Which is more likely: lasting Peace of Amiens of Britain accepting the Frankfurt Proposals?
- Thread starter HipstaKing
- Start date
None.
Britain wanted war at all costs in 1803 because it quickly realized that french power would not be contained and that France was too powerful from the british point of view.
And the Frankfurt proposals of 1813 were nothing but a comedy designed to weaken support for Napoleon in France. When Aberdeen took the proposals for real and gave favorable signs to it, he was quickly disavowed by Castlereagh who made clear that Britain would not settle for more than France returning to its former borders.
So, is there any moment or chance that Britain might sign a lasting peace agreement with Napoleon's France?
longsword14
Banned
If only he were to roll back to early borders and completely withdraw from the lowlands. That might be a start.
Britain's openness to peace basically depends on the makeup of the British government, and how financially sustainable the war is. Whig governments will be more inclined towards peace, and if I remember correctly, Britain was beginning to feel the financial strain in the late stages of the wars OTL. If the war dragged on for longer without any sign of breakthrough, or if the French were able to strike a blow to the British economy (for example, if Linois managed to defeat/capture the HEIC China Fleet at Pulo Aura, 8 million pounds of merchandise would be lost, putting strain on British financial institutions and their ability to lend to the government), the British government might seriously consider withdrawing from the war.
One opportunity for peace could be in 1806: Grenville came to power at the beginning of the year, and made Charles James Fox the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Fox began peace negotiations, but these efforts were halted by June, as Fox was convinced by Talleyrand's negotiating tactics that France didn't want peace. A different French government, or different French actions during the negotiations, might lead to a peace treaty being signed here. The problem is that the Tories, if (when) they come back to power, would probably restart the war.
I agree that on a mere Anglo-french point of view, 1806-1807 was the right moment to make a global peace. French treacherous takeover of Spain in the spring of 1812 closed the window of opportunity.
And the other problem is that Britain and France were not the only players. Russia was an as important player as Britain and in fact did much more to bring Napoleon's downfall than Britain did. And the point is that from 1803 to 1807, czar Alexander I wanted war at all costs and was in fact the soul of the coalition.
So the later POD is concentrated between Tilsit in 1807 and early 1808.
You mean 1808, right?
Could the POD be that Charles Talleyrand, (French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1799 to 1807) doesn't resign after the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, so Napoleon's invasions of Portugal and Russia are avoided due to a better foreign policy? From what I've heard, Talleyrand was a great statesman during that time, serving France in the Pre-Revolutionary, Revolutionary, Napoleonic and Bourbon Restoration eras.
Yes, 1808 of course.
I don't think Talleyrand remaining in charge of foreign affairs would change anything. Talleyrand advised Napoleon to have an agressive policy towards Spain. And attacking Portugal was unavoidable from a french point of view since Portugal was allied with Britain.
You're right that Russia is the key to a 1806/1807 peace. Fox's 1806 negotiations collapsed because Talleyrand demanded that Russia not be included in the Anglo-French discussions - a ploy to separate the coalition and play them off against eachother. In June, Britain found out that Russia was separately negotiating, and the French were increasing their demands with Britain (perhaps to try to pressure them back to the table).
One way of perhaps reconciling the dilemma here is playing Britain and Prussia against eachother - Prussia turned against France in 1806 because Napoleon told Talleyrand that he should be open to giving Hanover to Britain in exchange for peace. Prussia, who was 'temporarily' occupying Hanover at the time (officially "until the conclusion of a general peace"), would supposedly have been compensated for withdrawing from Hanover. The court of Prussia, which wanted to annex Hanover (perhaps in exchange for giving France the far western territories of Prussia), was greatly offended on learning of the plan, and despite Napoleon offering Prussia a sphere of influence in Northern Germany (a North German Confederation), this dispute over Hanover broke Prussia's trust in France, and was the casus belli for Prussia joining the Fourth Coalition.
Perhaps a sufficiently competent ATL French foreign minister could offer Hanover to Britain, keeping Britain interested and open to negotiations, and then frame Prussia's objections as breaking the terms of the agreement that allowed them to occupy Hanover. This would damage British-Prussian relations, and Britain might then join Russia in making peace at Tilsit (if Napoleon can be convinced to hold back on Prussia, as such a harsh treaty as OTL would scare Britain off and achieve the same result as OTL).
Another option would be France accepting Britain's demands for joint negotiations with Russia - OTL the June 1806 peace deal between France and Russia was vetoed by Alexander I, but if Napoleon and Alexander meet in person, Napoleon may be able to charm him into accepting a deal (as happened at Tilsit in OTL). The problem is that this puts France in a vulnerable position during negotiations - Russia was willing to cede Naples to France when negotiating alone, but together, Britain and Russia might pressure France to withdraw.
Of course, the devil is in the details for these peace treaties. OTL during the 1806 negotiations, France was willing to offer Hanover to Britain, plus recognition of British possession of Malta and the Cape Colony. Other issues, such as Naples being returned to Sicily, were the main focus of negotiations. As Britain grew more willing to accept French possession of Naples, Talleyrand increased tensions by demanding Sicily be given to France in exchange for Dalmatia, Ragusa and Albania (the latter two not being in French possession). Talleyrand also broke British trust by promising that no territorial changes in Germany would take place, and then after the July treaty forming the Confederation of the Rhine, he claimed that he only meant *after* the peace treaty is signed. If Talleyrand handled these disputes better, I could see a preliminary peace agreement based on France keeping Naples, Britain keeping Malta and the Cape Colony, and Hanover being transferred back to Britain despite Prussian objections.
Talleyrand was very skilled, but also corrupt (as seen during the XYZ affair), and he had his own priorities beyond the interests of the French government. His style worked sometimes, but during the 1806 negotiations with Britain he was confrontational and demanding, poisoning relations with the British Whigs, and alienating Fox, perhaps the only British politician openly sympathetic with France.
There are two explanations for Talleyrand's actions in 1806 - that he failed by overestimating how far he could push Britain, or that he wanted negotiations to fail. If he wanted to fail, then he would have been acting against the wishes of Napoleon, who had told Talleyrand that he should be open to giving Hanover to Britain in exchange for peace. Neither option reflects well on Talleyrand.
Looking at the possibility of Talleyrand not resigning after Tilsit: Talleyrand may be able to convince Napoleon to not punish Prussia as much at Tilsit (the reason he resigned OTL), perhaps by letting Prussia retain Altmark-Magdeburg and/or Hanover. Talleyrand might convince Napoleon not to invade Spain or Russia, and he might bring Britain back to the table and negotiate a peace later. But his record in OTL (failure of the 1806 negotiations, failure to moderate the Treaty of Tilsit) doesn't give me much hope he would achieve any of this, either due to lack of ability or lack of motive.
Would he dethrone and replace the Spanish Bourbons though? Because if not, the Franco-Spanish Alliance remains in place, Wellington at that time would be at Venezuela and the Peninsular War could end in a French victory in 1808/1809 maybe.
Talleyrand certainly did make some mistakes in 1806, but the real obstacle was Napoléon. The Emperor was putting Talleyrand's ministry under his own control and putting pressure on the talks against Talleyrand's advice. For example, the all Sicilian demand was made by Napoléon's order. The failure of the peace talks of 1806 was the cause of the rift between Talleyrand and Napoléon. As time went, Talleyrand came to realize that Napoléon would never manage to conclude a lasting peace, hence his active efforts to remove him. Believe it or not, Talleyrand had convictions and truly wanted peace, as long as France remained a great power.
I agree with @Camelopardalim, no 1806 Talleyrand PoD would be enough. Napoléon falling sick, maybe ?
Talleyrand's plan was to kept Ferdinand VII on the throne. He was inclined to interventionism in Spanish affairs (an old temptation of France's diplomacy), but playing the son against the father (or rather, against the father's advisor) was his move.
Apparently that was after Napoleon lost more battles. When you see that someone you have been fighting on-and-off for two decades stalling for time, you come to think they might be a bit disingenuous. Napoleon had already been told those were the best optoin he was getting, but that he had to accept them soon. He tried using blood and powder to increase his position, but it simply meant the offer wa son longer on the table.
That's what Talleyrand wanted others, including you and me, to believe because he cared very much about his reputation and legacy.
But as I mentioned, there are several events that contradict at least partly this way self portrait.
Well, there are also historians who studied this period from other sources than Talleyrand's memoirs or Napoleon's and their conclusion is this : even if Talleyrand did wrote he advised against an intervention in Spain, he did. But he advised against putting Joseph on the throne.
That is confusing with Talleyrand : when he failed to bring things the way he wanted, he stayed on board trying to salvage things, thus betraying. He did double-cross Napoleon, but not before Napoleon refused his proposals. That did not mean Talleyrand had not a precise project for France : since before 1789, he wanted a parliamentary monarchy, relying on financial trust and enjoying peace as a great power. He took every opportunity he could, but in the end, he achieved it.
Agreed on all except that Talleyrand did not achieve it. Nothing was unavoidable before 1813 when Napoleon lost the campaign of Germany.
1830 July Monarchy was pretty much an achievement, from Talleyrand's point of view. I did not write he was right, only he was coherent.