was dropped.

The latter showing it would be almost ASB for it not to be used once Japan did not clearly accept the Potsdam Declaration.

Taft is interesting in that IF he was elected President, and willing to push through a more conditional surrender, the Declaration would differ and Japan surrendered earlier. But that IF seems pretty massive.
 
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